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in respect of criminal law-enforcement agencies should be adjusted 
accordingly. 
The Committee further recommends that the Attorney-General report to 
Parliament on the findings of the review by the end of the 
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law-enforcement agencies under proposed section 110A of the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. 
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authorisation, be specifically listed in the Telecommunications (Interception 
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that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended so that the Attorney-General can 
declare an authority or body as an enforcement agency subject to the 
following conditions: 
 the declaration ceases to have effect after 40 sitting days of either 
House; 
 an amendment to specify the authority or body as an enforcement 
agency in legislation should be brought before the Parliament before 
the expiry of the 40 sitting days; and 
 the amendment should be referred to the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security with a minimum of 15 sitting 
days for review and report. 
Further, consistent with the existing provisions of the Bill, the Attorney-
General must have regard to the factors listed in proposed paragraphs 
176A(4)(b)-(f), and must also be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the 
functions of the agency include enforcement of the criminal law, 
administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty, or administering a 
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Recommendation 22 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014, or the Explanatory 
Memorandum, or both, be amended to provide that the characteristics of 
a binding scheme referred to in proposed subparagraph 176A(4)(c)(ii) of 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 include a 
mechanism: 
 for monitoring the authority or body’s compliance with the 
scheme; and 
 to enable individuals to seek recourse if their personal information 
is mishandled. 
The Committee notes that the Australian Privacy Commissioner 
currently has these functions in relation to Commonwealth agencies, and 
some States have privacy commissions which would be well placed to 
perform these functions within these jurisdictions. Other jurisdictions 
may need to expand the functions of their existing oversight bodies, or 
establish new oversight arrangements to meet these requirements. 
Recommendation 23 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to 
prohibit civil litigants from being able to access  telecommunications data 
that is held by a service provider solely for the purpose of complying 
with the mandatory data retention regime. 
To enable appropriate exceptions to this prohibition the Committee 
recommends that a regulation making power be included. 
Further, the Committee recommends that the Minister for 
Communications and the Attorney-General review this measure and 
report to the Parliament on the findings of that review by the end of the 
implementation phase of the Bill. 
Recommendation 24 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to make 
clear that individuals have the right to access their personal 
telecommunications data retained by a service provider under the data 
retention regime. Telecommunications service providers should be able 
to recover their costs in providing such access, consistent with the model 
applying under the Privacy Act in respect of giving access to personal 
information. 
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Recommendation 25 
The Committee recommends that section 180F of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 be replaced with a requirement that, 
before making an authorisation under Division 4 or 4A of Part 4-1 of the 
Act, the authorised officer making the authorisation must be satisfied on 
reasonable grounds that any interference with the privacy of any person 
or persons that may result from the disclosure or use is justifiable and 
proportionate. 
In making this decision the authorised officer should be required to have 
regard to: 
 the gravity of the conduct being investigated, including whether 
the investigation relates to a serious criminal offence, the enforcement 
of a serious pecuniary penalty, the protection of the public revenue at a 
sufficiently serious level or the location of missing persons; 
 the reason why the disclosure is proposed to be authorised; and 
 the likely relevance and usefulness of the information or 
documents to the investigation. 
Recommendation 26 
The Committee acknowledges the importance of recognising the 
principle of press freedom and the protection of journalists’ sources. The 
Committee considers this matter requires further consideration before a 
final recommendation can be made. 
The Committee therefore recommends that the question of how to deal 
with the authorisation of a disclosure or use of telecommunications data 
for the purpose of determining the identity of a journalist’s source be the 
subject of a separate review by this Committee. 
The Committee would report back to Parliament within three months. 
In undertaking this inquiry, the Committee intends to conduct 
consultations with media representatives, law enforcement and security 
agencies and the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. The 
review will also consider international best practice, including data 
retention regulation in the United Kingdom. 
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Recommendation 27 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 be amended to require agencies to provide a copy to the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman (or Inspector General of Intelligence and 
Security (IGIS) in the case of ASIO) of each authorisation that authorises 
disclosure of information or documents under Chapter 4 of the Act for 
the purpose of determining the identity of a journalist’s sources. 
The Committee further recommends that the IGIS or Commonwealth 
Ombudsman be required to notify this Committee of each instance in 
which such an authorisation is made in relation to ASIO and the AFP as 
soon as practicable after receiving advice of the authorisation and be 
required to brief the Committee accordingly. 
Recommendation 28 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
oversee a review of the adequacy of the existing destruction requirements 
that apply to documents or information disclosed pursuant to an 
authorisation made under Chapter 4 of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 and held by enforcement agencies and 
ASIO. 
The Committee further recommends that the Attorney-General report to 
Parliament on the findings of the review by 1 July 2017. 
7 Safeguards and oversight 
Recommendation 29 
The Committee recommends that the Government consider the 
additional oversight responsibilities of the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
set out in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Bill 2014 and ensure that the Office of the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman is provided with additional financial 
resources to undertake its enhanced oversight responsibilities. 
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Recommendation 30 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to 
require the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security to 
commence its review no later than the second anniversary of the end of 
the implementation period. 
The Committee considers it is desirable that a report on the review be 
presented to the Parliament no later than three years after the end of the 
implementation period. 
Recommendation 31 
At the time of the review required to be undertaken by the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security under proposed section 
187N of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Bill 2014, the Committee recommends that the Attorney-
General request the Committee to examine the following issues: 
 the effectiveness of the scheme, 
 the appropriateness of the dataset and retention period, 
 costs, 
 any potential improvements to oversight, 
 regulations and determinations made, 
 the number of complaints about the scheme to relevant bodies, 
and 
 any other appropriate matters. 
To facilitate the review, the Committee recommends that agencies be 
required to collect and retain relevant statistical information to assist the 
Committee’s consideration of the above matters. The Committee also 
recommends that all records of data access requests be retained for the 
period from commencement until the review is concluded. 
Finally the Committee recommends that, to the maximum extent 
possible, the review be conducted in public. 
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Recommendation 32 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General coordinate the 
provision of a standing secondee or secondees to the secretariat of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, in 
recognition of the additional oversight and review requirements 
associated with the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign 
Fighters) Act 2014 and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014. 
Recommendation 33 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to 
require the annual report prepared under section 187P to include: 
 costs of the scheme, 
 use of implementation plans, 
 category of purpose for accessing data, including a breakdown of 
types of offences, 
 age of data sought, 
 number of requests for traffic data, and 
 number of requests for subscriber data. 
The Committee also recommends that the Attorney-General’s 
Department provide the Committee with an annual briefing on the 
matters included in this report. 
Recommendation 34 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to 
provide that the Committee may inquire into any matter raised in the 
annual report prepared under proposed section 187P, including where 
this goes to a review of operational matters. 
Legislative change to the Intelligence Services Act 2001 should be 
implemented to reflect this changed function. 
The Committee further recommends that the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman and Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security provide 
notice to the Committee should either of them hold serious concerns 
about the purpose for, or the manner in which, retained data is being 
accessed. 
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Recommendation 35 
Having regard to the regulatory burden on small providers with an 
annual turnover of less than $3 million, the Committee recommends that 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to require all service providers to be 
compliant, in respect of retained data, with either the Australian Privacy 
Principles or binding rules developed by the Australian Privacy 
Commissioner. 
Recommendation 36 
The Committee recommends that the Government enact the proposed 
Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms prior to the end of the 
implementation phase for the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014. 
Recommendation 37 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to 
require service providers to encrypt telecommunications data that has 
been retained for the purposes of the mandatory data retention regime. 
To give effect to this recommendation, the Committee recommends that 
the Data Retention Implementation Working Group develop an 
appropriate standard of encryption to be incorporated into regulations, 
and that the Communications Access Co-ordinator be required to 
consider a provider’s compliance with this standard as part of the Data 
Retention Implementation Plan process. 
Further, the Communications Access Co-ordinator should be given the 
power to authorise other robust security measures in limited 
circumstances in which technical difficulties prevent encryption from 
being implemented in existing systems used by service providers. 
Recommendation 38 
The Committee recommends introduction of a mandatory data breach 
notification scheme by the end of 2015. 
Recommendation 39 
The Committee recommends that, following consideration of the 
recommendations in this report, the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be passed. 
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Introduction 
The Bill and its referral 
1.1 On 30 October 2014, the Minister for Communications, the Hon Malcolm 
Turnbull MP, introduced the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (the Bill) into the House of 
Representatives. 
1.2 In his second reading speech, Minister Turnbull stated that the Bill is 
intended to ‘prevent the further degradation of the investigative 
capabilities of Australia's law enforcement and national security 
agencies’.1 
1.3 Minister Turnbull added that the Bill will ‘require companies providing 
telecommunications services in Australia, carriers and internet service 
providers to keep a limited, prescribed set of telecommunications data for 
two years’.2 
1.4 Minister Turnbull also explained that: 
This bill is critical to prevent the capabilities of Australia’s law 
enforcement and national security agencies being further 
degraded. It does not expand the range of telecommunications 
metadata which is currently being accessed by law enforcement 
1  The Hon Malcom Turnbull MP, Minister for Communications, House of Representatives 
Hansard, 30 October 2014, p. 12560. 
2  The Hon Malcom Turnbull MP, Minister for Communications, House of Representatives 
Hansard, 30 October 2014, p. 12562. 
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agencies. It simply ensures that metadata is retained for a period 
of two years.3 
1.5 On 21 November 2014, the Attorney-General, Senator the Hon George 
Brandis, QC, wrote to the Committee to refer the provisions of the Bill for 
inquiry and to request it to report by 27 February 2015. He further 
requested that the Committee should, as far as possible, conduct its 
inquiry in public. 
1.6 In the letter, the Attorney-General informed the Committee that the Bill 
follows the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No.1) 2014 and 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 as 
the Government’s third tranche of legislation in response to the current 
national security threat. 
1.7 The Attorney-General also provided the Committee with a draft data set 
outlining the specific types of telecommunications data that service 
providers would be required to retain. The Attorney-General indicated 
that it was his intention for the data set to be given effect by regulation at 
the time the Bill received Royal Assent. A copy of the draft data set is 
included at Appendix A to this report. 
2012–13 Inquiry into potential reforms of Australia’s 
national security legislation 
1.8 The Committee previously examined a proposal for a mandatory data 
retention regime in the 43rd Parliament as part of its inquiry into potential 
reforms of Australia’s national security legislation. The then Committee 
tabled its report before the Parliament on 24 June 2013.4 A copy of this 
report is available on the Committee’s website at www.aph.gov.au/pjcis. 
1.9 The 2013 report made several recommendations of relevance to the data 
retention regime, only some of which have been addressed in the current 
Bill. Many of the report’s recommendations on other matters were 
addressed by the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 
2014, which the Committee reported on 17 September 2014. However, a 
number of recommendations in the 2013 report that are of relevance to the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (the TIA Act) are yet 
to be responded to by the Government. 
3  The Hon Malcom Turnbull MP, Minister for Communications, House of Representatives 
Hansard, 30 October 2014, p. 12560. 
4  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Report of the Inquiry into Potential 
Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, Canberra, May 2013. 
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1.10 The Committee notes that the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
References Committee is currently undertaking a comprehensive inquiry 
examining revision of the TIA Act. 
1.11 Without pre-empting the Senate Committee’s conclusions, the Committee 
draws the Government’s attention to the recommendations included in its 
2013 report that have not yet been responded to (these recommendations 
are set out in Appendix B). The Committee recommends that the 
Government respond to those recommendations by 1 July 2015. The 
Committee notes that the Government response should not in any way 
delay debate of the Bill.  
 
Recommendation 1 
 The Committee recommends that the Government provide a response to 
the outstanding recommendations from the Committee’s 2013 Report of 
the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security 
Legislation by 1 July 2015. 
Inquiry objectives and scope 
1.12 Through its current inquiry, the Committee carefully examined the overall 
appropriateness of the data retention regime proposed in the Bill and the 
draft data set. In doing so, the Committee weighed evidence provided by 
law enforcement and security agencies (both in public and private) that 
the continued availability of historical telecommunications data was 
critical for efforts to deal with the current national security environment 
and the ongoing threat posed by other serious criminal offences; against 
the financial implications and privacy and data security concerns 
associated with the proposal. 
1.13 The Committee focused on ensuring the Bill incorporates adequate 
safeguards and accountability mechanisms for the proper application of 
the laws into the future. 
1.14 At the time of the Bill’s introduction into the Parliament, the formation of 
a joint government-industry Implementation Working Group (IWG) on 
data retention was announced. The IWG comprised senior representatives 
from both the telecommunications industry and Australian law 
enforcement and national security organisations. It was established to 
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discuss implementation, refinement of the draft data set and the cost of the 
scheme, in parallel with the Committee’s inquiry. 
1.15 On 16 December 2014, the Attorney-General provided the Committee with 
a copy of the IWG’s first report.5 The report made 16 recommendations, 
including four suggesting changes to the draft data set, 11 suggesting 
additions to the supporting explanatory material, and one recommending 
changes to the procedure for any future amendments to the data set. The 
report also included an amended version of the draft data set reflecting 
the IWG’s recommendations. In its submission to the Committee, the 
Attorney-General’s Department explained that the IWG report was 
intended to assist the Committee’s consideration of the proposed data set 
rather than provide a replacement. A copy of the IWG report’s 
recommendations is included at Appendix C to this report. 
Conduct of the inquiry 
1.16 The Chair of the Committee, Mr Dan Tehan MP, announced the inquiry by 
media release on 27 November 2014 and invited submissions from 
interested members of the public. Written questions were also sent to 
selected law enforcement agencies and industry organisations. 
Submissions were requested by 19 January 2015. 
1.17 The Committee received 204 submissions, 31 supplementary submissions 
and two exhibits from sources including individuals, government 
agencies, statutory authorities, telecommunications companies and 
industry, legal, community and civil liberties groups. A list of submissions 
and exhibits received by the Committee is at Appendix D. 
1.18 The Committee held three public hearings on 17 December 2014, 
29 January 2015 and 30 January 2015. The Committee also held one private 
hearing and received three private briefings from relevant agencies in 
Canberra, and visited the Australian Federal Police headquarters for 
further operational briefings. A list of hearings and the witnesses who 
appeared before the Committee is included at Appendix E. 
1.19 Copies of submissions received and transcripts of public hearings can be 
accessed on the Committee’s website at www.aph.gov.au/pjcis. Links to 
the Bill and the Explanatory Memorandum are also available on the 
Committee’s website. 
5  Data Retention Implementation Working Group (IWG), Report 1 of the Data Retention 
Implementation Working Group, December 2014. 
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1.20 This report, while making a number of recommendations to amend the 
Bill, is designed to inform the next stage of debate which will take place in 
the Senate and House of Representatives. In some instances the 
Committee has recommended amendments to the Bill. In other instances 
the Committee has determined that measures in the Bill require more 
detailed explanation and has requested that the Attorney-General provide 
additional information to assist debate of the Bill. 
1.21 The provisions of the Bill were intensely debated and there were a variety 
of views expressed within the Committee. The Committee expects the Bill 
will be subject to continuing debate in the Parliament and the community. 
Report structure 
1.22 This report consists of seven chapters: 
 This chapter sets out the context, scope and conduct of the inquiry, 
 Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Committee’s consideration of 
the case for data retention. The chapter considers whether mandatory 
data retention can, in principle, be justified as a vital tool for national 
security and law enforcement investigations, and whether appropriate 
safeguards and oversight can be put in place. The chapter discusses the 
adequacy of the current regime, privacy and civil liberties concerns, and 
the security of the retained data. 
 Chapters 3 to 5 discuss the main issues raised in evidence to the inquiry 
in relation to Schedule 1 to the Bill, and the Committee’s comments and 
recommendations in regard to those issues. These issues were: 
⇒ Chapter 3 – Whether the Government’s proposed data set should be 
contained in primary legislation, as opposed to being made in 
regulations; and the scope of the Government’s proposed data set. 
⇒ Chapter 4 – The proposed two-year retention period; and whether 
service providers should be required to destroy telecommunications 
data retained in accordance with proposed new Division 1 of Part 5-
1A at the end of the retention-period. 
⇒ Chapter 5 – The range of service providers and services to which 
data retention obligations are proposed to apply; the implementation 
arrangements for the proposed data retention regime; and the cost of 
the proposed data retention scheme. 
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 Chapter 6 discusses the main issues raised in evidence to the inquiry in 
relation to Schedule 2 to the Bill, and the Committee’s comments and 
recommendations in regard to those issues. Schedule 2 contains 
amendments in respect of restrictions on access to stored 
communications and telecommunications data. 
 Chapter 7 examines specific safeguards and oversight mechanisms set 
out in the Bill. This includes consideration of the expanded role for the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman set out in Schedule 3 to the Bill, review 
mechanisms and reporting requirements. The chapter also examines 
matters raised in evidence that are outside the scope of the Bill, but 
which were addressed by the Committee in its 2012–13 inquiry, 
including a mandatory data breach notification scheme. 
 
 
 
 2 
 
The case for data retention 
2.1 When this Committee last considered the issue of mandatory data 
retention as part of its Inquiry into potential reforms of Australia’s national 
security legislation, the then Government had not prepared or released a 
detailed legislative proposal; the question was dealt with at the conceptual 
level. The absence of a detailed legislative proposal limited the capacity of 
the public to make meaningful comment on this issue, and limited the 
capacity of the Committee to consider and resolve the question of whether 
such a scheme was, at the most fundamental level, capable of being 
justified for national security and law enforcement purposes.  
2.2 In 2012–13, there was a relatively clear divide between law enforcement 
and national security agencies in support of the proposal, and 
organisations and individual submitters in opposition to the proposal.  
2.3 In this inquiry, however, the Committee and the public have had the 
benefit of being able to review draft legislation, a proposed data set, 
detailed supporting materials and submissions prepared by the Attorney-
General’s Department and other Government agencies. The Committee 
has, therefore, received detailed submissions arguing the need for data 
retention from a wide range of stakeholders.  
2.4 Based on the submissions and evidence this Committee has received over 
the course of this inquiry, the dichotomy between Government and  
non-Government submissions has weakened. Many organisations and 
individuals remain opposed to the principle of data retention.1 However, 
1  See, for example: Mr Ben Johnston, Submission 35, p. 1;  Mr Bernard Keane, Submission 37, p. 1; 
Mr Glenn Bradbury, Submission 38, p. 1; Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission 54, p. 3; 
Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, p. 2; Dr Lesley Lynch, Secretary, New South 
Wales Council for Civil Liberties, on behalf of joint councils for civil liberties, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 79; Amnesty International, Submission 95, p. 1; Law 
Institute of Victoria, Submission 117, p. 1. 
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the concept of data retention, either as proposed by the Government in 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2014 (the Bill) or in another form, has attracted support 
from a broad range of stakeholders. A selection of extracts from evidence 
provided by these stakeholders is contained below.  
Box 2.1 – Selected extracts from submissions expressing in-principle support to data retention 
It is Bravehearts' position that Australia should implement a data retention scheme as a critical tool 
for supporting the investigation of child sexual exploitation matters and other serious offences — 
Bravehearts, Submission 33. 
[M]odernising our laws to reflect contemporary technical advances is obviously a sensible, justified 
and legitimate objective … We then, in short, support the passage of the bill … In particular, we 
strongly support the bill’s proposal to confine the number of agencies that can access retained 
telecommunications data, and there are other aspects of the bill that we think are extremely useful 
— Professor Gillian Triggs, President, Australian Human Rights Commission, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 29 January 2015. 
Metadata has become a vital part of the investigative process, and in almost all instances is a 
fundamental part of the case for acquiring a warrant with more and wider ranging powers ― 
Alexander Lynch, Submission 1. 
[W]e do see policy merits in a more standardised set of arrangements to give certainty for agencies, 
industry and citizens. So the policy intent of the overall framework we do think is an appropriate and 
worthwhile activity — Mr Matthew Lobb, General Manager, Industry Strategy and Public Policy, 
Vodafone Hutchison Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015. 
The Unit is largely supportive of the Bill, as a very important instrument in the fight against online 
child sexual abuse. The Australian Federal Police have identified the vital role metadata retention 
plays in the being able to identify and prosecute offenders engaged in online child sexual abuse. 
Further, the failure to pass this legislation will undoubtedly assist large numbers of offenders 
escape detection and prosecution each year, reducing the effectiveness of the Australian Federal 
Police in combating this crime type ― Uniting Church Justice and International Mission Unit, 
Submission 76. 
[T]he right to privacy is not absolute and requires an assessment to be made of whether the 
measures that may limit privacy are both necessary and proportionate to achieve that objective. 
Applying this in the context of the introduction of a data retention scheme, privacy interests must be 
balanced with the need to ensure that law enforcement and security agencies have access to the 
information necessary to perform their functions — Mr Timothy Pilgrim PSM, Australian Privacy 
Commissioner, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015 
I think the previous inquiry exposed the extent to which data is potentially not being retained … we 
welcome efforts to standardise the data held and restrict access to a named group of agencies — 
Ms Narelle Clark, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Australian Communications Consumer Action 
Network, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015. 
2.5 Professor George Williams and Dr Keiran Hardy, submitting in their 
personal capacity as members of the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law 
at the Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales expressed  
in-principle support for data retention: 
We recognise the importance of standardising the collection of 
data by communications service providers. Given that 
telecommunications data can play an important role in 
investigating serious criminal offences such as terrorism and child 
pornography, we accept that this data should be available to law 
enforcement agencies in appropriate circumstances. Having a clear 
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and codified legislative scheme for the collection of 
telecommunications data is a worthy goal that will aid in the 
prevention of serious crime. 2  
2.6 Mr John Stanton, CEO of Communications Alliance, the primary 
telecommunications industry body in Australia, gave evidence that the 
views of members of the telecommunications industry have also shifted 
since 2012: 
Last time we appeared before the committee back in 2012 we 
stated on behalf of the industry quite clearly that we did not 
believe a case had been made for the type of mandatory data 
retention regime that was at that time being proposed. Today it is 
fair to say there is something of a range of views among our 
membership as to whether such a case has now been made, and it 
depends in part on the final shape of the regime, around which 
many questions remain. 3 
2.7 However, the Committee does not wish to overstate the level and breadth 
of support for data retention. It remains a disputed proposal. For example, 
Blueprint for Free Speech stated that: 
Blueprint remains firmly against the introduction of a data 
retention regime in Australia. Cementing a place for a mass 
surveillance regime in Australia bucks international trend and 
does not reflect necessity or proportionality to the investigation 
and resolution of serious criminal activity.4 
2.8 The Committee also received many submissions from individual 
community members which, by and large, expressed in-principle 
opposition to the proposed data retention regime. For example, Ms Priya 
Shaw stated that ‘there is no version of this legislation I believe I can in 
good conscience support’.5  
2.9 While it is impossible within the confines of this report for the Committee 
to cite from every individual submission, a representative selection of 
contributions from individual submitters is contained below. 
Box 2.2 – Selected extracts from submissions made by individual community members 
Targeted communications surveillance, undertaken by LEAs via warrant, is a necessary and 
effective weapon in fighting serious crime including terrorism. However unwarranted blanket data 
2  Professor George Williams AO and Dr Keiran Hardy, Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, 
Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, Submission 5, p. 1. 
3  Mr John Stanton, CEO, Communications Alliance, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 
2014, p. 31. 
4  Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission 54, p. 14. 
5  Ms Priya Shaw, Submission 47, p. 1. 
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retention is fraught with dangers and represents a step change in powers that citizens would be 
required cede to government ― Brian Ridgway, Submission 54. 
I believe that our security organisations have failed to put a credible case as to why these changes, 
which impinge on the privacy of all Australians and thus give yet another win to the terrorists who 
aim to undermine our democracy, are necessary ― Albert Lightfoot, Submission 134. 
This bill will destroy the general public's basic right to privacy in an ill-advised bill resulting in the 
death of a fundamental democratic freedom ― Iain Muir, Submission 28. 
This metadata reveals far too much about citizens, who have a right to their privacy and who should 
not be treated like criminals ― Fiona Maley, Submission 49. 
Metadata now provides a more complete, constant and intrusive picture of an individual's lifestyle, 
habits and relationships than can be obtained by access to content alone ― Alexander Lynch, 
Submission 1. 
This bill tries to make the distinction that 'metadata' is of lesser importance to regular 'content'. I 
disagree, as it can be as important or even more important ― Adam Cooksley, Submission 43. 
… the Bill does not define what categories of data industry will be forced to retain. This is the single 
most critical aspect of the proposed regime, and the Government needs to reveal this information to 
enable effective and robust consideration of the proposal by the Australian community ― Damien 
Donnelly, Submission 30. 
Treating all Australians as potential suspects runs contradictory to not only our democracy but our 
Australian values ― Alicia Cooper, Submission 22. 
Australia's internet is already overly expensive and this policy will just end up costing every 
Australian citizen more money to use the internet. Whether it is paid for by the ISPs or by the 
Government, any internet user will have to foot the bill either through higher ISP fees, or through 
government taxes ― Tom Courtney, Submission 23. 
Not only will the proposed legislation compromise the privacy and freedoms of all Australians that 
use the  internet, but and perhaps most importantly, similar laws around the world both in the  
United States and Europe have been proven not to work; why would they work here? ― Cam 
Browning, Submission 44. 
Many terrorists are already familiar with ways to circumvent these proposals meaning that majority 
of the people who will be affected will be law abiding citizens while the terrorists ‘swim through the 
net’ ― Peter Freak, Submission 26. 
The two year data retention duration specified in the legislation has never been justified. It is 
significantly longer than the retention duration in most other jurisdictions that have implemented 
similar schemes ― Douglas Stetner, Submission 32. 
This legislation should require a warrant for access to any data retained, as recommended by the 
Parliamentary Human Rights Committee. This maintains coherence with requirement for judicial 
oversight and maintains a balance where an external party must be satisfied as to the reason for 
the request ― Barbara Reed, Submission 154. 
The Australian public needs clear and transparent guarantees that their sensitive personal data 
information will be protected from hackers or foreign entities, especially in the light of the number of 
significant data breaches in recent times ― Mason Hope, Submission 18. 
What regulations will be enforced to make sure my private information and property are not stolen 
or leaked out onto the internet? Can the Australian Government guarantee that my information will 
be protected? Can ISPs do the same? Is it even possible to make such a guarantee? ― Josh 
O’Callaghan, Submission 29. 
With vast amounts of very revealing, very telling, very intimate data sitting in one place, these data 
centres will be a primary target of cybercriminals and hackers from all around the world ― Daniel 
Scott, Submission 61. 
Copyright holders will demand access to these stores of metadata likely pressing down on service 
providers via threats of litigation. These will be used in turn to self-police their intellectual property 
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― Iain Muir, Submission 28. 
This bill is an attack on the personal freedoms of Australian citizens and particularly undermines the 
ability of journalists and whistle-blowers to expose corruption and misconduct in government 
agencies ― Dr Peter Evans, Submission 57. 
A similar metadata storage plan has already been considered and rejected by the European 
Union's Court of Justice ― please give this plan the same consideration that it was given there ― 
Bethany Skurrie, Submission 63. 
2.10 The Committee has been requested to review the Government’s proposal 
to establish a mandatory telecommunications data retention regime, 
including appropriate exemptions, safeguards and oversight mechanisms, 
and to provide advice to the Parliament on these important issues. 
2.11 In this process, the Committee is mindful of the advice of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, Professor John McMillan, who has previously 
noted that the question of data retention raises a number of interrelated 
policy issues, and argued for the need to carefully distinguish between 
these issues when discussing data retention: 
[T]he term ‘data retention’ in fact camouflages a whole range of 
other issues. There is the question of data capture, data 
minimisation, data security, data storage and data use … My 
anecdotal observation of the debate is that all of those issues are 
sort of tossed around fairly indiscriminately, and all under the 
umbrella of ‘data retention’. At the end of the day what we clearly 
need is to untangle those issues and work through them on a 
systematic and principled basis.6 
2.12 This chapter addresses this issue through consideration of the following 
topics: 
 the adequacy of the current regime,  
 privacy and civil liberties concerns, and 
 security of the retained data. 
2.13 The Committee notes that the final two topics are closely related, as the 
potential for security breaches has significant ramifications for the 
proportionality and privacy risks associated with the proposed scheme. 
2.14 Subsequent chapters of this report will address the substance of the 
proposed data retention regime, the implementation process, the cost of 
the proposed regime, arrangements for access to telecommunications data 
by government and non-government entities, and oversight and security 
arrangements. 
6  Professor John McMillan, Australian Information Commissioner, Committee Hansard, Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Canberra, 23 April 2014, p. 22. 
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Is the current regime adequate? 
2.15 The following section provides an overview of the current regime for 
access to telecommunications data by national security and law 
enforcement agencies, including the types of data that are regularly 
accessed. The section concludes with a discussion of how the declining 
availability of telecommunications data, in conjunction with other 
challenges, is impacting on agencies operational capabilities and 
outcomes.  
Overview of the current regime 
2.16 At present, ‘enforcement agencies’ and the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) may access telecommunications data under an 
internal authorisation issued under Part 4-1 of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (the TIA Act).  
2.17 Telecommunications data is information about a communication or the 
parties to a communication, as distinct from the content or substance of 
that communication. Access to the actual content or substance of 
communication, such as a recording of a voice call, or the body or subject 
line of an email, is prohibited except under a warrant.7 
2.18 During the course of the Committee’s 2012–13 Inquiry into potential reforms 
of Australia’s national security legislation, the Attorney-General’s 
Department provided a document outlining the types of data it considered 
to be telecommunications data. In summary, telecommunications data 
includes: 
 ‘information that allows a communication to occur’, such as the time, 
date and duration of the communication, the identifiers of the services 
and devices involved, and certain information about the location of the 
respective devices (such as which cell tower or access point the device 
was connected to), and 
 ‘information about the parties to the communication’, such as their 
name, address and contact details, billing and transaction information, 
and general account information.8 
2.19 An enforcement agency is defined to include the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) or the police force of a State or Territory, as well as a limited 
number of crime commissions, integrity bodies, the Australian Customs 
7  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act), sections 7, 108 and 172. 
8  See Appendix G of Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), Report 
of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, Canberra, 
May 2013. 
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and Border Protections Service (Customs) and the CrimTrac Agency. 
However, the definition also contains an open-ended provision permitting 
‘any body whose functions include administering a law imposing a 
pecuniary penalty; or administering a law relating to the protection of the 
public revenue’.9  
2.20 The power to authorise access to historic telecommunications data by an 
enforcement agency is limited to: 
 the head of an agency, 
 the deputy head of an agency, or 
 a management-level officer or employee of the agency authorised, in 
writing, by the head of the agency.10 
2.21 These authorised officers may only authorise access to historic 
telecommunications data where access to that particular data is 
‘reasonably necessary’ for the enforcement of the criminal law or a law 
imposing a pecuniary penalty, or for the protection of the public revenue. 
Authorisations may only be made after considering whether any 
interference with the privacy of any person is justifiable, having regard to 
the likely relevance and usefulness of the data, and the reason why access 
is proposed to be authorised.11 
2.22 In 2012–13, more than 80 Commonwealth, State and Territory enforcement 
agencies accessed historic telecommunications data under the TIA Act. In 
total, those agencies made 330 640 authorisations for access to historic 
telecommunications data,12 resulting in a total of 546 500 disclosures.13 The 
Queensland Police Service explained that, depending on how a service 
provider counts their disclosures, a single authorisation may result in a 
number of disclosures: 
[A]n authorisation requesting all information in relation to the 
connection of a mobile service requires a number of separate 
requests to be submitted to one telecommunications company as 
they will only provide information to specific request such as 
‘subscriber information’, ‘point of sale’, ‘copy of customer contract’ 
and ‘payment details’. It is this information together that would 
9  TIA Act, section 5. 
10  TIA Act, section 5AB. 
11  TIA Act, Part 4-1. 
12  Attorney-General, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979: Report for the year 
ending June 2013, Commonwealth of Australia, 2013, pp. 47–51. 
13  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Communications Report 2012–13, p. 54. 
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satisfy the documents/data being requested under the original 
authorisation.14 
2.23 Previous evidence from the AFP indicates that approximately 85 per cent 
of data authorisations relate to subscriber information, such as name and 
address information, with only 15 per cent relating to ‘traffic data’, such as 
call charge records.15 Victoria Police similarly provided evidence to this 
Committee that such subscriber checks ‘make up the overwhelming 
majority of historical data requests made by Victoria Police’.16 This 
evidence is consistent with the detailed operational briefings provided by 
a number of law enforcement and national security agencies to this 
Committee. However, the absence of more detailed, publicly-available 
information about the use of law enforcement agencies’ use of powers 
under Chapter 4 of the TIA Act is an issue with the existing regime.17 The 
Committee has made recommendations in support of enhanced collection 
of statistical information and annual reporting arrangements in Chapter 7 
of this report. 
2.24 For ASIO, authorisations for access to historic telecommunications data 
may only be made where the person making the authorisation is ‘satisfied 
that the disclosure would be in connection with the performance by the 
Organisation of its functions’.18 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security described the threshold set by the TIA Act as ‘low’, but also noted 
that ASIO must additionally comply with the Attorney-General’s 
Guidelines, issued under section 8A of the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act),19 which provide, among other things, 
that: 
 the initiation and continuation of investigations shall be authorised 
only by the Director-General, or an officer at or above Executive Level 2 
authorised by the Director-General for that purpose,20 
14  Queensland Police Service, Submission 19, p. [3]. 
15  Australian Federal Police (AFP), Submission 25, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
References Committee, Inquiry into the comprehensive revision of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979, pp. 5–6.  
16  Victoria Police, Submission 8, p. 2. 
17  See, for example: PJCIS, Report of the inquiry into potential reforms of Australia’s national security 
legislation, Canberra, May 2013, Recommendation 3; Attorney-General’s Department, 
Equipping Australia Against Emerging and Evolving Threats (2012), p. 26; Submission 26, Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Inquiry into the comprehensive revision 
of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, p. 28.  
18  TIA Act, Part 4-1. 
19  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), Submission 131, p. 3. 
20  Attorney-General's Guidelines in relation to the performance by the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation of its function of obtaining, correlating, evaluating and communicating intelligence 
relevant to security (including politically motivated violence) (Attorney-General’s Guidelines), 
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 any means used for obtaining information must be proportionate to the 
gravity of the threat posed and the probability of its occurrence,21 
 inquiries and investigations into individuals and groups should be 
undertaken using as little intrusion into individual privacy as is 
possible, consistent with the performance of ASIO's functions, and with 
due regard for the cultural values, mores and sensitivities of 
individuals of particular cultural or racial backgrounds, consistent with 
the national interest,22 and 
 wherever possible, the least intrusive techniques of information 
collection should be used before more intrusive techniques.23 
2.25 The number of data authorisations made by ASIO is not publicly reported 
on national security grounds. However, the former Director-General of 
Security, Mr David Irvine, recently provided evidence to the Senate Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs References Committee that the number of 
authorisations made by ASIO for access to telecommunications data each 
year is ‘proportionate… with other individual agencies.’24 This Committee 
is aware of the number of data authorisations made by ASIO, and can 
confirm the accuracy of Mr Irvine’s statement. 
Utility of telecommunications data for national security and law 
enforcement investigations 
2.26 Mr David Vaile and Mr Paolo Remati, from the Cyberspace Law and 
Policy Community of the University of New South Wales Law Faculty, 
identified the value of telecommunications data to law enforcement and 
national security investigations: 
Many uses of telecommunications metadata, and content for that 
matter, for targeted law enforcement and criminal intelligence 
purposes are widely accepted and uncontroversial. Use of large 
volumes of metadata may also be justified in some cases. It is 
important to support such law enforcement and intelligence 
capabilities, since they have proven useful and there is a consensus 
that they can be appropriately regulated based on years of policy 
refinement.25 
Guideline 8.1. 
21  Attorney-General’s Guidelines, Guideline 10.4(a). 
22  Attorney-General’s Guidelines, Guideline 10.4(b). 
23  Attorney-General’s Guidelines, Guideline 10.4(d). 
24  Mr David Irvine AO, Director-General of Security, Committee Hansard, Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Canberra, 21 July 2014, p. 10. 
25  Mr David Vaile and Mr Paolo Remati, Cyberspace Law and Policy Community, University of 
New South Wales Law Faculty, Submission 194, p. 2. 
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2.27 However, several submitters asserted that telecommunications data is of 
no value to law enforcement and national security investigations. For 
example, Mr Peter Freak stated that: 
This kind of information not only is intrusive but does absolutely 
nothing to stop a potential terrorist attack. Despite this, it does 
however waste law enforcement resources that could be otherwise 
spent catching actual terrorists.26 
2.28 The Attorney-General’s Department submitted that: 
telecommunications data is critical to the investigation of almost 
any criminal activity, serious or otherwise, and almost any activity 
prejudicial to security that has been facilitated, enabled or carried 
out via communications technology. Electronic communications, 
by definition, do not leave a physical footprint, allowing  
individuals and groups to plan and carry out such activities 
without risk of detection via many ‘traditional’ investigative 
techniques. As such, the records kept by telecommunications 
companies about the services they have provided 
(telecommunications data) are often the only source of information 
available to agencies to identify and investigate individuals and 
groups using communications technologies for such purposes.27 
2.29 The Committee also received detailed evidence from agencies about the 
role telecommunications data plays in their investigations. Agencies 
emphasised that telecommunications data is used extensively, and 
provides significant value, in serious and complex investigations. 
2.30 Ms Kerri Hartland, then Acting Director-General of Security, confirmed 
that ‘communications data has been critical to the disruption of terrorist 
attacks in Australia’,28 and provided the Committee with a detailed, 
unclassified summary of the use of telecommunications data in 
Operations Pendennis29 and Neath.30 ASIO’s assessment was that, in both 
cases, had relevant telecommunications data not been available ASIO 
would have been blind to critical information, including the existence of 
covert communications between members of the terrorist groups, and the 
26  Mr Peter Freak, Submission 26, p. 1. 
27  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 14. 
28  Ms Kerri Hartland, Acting Director-General of Security, Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 5. 
29  ASIO, Submission 12.1, p. 33; Operation Pendennis involved the disruption of planned mass 
casualty attacks in Sydney and Melbourne in 2005-06 resulting in the arrest of 22 men, 18 of 
whom were convicted of terrorism offences. 
30  ASIO, Submission 12.1, p. 34; Operation Neath involved the disruption of a planned attack on 
Holsworthy Barracks in Sydney in 2009, resulting in the arrest of 5 men, 3 of whom were 
convicted of terrorism offences. 
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full scope of the network of persons involved, with potentially ‘disastrous’ 
consequences.31 ASIO provided the Committee with further, classified, 
evidence on the use of telecommunications data in these operations. 
2.31 The Director-General of Security, Mr Duncan Lewis, also provided the 
Committee with a detailed explanation of how ASIO uses 
telecommunications data in the early stages of its investigations: 
When an individual comes to ASIO’s attention, there are a range of 
methods that can be applied to establish whether that person’s 
activities are relevant to security or not. Requesting historical 
communication data is often one of the most useful as well as one 
of the least intrusive methods of establishing those matters of fact. 
In many cases a simple subscriber check on a phone number is 
sufficient to determine that there is actually no investigation 
required and the matter can be put aside.32 
2.32 Mr Lewis also highlighted the importance of reliable access to 
telecommunications data to counter-espionage investigations: 
Less known, of course, is the way in which historical 
communication data has been of assistance to us as we tackle the 
problems of counterespionage. We provided a submission to the 
committee which you have all seen, and I know one of my 
colleagues gave evidence in a closed session.33 
2.33 The AFP explained in its submission that telecommunications data is a 
‘cornerstone of contemporary policing’ and allows the AFP to: 
 identify suspects and/or victims, 
 exculpate uninvolved persons, 
 resolve life threatening situations like child abduction or 
exploitation, 
 identify associations between members of criminal 
organisations, 
 provide insight into criminal syndicates and terrorist networks, 
and 
 establish leads to target further investigative resources.34 
2.34 The AFP advised that telecommunications data is accessed only on a ‘case 
by case basis according to identified operational needs’, and has provided 
fundamental information across the full suite of the AFP’s investigative 
functions, including:  
31  Ms Hartland, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 5. 
32  Mr Duncan Lewis AO DSC CSC, Director-General of Security, ASIO, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 65. 
33  Mr Lewis, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 64. 
34  AFP, Submission 7.1, p. 3. 
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counter terrorism, serious and organised crime, firearm and drug 
trafficking, child protection operations, cybercrime, crimes against 
humanity such as slavery, people smuggling and human 
trafficking, as well as community policing in the ACT and 
airports.35  
2.35 At a public hearing, Commissioner Andrew Colvin provided further, 
detailed information about the AFP’s use of telecommunications data in 
particular classes of investigations: 
Looking at AFP investigations commenced between July and 
September of this year, 2014, I can advise that telecommunications 
data has been used in 92 per cent of counterterrorism 
investigations, 100 per cent of cybercrime investigations, 87 per 
cent of child protection investigations and 79 per cent of serious 
organised crime investigations.36 
2.36 Victoria Police highlighted to the Committee how changes in the broader 
communications environment are requiring agencies to rely on 
telecommunications data as an increasingly integral part of their 
investigations: 
In an age where there is an ever-increasing reliance across 
virtually all elements of our community on telecommunications in 
its various forms, coupled with increasingly sophisticated 
telecommunications technologies, law enforcement must be able to 
stay abreast of the tools of the trade or the modus operandi of the 
similarly empowered and sophisticated criminal element who are 
always amongst us. 
One of the touchstones of investigation that junior investigators 
are taught is the notion that every contact leaves its trace. In the 
past, this was intended to draw the investigator’s attention to the 
possibilities of fibres, fingerprints and DNA evidence. In the 
present, this thinking is just as applicable to the opportunities 
provided to serious and organised crime investigators by 
metadata … 
An investigation can be considered to be a process underpinned 
by a series of logical and ordered steps, and the identification, 
analysis and interpretation of the traces that an offender has left 
behind in the course of his or her preparatory actions or actual 
offending will always be amongst the critical first steps that can 
ultimately determine the success or otherwise of an investigative 
35  AFP, Submission 7.1, p. 3. 
36  Commissioner Andrew Colvin, AFP, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 3. 
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process, whether such traces are in the form of a fingerprint or a 
call charge record.37 
2.37 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
highlighted the important role that telecommunications data plays in the 
initial stages of an investigation, and noted that the absence of such 
information can result in investigations failing before they truly even 
commence.38 
2.38 Mr Michael Griffin, the recently-appointed Commonwealth Law 
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner, and a former Director of Military 
Prosecutions for the Australian Defence Force; Examiner of the Australian 
Crime Commission; and Principal Member, Senior Member and Member 
of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Migration Review Tribunal and 
Refugee Review Tribunal, and of the Veterans’ Review Board, explained 
the role historic telecommunications data plays in anti-corruption 
investigations involving compromised law enforcement officials: 
I have had the benefit of being briefed on all of [the Australian 
Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity’s] current operations 
as well as a number of past investigations. In my review of these 
cases, the thing that has struck me the most is the lengths to which 
corrupt officers will go to cover their tracks. Accordingly, 
telecommunications data is essential to finding corrupt conduct 
and can be crucial to its successful prosecution.  
… 
[T]he particular area of interest to us relates to people who are 
presently covering their tracks, and very recently covering their 
tracks. It is unlikely that the connections they have made will be 
present contemporaneously. Therefore, it is the historical record 
that is important to us, and looking at our history of 
investigations, we are of the view that the two-year period works 
for us. Although, as you will see from Operation Heritage-Marca, 
we have looked at historical data, where it has been available, that 
has gone back several years, indeed to 2006 in Operation Heritage-
Marca.39 
2.39 The AFP also drew the Committee’s attention to the important role that 
telecommunications data plays in enabling and supporting the use of 
37  Inspector Gavan Segrave, Intelligence and Covert Support Command, Victoria Police, 
Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 44. 
38  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), Submission 24, p. 9. 
39  Mr Michael Griffin AM, Integrity Commissioner, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 
2015, pp. 34–35. 
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other investigative powers that Parliament has granted law enforcement 
and national security agencies: 
Intercepted or accessed content played a role in at least 328 
convictions [by the AFP] over the past five years. In each of these 
cases telecommunications data was a crucial tool to ensure that 
those more intrusive capabilities were appropriately targeted and 
deployed.40 
2.40 The New South Wales Police Force (NSW Police) also provided further 
evidence in support of the nexus between telecommunications data and 
telecommunications interception.41 
What data is accessed? 
2.41 Victoria Police emphasised to the Committee that the extensive use of 
telecommunications data at the early, intelligence stages of investigations 
should not be misinterpreted as agencies engaging in unjustified ‘fishing 
expeditions’: 
I think there is potential for some observers to misconstrue this 
idea of law enforcement using metadata in terms of intelligence. It 
needs to be tied back to an understanding of the investigative 
process … It is important for people to understand that in most 
instances metadata is used at the early stages of investigations 
when police are trying to get an understanding of a whole range of 
things in relation to the circumstances under investigation. I think 
this is what we mean when we talk about it being used in an 
intelligence sense, not that it is some broad fishing expedition 
because we have nothing better to do.42 
2.42 South Australia Police explained to the Committee how the concepts of 
‘reasonable necessity’ and ‘relevance’, which are core elements of the 
statutory test for authorised officers making a data authorisation under 
Chapter 4 of the TIA Act, are applied: 
The legislation talks about it being reasonably necessary and 
relevant. To me, if person A is murdered, who has had contact 
with that person in the previous 24 hours, 48 hours, seven days is 
quite relevant to that murder investigation, and that is what we 
are asking at that point in time. It is the same with a drug 
40  AFP, Submission 7.1, p. 5. 
41  Detective Superintendent Arthur Kopsias APM, Commander, Telecommunications 
Interception Branch, New South Wales Police Force, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 
2015, p. 49. 
42  Inspector Segrave, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 59. 
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trafficker: whom that person has had contact with is relevant to 
that investigation.43 
2.43 The Director-General of Security also drew the Committee’s attention to 
how the limits and controls on ASIO’s access to telecommunications data, 
which are contained in both the TIA Act and the Attorney-General’s 
Guidelines made under section 8A of the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979, are applied in practice:  
ASIO is careful to ensure that the level of intrusion into individual 
privacy remains proportionate to that threat and in accordance 
with the guidelines that were provided by the Attorney-General. It 
is not and will not be the case that ASIO automatically requests the 
maximum amount of data available. Should this bill become law, 
ASIO will continue to request access to historical communication 
data needed only for the purpose of carrying out our function, 
regardless of the length of time that data may be available for. We 
abide by the law.44 
2.44 In response to a question from the Committee, a senior official of the 
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) confirmed 
that access to historical telecommunications data would itself likely play a 
key role in any investigation by ACLEI of any alleged corrupt access to or 
misuse of telecommunications data by a law enforcement official.45 
2.45 Telstra noted that there appear to be significant public misconceptions 
about the nature and extent of access to telecommunications data by 
Australian law enforcement and national security agencies: 
I think that there is often a lot of mystery around it. Very simply, it 
is often very simple metadata—the same sorts of information that 
you might be able to access from your bill: who you called; where 
you were when you made the call, by cell tower; a name and a 
billing address. I am sure people perceive that it is mysterious. It is 
actually, often—most times—very simple metadata.46 
2.46 Telstra’s statement is consistent with the Attorney-General’s Department’s 
submission to this inquiry,47 and the AFP’s submission to the Senate Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs References Committee’s Inquiry into the 
43  Assistant Commissioner Paul Dickson, Crime Service, South Australia Police, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 60. 
44  Mr Lewis, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 65. 
45  Mr Nick Sellars, Executive Director, Secretariat, Australian Commission for Law Enforcement 
Integrity, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 35. 
46  Mrs Kate Hughes, Chief Risk Officer, Telstra, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, 
p. 17. 
47  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 61. 
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Comprehensive Revision of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Act 1979.48 This evidence indicates that approximately 85 per cent of data 
authorisations relate to subscriber information, such as name and address 
information, with only 15 per cent relating to ‘traffic data’, such as call 
charge records. 
2.47 At a public hearing with the Committee, Victoria Police also highlighted 
that the number of data authorisations made each year by law 
enforcement agencies does not reflect the number of persons under 
investigation using those powers: 
Inspector Segrave: The numbers that have been put before you 
today, in terms of the applications, reflect the uptake of the 
broader community of the communications technologies that are 
available. Obviously, they have increased exponentially over time 
and the law enforcement figures just reflect that. The other point 
that I would make in relation to those numbers, certainly from a 
Victoria Police point of view—and I would be confident that that 
extends across other law enforcement agencies—is that it should 
not be interpreted that, if we have made 60 000 requests in a year, 
that is 60 000 individuals. A lot of the organised crime figures that 
are investigated and where these tools are utilised routinely drop 
phones and roll phones over, so there are multiple requests in 
relation to that. There may be multiple requests in relation to call 
charge records over periods of time, and so on. Another aspect 
that needs to be understood is that, if you were to drill down into 
those figures, the actual numbers, in terms of the individuals that 
are the subject of the applications, are much less than the bottom 
line figure—49 
2.48 Victoria Police went on to confirm that there may be many hundreds of 
requests for telecommunications data for a single investigation that may 
only relate to ‘half a dozen or a dozen individuals’. 
Mr DREYFUS: Can I reassure you, Inspector, on behalf of myself 
and my colleagues, that we have been given, in closed hearings, by 
the Australian Federal Police and ASIO, multiple examples of 
exactly what you are talking about. I am not disclosing anything 
here. For major investigations, there will be hundreds of requests 
for telecommunications data for a single investigation— 
Inspector Segrave: Indeed. That is the experience across— 
48  AFP, Submission 25, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee,  
pp. 5–6. 
49  Inspector Segrave, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 60. 
 
THE CASE FOR DATA RETENTION 23 
 
Mr DREYFUS: possibly only covering half a dozen or a dozen 
individuals, but nevertheless there are hundreds of requests. So, 
take it from me, and I think I can speak for my colleagues: we are 
not assuming—it is quite the reverse—that the 60,000 requests 
from your force or the 122,000 requests from New South Wales 
describe a number of persons. Far from it. 50 
A ‘self-service’ regime? 
2.49 A number of submissions and witnesses argued that the existing controls 
in the TIA Act around access to telecommunications data are inadequate. 
For example, Professor George Williams argued that the current regime 
for access to telecommunications data is something of an accident of 
history, and that it should be reformed: 
my underlying concern is that I do not think the current system is 
appropriate, but I think it is somewhat accidental that we have got 
to this position where agencies can access vast amounts of data—
tens of thousands, perhaps, over a number of years—without any 
form of clear political accountability. I think the scheme has grown 
up without actually being designed properly. And if we were 
starting fresh—let us say we did not have this data access that we 
have at the moment—I do not think there would be any doubt 
about the need to have some sort of authorisation process in play. 
It is just that we have this unfortunate ad hoc regime that I think 
we need to move beyond.51 
2.50 The Law Council argued that the introduction of a mandatory data 
retention regime would increase the risks under an internal authorisation 
model for access to telecommunications data: 
under the proposed data retention regime, vastly more 
telecommunications data will be available – both in terms of 
volume and potentially the quality of the data retained – than is 
currently the case. This change heightens the risk of an 
encroachment on rights of privacy.52 
2.51 The Committee accepts that the adequacy of safeguards around access to 
telecommunications data are relevant to the proportionality of the 
proposed data retention regime. Chapters 6 and 7 of this report address 
the controls and safeguards around telecommunications data in detail.  
50  Inspector Segrave, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 60. 
51  Professor Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 11. 
52  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 18. 
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The challenges facing national security and law enforcement 
investigations 
2.52 The Government has indicated that it considers the implementation of a 
mandatory data retention regime to be an urgent priority to address 
challenges facing Australia’s national security and law enforcement 
agencies.53 
2.53 However, the Law Council of Australia argued that the Government has 
not demonstrated the urgency or pressing social need underpinning the 
Bill. The Law Council regarded the fact that ‘certain features’ of the Bill 
will not commence until six months after Royal Assent, and that the 
overall scheme will not be fully functional for a further 18 months after 
commencement, as indicating an absence of such an urgent need.54  
2.54 In evidence, the Law Council went somewhat further, arguing that there is 
no evidence that the current regime was ineffective: 
[T]he examples [given] were examples where the metadata had 
been available under the existing voluntary regime. So that does 
not demonstrate the necessity of this new regime; it demonstrates 
that the existing regime is working. 
The difficulty is that submitters to this inquiry were asked to take 
on face value the statement that carriers are in fact reducing the 
amount of information that they retain such that the voluntary 
disclosure regime may become less effective over time. I do not 
think that that has been demonstrated in evidence or at least that I 
have seen in the submissions.55 
2.55 Guardian Australia also noted the longstanding nature of the debate 
around mandatory data retention, including this Committee’s 
consideration of the issue in 2012–13: 
Debate about interception, storage and use of Australians’ 
communications for security and law enforcement purposes is 
longstanding, not a product of relatively recent concerns about a 
particular strain of terrorism.56 
53  The Hon. Tony Abbott MP, Prime Minister, Transcript of Joint Press Conference with the 
Minister for Justice, the Hon. Michael Keenan MP and the Commissioner of the AFP, 
Mr Andrew Colvin APM OAM, 5 February 2015, Melbourne. 
54  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, pp. 6–7. 
55  Mr Peter Leonard, Chairperson, Media and Communications Committee, Business Law 
Section, Law Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 31. 
56  Guardian Australia, Submission 132, p. 3. 
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2.56 Mr Virgil Hesse cautioned the Committee against overreacting to recent 
events, such as the incidents in Sydney, Paris and Ottawa, when 
considering this proposal: 
Sadly recent events have left State and Federal Law Enforcement 
asking questions which in hindsight point to a breakdown across 
the Law Enforcement’s and their ability to adequately monitor one 
individual who had intentions no one person could predict. 
I would ask the Committee to be very careful in reacting emotively 
with regard to this aberration when considering the third tranche 
of legislation, that being the Data Retention component.57 
2.57 The Committee noted evidence that data retention would likely not have 
enabled agencies to prevent these incidents. NSW Police gave considered 
evidence on this point, emphasising that attempting to determine whether 
such information could have assisted in hindsight necessarily involves a 
hypothetical, counterfactual exercise:  
[A]s a hypothetical, with the nature of Sydney itself and where law 
enforcement would benefit from metadata in relation to, say, the 
Sydney incident, it most likely would not have prevented the 
Sydney incident. At the time, metadata could have been essential 
in trying to identify any other persons who may be engaged in a 
group or involved in that type of offence. Historical metadata 
could still benefit police down the track to see who that person has 
associated with in terms of a cell or, if they have been radicalised, 
where they come from.58 
2.58 The Attorney-General’s Department and a number of agencies noted that 
long-term changes in the telecommunications industry are impacting a 
number of key investigative capabilities. These changes are being 
exacerbated by an increasingly high-risk operational environment. 
2.59 This section of the report will consider evidence received regarding: 
 the declining ability of agencies to reliably access the content of 
communications, 
 the declining ability of agencies to reliably access telecommunications 
data about communications, and 
 the extent to which the current operational environment is exacerbating 
these challenges, increasing the urgency of the reform. 
57  Mr Virgil Hesse, Submission 15, p. 1. 
58  Assistant Commissioner Lanyon, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, pp. 61–62. 
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Declining ability to reliably access the content of communications 
2.60 The Attorney-General’s Department noted that the ability of law 
enforcement and national security agencies to access the content of 
communications is in long-term decline, as a result of ongoing 
technological change. The Department claimed that this decline is 
degrading the ability of agencies to investigate serious threats, such as 
organised crime and terrorist cells. As a result, agencies are ‘increasingly 
reliant on alternative investigative techniques, including access to 
telecommunications data’.59  
2.61 NSW Police provided a valuable explanation of this challenge: 
It is a pretty broad topic but it is also very close to my heart as I 
have been the [telecommunications interception (TI)] commander 
for 15 years. I have been doing interceptions for 15 years. I have 
managed thousands and thousands of intercepts. But, in the last 
four or five years, the phrase ‘going dark’ has come about in terms 
of the strong encryption out there, lots of over-the-top providers 
providing apps, the online process. The advent of the internet, if I 
could explain it to you, has actually degraded our interception 
capability to the point where we are receiving a lot less than we 
used to receive. 
When I went to the [Telecommunications Interception Branch], I 
used to apply for the warrants. I used to go before Federal Court 
judges; in those days, we did not have AAT members. I used to go 
down with a request for the warrant, the same warrant that is 
served today, and present it before the member, present our case 
with the affidavit, come back with a warrant and serve it on the 
carrier. In those days, we had the luxury of one carrier. We would 
get all communications related to Mal Lanyon, say—everything. It 
was not a problem. It was easy. Any words spoken were what was 
said over the phone. The audio was easy to work out. But with the 
advent of the internet, although it is the same warrant today to the 
same member, there are about 600 or 700 potential ISPs and 
carriage service providers out there; and, when we serve the 
warrant, I am not getting the content, the communications, I used 
to get, to the point where we have to do other things—I cannot 
disclose those things in this forum—to complement the TI process. 
So we are exploring alternative methods of operational 
deployment and other forms of electronic surveillance services to 
fill in the gaps. There is a gap there. Encryption has become 
59  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 13. 
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mainstream now, with the Snowden impact; we have over-the-top 
applications and the smartphones out there: all those things are 
impacting on us. I am not saying they are bad for the global 
community. I think there are some good things in there, but for us 
it is hard just to keep abreast.60 
2.62 The Attorney-General’s Department also noted that the relative value of 
telecommunications data to investigations is increasing as 
communications technology plays an increasing role in activities 
prejudicial to security, including cyber-espionage, and serious criminal 
activity.61  
Declining ability to reliably access telecommunications data 
2.63 The Attorney-General’s Department noted that the ability of agencies to 
access telecommunications data is in long-term decline, reducing the value 
of data both as a primary investigative tool, and impairing the ability of 
agencies to mitigate the loss of capability they are experiencing as a result 
of the ongoing loss of access to the content of communications. The 
Committee identified this issue as a key challenge to national security 
investigations in its 2013 Report.62  
2.64 The Department confirmed that this trend ‘has continued unabated since 
the Committee’s report, with further, significant reductions in the period 
for which certain service providers retain critical telecommunications 
data’.63  
2.65 In its submission, the Attorney-General’s Department drew a distinction 
between the increasing volume of telecommunications data being retained 
across the telecommunications industry, and retention practices in relation 
to particular categories of telecommunications data that are of any 
significant utility for national security and law enforcement purposes: 
It is important to distinguish between industry retaining 
telecommunications data in general, and retaining the types of 
telecommunications data that are critical to law enforcement and 
national security investigations. While it is true that, across the 
telecommunications industry, more telecommunications data is 
generated and retained than at any previous point in history, 
60  Detective Superintendent Kopsias, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 56. 
61  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, pp. 11–12. 
62  PJCIS, Report of the inquiry into potential reforms of Australia’s national security legislation, 
Canberra, May 2013, p. 190. 
63  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 13. 
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much of this data is of limited, if any, investigative value and 
would not be subject to data retention obligations.64 
2.66 The evidence received by the Committee over the course of this inquiry 
outlined two distinct challenges: 
 a general decline in the availability of telecommunications data, and 
 the inconsistent availability of telecommunications data for similar 
services provided by different providers, and between different services 
provided by the same provider. 
Declining availability of telecommunications data 
2.67 The AFP explained the challenge facing law enforcement agencies as a 
result of declining retention practices for critical categories of 
telecommunications data:  
Telecommunications data is a critical component of investigations 
and has been successfully used to support numerous 
investigations into serious criminality from many, many years. 
Industry already captures much of this data, but, as more services 
become available, providers are keeping fewer records for shorter 
periods of time.65 
2.68 In his second reading speech to the House of Representatives following 
the introduction of the Bill, the Minister for Communications, the Hon 
Malcolm Turnbull MP, provided an example of the decline in retention 
practices and their potential to impact on national security investigations: 
Last year, a major Australian ISP reduced the period for which it 
keeps IP address allocation records from many years to three 
months. In the 12 months prior to that decision, the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) obtained these records 
in relation to at least 10 national security investigations, including 
counter-terrorism and cybersecurity investigations. If those 
investigations took place today, vital intelligence and evidence 
simply may not exist.66 
2.69 In its submission, the Attorney-General’s Department provided two 
specific examples where, since this Committee’s 2013 report, major 
Australian service providers have substantially reduced their holdings of 
IP address allocation records and other critical data types. The 
Department advised that the impact of one of these changes is that, ‘[a]s a 
64  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 13. 
65  Commissioner Andrew Colvin, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 3. 
66  The Hon Malcom Turnbull MP, Minister for Communications, House of Representatives 
Hansard, 30 October 2014, p. 12561. 
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direct result of this action, agencies are unable to reliably identify suspects 
or execute interception warrants on this carrier’s network.’67 
2.70 Mr Chris Berg, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Public Affairs, summarised 
the challenge facing agencies in the following terms: 
The existing telecommunications data access regime takes 
advantage of a practice that telephone providers utilise for 
business purposes – the recording of data about the time, length, 
and parties to an individual telephone call. This information is 
retained in order to accurately bill customers, as telephone services 
are billed typically on a per-call basis or some variation of that 
system. From this data large amounts of information can be 
gleaned, but it is important to note that the data exists 
independently of its law enforcement uses. The data has been 
created by telecommunications providers for specific business 
purposes. 
In the internet era, this sort of data is both less important and less 
accessible. Communication that was once done by phone might be 
done over email, or in a chat room. Telephone calls which were 
logged on a per-call basis might be conducted over purely internet 
telephonic services like Skype. Rather than selling customers per-
call access, now telecommunications is sold in large blocks of data. 
The only information needed for billing purposes with internet 
access might be download volumes. Even then that might not be 
necessary, either in the case of unlimited download plans or 
simply because excess downloads are ‘shaped’ – that is, offered 
freely at a reduced speed – rather than charged back to the 
customer.68 
2.71 In its submission, ASIO provided a similar assessment of the underlying 
drivers of the decline in retention practices.69 
2.72 Agencies provided a large number of case studies addressing situations 
where the non-retention of telecommunications data hampered law 
enforcement and national security investigations. For example, NSW 
Police explained to the Committee how changing industry retention 
practices are impacting on its investigations: 
There were only about 1 100 requests [for IP data in 2013–14], of 
which conservatively 80 per cent failed to yield a subscriber from 
67  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 16. 
68  Mr Chris Berg, Senior Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs, Submission 94, p. 4. 
69  ASIO, Submission 12.1, p. 20. 
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the other end because, without the legislation, carriers are not 
required to keep the proposed data sets. 
Similarly, on metadata call charge records, investigators get very 
skilled at knowing which carriers they can get data from and 
which they cannot. They know very well, so the level of requests 
that go to carrier A, knowing that they only hold that data for four 
to six seeks, is obviously reduced. There is no point putting a 
request in if we know the carrier does not hold the data for that 
long.70 
2.73 Similarly, South Australia Police explained how the inability to access 
14-month old telecommunications data in a murder investigation 
hampered efforts to investigate a newly-identified suspect: 
A stalled murder investigation was reviewed about 14 months 
after the victim’s death. Fresh information received during the 
review identified a suspect who was a known drug dealer. The 
victim, a regular drug user, had been in contact with the suspect 
and investigators suspect the victim may have been killed over a 
drug debt. Historical telecommunications data was sought for the 
suspect’s mobile service for around the time of the murder but it 
was no longer available. The unavailability of the 
telecommunications data has been detrimental to the investigation 
and the case remains unsolved.71 
2.74 The major service providers each provided the Committee with 
assurances that they do not currently intend to further reduce their 
retention practices.72 For example, in response to a question as to whether 
there was any imminent proposal to reduce the data that it keeps, Telstra, 
responded: 
We have no proposals to substantially reduce our data holdings at 
this point in time. What we have at the moment is sufficient to 
meet our regulatory obligations and to manage our network and 
provide services to customers.73 
2.75 However, these assurances must be viewed in light of the providers’ 
further evidence that services providers are likely to release new services, 
70  Assistant Commissioner Lanyon, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 49. 
71  South Australia Police, Submission 9, p. 3. 
72  Mr James Shaw, Director, Government Relations, Telstra, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 
January 2015, pp. 18–19; Mr Matthew Lobb, General Manager, Industry Strategy and Public 
Policy, Vodafone Hutchison Australia (Vodafone), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 
2015, p. 64; Mr David Epstein, Vice-President, Corporate and Regulatory Affairs, Singtel-
Optus (Optus), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 21. 
73  Mr Shaw, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, pp. 18–19. 
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update the underlying architecture of their existing networks and services, 
and transition subscribers and communications onto IP-based platforms in 
the future. This may further reduce the availability of telecommunications 
data for national security and law enforcement purposes. For example, 
Telstra also explained that: 
As we change our business, as we introduce new products, or we 
might phase out an old system and introduce a new system—a 
new building platform or something, for instance—we would 
design that in order to meet business needs and whatever 
regulatory obligations there are. If that meant that we kept less 
data because we did not need to keep it, then that would be an 
artefact of that particular process.74 
2.76 Similarly, Vodafone explained that, while it does not currently intend to 
reduce its retention practices in relation to its traditional telephony 
network, it expects that increasingly large volumes of communications 
will occur via newer, IP-based technologies. For these technologies, less 
telecommunications data is kept, and such data is kept for significantly 
shorter periods of time.75 
2.77 Optus also observed that it is the migration of customers and services to 
newer platforms, which have shorter retention periods, that is driving 
down the overall period for which relevant telecommunications data is 
retained: 
I think the main influence on change and the overall character of 
the dataset, if you were to look at it in the very broad, is that 
increasingly communications are moving to mobile services and 
increasingly—even with what we would regard as voice 
communications between ourselves—they are in effect data, and 
that has an influence on how data is kept.76  
Inconsistent availability of telecommunications data 
2.78 The Committee received evidence from law enforcement agencies and 
ASIO that the inconsistent retention of data between providers, and 
between services offered by the same provider, poses a considerable 
challenge. That is distinct from the declining retention of critical 
telecommunications data across the industry.77  
2.79 For example, Commissioner Colvin explained that: 
74  Mr Shaw, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 14. 
75  Mr Lobb, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 66. 
76  Mr David Epstein, Vice-President, Corporate and Regulatory Affairs, Optus-Singtel (Optus), 
Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 21. 
77  For example, South Australia Police, Submission 9, p. 1. 
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When the AFP are dealing with serious threats to national security 
and other serious crime, we cannot afford to rely on luck to see if 
the provider that the criminal has chosen to use has retained that 
data. I also do not think the public would consider that an 
acceptable outcome for serious criminal investigations.78 
2.80 The AFP further explained that sophisticated criminals actively exploit the 
inconsistent retention practices between providers: 
We want standardisation. Also, we do not want the crooks to 
shop. We do not want them to go to the providers who they know 
keep the data—and it will not take long to work out who keeps the 
data and who does not keep the data. We do not want them to sit 
there and say, ‘That's the best network to go if you are a criminal, 
because we know that they are not going to keep the IP addresses 
if it is dynamic. They are not going to keep it for any length of 
time. They might keep it for three months, because that is what 
their business model says, but beyond that that is fine. Why we do 
not go to one of the big ones at the moment is because they keep it 
for—for however long they keep it—a long period of time’. We do 
not want that to happen. We want a consistent model, so that we 
have a level playing field and the people we are trying to combat 
against also have a level playing field.79 
2.81 The AFP confirmed that the risk of sophisticated criminals actively 
seeking out providers with more limited retention practices is not 
hypothetical, and is ‘absolutely’ occurring at present.80  
2.82 Mr Chris Dawson, Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Crime 
Commission (ACC), explained the importance of reliable and consistent 
access to historic telecommunications data, noting that the ACC 
investigates ‘complex communications webs which are often only able to 
be discovered through retrospective analysis of criminality which span at 
times many years.’81 
2.83 ASIO provided a summary of its assessment of current industry retention 
practices, demonstrating their wide variability.82 A copy of this table is 
included in the detailed discussion on retention periods in Chapter 4 of 
this report (Table 4.2). 
78  Commissioner Andrew Colvin, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 3. 
79  Deputy Commissioner Michael Phelan APM, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 15. 
80  Deputy Commissioner Phelan, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 15. 
81  Mr Chris Dawson, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Crime Commission, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 6. 
82  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Submission 12.2, p. 5. 
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2.84 Optus noted the current inconsistencies and the potential for these 
disparities to increase over time: 
[T]his regime is bringing everyone to a common set of standards. 
At the moment, probably the vast bulk of communications pass 
through the three major carriers in some form or another by means 
that are captured relatively well for the purpose of a regime like 
this one that we are discussing, but increasingly there is the 
potential for that to fragment. Indeed, people are always on the 
lookout for something. You will have seen media reports, for 
example, [about] drug syndicates and bikie gangs. There was a 
reason for that. Whether they can feel entirely confident of what 
they are up to is another thing, but they have clearly tried it on 
because they are of the belief that they can evade the protections 
that apply or the enforcement regime that applies in Australia 
through mainstream services.83  
2.85 Optus went on to confirm that the concerns regarding the inconsistent 
retention of telecommunications data sought by law enforcement agencies 
did not just relate to the major carriers: 
I think it is a combination of a smaller part of the market, 
fragmentation in the market, technological alternatives and a 
broader change to what I would call crudely a data based regime 
for communications, rather than necessarily a traditional PSTN 
type voice regime.84 
2.86 The level of inconsistency was most clearly highlighted by the evidence 
from Telstra, which confirmed that agencies’ ability to access 
telecommunications data could vary significantly depending on which 
day of the year the request relates to: 
Some of the data that is being sought on a quiet day might be kept 
for a couple of weeks but on New Year’s Eve is on the network for 
only a few hours.85 
Higher risk operational environment 
2.87 The Attorney-General’s Department explained that the ‘increasingly high-
risk operational environment’,86 particularly the increased threat of 
domestic terrorism, has exacerbated the capability gaps experienced by 
agencies:  
83  Mr Epstein, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, pp. 21–22. 
84  Mr Epstein, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 22. 
85  Mr Shaw, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 14. 
86  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 12. 
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[I]n an increased threat environment characterised by a higher 
operational tempo, there is a narrower margin for error in law 
enforcement and national security investigations. This narrower 
margin is particularly evident in relation to ‘lone wolf’ threats: 
such persons have limited, if any, contact with other known 
extremists, giving authorities fewer opportunities to detect their 
activities and intentions. As such, any missed opportunity to 
identify and prevent these attacks represents a significant risk.87 
2.88 The Department noted that, where telecommunications data is not 
retained, it can result in missed opportunities: 
In the best case, agencies may be able to progress investigations by 
using more resource-intensive methods (limiting their capacity to 
investigate other matters) or more intrusive investigative 
techniques. 
In the worst case, a crime or threat to security will not be 
adequately investigated.88 
2.89 ASIO’s submission described the scale of the challenge it is facing to 
identify, investigate and prevent terrorist attacks in Australia at present: 
Presently, there are over 300 counter-terrorism investigations, of 
which a third are high threat priority cases. High threat cases are 
ones in which ASIO holds credible information requiring time 
critical action to resolve or monitor. The dominant theme across 
these cases is the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.89 
2.90 The Attorney-General’s Department also noted the increasing risk posed 
by cyber-espionage, and the importance of telecommunications data to 
combat that risk: 
Instances of espionage and foreign interference within Australia 
have continued to increase, both in terms of the number of 
occurrences and the range of operatives. In particular, the scale 
and sophistication of cyber-espionage conducted against 
Australian Government and private sector systems has increased 
significantly … 
… [A]ccess to telecommunications data and the lawful 
interception of… communications are often both crucial aspects of 
counter-espionage investigations.90 
87  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 15. 
88  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 15. 
89  ASIO, Submission 12.1, p. 15. 
90  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, pp. 11–12. 
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2.91 The Commissioner of ASIC highlighted the need for reliable access to 
telecommunications data to combat the increasing global threat of insider 
trading: 
It is not like terrorism, and I do not make a case that it is exactly 
the same as terrorism. That would be churlish and, frankly, stupid. 
But insider trading is an especially pernicious activity. If insider 
trading is permitted to continue, retail investors and institutional 
investors will lose confidence in the Australian market. Australia 
is a net importer of capital—a very major net importer of capital—
and if foreign investors in particular, let alone Australian 
investors, lose confidence in our market, we lose this whole engine 
and multiplier effect that we have through our capital markets for 
efficient capital raising. … I am not equating this to a terrorist act, 
but I am equating this somewhat to other crimes which cause 
physical harm to people. It is very difficult for a person who has 
lost their life savings to recover, particularly if your are at that part 
of your life… where you do not have a lot of time to recover a 
deadweight loss.91 
2.92 The Director-General of Security also addressed the question of whether 
the two-year implementation timeframe following the Bill receiving Royal 
Assent runs counter to the argument that the passage of the Bill is 
required to address these urgent operation pressures:  
We had a discussion internally about this. From the time of Royal 
Assent, there is no … backsliding in terms of the data that is being 
held by the telecommunication companies at that point.92 
2.93 Additionally, the Attorney-General’s Department’s explained that one of 
the core objectives of the implementation planning arrangements 
proposed to be established by the Bill is to:93 
ensure that service providers achieve substantial compliance with 
their data retention obligations early in the implementation phase 
by encouraging interim data retention solutions, for example, by 
increasing storage capacity for existing databases to approach the 
two year retention period, or by prioritising the implementation of 
full data retention capability for some services or kinds of data. 
2.94 The implementation arrangements for the proposed data retention scheme 
are discussed later in the report. 
91  Mr Greg Tanzer, Commissioner, ASIC, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, pp. 4–5. 
92  Mr Lewis, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 69. 
93  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 34. 
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Reconciling data retention with privacy and civil liberties 
concerns 
2.95 In May 2013, the previous Committee cautioned that: 
A mandatory data retention regime raises fundamental privacy 
issues, and is arguably a significant extension of the power of the 
state over the citizen. No such regime should be enacted unless 
those privacy and civil liberties concerns are sufficiently 
addressed.94 
2.96 The Bill’s Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights identifies that 
the proposed data retention regime would engage the right to protection 
against arbitrary or unlawful interferences with privacy, set out in Article 
17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
(referred to hereafter as the ‘right to privacy’),95 as well as the right to 
freedom of expression, set out in Article 19 of the ICCPR. The Australian 
Human Rights Commission supported this assessment.96 
2.97 The Attorney-General’s Department recently gave evidence to the Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee summarising the 
effect of Australia’s obligations under Article 17: 
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights sets out the right of persons to be protected against 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy. In order to 
avoid being arbitrary, any interference with privacy must be 
necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose and proportionate to 
that purpose.97 
2.98 The Australian Privacy Commissioner, Mr Timothy Pilgrim PSM, drew 
the Committee’s attention to the test put forward by the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: 
The limitation must be necessary for reaching a legitimate aim, as 
well as in proportion to the aim and the least intrusive option 
available. Moreover, the limitation placed on a right (an 
interference with privacy, for example, for the purposes of 
94  PJCIS, Report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, 
Canberra, May 2013, p. 190. 
95  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 [Data 
Retention Bill], Explanatory Memorandum, p. 10. 
96  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, p. 4. 
97  Ms Katherine Jones, Deputy Secretary, National Security and Criminal Justice Group, 
Attorney-General’s Department, Committee Hansard, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
References Committee, Canberra, 2 February 2015, p. 44. 
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protecting national security or the right to life of others) must be 
shown to have some chance of achieving that goal.98 
2.99 The Law Council of Australia also endorsed this test.99  
2.100 Mr Vaile and Mr Remati of the University of New South Wales discussed 
how the Committee should approach the question of whether the scheme 
is necessary and proportionate: 
Proportionality requires identification and weighting of benefits 
and costs or risks for the proposal, and for its realistic alternatives. 
We need to avoid considering benefits or costs in isolation, or 
overlooking whether an effective alternative with better 
proportionality exists. 
… 
‘Necessity’ and ‘effectiveness’ are key factors on the benefits side. 
Consideration of the effectiveness of alternatives is also a 
necessary part of consideration of necessity.100 
2.101 As the Australian Human Rights Commission also noted, the mere fact 
that a law interferes with privacy or freedom of expression does not make 
that interference disproportionate, nor does it make that law unjustified. 
In the Commission’s view: 
Human Rights Law provides significant scope for [law 
enforcement and national security] agencies to have expansive 
powers, even where they impinge on individual rights and 
freedoms. Such limitations must, however, be clearly expressed, 
unambiguous in their terms, and legitimate and proportionate to 
potential harms.101 
2.102 Following on from the 2013 report of this Committee, which emphasised 
the need to address privacy and civil liberties concerns raised by 
mandatory data retention, the following sections consider the evidence 
received by the Committee about the necessity, efficacy and 
proportionality of a data retention scheme as a response to the current risk 
environment. 
98  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 4, quoting Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, 
UN Doc A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014), p. 23. 
99  Dr Natasha Molt, Senior Policy Lawyer, Criminal Law, Law Council of Australia, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 32. 
100  Mr Vaile and Mr Remati, Submission 194, p. 3. 
101  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, p. 3. 
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Can data retention meet the test as being necessary for a legitimate 
aim? 
2.103 The Explanatory Memorandum identifies that the legitimate aim, or aims, 
of a data retention scheme are: 
the protection of national security, public safety, addressing crime, 
and protecting the rights and freedoms … by requiring the 
retention of a basic set of communications data required to 
support relevant investigations.102 
2.104 The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights has reported on the 
Bill, and concluded that, in relation to the question of necessity: 
the committee considers that the statement of compatibility has 
generally established why particular categories of data are 
considered necessary for law enforcement agencies.103 
2.105 However, the Committee received a number of submissions questioning 
the necessity of mandatory telecommunications data retention.  
2.106 The Law Council of Australia argued that: 
[T]he case for mandatory data retention has not been made out 
because: 
 the ability of access to telecommunications data is not limited to 
national security or serious crime; 
 there is little evidence from comparable jurisdictions that had 
previously had mandatory data retention schemes to suggest 
that such schemes actually assist in reducing the crime rate, for 
example in Germany, research indicates that a mandatory data 
retention scheme led to an increase in the number of 
convictions by only 0.006%; 
 there is a lack of Australian statistical quantitative and 
qualitative data to indicate: 
⇒ the necessity of telecommunications data in securing 
convictions; or 
⇒ the cases where requests for telecommunications data could 
not be met because data had not been retained and its effect 
on an investigation.104 
2.107 In evidence, the Law Council acknowledged that the evidence provided 
by agencies ‘definitely have the benefit of showing why agencies such as 
the AFP consider the value of telecommunications data’, but argued that 
102  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 10. 
103  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Fifteenth Report to the 44th Parliament, p. 12. 
104  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 7. 
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‘there seems to be a lack of statistical data that indicates the value of such 
data’.105 
2.108 A number of submissions cited the report alluded to by the Law Council, 
which was prepared by the Legal Services of the German Parliament.106 
Extracts of this report have been translated by the German privacy rights 
group, AK Vorrat.107 The report is stated to have addressed Germany’s 
data retention regime, which was in force between 1 January 2008 and 
2 March 2010, and concluded that data retention had increased ‘crime 
clearance rates’ by 0.006%.  
2.109 In a joint submission, the councils for civil liberties across Australia 
accepted that ‘telecommunications data is an important investigative tool 
that and law enforcement and security agencies should have appropriate 
access to it’.108 However, the councils noted that they: 
share the scepticism of many experts, parliamentarians, legal and 
civil society groups that the mass collection and retention of 
telecommunications data of non-suspect citizens for retrospective 
access will significantly increase Australia’s (or any nation’s) 
safety from terrorism and serious crime.109 
2.110 The councils further drew the Committee’s attention to the United States’ 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board’s January 2014 Report on the 
Telephone Records Program. That program involved the collection by the 
United States Government of large volumes of call-charge records (the 
time, date, duration and phone numbers) from some US phone 
companies.110 The Board’s headline conclusion, which was referenced by 
the councils, was that ‘we are aware of no instance in which the program 
directly contributed to the discovery of a previously unknown terrorist 
plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack.’111 However, the Board also 
concluded that the program: 
 identified one unknown terrorism suspect, although there was reason 
to believe that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ‘may have 
105  Dr Natasha Molt, Senior Policy Lawyer, Criminal Law, Law Council of Australia, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 30. 
106  See, for example: Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 117, p. 8; Mr Vaile and Mr Remati, 
Submission 194, p. 4. 
107  Available at: <http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/content/view/534/55/lang,en/> 
viewed 26 February 2015.  
108  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 129, p. 8. 
109  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 129, p. 9. 
110  Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records Program, p. 8. 
111  Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records Program, p. 11. 
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discovered him without the contribution of the National Security 
Agency’s program’, 
 provided additional leads regarding the contacts of terrorism suspects, 
and 
 demonstrated that foreign terrorist plots did not have a US nexus, 
allowing the US intelligence community to avoid false leads and to 
channel its limited resources more effectively.112 
2.111 The Board also indicated that the Telephone Records Program provided 
little additional value to the FBI’s more ‘traditional’, targeted powers, 
noting that: 
 US service providers are already subject to long-standing data retention 
obligations under Federal Communications Commission Regulations 
that cover the telecommunications data collected under the program, 
ensuring that those records are relatively consistently available to the 
FBI,113 and 
 the FBI (and other US law enforcement agencies) have the power to 
access those records under an ‘administrative subpoena’, similar to data 
authorisations made under the TIA Act, making it possible to 
‘streamline this process and eliminate delays’ in accessing the 
telecommunications data retained by service providers.114 
2.112 The Department drew the Committee’s attention to the European 
Commission’s Evaluation Report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 
2006/24/EC), which concluded that:  
 ‘The European Union should support and regulate data retention as a 
security measure’, 
 ‘The evidence… is limited in some respects, but nevertheless attests to 
the important role of retained data for criminal investigation’, and 
 ‘These data provide valuable leads and evidence in the prevention and 
prosecution of crime and ensuring criminal justice. Their use has 
resulted in convictions for criminal offences which, without data 
retention, might never have been solved. It has also resulted in 
acquittals of innocent persons’.115 
112  Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records Program, p. 11. 
113  Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records Program, p. 141. 
114  Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records Program,  
pp. 140–141. 
115  European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Evaluation Report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), p. 31.  
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2.113 The Commission also criticised the use of ‘crime clearance rates’ as an 
appropriate methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of data retention 
(internal citations omitted): 
[C]rime statistics – including the number of crimes and the 
number of crimes which are solved (‘clearances’) - are determined 
by multiple socio-economic factors, and success in tackling crime 
cannot be attributed to a specific security measure, such as data 
retention. Police use different methods for measuring crime 
clearance rates and, moreover, it may be argued that an undue 
focus on such statistics can be counterproductive to the 
effectiveness of law enforcement. In any case, it would not be 
possible to identify meaningful statistical trends only a few years 
after the [Data Retention Directive] entered into force.116 
2.114 While claiming data retention to be a necessary tool, representatives of 
South Australia Police and Victoria Police highlighted the complexities of 
assessing its direct impact on investigative outcomes: 
Assistant Commissioner Dickson: It is a very difficult question to 
answer. In jury matters, it is difficult to know why a jury found a 
person guilty, as an example. Was it because of the metadata 
provided? Was it because of certain admissions made? Or was it 
because of the DNA evidence? It is very difficult to say that 
metadata was the reason that that person was convicted. Most 
convictions at the end of the day are because of a whole raft of 
different things and bits of evidence. 
Inspector Segrave: I will make another point there, if I may. The 
metadata, quite often, is a step in the process to the investigator to 
get to the evidentiary footing. Without the metadata, that 
evidentiary footing may never be achieved. But it is not actually 
represented or recognised in the brief of evidence that is put 
before a court. So it can be very hard to drill down into the brief 
and into the prosecution to have an understanding of the 
underlying role that metadata actually places. But I think law 
enforcement consistently says that, with our understanding of the 
investigative process and the application of metadata within that 
process routinely, it is critical to us.117 
2.115 In response to later questioning, NSW Police further emphasised the 
difficulty in producing meaningful quantitative analysis for the utility of 
access to retained data: 
116  European Commission (2013), Evidence for necessity of data retention in the EU, p. 8. 
117  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 49. 
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I do not think there would be a police force in Australia that 
would keep that sort of data and, as Mr Dickson alluded to before, 
one of the issues is that it is rarely a single source of data that is 
responsible. For example, metadata might identify a source for us 
and might contribute to the way we go with the first steps of an 
investigation but there would be a number of other contributors. 
So to say that it was simply purely as a result for metadata would 
be a very problematic statistic to keep and I do not know of a 
police force which keeps that sort of information.118 
2.116 The Committee received a range of evidence and case studies highlighting 
the impact that the absence of telecommunications data can have on 
investigative outcomes. This evidence supplements evidence previously 
received by this Committee in the course of its 2012–13 inquiry, and other 
publicly-available information on this issue, including evidence received 
by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee.  
2.117 The Attorney-General’s Department drew the Committee’s attention to 
analysis conducted by the German Federal Police of the utility of retained 
data to their investigations, which demonstrated that: 
[O]f the investigations in which telecommunications data was 
accessed, that telecommunications data provided the only 
investigative lead in 45.4% of cases. Telecommunications data 
made an ‘important’ contribution in 92.7% of the remaining 
cases.119 
2.118 In its submission, the AFP provided an unclassified summary of the 
impact that current, inconsistent data retention practices had on the 
outcomes achieved by Operation Drakensberg, a major online child 
exploitation investigation that commenced in November 2013 following a 
referral from UK authorities. The referral contained 333 IP addresses 
suspected of accessing child exploitation material hosted on a UK-based 
website in 2011, as well as a further 219 IP addresses that had not actually 
performed any transactions. The non-retention of IP address allocation 
records by Australian service providers meant that the AFP were unable 
to even commence investigations into more than 45 per cent of the IP 
addresses identified as being highest-risk—those that had likely accessed 
the child exploitation material. Of the remaining cases, where service 
providers had retained IP address allocation records for up to two years, 
118  Assistant Commissioner Lanyon, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 61. 
119  Bundeskriminalamt, Statistical analysis of data collection in the BkA, p. 13, quoted in Attorney-
General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 14. 
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the AFP were able to positively identify 139 suspects, a success rate of 
almost 80 per cent.120 
2.119 In its supplementary submission, the AFP advised the Committee that it 
received 5 617 reports of online child sexual exploitation relating to 
Australian IP addresses in 2014, a 54 per cent increase from the previous 
year. As at 9:00am on 27 January 2015, the AFP had received 709 reports 
this year. If that rate continues, the AFP would receive approximately 
9 585 reports this year, an increase of almost 71 per cent.121 The AFP drew 
to the Committee’s attention the findings of a 2013 study by the 
United Kingdom’s Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre, that 
‘up to 85 per cent of online child sexual exploitation offenders have, or at 
some point, will contact offend against a child’.122  
2.120 The AFP also noted the potential for reports from its international 
counterparts to be delayed, which would require the AFP to access more 
historic telecommunications data, as was the case in Operations 
Drakensberg: 
The time taken in respect of the referral of an online child sexual 
exploitation matter by an international partner of the AFP, and the 
investigation by the AFP, is dependent on the complexities of the 
matter, evidence available, technology used, volume of data and 
the results available from internet service providers.123 
2.121 The Uniting Church in Australia’s Justice and International Mission Unit 
of the Synod of Victoria and Tasmania (hereafter referred to as the Uniting 
Church Justice and International Mission Unit) drew the Committee’s 
attention to the recommendations of the Asia-Pacific Financial Coalition 
Against Child Pornography that ‘both for Internet Service Providers and 
file sharing companies, data retention and preservation are critical 
functions in the fight against child pornography’.124 
2.122 The Unit also observed that: 
The Bill does not provide law enforcement agencies with any 
additional powers, nor does it give them any capacity to access 
metadata beyond what they already have. However, they cannot 
120  AFP, Submission 7.1, p. 11. 
121  AFP, Submission 7.2, p. 2. 
122  AFP, Submission 7.2, p. 1. 
123  AFP, Submission 7.2, p. 2. 
124  Asia-Pacific Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography, Confronting New Challenges in the 
Fight Against Child Pornography: Best Practices to Help File Hosting and File Sharing Companies 
Fight the Distribution of Child Sexual Exploitation Content, September 2013, p. 4, quoted in 
Uniting Church Justice and International Mission Unit, Submission 76, p. 5. 
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access the information if the company that has it has wiped it 
before the police are able to request it.125 
2.123 It was also argued that data retention is necessary to assist in the 
protection and promotion of human rights. 
2.124 For example, the Attorney-General’s Department, in evidence to the 
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 
summarised the Australian Government’s obligations under international 
human rights law to take positive steps to protect and promote 
fundamental human rights. The Department noted that this obligation is 
achieved in part through the maintenance of effective law enforcement 
and national security capabilities: 
International law to which Australia is a party recognises that 
Australians have a right to security of person, which requires the 
government to protect a person’s physical safety and right to life. 
That means we must have an effective criminal justice system and 
the capacity to undertake preventative operational measures to 
protect people from the worst behaviour of others. The Australian 
Government also has an obligation to provide the right to an 
effective remedy for victims of crime. That means agencies need 
the investigative tools that will enable offenders to be brought to 
justice. 
The government believes that effective access to 
telecommunications data is critical to the government meeting 
those responsibilities. In investigating past crimes and deterring 
and preventing future crimes, Australia’s agencies have come to 
rely heavily on telecommunications data. This should not be 
surprising, given how heavily the broader Australian population 
and the criminal element without our broader population have 
come to rely on communications technology … It is particularly 
necessary during the early stages of investigating crimes, where 
telecommunications data availability can often determine whether 
or not an investigation can succeed and the human rights of the 
victim can be protected.126 
2.125 The Uniting Church Justice and International Mission Unit’s submission 
contained a detailed review of Australia’s human rights obligations in 
relation to online child exploitation. In particular, the Unit drew the 
125  Uniting Church Justice and International Mission Unit, Submission 76, p. 9. 
126  Ms Jones, Committee Hansard, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 
Canberra, 2 February 2015, p. 43. 
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Committee’s attention to the United Nations Human Rights Council’s 
Resolution A/HRC/8/L.17 of 12 June 2008, calling on governments: 
2(g) To establish mechanisms, where appropriate, in cooperation 
with the international community, to combat the use of the 
Internet to facilitate trafficking in persons and crimes related to 
sexual or other forms of exploitation and to strengthen 
international cooperation to investigate and prosecute trafficking 
facilitated by the use of the Internet.127 
2.126 The Unit then noted Australia’s obligations under Articles 7, 8 and 17 of 
the ICCPR, Articles 16 and 34-36 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
and Article 9 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography to protect 
children from the cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment, sexual 
servitude, and violations of their privacy, honour and reputation 
associated with child exploitation, and argued that: 
The demonstrated likelihood that without data retention (as 
proposed in the Bill) hundreds, if not thousands, of offenders 
engaged in online child sexual abuse offences will escape detection 
and prosecution over time, should outweigh any concerns about 
the impact of data retention on the right to privacy. 
… 
It needs to be stressed that for the vast majority of Australians, law 
enforcement will never access the data retained under the 
requirements of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014, so the Unit rejects the 
arguments that retaining data is a violation of the privacy rights of 
all Australians.128 
2.127 Bravehearts argued that data retention represents a particular opportunity 
to improve conviction rates in relation to child sex offenders: 
[W]e know that trying to find evidence to prosecute sex offenders 
is very difficult. This is why we have such a low conviction rate, 
because it is such a difficult crime to prosecute. And this is an 
opportunity where there is actually evidence; the police can get 
evidence. And we would hate to see that squandered, because it is 
critical in terms of child protection that this metadata is retained 
127  Uniting Church Justice and International Mission Unit, Submission 76, p. 10. 
128  Uniting Church Justice and International Mission Unit, Submission 76, pp. 11–12. 
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and that police have access to it in order that they can identify 
children who are at risk.129 
2.128 Professor George Williams of the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law 
acknowledged the need for agencies to be able to intrude on individuals’ 
privacy by accessing telecommunications data, but emphasised the need 
for appropriate safeguards to ensure that such access occurs only as part 
of a legitimate investigation.130 
Can data retention meet the test as being effective for a legitimate 
aim? 
2.129 As noted above, for a measure to be considered ‘necessary’ for a legitimate 
aim, it must be shown to have some chance of achieving that goal. That is, 
even where a measure is properly directed at a legitimate aim, it may not 
be regarded as ‘necessary’ if it produces second-order consequences that 
undermine its likely efficacy. 
2.130 Mr Chris Berg, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Public Affairs argued that 
the existence of relatively easy-to-use counter-surveillance tools, such as 
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), would undermine the value of data 
retention for law enforcement and national security purposes: 
The law enforcement value of data retention will be seriously 
eroded by the large scale VPN use. Any mildly sophisticated user 
is capable of setting up a VPN on their computer or mobile phone. 
Given that data retention is intended for ‘serious crime’ in the 
words of the prime minister, it is likely that any serious criminals 
will deploy VPNs or other data retention countermeasures to 
prevent law enforcement action. The Institute of Public Affairs has 
previously identified VPNs as a critical barrier to government 
internet policy in the domain of copyright infringement. Security 
and law enforcement agencies – like copyright holders – have to 
understand how technological adaptation will limit the efficacy of 
desired new powers.131 
2.131 Communications Alliance, Mr Ben Johnston, and Mr Bernard Keane also 
highlighted this issue.132 
129  Mrs Hetty Johnston AM, Chief Executive Officer, Bravehearts, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
30 January 2015, p. 1. 
130  Professor Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 9. 
131  Mr Chris Berg, Senior Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs, Submission 94, p. 12. 
132  Communications Alliance (CA) and the Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association 
(AMTA), Submission 6, p. 16; Mr Ben Johnston, Submission 36, pp. 1–2; Mr Bernard Keane, 
Submission 37, pp. 5–6. 
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2.132 The Attorney-General’s Department addressed this argument, to the 
extent possible in public testimony, in evidence to the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs References Committee: 
I am sure you will appreciate that in this forum I need to be careful 
about talking about the capabilities of the agencies, but it is fair to 
say that notwithstanding that there is a variety of means by which 
those people who are engaged in criminal and security relevant 
activities might seek to engage and subvert any lawful access to 
their data or their activities, it remains the case … that data present 
a critical and unique tool and key lead piece of information in 
progressing their investigations.133 
2.133 A number of law enforcement and national security agencies gave 
evidence that telecommunications data is used most frequently in complex 
investigations where agencies would be expected to routinely encounter 
suspects practicing counter-surveillance techniques, indicating that it 
remains of considerable value in such circumstances. The AFP provided 
evidence that telecommunications data has been used in all recent 
cybercrime investigations, which inherently tend to involve highly 
technologically-sophisticated criminals, as well as virtually all counter-
terrorism, child protection and organised crime investigations, where 
suspects tend to adopt significant more advanced tradecraft than the 
average criminal.134 
2.134 Similarly, ASIO gave evidence that it uses telecommunications data in its 
counter-espionage and cyber-security investigations, and emphasised that: 
the 10 per cent or the two per cent outside, at the longest length of 
retention, is actually the most crucial information that you are 
looking for in terms of networks and … in terms of particularly 
espionage cases and cyber cases.135 
2.135 The Uniting Church Justice and International Mission Unit strongly 
opposed the argument that the uptake of counter-surveillance tools 
undermines the case for a data retention regime, noting that ‘the 
argument… would appear to be that because some offenders may adapt 
their behaviour… the capacity of law enforcement should be permitted to 
be eroded.’136 The Unit provided a detailed rebuttal of the argument, 
focusing in particular on the case of child exploitation: 
133  Ms Anna Harmer, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department, Committee 
Hansard, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Canberra, 2 February 
2015, p. 45. 
134  Commissioner Andrew Colvin, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 3. 
135  Ms Hartland, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 21. 
136  Uniting Church Justice and International Mission Unit, Submission 76, p. 8. 
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The argument is deeply flawed. While any improvement in tools 
for law enforcement to combat online criminal activity is likely to 
see some offenders adapt and use more sophisticated tools to 
avoid detection and capture, experience of law enforcement 
agencies is that many offenders do not adapt their behaviour and 
are more likely to get caught. The fact that many offenders 
engaged in extreme forms of online criminal activity do not 
currently make use of all the online tools available to them that 
would assist them in avoiding detection and capture is evidence 
that not all offenders have the knowledge or simply do not behave 
in a way that maximizes their ability to get away with their online 
criminal behaviour. 
For example, offenders who access child sexual abuse material do 
not appear as sophisticated as is often assumed. The [United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime] commented only 6% of 
offenders in one sample used encryption technology. In another 
sample, 17% used password protection, 3% evidence eliminating 
software and only 2% used remote storage systems. They note 
more sophisticated consumers could have evaded detection. 
However, such statistics serve as a warning that simply because a 
counter-strategy is technologically available does not mean that all 
offenders will avail themselves of the strategy.137 
2.136 The Unit also drew the Committee’s attention to the assessment of the 
Virtual Global Taskforce, which is an international coalition of law 
enforcement from 11 countries, as well as INTERPOL and Europol, 
dedicated to protecting children from sexual exploitation: 
[A]wareness is not the same as execution. Very few offenders are 
100% secure all of the time or in all respects. The collecting 
impulse and sexual drive of offenders often prevents them from 
being as secure as they would like. 
Equally, offenders cannot entirely control the behaviour of others. 
Participating in online forums, while necessary to access newer 
material, was deemed by some respondents to be something of a 
risk in itself, even in those environments in which administrators 
enforce security standards. In this respect, anonymity is never 
absolutely assured.138 
2.137 Communications Alliance noted that counter-surveillance tools may not 
entirely defeat agencies attempting to identify communications as part of a 
137  Uniting Church Justice and International Mission Unit, Submission 76, p. 7. 
138  Uniting Church Justice and International Mission Unit, Submission 76, p. 8. 
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lawful investigation,139 and that the existence of such tools may in fact 
represent a further justification for data retention: 
Equally you could make the argument that because there are holes 
you should make the pieces you can cover as absolutely stringent 
as possible. That is not an argument we are advancing, but we 
think it is an issue worthy of considering in the overall picture.140 
2.138 The European Commission’s Evaluation Report also noted that, despite 
concerns expressed by civil society groups that the introduction of data 
retention could lead to people to change their communications behaviour, 
‘there is no corroboratory evidence for any change in behaviour having 
taken place in any Member State concerned or in the EU generally’.141 
Can data retention meet the test as being proportionate for a 
legitimate aim? 
2.139 The Committee received a number of submissions arguing that mandatory 
telecommunications data retention would constitute a disproportionate 
interference with the rights to privacy and freedom of expression. As 
noted above, the Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights confirms 
that the retention of telecommunications data constitutes an interference 
with the rights to privacy and freedom of expression. 142  
2.140 Dr Lesley Lynch, Secretary of the New South Wales Council for Civil 
Liberties, emphasised the value of privacy to individuals and society: 
[P]rivacy, like security, does matter; it is not a trivial consideration 
in the balancing equation. Serious intrusions into privacy have real 
consequences for persons and for societies, and that is what we are 
grappling with balancing in this context.143 
2.141 Mr Chris Berg of the Institute of Public Affairs provided a more detailed 
explanation of the individual value of privacy: 
[W]e all require privacy to function and thrive. Let’s start with the 
mundane. Obviously we desire to keep personal details safe – 
credit card details, internet passwords - to protect ourselves 
against identity theft. On top of this, we seek to protect ourselves 
against the judgment or observation of others. We close the door 
139  Mr Stanton, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 39. 
140  Mr Stanton, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 39. 
141  European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Evaluation Report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), p. 26. 
142  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 14. 
143  Dr Lesley Lynch, Secretary, New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 79. 
 
50  
 
to the bathroom. We act differently with intimates than we do 
with colleagues. We often protect our thoughts, the details of our 
relationships, our preferences, from prevailing social norms. We 
compartmentalise. How many people would be uncomfortable 
with a colleague flipping through their mobile phone – with the 
window into a life that such access would provide?144 
2.142 Mr Berg also explained the value of a broad construction of freedom of 
speech, and the relationship between privacy and freedom of expression, 
insofar as ‘the threat or actuality of government surveillance may 
psychologically inhibit freedom of speech’,145 arguing that: 
The potential of surveillance – and there is no doubt that the data 
retention bill threatens to inculcate a culture of being under 
surveillance, given its possible breadth and future expansion – to 
limit freedom of speech is significant. Once the government has 
introduced this legal regime it is, barring future judicial oversight, 
unlikely to be repealed, and almost certain to be extended. The so-
called ‘balance between liberty and security’ is only ever moved in 
favour of security.146 
2.143 The Victorian Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection argued that 
‘the wide scale collection of metadata is an unjustified infringement on 
human rights’,147 and that retained data would: 
reveal patterns of communications that will enable those who have 
access to it to investigate and understand the private lives of all 
Australians, such as the habits of everyday life, places of residence, 
minute by minute movements, activities undertaken, social, 
professional and commercial arrangements, and relationships and 
social environments frequented.148 
2.144 Mr Jon Lawrence, of Electronic Frontiers Australia and the Australian 
Privacy Foundation, made similar arguments.149 
2.145 Mr Lawrence also drew the Committee’s attention to the conclusion of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, in its decision in Digital Rights 
Ireland, that, where telecommunications data is required to be retained:  
144  Mr Chris Berg, Senior Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs, Submission 94, p. 8. 
145  Quoting G.L. White and P.G. Zimbardo, The chilling effects of surveillance: Deindividuation and 
reactance, Office of Naval Research, 1975. 
146  Mr Chris Berg, Senior Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs, Submission 94, p. 10. 
147  Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection (Victoria), Submission 39, p. 9.  
148  Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection (Victoria), Submission 39, p. 8. 
149  Mr Jon Lawrence, Executive Officer, Electronic Frontiers Australia, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 21; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, p. 1. 
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Those data, taken as a whole, may allow very precise conclusions 
to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data 
has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent 
or temporary place of residence, daily or other movements, the 
activities carried out, the social relationships of those persons, and 
the social environments.150 
2.146 Dr David Lindsay, Vice Chair of the Australian Privacy Foundation, 
argued that the Bill is disproportionate, and a ‘sledgehammer that 
unjustifiably breaches the right to privacy who are overwhelmingly 
neither criminals nor terrorists’. Dr Lindsay cited a report of the Office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which states that: 
Concerns about whether access to and use of data are tailored to 
specific legitimate aims… raise questions about the increasing 
reliance of Governments on privacy sector actors to retain data 
‘just in case’ it is needed for government purposes. Mandatory 
third-party data retention – a recurring features of surveillance 
regimes in many States, where Governments require telephone 
companies and Internet service providers to store metadata about 
their customers’ communications and location… - appears neither 
necessary nor proportionate.151 
2.147 The Committee noted that the following paragraph of the Office’s report 
went on to list ‘factors that must be taken into account in determining 
proportionality’ in relation to ‘bulk data’ programs, such as data 
retention.152 Similarly, the preceding paragraph, which discussed the mass 
collection of communications or telecommunications data by government 
agencies (as opposed to third-party data retention) states that: 
Where there is a legitimate aim and appropriate safeguards are in 
place, a State might be allowed to engage in quite intrusive 
surveillance; however, the onus is on the Government to 
demonstrate that interference is both necessary and proportionate 
to the specific risk being addressed.153 
150  Digital Rights Ireland v Ireland; Kärtner Landesregierung, Seitlinger and Tschohl (joined cases  
C-293/12 and C-594/12, Court of Justice of the European Union, 8 April 2014), [27]. 
151  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age, A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014), [27], quoted by Dr David Lindsay, Vice-Chair, 
Australian Privacy Foundation, Committee Hansard, 30 January 2015, p. 77; the Law Institute of 
Victoria also referred the Committee to this paragraph of the report in Submission 117, p. 14. 
152  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age, A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014), [28]. 
153  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age, A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014), [26]. 
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2.148 Emeritus Professor Gillian Triggs, President of the Australian Human 
Rights Commission, drew a distinction between the magnitude of the 
privacy intrusion associated with access to telecommunications data by 
law enforcement and national security agencies, which she characterised 
as ‘powerful’,154 compared to the mandatory collection and retention of 
telecommunications data by a third-party service provider, which she 
characterised as ‘small’.155 
2.149 Mr Peter Leonard, from the Law Council of Australia, supported this 
distinction: 
The fact that data is retained about me is not, of itself, pervasive 
surveillance, but it does enter into the balance between those three 
rights—that if there is a risk that data may be used to undermine 
the other rights that I should enjoy, then that should be assessed in 
determining the proportionality of the data retention. So I think it 
is necessary to look, firstly, at the data retention, and balance its 
effect on other rights before we got to the question of 
proportionality as to how the data is used.156 
2.150 Mr Leonard went on to argue that whether telecommunications data 
should be retained and, if so, how much and for how long, are less 
significant issues than questions about the types of safeguards that should 
apply to protect that data from being improperly accessed or misused.157 
2.151 The Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights, which accompanies 
the Bill, notes that the proportionality of data retention cannot be 
considered in isolation from the purposes for which retained data can be 
lawfully used, and the safeguards that exist around the access to and use 
of such data: 
The Bill permissibly limits an individual’s privacy in 
correspondence (telecommunications) in a way which is 
reasonable and proportionate by circumscribing the types of 
telecommunications data that are to be retained by service 
providers to the essential categories of data required to advance 
criminal and security investigations, permitting access to 
telecommunications data only in circumstances prescribed by 
existing provisions in the TIA Act and moreover reducing the 
range of agencies who may access data under those provisions.158 
154  Professor Triggs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 76. 
155  Professor Triggs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 78. 
156  Mr Leonard, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 34. 
157  Mr Leonard, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 35. 
158  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 11. 
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2.152 The Privacy Impact Assessment for the Bill notes that ‘the kind of 
information that may be prescribed does not go beyond that which service 
providers are already generating to provide services, albeit that some 
service providers may not be recording the information or keeping it for 
very long’,159 and ultimately concludes that: 
we have concluded that the proposed changes set out in the draft 
Amendment Bill do not appear to have significant privacy 
implications.160 
2.153 Dr Roger Clarke, Immediate Past Chair of the Australian Privacy 
Foundation, disagreed with Professor Triggs’ and Dr Leonard’s 
assessment that data retention, of itself, involves a small intrusion on 
privacy and is not pervasive surveillance: 
[T]his is mass surveillance that is to be imposed by the parliament 
on the Australian people. We have skirted around that and never 
used the word. There has been mention of personal surveillance—
the collection of data about individuals who come to attention and 
about whom there is reasonable suspicion et cetera. That has been 
mentioned in passing. But this moves way, way beyond that, to 
mass surveillance.161 
2.154 Professor Williams, while supporting data retention, emphasised that the 
fact that data retention will potentially apply to all Australians’ 
communications is an important distinguishing factor from other law 
enforcement and national security measures, and emphasised the need for 
appropriate safeguards.162 
2.155 In its submission, ASIO argued that the view that telecommunications 
data is, or will be, used for ‘mass surveillance’ is a misconception. In 
particular, ASIO advised the Committee that: 
 ASIO does not engage in ‘large-scale mass gathering of 
communications data’, and that it ‘does not have the resources, the 
need, or the inclination’ to do so, and 
159  Australian Government Solicitor, Privacy Impact Assessment: Proposed amendments to the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, 15 December 2014, p. 15 (appended to 
Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27). 
160  Australian Government Solicitor, Privacy Impact Assessment: Proposed amendments to the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, 15 December 2014, p. 25 (appended to 
Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27). 
161  Dr Roger Clarke, Immediate Past Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation, Committee Hansard, 
30 January 2015, p. 78; see also, Dr Clarke, Committee Hansard, Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs References Committee, 2 February 2015, p. 20. 
162  Professor Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 9. 
 
54  
 
 at most, a few thousand people come to ASIO’s attention each year as 
part of security investigations, inquiries and leads that may require 
access to telecommunications data.163 
2.156 In her submission, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 
(IGIS) advised that the Attorney-General’s Guidelines for ASIO require, 
among other things, that: 
 any means used by ASIO for obtaining information must be 
proportionate to the gravity of the threat posed and the probability of 
its occurrence, and 
 inquiries and investigations into individuals and groups must be 
undertaken using as little intrusion into individual privacy as is 
possible, consistent with the performance of ASIO’s functions.164 
2.157 As noted earlier, the Director-General of Security explained to the 
Committee how the legal restrictions contained in the Guidelines are 
applied in practice: 
It is not and will not be the case that ASIO automatically requests 
the maximum amount of data available. Should this bill become 
law, ASIO will continue to request access to historical 
communication data needed only for the purpose of carrying out 
our function, regardless of the length of time that data may be 
available for. We abide by the law.165 
2.158 The IGIS confirmed that her Office inspects ASIO’s access to and use of 
both historic and prospective telecommunications data, that there is a high 
rate of compliance in this area, and that she had not identified any 
concerns with ASIO’s access to such information.166  
2.159 Professor Triggs challenged the view that telecommunications data is less 
privacy sensitive than the content of communications, noting that: 
A great deal can be learned from metadata. Indeed, in many cases, 
more can be learned from metadata than can be learned from 
content, especially as many people are extremely cautious about 
content but forget that it is the metadata that can actually lead law 
enforcement agencies to a paedophile ring, to a terrorist group or 
to serious criminals.167 
163  ASIO, Submission 12.1, p. 10. 
164  IGIS, Submission 131, p. 6. 
165  Mr Lewis, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 65. 
166  IGIS, Submission 131, p. 5. 
167  Professor Triggs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 71. 
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2.160 However, the Explanatory Memorandum argues that telecommunications 
data is less privacy sensitive than the content of communications.168 The 
Bill’s Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights also identifies that 
the degree of this interference differs in relation to various elements of the 
proposed data set. For example, the Statement identifies that 
subscriber data, as the predominant data category which would be 
generated through the collection of customer information, raises 
relatively fewer privacy implications than traffic and location data 
comparators.169 
2.161 The Attorney-General’s Department, in its supplementary submission, 
drew the Committee’s attention to the conclusion of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union that: 
even though the retention of data required by Directive 2006/24 
constitutes a particularly serious interference with those rights, it 
is not such as to adversely affect the essence of those rights given 
that, as follows from Article 1(2) of the directive, the directive does 
not permit the acquisition of knowledge of the content of the 
electronic communications as such.170 
2.162 Professor Williams noted that, ‘I do think there are different degrees of 
information… I think there is a clear distinction between the stored 
communications as to content and metadata.’  
2.163 However, Professor Williams also observed that: 
I think the community is sending a pretty strong signal to your 
committee that they do see this information as sensitive. You only 
need to look at the public debate and the public reaction about this 
to see that the community does not see this as ordinary 
information but is actually very concerned as to the circumstances 
in which government agencies would access it.171 
2.164 A number of submissions and witnesses argued that the Government 
should consider less privacy-intrusive alternatives to data retention.172  
2.165 Mr Vaile and Mr Remati drew the Committee’s attention to a recent report 
of the US National Research Council, entitled Bulk Collection of Signals 
168  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 3. 
169  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 14. 
170  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, p. 9, referring to  Digital Rights Ireland v 
Ireland; Kärtner Landesregierung, Seitlinger and Tschohl (joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, 
Court of Justice of the European Union, 8 April 2014), [39]. 
171  Professor Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 8. 
172  See, for example: Privacy International, Submission 80, p. 11; Mr Lawrence, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 22. 
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Intelligence: Technical Options.173 The report, released on 15 January 2015, 
evaluated whether viable alternatives existed to the bulk collection of 
signals intelligence by US intelligence agencies, and concludes that: 
there are no technical alternatives that can accomplish the same 
functions as bulk collection and serve as a complete substitute for 
it; there is no technological magic.174 
2.166 Some submitters argued that viable alternatives existed to a mandatory 
data retention regime, such as the use of the existing preservation notice 
regime under Part 3-1A of the TIA Act. The Australian Privacy 
Foundation argued that: 
[I]n proposing a mandatory blanket data retention regime, the 
government has given insufficient consideration to the potential 
benefits of a targeted data preservation regime, in which relevant 
agencies may selectively require the preservation of 
telecommunications data, provided always that satisfactory 
procedural safeguards are met … In any case, no consideration 
appears to have been given to the merits of adapting and 
extending a regime such as the Chapter 3 preservation notice 
regime, to appropriately apply to the preservation of non-content 
telecommunications data.175 
2.167 Similarly, Mr Keane argued that agencies could currently use these notices 
to preserve telecommunications data as an alternative to data retention: 
The ‘going dark’ argument is further undermined by the fact that 
ASIO simply doesn’t use existing tools designed explicitly to 
enable data retention.  
For two years, ASIO, the AFP and state police forces have had the 
power, under the Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Act 2012, to 
require communications companies to store information that may 
help in the investigation of a ‘serious contravention’ — an offence 
punishable by three years or more in jail — for up to 90 days 
before getting a warrant to access the data. The only limitation on 
the requests apart from the seriousness of the offence is that it 
173  Mr Vaile and Mr Remati, Submission 194, p. 8. 
174  United States National Research Council, Bulk Collection of Signals Intelligence: Technical 
Options, pp. 4–5; The Committee notes that the report primarily concerns foreign intelligence 
collection by US Government agencies, as quite distinct from the Government’s proposal to 
require Australian telecommunications companies to keep records at arms-length from 
Australian agencies. Nevertheless, much of the Council’s core analysis around the utility of 
retaining information and possible alternative approaches is relevant to this Committee’s 
consideration of the Bill. 
175  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, p. 30. 
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must be targeted at one person, but an agency can issue as many 
preservation notices as necessary.176 
2.168 Mr Berg raised the question of whether any inadequacies within the 
preservation notice regime could be rectified, as an alternative to 
implementing data retention.177 
2.169 This Committee previously received evidence from the Attorney-General’s 
Department about whether preservation notices are a viable alternative to 
data retention as part of its Inquiry into potential reforms of Australia’s 
national security legislation: 
Data preservation involves a [carrier or carriage service provider 
(C/CSP)] preserving specific telecommunications data identified 
by an agency that it has available on its network in relation to a 
relevant investigation or intelligence gathering activity on 
notification by an agency. Given the current authority under the 
TIA Act for agencies to access telecommunications data from a 
C/CSP when it has been identified as being relevant to a specific 
investigation or intelligence gathering activity, agencies already 
have the ability to access telecommunications data that the C/CSP 
has on hand at the time of the request or that comes into existence 
into the future, negating the need for data preservation.178 
2.170 The Department’s submission to this inquiry contained further discussion 
on this issue.179 In particular, the Department explained that such notices, 
which are currently issued under Part 3-1A of the TIA Act (‘Preserving 
stored communications’) apply only to ‘stored communications’, such as 
emails and SMS messages, and the associated telecommunications data.180 
This is consistent with the Department’s previous evidence to the Joint 
Select Committee on Cyber-Safety that preservation notices apply only to 
‘stored computer data’, as defined in the Convention on Cybercrime and 
which equates to ‘stored communications’ under the TIA Act.181 
176  Mr Bernard Keane, Submission 37, p. 7. 
177  Mr Chris Berg, Senior Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs, Submission 94, p. 13. 
178  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 218 to the Inquiry into potential reforms of Australia’s 
national security legislation, p. 8, quoted at p. 163 of the Report of the inquiry into potential reforms 
of Australia’s national security legislation. 
179  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, pp. 17–18. 
180  TIA Act, section 107J. 
181  See: Ms Catherine Smith, Assistant Secretary, Telecommunications and Surveillance Law 
Branch, Attorney-General’s Department, Committee Hansard, Joint Select Committee on Cyber-
Safety, 1 August 2011, p. 31; Mr David Cramsie, Senior Legal Officer, Telecommunications and 
Surveillance Law Branch, Attorney-General’s Department, Committee Hansard,  Joint Select 
Committee on Cyber-Safety, 1 August 2011, p. 32. 
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2.171 The Department acknowledged that the preservation notice regime could 
be amended or expanded, as suggested by Mr Berg, but argued that while 
preservation notices could complement data retention, they would not be 
a substitute for it: 
The purpose of preservation notices is to ‘quick freeze’ volatile or 
perishable electronic evidence that a provider possesses for a short 
period of time, to allow agencies time to apply for and obtain a 
warrant to access that information. Evidence cannot be preserved 
if it was never retained, or if it has already been deleted. 
… 
As such, data retention is in fact a prerequisite to preservation of 
data, rather than preservation offering an alternative to 
retention.182 
2.172 The Director-General of Security provided the Committee with his views 
about the circumstances in which preservation notices are, and are not, of 
use to ASIO: 
It is something we use and it is absolutely the case that if we were 
aware that something was likely to happen that you can in fact put 
in place a preservation order around that particular set of 
circumstances to understand it better going forward. But all of that 
of course is prospective. Your earlier question… is a retrospective 
issue and retrospectivity is a different set of issues here.183 
2.173 The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) drew 
the Committee’s attention to the fact that preservation notices are of 
limited value, in particular, as part of anti-corruption investigations: 
ACLEI notes that data retention alternatives, such as preservation 
notices, are currently available under the TIA Act. However, 
ACLEI’s experience is that these alternatives are most relevant 
when it is desirable to ensure preservation of future information, 
such as when a person is under investigation and is likely to 
commit further crimes. Preservation of past data is entirely limited 
to the carrier’s business practices. 
The nature of corruption – particularly in a law enforcement 
context where officers are more aware of surveillance limitations 
and able to defeat them – means that relevant conduct is covert 
and may not come to light for some months or years after the 
event. It follows that preservation notices cannot assist an 
182  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 17. 
183  Mr Lewis, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 69. 
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investigation if the data sought has already been deleted by the 
carrier.184 
2.174 The AFP also argued that, without data retention, agencies would 
frequently lack the necessary information to identify a suspect and serve a 
preservation notice, rendering the preservation notice power ‘ineffective’ 
in many situations: 
In many instances, the role that data place in the early stages of 
investigations is to assist in attribution: that is, data is a crucial tool 
in identifying the suspect in a criminal act or event, and in clearing 
other persons from suspected involvement. Where this data is 
unavailable because it has not been retained, investigations have 
been unable to progress.185 
2.175 The US National Research Council’s report considered the comparative 
value of retained data compared to targeted collection or preservation: 
If past events become interesting in the present for understanding 
new events… historical facts and the context they provide will be 
available for analysis only if they were previously collected. 
… 
Targeted collection provides data only on present and future 
actions of parties of interest at the time of collection, but not their 
past activities.186  
2.176 In its submission, the Department drew the Committee’s attention to a 
number of international evaluations of whether preservation notices are a 
viable substitute for data retention, including the Council of Europe’s 
Assessment Report: Implementation of the preservation provisions of the 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime,187 the European Commission’s Evidence 
of the Potential Impacts of Options for Revising the Data Retention Directive: 
Current approaches to data preservation in the EU and in third countries,188 and 
the Netherlands Government’s The Dutch implementation of the Data 
Retention Directive.189 Each of these reports concluded that preservation 
notices are not a substitute for accessing existing telecommunications data. 
184  Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, Submission 48, p. 8. 
185  AFP, Submission 7.1, p. 13. 
186  United States National Research Council, Bulk Collection of Signals Intelligence: Technical 
Options, p. 4-1. 
187  Council of Europe, Assessment Report: Implementation of the preservation provisions of the Budapest 
Convention on Cybercrime, 2012, pp. 75-76. 
188  European Commission, Evidence of the Potential Impacts of Options for Revising the Data Retention 
Directive: Current approaches to data preservation in the EU and in third countries, 2012, pp. 22-23. 
189  Netherlands Government, The Dutch implementation of the Data Retention Directive, 2014, 
pp. 110–111. 
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2.177 As noted above, Mr Leonard of the Law Council argued that the available 
evidence shows that existing arrangements for the retention of 
telecommunications data by service providers are adequate for the 
purposes of national security and law enforcement investigations.190 
2.178 Similarly, the Australian Interactive Media Industry Association (AIMIA) 
Digital Policy Group (DPG) argued that: 
law enforcement are not fully utilising the data that is currently 
available to them, particularly metadata that is publicly available. 
The DPG members expect that law enforcement should make full 
use of such information before embarking on a fishing expedition 
by requiring businesses to retain data for a defined period of 
time.191 
2.179 The substance of this issue is largely addressed in the preceding 
discussion about the necessity of data retention. However, the Attorney-
General’s Department, in evidence to the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs References Committee, observed that: 
[A] number of commentators I think have referred to the existing 
practices of industry in retaining telecommunications data and 
that that provides an avenue to avail agencies of the data that they 
need to conduct investigations. In that regard, the key thing that 
we would note is that telecommunications industry practices are 
changing and that they are changing at a rapid rate. A number of 
providers have indicated in evidence before committees, most 
recently the PJCIS, the fact that they have significant gaps in their 
holdings of data, particularly in relation to more modern 
telecommunications services as opposed to traditional telephony 
services. And of course the range of service s is constantly 
changing and their business practices are being driven by the 
profitability of their particular companies. They are driven by 
commercial needs rather than the needs of law enforcement and 
security agencies. So the alignment between what has historically 
been a coincidence between the business practices of the 
telecommunications industry and the needs of law enforcement 
and security agencies is moving apart and that is why there is in 
part the need to address the retention of telecommunications 
data.192  
190  Mr Leonard, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 31. 
191  AIMIA Digital Policy Group, Submission 34, p. 5. 
192  Ms Harmer, Committee Hansard, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References 
Committee, Canberra, 2 February 2015, pp. 44–45. 
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2.180 In evaluating the proportionality of a data retention regime for national 
security and law enforcement purposes, the Committee received a range 
of evidence on comparable international regimes. As the Committee has 
noted above, Australia’s human rights obligations at international law 
derive from, among other instruments, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. Nevertheless, the reasoning of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, in its decision in Digital Rights Ireland, 
provides useful guidance for evaluating the proportionality of a proposed 
data retention scheme: 
[A]ny limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms laid 
down by the Charter must be provided for by law, respect their 
essence and, subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations 
may be made to those rights and freedoms only if they are 
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others. 193 
2.181 The Court went on to conclude that the form of data retention established 
by the Data Retention Directive (upon which the Bill is based): 
 was provided for by law, 
 respected the essence of the right to privacy, as it did not ‘permit the 
acquisition of knowledge of the content of electronic 
communications’,194  
 respected the essence of the right to the protection of personal data, as 
Member States were required under separate EU Directives to ‘ensure 
that appropriate technical and organisational measures are adopted 
against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alternation 
of the data’,195 and 
 ‘genuinely satisfie[d] an objective of general interest’, namely being to 
contribute to public security through the fight against international 
terrorism, the maintenance of international peace and security, the fight 
against crime and, in particular, organised crime, and the promotion of 
the right of any person to security.196 
193  Digital Rights Ireland v Ireland; Kärtner Landesregierung, Seitlinger and Tschohl (joined cases  
C-293/12 and C-594/12, Court of Justice of the European Union, 8 April 2014), [38]. 
194  Digital Rights Ireland v Ireland; Kärtner Landesregierung, Seitlinger and Tschohl (joined cases  
C-293/12 and C-594/12, Court of Justice of the European Union, 8 April 2014), [39]. 
195  Digital Rights Ireland v Ireland; Kärtner Landesregierung, Seitlinger and Tschohl (joined cases  
C-293/12 and C-594/12, Court of Justice of the European Union, 8 April 2014), [40]. 
196  Digital Rights Ireland v Ireland; Kärtner Landesregierung, Seitlinger and Tschohl (joined cases  
C-293/12 and C-594/12, Court of Justice of the European Union, 8 April 2014), [41]–[44]. 
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2.182 As summarised in the Australian Human Rights Commission’s 
submission, the Court’s decision to strike down the Directive was, 
therefore, based on ‘several characteristics of the Data Retention Directive 
that rendered the regime disproportionate’.197 
2.183 The Attorney-General’s Department summarised the key issues identified 
by the Court, being that the Directive: 
 ‘cover[ed], in a generalised manner, all persons and all means of 
electronic communication as well as all traffic data without any 
differentiation, limitation or exception’, 
 ‘fail[ed] to lay down any objective criterion by which to determine the 
limits of the access of the competent national authorities to the data and 
their subsequent use for the purposes of prevention, detection or 
criminal prosecutions’ (such matters were left to each member-State of 
the EU to determine), 
 ‘require[ed] that those data be retained for a period of at least six 
months, without any distinction being made between the categories of 
data … on the basis of their possible usefulness for the purposes of the 
objective pursued or according to the persons concerned’, 
 ‘[did] not provide for sufficient safeguards… to ensure effective 
protection of the data retained against the risk of abuse and against any 
unlawful access and use of that data’, and 
 ‘[did] not require the data in question to be retained within the 
European Union’.198 
2.184 The effect of this decision, in the Australian Human Rights Commission’s 
view, was to ‘define the limits of permissible data retention pursuant to 
human rights law’,199 rather than to prohibit data retention outright. The 
Committee noted that similar conclusions have been reached by the 
German Constitutional Court and the Czech Republic’s Constitutional 
Court, striking down domestic laws on particular grounds while 
confirming that data retention may, in principle, be a necessary and 
proportionate response.200 Similarly, courts in Cyprus and Bulgaria have 
197  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, p. 5. 
198  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 39. 
199  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, p. 5. 
200  Judgement of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1 BvR 256/08, of 2 March 2010; Official Gazette 
of 1 April 2011, Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 22 March on the provisions of 
section 97 paragraph 3 and 4 of Act No. 127/2005 Coll. on electronic communications and 
amending certain related acts as amended, and Decree No 485/2005 Coll. on the data retention 
and transmission to competent authorities. 
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annulled individual elements of their national laws, without affecting the 
validity of data retention as a whole in those countries.201 
2.185 The Romanian Constitutional Court held data retention to be 
unconstitutional in 2009.202 Additionally, as the Department notes in its 
submission: 
The invalidation of the Directive has resulted in the annulment of 
a number of data retention laws in member States where the 
Directive was implemented, in particular in jurisdictions that had 
effectively transposed the Directive without incorporating 
additional, national safeguards.203 
2.186 The outcomes of these international decisions indicates that the 
assessment of the proportionality of a mandatory data retention scheme 
must take into account the existence and extent of safeguards to protect 
against unlawful or improper access to or use of retained information. 
Privacy concerns relating to legal professional privilege 
and obligations of professional confidence 
2.187 The Committee received evidence from a number of submitters and 
witnesses identifying particular privacy concerns regarding access to 
telecommunications data about communications that may be subject to 
legal professional privilege or to obligations of professional confidence, 
such as a journalist’s obligation to protect the confidentiality of their 
sources.204 
2.188 The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights has requested the 
advice of the Attorney-General as to whether access to 
telecommunications data under the TIA Act may impact on legal 
professional privilege and, if so, how this is proportionate with the right to 
privacy.205 
2.189 The Attorney-General’s Department noted that existing safeguards under  
the Public Interest Disclosures Act 2013 immunise Commonwealth officials 
201  Supreme Court of the Republic of Cyprus, Decision in civil applications 65/2009, 78/2009, 
82/2009 and 15/2010-22/2010, 1 February 2011; Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria, 
No. 13627, 11 December 2008. 
202  Decision no 1258 from 8 October 2009 of the Romanian Constitutional Court, Romanian 
Official Monitor No 789, 23 November 2009. 
203  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 39. 
204  See, for example, Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 22; Media, Entertainment and 
Arts Alliance, Submission 90, p. 4. 
205  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Fifteenth Report to the 44th Parliament, p. 17. 
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from any form of criminal, civil or administrative liability for making a 
legitimate public interest disclosure, and that: 
As such, data access powers will generally not be available to law 
enforcement agencies in relation to genuine whistleblowers by 
reason of those disclosures.206 
2.190 The Department’s submission further argued that, where particular 
conduct has been determined to be criminal in nature, agencies should 
have access to appropriate tools to investigate that conduct : 
Disclosures of data are available to support the enforcement of the 
criminal law, administration of pecuniary penalties and the 
protection of the public revenue. It is not appropriate to afford a 
special status to particular types of communications as powers of 
this type should, by their nature, be applied generally.207 
2.191 The Law Council of Australia acknowledged that there are circumstances 
in which access to telecommunications data about a lawyer’s 
communications will be justifiable, including where the communications 
are in furtherance of the commission of a crime.208 Similar reasoning 
would apply to communications within other relationships that are subject 
to obligations of confidence. 
2.192 In evidence, the Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance argued that the Bill 
should not be passed, but that if it were passed it would be preferable that 
law enforcement and national security agencies should be precluded from 
accessing telecommunications data to investigate criminal offences 
involving the unlawful disclosure of information covered by the official 
secrecy provisions of the Crimes Act 1914:209 
The real concern of all this is that the use and the keeping of 
metadata makes the ability to identify confidential sources and the 
communication between a confidential source and a journalist 
transparent to the authorities. We have seen over the past 10 or 15 
years an increasing amount of referral to particularly the 
Australian Federal Police for investigation of breaches under the 
Crimes Act.  
… 
There is no doubt under the current legislation, because of the 
failure of repeated governments to decriminalise the leaking of 
206  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 22. 
207  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 21. 
208  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 22. 
209  Mr Christopher Warren, Federal Secretary, Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 38. 
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information, that a whistleblower or a confidential source of 
whatever nature is committing a crime—when they are a 
government employee—when they release information to a 
journalist. 
… 
The problem of having a criminalised approach like that is it acts 
as a very serious chilling effect. The main impact of this legislation 
is to have a chilling effect on any potential whistleblower or 
confidential source releasing information they would not want to 
release. 
2.193 The Committee recognises the heightened public interest in ensuring the 
confidentiality of certain privileged or confidential communications, as 
well as in promoting public confidence in the confidentiality of those 
communications. This issue is considered in greater detail later in the 
report (see Chapter 6). 
The security of retained telecommunications data 
2.194 Whether or not telecommunications data retained under a mandatory data 
retention scheme can be effectively secured is critical to assessing whether 
such a scheme is a proportionate for national security and law 
enforcement purposes. 
2.195 The Committee received a range of evidence that retained 
telecommunications data would be vulnerable to unauthorised access.210 
The risk of unauthorised access to or modification of telecommunications 
data retained by carriers is closely related to privacy and civil liberties 
concerns. The Australian Privacy Commissioner observed that data 
retention: 
creates a risk that the data may be misused, such as through 
inappropriate access or the risk of identity theft and fraud as a 
result of data breaches.211 
2.196 Mr Tom Courtney submitted that ISPs would implement inadequate 
security controls to reduce costs: 
210  See, for example: Ms Clark, Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, 
Committee Hansard, 29 January 2015, p. 81; Mr Lawrence, Electronic Frontiers Australia, 
Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 21. 
211  Mr Timothy Pilgrim PSM, Australian Privacy Commissioner, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
29 January 2015, p. 46. 
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As storing the data will have to be implemented by the ISP’s it will 
not necessarily have the appropriate security controls. It is very 
likely that ISPs will implement the cheapest solution at the 
expense of security which would lead to this data being easily 
hacked by any malicious person or organisation.212 
2.197 Mr Courtney’s concerns echo public comments previously made by the 
then Chief Regulatory Officer of iiNet that ‘we’ll be looking for the 
cheapest, lowest-cost option. That means cloud storage and the lowest-
cost cloud storage in the world today is in China’.213 
2.198 Telstra’s Chief Information Security Officer explained to the Committee 
how implementing a data retention scheme may increase, but not 
fundamentally alter the nature of the information security risks currently 
faced by service providers: 
We do secure the data we have today. So we do have that problem 
today. The issue here is that now we are advertising that for a 
customer of Telstra there is a whole range of data, depending on 
what services they have, that for two years we can make available 
upon lawful request. If I were that way inclined as a hacker, you 
would go for that system, because it would give you the pot of 
gold as opposed to working your way through our multitude of 
systems today to try to extract some data. But your fundamental 
point is that, yes, we face this risk today—absolutely.214 
2.199 Optus provided an alternative view on how the centralised storage of data  
may alter the level of information security risk: 
[H]aving a relatively limited, well-defined dataset as opposed to 
our entire internal commercial dataset … just makes that task a lot 
easier. Mr Burgess from Telstra did say that yes, there will be a—I 
think the word he used was ‘honeypot’. Clearly just the existence 
of a database will attract people’s interest. But if it is a well-
defined database and it is not the entire set of data or processes 
that we maintain, it should be a relatively straightforward task to 
segregate it for security purposes, and possible encrypt it, if need 
be. It is a sensible thing to have things like electronic sand traps—
212  Mr Tom Courtney, Submission 23, p. 1. 
213  Mr Steve Dalby, Chief Regulatory Officer, iiNet Ltd, quoted in ‘New laws to stop web storage 
hackers’, Sydney Morning Herald, 31 October 2014, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-
politics/political-news/new-laws-to-stop-web-storage-hackers-20141031-11f3qz.html> viewed 
26 February 2015.  
214  Mr Mike Burgess, Chief Information Security Officer, Telstra, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
p. 9. 
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all of the access protocols that we apply to the most sensitive 
information already.215 
2.200 Optus further observed that, because information retained in accordance 
with data retention obligations may only need to be accessed by a 
provider’s law enforcement liaison unit, providers may actually have 
options to secure such information to a greater extent than is possible for 
most telecommunications data currently held by industry:  
One of the options that may be considered is putting all of this 
data onto its own system, its own separate database, so that the 
only people who can access that system are the law enforcement 
liaison unit staff and it is not available for other people in the 
business and so, therefore, it is not linked out into the wide world 
where people can attack it from. That is one of the options that 
providers could give very serious consideration to.216 
2.201 The telecommunications industry is currently subject to a range of 
information security obligations. Most service providers, with the 
exception of those with an annual turnover of less than $3 million, are 
required to comply with the information security provisions of the 
Privacy Act 1988. The Attorney-General’s Department noted that these 
obligations require service providers to ‘adopt a risk-based approach to 
protecting personal information in their possession from misuse, 
interference or loss, as well as from unauthorised access, modification or 
disclosure’.217 
2.202 The Department also drew the Committee’s attention to the guidelines 
issued by the Australian Information Commissioner, which explain that 
entities must consider a range of factors when determining how to protect 
information they hold, including the amount and sensitivity of the 
personal information, and the possible adverse consequences for an 
individual. In particular, the guidelines state that ‘[m]ore rigorous steps 
may be required as the quantity of personal information increases’.218 
2.203 Communications Alliance also confirmed that service providers are 
currently required to comply with the Australian Government Protective 
Security Policy Framework (PSPF), which sets out mandatory 
requirements for physical, personnel and information security, and the 
Information Security Manual (ISM), which is developed by the Australian 
215  Mr Epstein, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 22. 
216  Mr Michael Elsegood, Member of Communications Alliance, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
17 December 2014, p. 40. 
217  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 37. 
218  Australian Information Commissioner, Australian Privacy Principles guidelines (2014), [11.7]. 
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Signals Directorate and sets out executive guidance, principles and 
technical security controls to mitigate risks to information and systems.219  
2.204 The Committee notes that it is not common for private sector 
organisations to be required to comply with the PSPF and ISM. 
2.205 The Government has also undertaken to implement further, industry-wide 
telecommunications sector security reforms (TSSR), recommended by this 
Committee in May 2013, before data retention is fully implemented.220 In 
its submission, the Department explained that: 
TSSR is designed to ensure the security and integrity of Australia’s 
telecommunication infrastructure by encouraging ongoing 
awareness and responsibility for network security by the 
telecommunications industry, and will extend to provide better 
protection of information held by industry in accordance with data 
retention obligations. 
TSSR will impose an obligation on service providers to do their 
best to prevent unauthorised access and unauthorised interference 
to telecommunications networks and facilities, including where 
the provider outsources functions.221 
2.206 The Bill does not introduce new information security obligations for 
retained telecommunications data. However, the Department argued: 
it is preferable to implement a holistic security framework for the 
telecommunications sector, rather than imposing specific, stand-
alone and potentially duplicative security obligations that apply 
only to a relatively narrow subsection of the information held by 
industry.222 
2.207 Mr Peter Froelich, appearing as an industry member of the 
Communications Alliance, stressed that, beyond their legal obligations, 
providers have commercial and ethical incentives, as well as a range of 
tools, to secure customer information: 
[A]s an industry, we have every reason and every intention to 
protect the privacy and security of our customers. For our industry 
members, there would be no reason why we do anything less with 
their data under this regime than we do under anything else. All 
of those security structures and tools available to us—firewalls, 
219  Mr Stanton, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 39. 
220  The Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, Minister for Communications, House of Representatives 
Hansard, 30 October 2014, p. 12562; Ms Jones, Attorney-General’s Department, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 2. 
221  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 38. 
222  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 37. 
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physical security and encryption—we would put in place to 
ensure that our customers’ privacy and security is maintained 
along with the interface with government as well. Those are 
standard practices now in the way we deal with law enforcement 
and national security and the way we deal with customers’ data.223 
Committee comment 
2.208 The Committee received a great deal of evidence on the question of 
whether mandatory data retention is a necessary and proportionate 
measure for national security and law enforcement purposes. Much of this 
evidence was received in public. The Committee has also received 
classified and commercially confidential evidence. The Committee has 
carefully weighed the totality of the evidence before it when considering 
this issue. 
2.209 The value of telecommunications data to national security and law 
enforcement investigations is indisputable. Its value is rising as criminals 
and persons engaged in activities prejudicial to security increasingly rely 
on communications technology to plan, facilitate and carry out their 
activities, while the ability of agencies to lawfully intercept the content of 
those communications declines.  
2.210 Several submissions and witnesses argued that this Bill is not urgent, due 
to the long-term nature of the challenges facing agencies and the fact that, 
should this Bill be passed, it would take up to two years following Royal 
Assent for data retention to be fully implemented.224 This is an argument 
which the Committee has carefully considered.  
2.211 Nearly two years ago, the previous Committee concluded that the ability 
of national security and law enforcement agencies to safeguard national 
security and public safety, and to combat serious crime, had already been 
degraded as a result of service providers keeping fewer records about the 
services they provide. This degradation has continued.  
2.212 This Committee has been briefed on numerous, major investigations into 
serious criminal activity that have failed as a result of these changes. For 
example, the AFP have been unable to identify nearly half of all suspects 
in a current child exploitation investigation, because a number of 
Australian service providers do not retain basic IP address allocation 
223  Mr Peter Froelich, Industry Member, Communications Alliance, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
17 December 2014, pp. 39–40. 
224  See, for example, Mr Lawrence, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 25. 
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records—which are akin to a person’s phone number—for any length of 
time.225 In South Australia, service providers not retaining 
telecommunications data for mobile phones has stalled murder 
investigations.226 In New South Wales, more than 80 per cent of requests 
for internet-related data for police investigations have been 
unsuccessful.227 In Queensland, the unavailability of critical 
telecommunications data prevented police from identifying an offender in 
a child exploitation investigation; that offender continued to sexually 
abuse a young girl for more than four years until his identity was 
discovered as part of a separate investigation.228 
2.213 The Committee has also received detailed, classified evidence on the 
impact that the inconsistent retention of telecommunications data has had 
on national security investigations, including counter-terrorism, counter-
espionage and cyber-security investigations. This long-term decline in the 
availability of telecommunications data has undermined ASIO’s ability to 
detect and prevent threats to national security and public safety. ASIO has 
confirmed that these changes in commercial retention practices have 
prevented it from replicating previous, specific successes in safeguarding 
national security.229  
2.214 Accordingly, the Committee accepts that introducing a mandatory data 
retention regime is necessary to support our national security and law 
enforcement agencies’ capabilities.  
2.215 In the Committee’s view, the appropriate balance is to implement a data 
retention scheme that is strictly limited to what is necessary and 
proportionate, while ensuring that appropriate limits, safeguards and 
oversight mechanisms are in place to address privacy and civil liberties 
concerns. In examining the Bill, the committee has given careful 
consideration to the appropriate safeguards and oversight mechanisms 
that can be implemented to ensure the integrity of a data retention regime, 
and to protect and promote fundamental human rights and civil liberties, 
as the Australian public expects.   
 
225 AFP, Submission No. 76, p. 11. 
226  South Australia Police, Submission No. 9, p. 3; Assistant Commissioner Dickson, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 48.  
227  Assistant Commissioner Lanyon, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 43. 
228  Bravehearts, Submission No. 33, pp. 5-6. 
229  ASIO, Submission 12.1, p. 30. 
 
 3 
The data set 
Introduction 
3.1 Proposed new Division 1 of Part 5-1A of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (the Bill), 
entitled ‘Obligation to keep information and documents’, would establish 
a mandatory telecommunications data retention regime. The proposed 
regime would require carriers, carriage service providers and internet 
service providers to retain a defined set of telecommunications data for 
two years, ensuring that such data remained available for law enforcement 
and national security investigations.  
3.2 The following three chapters discuss the main issues raised in evidence to 
the inquiry in relation to Schedule 1 to the Bill, and the Committee’s 
comments and recommendations in regard to those issues. 
3.3 The chapters do not comment comprehensively on all aspects of the 
proposed regime. Instead, the chapters focus on the issues that were of 
most concern to the Committee, informed by the evidence received from 
participants in this inquiry in written submissions and at hearings. These 
issues were: 
(Chapter 3) 
 whether the Government’s proposed data set should be contained in 
primary legislation, as opposed to being made in regulations, and 
 the scope of the Government’s proposed data set. 
(Chapter 4) 
 the proposed two-year retention period, and 
 whether service providers should be required to destroy 
telecommunications data retained in accordance with proposed new 
Division 1 of Part 5-1A at the end of the retention-period. 
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 (Chapter 5) 
 the range of service providers and services to which data retention 
obligations are proposed to apply,  
 the implementation arrangements for the proposed data retention 
regime, and 
 the cost of the proposed data retention scheme. 
Should the data set be contained in primary legislation? 
3.4 Paragraph 187A(1)(a) of the Bill provides that service providers must keep 
information of a kind prescribed in regulations. This regulation-making 
power is subject to a number of limitations, the most significant being 
subclause 187A(2), which provides that the information prescribed for the 
purposes of subclause 187A(1)(a)  must relate to one or more of six 
matters, being: 
 the subscriber, accounts, telecommunications devices and other 
relevant services of a relevant service, 
 the source of a communication, 
 the destination of a communication, 
 the date, time and duration of a communication, 
 the type of communication, and 
 the location of the line, equipment or telecommunications device. 
3.5 The Explanatory Memorandum states: 
A regulation-making power is required to ensure that the 
legislative framework gives service providers sufficient technical 
detail about their data retention obligations while remaining 
flexible enough to adapt to future changes in communication 
technology.1 
3.6 The Attorney-General’s Department gave further evidence at a public 
hearing explaining the rationale for the data set being set out in 
subordinate legislation, in particular drawing the Committee’s attention to 
international precedent on the value of a more flexible approach to 
amending the data set: 
I think international experience suggests that potentially reshaping 
may be required at a future point. Our international colleagues 
1  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 [Data 
Retention Bill], Explanatory Memorandum, p. 36. 
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have reflected on their experience with the EU Data Retention 
Directive, which took a technologically specific approach to their 
data set and found that it was very quickly outdated. We have 
learnt from that in some respects by proposing to prescribe a more 
technologically neutral data set. But our discussions with industry 
consistently reinforce the fact that telecommunications technology 
evolves at a rapid pace. The kinds of services that are available 
now were not available 10 years ago or even five years ago. There 
have been radical changes in the technology and service offerings 
that are available to customers, who include people who use 
telecommunications services to engage in criminal acts and other 
activities. On the basis of advice from industry, we believe 
technological change is almost inevitable. Regulations would 
provide a vehicle for potentially making any refinements that were 
necessary in an expeditious way. That is an advantage of a 
regulation based approach. Amendment to legislation is naturally 
possible, but it takes longer.2 
3.7 In its supplementary submission, the Department noted the risks to 
national security and law enforcement if there is a delay in updating the 
data set in response to technological change: 
Sophisticated criminals and persons engaged in activities 
prejudicial to security are frequently early adopters of 
communications technologies that they perceive will assist them to 
evade lawful investigations.3 
3.8 The Department also noted that the level of detail contained in the data set 
is typically included in regulation rather than primary legislation.4 
3.9 In a letter to the Committee, dated 21 January 2015, the Director-General 
of Security provided a historical example of the significant delay that can 
occur where amendments to primary legislation are required to address 
technological change: 
A serious counter-example to defining everything in primary 
legislation is the history of [International Mobile Equipment 
Identifier (IMEI)] interception in Australia which took 10 years to 
achieve because it required change to the legislation. There was a 
technical solution available within months and, if it was open to 
2  Ms Anna Harmer, Acting First Assistant Secretary, National Security Law and Policy Division, 
Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 76. 
3  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, p. 7. 
4  Ms Harmer, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 16. 
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make a regulatory change, it could have been adapted for in faster 
time without this capability gap for interception agencies.5 
3.10 The Senate Standing Committee on the Scrutiny of Bills (Scrutiny of Bills 
Committee) concluded that paragraph 187A(1)(a) ‘delegates legislative 
power inappropriately’, and has recommended that ‘the types of data to 
be retained should be set out in the primary legislation to allow full 
Parliamentary scrutiny.’6 
3.11 The Scrutiny of Bills Committee also recommended that, if the data set is 
not set out in primary legislation:  
the bill be amended to ensure that any regulation under paragraph 
187A(1)(a) setting out the types of data to be retained under the 
scheme does not come into effect until the regulation has been 
positively approved by each House of the Parliament (see, for 
example, s 10B of the Health Insurance Act 1973). At a minimum, 
the committee considers that such regulations should not come 
into effect until after the disallowance period has expired (as 
recommended by the [Implementation Working Group (IWG)].7 
3.12 The Committee received submissions and evidence from a number of 
organisations and individuals recommending that the data set be set out 
in the Bill, rather than in regulations.8 
3.13 Professor George Williams agreed with the Attorney-General’s 
Department’s assessment that there is no practical impediment to 
including the data set in primary legislation, and argued that the 
government’s proposal to include the data set in regulations is ‘very 
inappropriate given that the definition itself is at the heart of whether the 
scheme should proceed’.9 
3.14 The Victorian Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection supported 
the Scrutiny of Bills Committee’s recommendation, noting that: 
The public interest in maintaining an extremely flexible data 
retention scheme does not outweigh the public interest in 
ensuring: 
 adequate privacy and security protections are maintained 
5  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Submission 12.2, pp. 6-7. 
6  Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, First Report of 2015, p. 118. 
7  Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, First Report of 2015, p. 118. 
8  See, for example: Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, p. 7; Mr Douglas 
Stetner, Submission 32, p. 1. 
9  Professor George Williams AO, Anthony Mason Professor of Law and Foundation Director of 
the Gilbert + Tobin Centre for Public Law, University of New South Wales, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 10. 
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 a certain and transparent scheme that is subject to public 
scrutiny.10 
3.15 The Australian Privacy Commissioner provided the Committee with a 
detailed analysis of the relevant issues and identified a range of potential 
options: 
The bill allows for regulations to be made that significantly affect 
the scope of the data retention scheme. In particular, the bill allows 
for regulations to be made relating to the services covered by the 
data retention scheme and the kinds of telecommunications data 
that service providers will be required to collect and retain. To 
ensure the greatest level of certainty, transparency and 
accountability possible, my preference would be for these matters 
to be included in the bill itself. However, I do note that in a period 
of rapidly changing technology this may not be achievable. In the 
event, then, that a decision is made to continue with the current 
model, with these matters being addressed in regulations, I 
consider that the bill should be amended to include a requirement 
for the undertaking of a privacy impact assessment, before any 
changes are made or new regulations are made, and that the 
Australian Privacy Commissioner be consulted in the making of 
any new regulations or changes to the existing regulations.11 
3.16 In its submission, the Law Council of Australia acknowledged that the 
disallowance process for regulations, which includes scrutiny of 
legislative instruments by the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations 
and Ordinances, might provide a mechanism to address concerns about 
the data set being unduly expanded by a future Minister. However, the 
Council argued that the fact that regulations come into force from the date 
of registration, which may be ‘weeks or months before a disallowance 
motion may be tabled or considered by the Parliament’, posed an 
unacceptable concern.12  
3.17 However, at a public hearing, the Council indicated that it had revised its 
position, having noted the Privacy Commissioner’s recommendations 
about additional safeguards that could be put in place to provide for 
greater oversight, while allowing for the data set to be amended via 
delegated legislation. The Council also endorsed any such amendments 
being referred to this Committee for review: 
10  Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection (Victoria), Submission 39, p. 9. 
11  Mr Timothy Pilgrim PSM, Australian Privacy Commissioner, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
29 January 2015, p. 47. 
12  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 14. 
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I think they are all excellent suggestions. We had suggested in our 
submission that it should be included and therefore locked in the 
legislation itself in the interests of certainty but we do hear other 
evidence which says that there is a need for some flexibility, ability 
to change over time, and if it is considered that to lock the dataset 
into legislation itself is excessive, then these are the alternative 
safeguard mechanisms that could be used.13 
3.18 Professor Williams gave evidence to the Committee recommending a 
hybrid approach whereby the data set is set out in the Bill, with a carefully 
circumscribed regulation-making power to allow the data set to be 
updated over time, if necessary: 
I accept the government’s design for a level of flexibility; that does 
seem appropriate to me. But, to be frank, we have moved beyond 
flexibility to actually not telling much at all of substance about 
exactly what data will be collected. All we have are some 
guidelines which are fairly loose given they are relating to criteria, 
and I think what you have ended up with is a shell of a scheme… 
So I think the balance here is to define as precisely as possible 
what the data set is while proving a power to the attorney to make 
appropriate modifications to that within limits so that there is a 
degree of flexibility over time.14  
3.19 Professor Williams and Dr Keiran Hardy also noted a particular concern, 
being that the current drafting of clause 187A(1) may allow 
telecommunications data to be prescribed that ‘relate to’ one of the 
categories listed in clause 187A(2) in a ‘tenuous way’.15 
3.20 Telstra and Optus both confirmed that, as service providers, they were 
agnostic about whether the data set is contained in primary or subordinate 
legislation and that their view, as service providers, is that it is more 
important to ensure that the consultation and implementation 
arrangements around any change to the data set ensure that any changes 
are technically feasible, cost-effective, allow for sufficient ‘lead-time’ to 
implement, and provide long-term regulatory certainty.16 Optus also 
13  Mr Peter Leonard, Chairperson, Media and Communications Committee, Business Law 
Section, Law Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 36. 
14  Professor Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 5. 
15  Professor George Williams and Dr Keiran Hardy, Submission 5, p. 2. 
16  See, for example, Mr James Shaw, Director, Government Relations, Telstra, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 11; Ms Jane van Beelen, Executive Director, Telstra, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 13; Mr David Epstein, Vice-President, Corporate and 
Regulatory Affairs, Singtel-Optus (Optus), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, 
p. 17. 
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considered the use of regulations to set out the detail of the data set to be 
‘appropriate’, and stated that, in its view:  
The proposed safeguards in the Bill are the guidance provided by 
section 187A(2) on the ‘kind of information’ that may be 
prescribed, and that the regulations are to be a disallowable 
instrument, which provides for Parliamentary scrutiny. These 
‘structural’ safeguards appear adequate.17 
3.21 In its first report, the Data Retention Implementation Working Group 
(IWG) acknowledged that any change to the data set could impose costs 
on service providers, and recommended greater procedural safeguards 
around any changes to the data set prescribed in regulations:  
The IWG recommends that any proposed change to the 
regulations should not enter into force immediately, but rather 
come into effect only after Parliament has had an opportunity to 
review the proposed change and the disallowance period has 
expired.18 
3.22 The IWG also noted that, pursuant to paragraph 187F(2)(c) of the Bill, ‘any 
change to the data set would also trigger the ability for industry to re-
apply for an 18 month implementation plan’.19 
3.23 In its submission, Optus also argued that the Bill should be amended to 
preclude changes to the data set until after this Committee has conducted 
its review of the scheme pursuant to proposed new section 187N 
(discussed later in this report). In Optus’ view, this would provide service 
providers with ‘a reasonable expectation of stability’, which would allow 
for ‘planning and investment certainty, and allow time for efficient 
practices to be developed and refined’.20 
3.24 The Attorney-General’s Department addressed this issue in its 
supplementary submission: 
The Department acknowledges the importance of regulatory 
certainty for industry, and notes the Department’s extensive 
consultations with industry to support the development of a clear 
data set capable of implementation within provider networks. The 
joint Government-Industry Implementation Working Group 
considered the issues of both certainty and affording industry an 
appropriate interval to adapt to any changes in the data set and 
17  Optus, Submission 86, p. 7. 
18  Data Retention Implementation Working Group (IWG), Report 1 of the Data Retention 
Implementation Working Group, December 2014, p. 10. 
19  IWG, Report 1 of the Data Retention Implementation Working Group, December 2014, p. 11. 
20  Optus, Submission 86, p. 7. 
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recommended that any changes to the data set not commence until 
after the expiry of the disallowance period. The Department 
supports that IWG recommendation. 
The Department considers however that precluding amendment 
of the data set until the completion of a future review may 
prejudice national security and law enforcement interests. 
Industry participants have consistently advised that their services 
and technology evolve rapidly. In circumstances where new 
services offerings and technology are inevitable in a technology 
and market driven environment, it is important for the framework 
to be able to respond to those changes. Only in the event that 
services offerings and technology are not changing would it be 
appropriate to fix the data set – in circumstances where the 
telecommunications services are certain to change, the 
Government should not be precluded from responding.21 
3.25 The Committee also received a number of submissions which stated that 
the decision to leave the data set to be prescribed in regulations meant that 
submitters either did not have sufficient certainty to comment on the 
detail of the data set, or were unaware that the data set had been publicly 
released.22 
3.26 The Department had published a copy of the Government’s proposed data 
set and accompanying explanatory material on 31 October 2014, which the 
Committee has had access to throughout the inquiry. The Department 
confirmed on a number of occasions that this document, included at 
Appendix A to this report, is, in fact, the Government’s proposed data set 
to be put into effect by regulation when the Bill receives Royal Assent.23  
3.27 The Department acknowledged that there are a number of possible 
alternative approaches to defining the data set that could be adopted:  
There are a number of different approaches, as the committee will 
be familiar with. All could be in legislation; all detail could be in 
regulations. Alternatively, what we have here is what might be 
described as a hybrid model, under which the key criteria or 
threshold issues are described in the legislation, with the detail 
being left to regulation. That provides a degree of flexibility in the 
event that changes are required, while still providing the 
21  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, p. 11. 
22  See, for example, Mr Bernard Keane, Submission 37, pp. 2-4. 
23  Ms Harmer, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 13; Ms Harmer, Letter to the 
Committee Secretary, 17 January 2015, published alongside Attorney-General’s Department, 
Submission 27; Ms Harmer, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 71. 
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opportunity for parliamentary consideration of regulations that 
are made under that act.24  
Committee comment 
3.28 The set of telecommunications data that service providers will be required 
to retain is central to the operation of the proposed data retention regime. 
It is critical that industry and the Australian public are assured that the 
data set proposed comprises that which is necessary and proportionate, 
and that safeguards are in place to monitor any future proposals to amend 
the data set.  
3.29 As such, the Committee considers that the proposed data set should be set 
out in primary legislation. 
3.30 The Committee notes that, while the proposed data set has been 
developed to be a technologically-neutral scheme, future technologies or 
changing telecommunications practices may require amendments to the 
data set in time to maintain the core purpose of the scheme. Currently the 
Committee does not see a situation where emergency changes to the data 
set may be required. However, given the dynamic environment of 
developing technologies, the Committee has considered the merits of 
including an emergency declaration power.  
 
Recommendation 2 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to 
include the proposed data set in primary legislation. 
 
  
24  Ms Harmer, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 16. 
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Recommendation 3 
 To provide for emergency circumstances, the Committee recommends 
that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended so that the Attorney-General can 
declare items for inclusion in the data set under the following 
conditions: 
 The declaration ceases to have effect after 40 sitting days of 
either House, 
 An amendment to include the data item in legislation should 
be brought before the Parliament before the expiry of the 40 
sitting days, and 
 The amendment should be referred to the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security with a minimum of 15 
sitting days for review and report. 
The data set as proposed and Industry Working Group 
recommendations 
3.31 Section 187A of the Bill establishes the set of telecommunications data that 
service providers would be required to retain. As the Explanatory 
Memorandum notes, ‘[d]ata retention obligations will not apply to all 
telecommunications data’,25 but to a defined set of telecommunications 
data prescribed in regulations. 
3.32 The regulation-making power, currently proposed in the Bill, is subject to 
a number of limits. Subsection 187A(2) provides that the prescribed data 
must relate to one of six categories, outlined above. 
3.33 The Bill also contains six further limits, being that service providers are 
not required to: 
 keep the contents or substance of any communication,26 
 keep web-browsing records or other records about the destination of 
communications sent via an internet access service,27  
 keep records about communications sent or received using third-party 
communications services,28 
25  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 38. 
26  Paragraph 187A(4)(a). 
27  Paragraph 187A(4)(b). 
28  Paragraph 187A(4)(c). 
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 keep records of information the provider would otherwise be required 
to delete under a determination made under section 99 of the 
Telecommunications Act, such as the Telecommunications (Service 
Provider—Identity Checks for Pre-paid Public Mobile Carriage 
Services) Determination 2013,29 
 generate and keep location records that are more detailed than or 
different to the location records used in relation to the relevant 
service,30 or 
 keep location records on a continuous basis.31   
3.34 Telstra welcomed the Government’s decision to include these limits as 
part of the proposed scheme:  
In terms of minimising the impact of the scheme on industry and 
our customers, we welcome the limits that the government has 
established for the scheme, such as focusing on metadata rather 
than the content of communications and limiting the agencies that 
can access the data. We believe these limits will help give the 
community a greater degree of comfort about the access to 
telecommunications data by the agencies.32 
3.35 The Government has not released a copy of draft regulations currently 
proposed to be made under the Bill. However, the Attorney-General’s 
Department has published a proposed data set. The Department 
confirmed in the inquiry that the difference between the proposed data set 
and draft regulations would be a question of form, rather than substance.33 
3.36 While not requiring it, the Bill will not preclude service providers from 
keeping the contents or substance of a communication for other lawful 
purposes.34 For example, a company providing an email service may keep 
the emails sent and received on its servers. However, the Explanatory 
Memorandum explains that agencies are not permitted to access the 
content of communications held by service providers under a data 
authorisation: 
29  Paragraph 187A(4)(d). 
30  Paragraph 187A(4)(e). 
31  Subsection 187A(7). Service providers would only be required to keep location records at the 
start and end of a communication, such as a phone or VoIP call or an SMS message, or the start 
and end of a communications session, such as an entire internet access session that may last 
for several hours through to many months. 
32  Mr Shaw, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 7. 
33  Ms Anna Harmer, Acting First Assistant Secretary, National Security Law and Policy Division, 
Attorney-General’s Department, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 13. 
34  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 44. 
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Section 172 of the TIA Act currently prohibits ASIO or 
enforcement agencies from authorising the disclosure of the 
substance or content of a communication under a data 
authorisation made under Chapter 4 of the Act. Agencies may 
only access the substance or content of a communication under a 
warrant, or in limited other circumstances, such as in a life-
threatening emergency. 35 
3.37 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) also noted that a 
range of other telecommunications data will not be subject to data 
retention obligations but will, nevertheless, remain accessible to agencies 
under Chapter 4 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 
1979 (TIA Act) to the extent that service providers continue to retain it for 
their ordinary business purposes.36 
3.38 On 16 December 2014, the Attorney-General provided the Committee with 
Report 1 of the Data Retention Implementation Working Group. The 
Implementation Working Group (IWG) is a joint government-industry 
group is chaired by the Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department 
and is comprised of CEO-level representatives from Government and 
industry, and has been tasked by Government to ‘further refine the data 
set and report back to the Government and the PJCIS’.37 The IWG 
established an Experts’ Group, comprised of technical experts from across 
Government and industry to assist the IWG in this task. 
3.39 The IWG recommended four further amendments to the data set and 
identified a number of areas in which additional explanatory material 
would be beneficial. A list of the IWG’s recommendations is included at 
Appendix C to this report. The IWG also prepared a revised data set in its 
report, including additional explanatory material, reflecting its 
recommendations. 
3.40 As noted in the introduction to this report, the Attorney-General’s 
Department clarified that the IWG’s recommendations ‘are intended to 
assist the Committee’s consideration of the proposed data set rather than 
provide a replacement’.38 
35  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 44. 
36  Dr Vivienne Thom, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 39. 
37  IWG, Report 1 of the Data Retention Implementation Working Group, December 2014, 
Attachment B, p. 1. 
38  Ms Harmer, Letter to the Committee Secretary, 16 January 2015. 
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 Committee Comment 
3.41 The Committee acknowledges the contribution of the data retention 
Implementation Working Group to the inquiry. The Committee recognises 
that the IWG’s recommendations are the result of expert level consultation 
and cooperation between key national security and law enforcement 
agencies, and industry stakeholders.  
3.42 The Committee notes that the IWG’s recommended changes to the data set 
and its explanatory material (set out in Appendix C) do not significantly 
change the kinds of data that are intended to be retained under the 
scheme. The recommendations would rather provide greater technical 
clarity to industry as to the precise nature of their data retention 
obligations. As such, the Committee supports the implementation of these 
recommendations and recommends their inclusion in the final data set. 
 
Recommendation 4 
 The Committee recommends that the proposed data set published by 
the Attorney-General’s Department on 31 October 2014 be amended to 
incorporate the recommendations of the Data Retention Implementation 
Working Group. 
Is the proposed data set sufficiently clear? 
3.43 A number of service providers assured the Committee that the level of 
detail provided in the Government’s proposed data set, in conjunction 
with the information provided through the IWG process, was sufficient 
for them to design and implement a data retention system.39 
3.44 Optus assured the Committee that it had: 
appreciated the ability to work with the Data Retention 
Implementation Working Group, convened by the Attorney-
General’s Department. Indeed, I think some of those discussions 
have helped to better inform both their understanding of some of 
the operational issues that arise and our own, in addition to 
informing the wider industry.40 
3.45 Optus drew particular attention to the ‘very large’ technical-level working 
group, established by the IWG, which included a ‘very representative 
39  See, for example, Mr Shaw, Telstra, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 7; 
Mr Epstein, Optus, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 17. 
40  Mr Epstein, Optus, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 13. 
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sample’ of the telecommunications industry.41 Optus also addressed the 
concerns raised by a number of submitters and witnesses about the 
potential lack of certainty about what would be contained in the final data 
set, arising from the government’s decision to prescribe the data set in 
regulations: 
Clearly, I think the point has been made by others that there is not 
an extant draft regulation that has been circulated, but in effect we 
have had fairly detailed discussions and they have gone directly to 
a consistent set of points, and you would assume that those 
consistent set of points would form the basis of regulations. And, 
yes, they are a bit better than in the broad workable; they appear 
quite workable.42 
3.46 However, a number of submitters raised particular issues relating to the 
proposed data set.  
Passwords and PINs 
3.47 Optus recommended, in its submission, that item 1 of the data set be 
amended to place beyond doubt that the data retention regime will not 
require service providers to retain customer passwords.43 In evidence, 
Mr Epstein confirmed that Optus’ concern is that the data set ‘does not 
directly exclude it, so there is always that risk’ that it could be interpreted 
as requiring the retention of passwords.44 
3.48 In its supplementary submission, the Attorney-General’s Department 
advised the Committee that: 
the retention of passwords would be inconsistent with both the 
proposed data set and the categories of data that may be 
prescribed. Accordingly, the Department does not consider that 
further amendment or consideration is required. However, the 
Department notes that, for clarity, the explanatory material to the 
data set could include an appropriate explanatory note to put the 
matter beyond doubt.45  
Data that is not readily available to service providers 
3.49 Optus also recommended that the requirement for service providers to 
retain information that is not otherwise created in the operation of a 
41  Mr Epstein, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 23. 
42  Mr Epstein, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 17. 
43  Optus, Submission 86, p. 19. 
44  Mr Epstein, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 27. 
45  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, p. 13. 
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relevant service, contained in proposed new subsection 187A(6), be 
amended to ensure that it does not impose an effectively impossible 
obligation in circumstances where a service provider does not have access 
to the relevant information.46 In its submission, however, Optus 
acknowledged the potential value of this provision, noting that it: 
appears to be an anti-avoidance or loop-hole prevention clause, 
which removes any incentive to design or create services in a 
manner which does not generate the required data set. 47 
3.50 In its supplementary submission, the Attorney-General’s Department 
advised the Committee that: 
Pursuant to proposed paragraph 187A(4)(d), the data retention 
obligations will apply to the services provided by access service 
providers. This does not include Over-The-Top services accessed 
by the user through the service provided. For example, an internet 
service provider does not have to keep information in relation to a 
third party VOIP or email usage, but must retain data in relation to 
an email service they provide. To that extent the data retention 
obligations are therefore directly connected to matters within a 
provider’s control, being the services that they provide and 
support.48 
3.51 The Explanatory Memorandum states that this provision is intended to 
apply in circumstances where the relevant information or documents ‘are 
not created by the operation of the relevant service, or if they are created 
in only a transient fashion’.49 
Committee Comment 
3.52 Customer passwords, PINs and other like information are highly private 
and security sensitive information. The Committee accepts that the Bill is 
not intended to require the retention of such information, and notes that 
the Government’s proposed data set is expressed as including name, 
address and other information for identification purposes, but considers 
that it would be appropriate to clarify this issue in the Explanatory 
Memorandum. 
46  Mr Michael Elsegood, Manager, Regulatory Compliance and Safeguards, Optus, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 28. 
47  Optus, Submission 86, p. 9. 
48  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, p. 13. 
49  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 46. 
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Recommendation 5 
 The Committee recommends that the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to make clear that service providers are 
not required to collect and retain customer passwords, PINs or other like 
information. 
3.53 The Committee considers that it has not been made clear that service 
providers are not required to collect and retain telecommunications data 
about devices that are not directly connected to their network (for 
example, devices connected to the network via a third-party router), or the 
details of communications passing over the top of an internet access 
network via a third-party communications application.  
3.54 There would be value in clarifying that service providers are not required 
to retain information that is not otherwise created in the operation of a 
relevant service. 
 
Recommendation 6 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to make 
clear that service providers are only required to retain 
telecommunications data to the extent that such information is, in fact, 
available to that service provider. 
Is there a need to retain each element of the data set? 
3.55 The Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights for the Bill contains a 
detailed description of the investigative value of each category of 
telecommunications data listed in subsection 187A(2).50  
3.56 The Committee notes that, on 14 November 2014, the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (PJCHR) released its preliminary report on 
the Bill, stating that:  
The statement of compatibility separately assesses why each 
category of data is necessary in pursuit of the scheme’s stated 
objective; and the committee considers that the statement of 
compatibility has generally established why particular categories 
of data are considered necessary for law enforcement agencies. 
50  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 13-16. 
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3.57 The Department’s submission contains further information relating to the 
Government’s proposed data set.51 The submission states that: 
Privacy and proportionality considerations have been central to 
the development of the proposed categories of data that the data 
retention obligations will apply to. The data retention obligations 
have been strictly limited to data that is vital to law enforcement 
and national security investigations, and was developed based on 
advice from law enforcement and national security agencies and 
feedback from the telecommunications industry.52 
3.58 Communications Alliance and the Australian Mobile Telecommunications 
Association (AMTA) emphasised the importance of balancing the cost to 
industry and taxpayers against improved law enforcement and national 
security outcomes: 
[A]gencies will naturally tend to ‘ask for everything’ because 
completeness lowers the risk of any small detail being missed. But 
when telecommunications users and taxpayers are liable for the 
cost of ‘everything’, some discipline should be applied to the scope 
and volume of agency requests.53 
3.59 However, the IWG report notes that ‘the data set has previously been the 
subject of, and benefited from, refinements and additional explanations 
arising from extensive previous consultations with industry’,54 and that 
‘some industry constituents not[ed] that the data retention obligations did 
not appear as onerous as they initially anticipated’.55 
Detailed subscriber and account information—Items 1(b)-(f) 
3.60 Item 1 of the Government’s proposed data set would require service 
providers to retain a range of records that relate to subscribers of, and 
accounts, services, telecommunications devices and other relevant services 
relating to, the relevant service, being: 
(a) any information that is one or both of the following: 
(i) any name or address information; 
(ii) any other information for identification purposes; 
51  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, pp. 26-30.  
52  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, pp. 25. 
53  Communications Alliance and the Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association, 
Submission 1, p. 2. 
54  IWG, Report 1 of the Data Retention Implementation Working Group, December 2014, p. 5. 
55  IWG, Report 1 of the Data Retention Implementation Working Group, December 2014, p. 3. 
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relating to the relevant service, being information used by the 
service provider for the purposes of identifying the subscriber 
of the relevant service; 
(b) any information relating to any contract, agreement or 
arrangement relating to the relevant service, or to any related 
account, service or device; 
(c) any information that is one or both of the following: 
(i) billing or payment information; 
(ii) contact information; 
relating to the relevant service, being information used by the 
service provider in relation to the relevant service; 
(d) any identifiers relating to the relevant service or any related 
account, service or device, being information used by the service 
provider in relation to the relevant service or any related account, 
service or device; 
(e) the status of the relevant service, or any related account, service 
or device; 
(f) any information about metrics of the relevant service or a 
related account, service or device. 
3.61 The Law Institute of Victoria posed the question: 
Why is it necessary, for example, for service providers to retain the 
features and service descripts of their account holders (sic) 
products and services? This data would seem to include 
information like a customer changing their monthly broadband 
quota, whether they have call waiting activated, whether their 
phone plan allows free international calls or free texts to numbers 
from the same provider. 
Beyond name, address and other contact details, how is all the 
very detailed subscriber information set out in category 1 of the 
draft data set relevant to law enforcement? Data such as billing 
information, status of the service and metrics of the service seems 
to have marginal relevance to the enforcement of serious crimes 
and protecting national security.56 
3.62 The Law Institute of Victoria also raised particular concerns about the 
retention of IP address allocation records, arguing that: 
56  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 117, p. 10. 
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An IP address does not identify a person. The LIV is concerned 
about the preservation of the presumption of innocence in the 
context of the use of source IP addresses.57 
3.63 Similarly, FutureWise argued that billing information (item 1(c)(i))  and 
information about the status (item 1(e)) and metrics (item 1(f)) of a service, 
seem to be of ‘marginal relevance to law enforcement’.58 
3.64 The Committee notes that the EU Data Retention Directive did not require 
service providers to keep records of historic aggregate upload and 
download volumes.59 
3.65 However, the Department’s submission provides a detailed explanation of 
the utility of these kinds of information to law enforcement and national 
security investigations: 
The information listed under item 1(c) (billing, payment or contact 
information) serves a similar purpose [to the types of subscriber 
records listed under item 1(a)], and is of particular utility where an 
account is subscribed under a false identity. Billing and payment 
information is generally more difficult to falsify, and contact 
information can often provide agencies with further investigative 
leads to identify who has made a communication of interest. 
The information listed under item 1(d) (identifiers relating to the 
relevant service) includes information such as the phone number 
or IP address/port number combination allocated to a particular 
account, service or device at a particular point in time. This 
information is necessary to allow particular communications of 
interest to be attributed to a particular account, service or device. 
Importantly, from a technical perspective, item 1(d) is limited to 
identifiers used by the service provider—item 1(d) does not 
require service providers to generate and retain identifiers that are 
not natively used by their network or service. 
The information listed under items 1(b) (contractual information), 
(e) (status of the service), and (f) (information about the metrics of 
the service) is critical for a range of technical purposes. Most 
importantly, this information is vital to allow agencies to properly 
57  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 117, p. 10. 
58  FutureWise, Submission 128, p. 19. 
59  Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention 
of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 
available online at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:PDF> viewed 
26 February 2015.  
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provision and resource interception warrants. 
Telecommunications interception, particularly in relation to IP-
based services, is highly complex and resource intensive. 
Inadequate resourcing and provisioning of interception systems 
can result in potentially incuplatory or exculpatory intercept 
material being lost, compromising the evidential chain and the 
overall investigation. The information… allows agencies to make 
an informed, risk-based estimate of how many resources need to 
be allocated to a particular interception warrant (for example, 
based on th[e] historic usage of the service or services, whether 
any of those services are no longer active, and the maximum data 
allowance for each service).60 
3.66 The Australian Federal Police explained the utility of historic, aggregate 
upload and download volume information from its perspective: 
First of all, working out whether or not the line is active is most 
important of all—whether there is any volume passing over it or 
not and the amount of volume are important. Torrenting is 
certainly not something that we have been looking at, but certainly 
the amount of volume also determines, when we want to put an 
internet intercept off, how much capability we will have to 
dedicate to it. For planning purposes as well that is extremely 
important to us. Like anything else, we have to know how many 
lines to put off, our monitoring capability, our monitoring capacity 
and so on. That is one component of it, but the most important is 
to know in the first place whether or not the line is active and if 
any volume passes between an account at all.61 
3.67 The Acting Director-General of Security also provided further information 
from ASIO’s perspective: 
To add to that, everything that the deputy commissioner has said 
is relevant from ASIO's perspective. Also—and I am happy to talk 
further about this in a closed hearing—in terms of looking at 
facilitation, networks who might be central, that sort of download 
information can be quite important in investigations.62 
3.68 The IWG has recommended that item 1(f) of the data set, which relates to 
‘metrics of the relevant service or a related account, service or device’, be 
removed from the data set, on the basis that ‘data of this kind is often not 
60  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 27. 
61  Deputy Commissioner Michael Phelan APM, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 14. 
62  Ms Kerri Hartland, Acting Director-General of Security, Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO ), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 14. 
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available and often only created because of numerous short-term 
marketing-based variations to allowances’, making the data ‘difficult to 
collect and aggregate for storage on an ongoing basis’.63 For example, 
service providers may release short-term promotional allowances, such as 
‘unlimited download weekends’ or ‘unlimited MMS messages for New 
Year’s Eve’.  
3.69 The IWG has acknowledged that: 
The availability of this information is useful and desirable for 
agencies and that, where the information is currently retained for 
business purposes, agencies would continue to be assisted by the 
availability of such information to the extent it is otherwise 
retained.64 
3.70 However, the IWG has also recommended that item 5(c) be amended to 
clarify that service providers would continue to be required to keep 
records of the historical upload and download volumes.  
3.71 As indicated earlier in this chapter, the Committee has recommended that 
the Government accept the IWG’s recommended amendments to the data 
set. 
Location information—Item 6 
3.72 The Committee received a number of submissions calling, in particular, 
for location information to not be retained as part of any data retention 
regime. 
3.73 For example, Blueprint for Free Speech noted that ‘[l]ocation data is 
especially sensitive’ and argued that: 
It is not appropriate for private companies nor government to 
routinely track and store this sort of information without a 
citizen’s permission simply because they are able. Nor is it right 
for government to access it without proper oversight from a judge 
authorising a warrant. Tracking all Australian citizens in this 
manner is a fundamental change in the relationship between the 
citizen and the state in this country.65 
3.74 Electronic Frontiers Australia also expressed concerns at the privacy 
sensitivity of location records: 
It is a concerning development that equipment locations are 
included in the draft data set. A mobile phone user is likely to 
63  IWG, Report 1 of the Data Retention Implementation Working Group, December 2014, p. 7. 
64  IWG, Report 1 of the Data Retention Implementation Working Group, December 2014, p. 7. 
65  Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission 54, p. 6. 
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have their location retained multiple times per day. Even though 
this is limited to approximate positions such as which cell tower is 
in use, this is sufficient to reveal all of a person’s travels for the 
two year retention period to suburb granularity. The significance 
of this sensitive information is presumably why it is included in 
the draft data set at all.66 
3.75 The Australian Privacy Commissioner, in his submission, noted that even 
the limited location data that the Bill proposes to require service providers 
to retain could, in some instances, provide detail ‘at a level approaching 
the equivalent effect of real-time location tracking’.67 
3.76 A number of other submitters also noted the particular privacy sensitivity 
of location information.68 
3.77 The Explanatory Memorandum notes that location-based information is 
used for a number of investigative purposes, including to demonstrate 
that a person was likely present at the scene of a crime, exclude suspects 
from further investigation where they were likely not at the scene of a 
crime, and to identify the historic movements and locations of missing 
persons: 
Location-based data is valuable for identifying the location of a 
device at the time of a communication, providing both evidence 
linking the presence of a device to an event, or alternative 
providing indications that may exclude a person from further 
inquiry. This data may also be instructive in determining the 
location of a person who is reporting an emergency, or help with 
precursory steps towards identifying the locality of a missing 
person who has used a telecommunications device. Without this 
information being retained by service providers, agencies’ abilities 
to investigate crimes, emergencies and missing person matters are 
substantially limited.69 
3.78 The Attorney-General’s Department further emphasised that location 
records can provide important contextual information about related 
records: 
[L]ocation information can provide important contextual 
information about communications that is often important for both 
inculpatory and exculpatory purposes. For example, where a 
66  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 97, p. 21. 
67  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, Appendix B, p. 1. 
68  See, for example: Telstra, Submission 112, p. 2; Internet Society of Australia, Submission 122, 
p. 6. 
69  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 15-16. 
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suspect makes a phone call immediately after the time a crime was 
committed, that phone call may appear suspicious. However, 
location records showing the phone call was made several suburbs 
from the scene of the crime would tend to remove that person 
from suspicion.70 
3.79 In its submission, the Department agreed that location information is 
‘among the most sensitive elements of the dataset’ and noted that: 
[T]he nature and volume of location information that service 
providers will be required to keep has been strictly limited to 
ensure that service providers are not required to keep continuous 
records about the location of a device, or anything approaching 
that level of detail.71 
3.80 Consistent with the Department’s statement, the Bill and the 
Government’s proposed data set contain a number of limitations on the 
nature and volume of location information that service providers would 
be required to retain. Paragraph 187A(4)(e) of the Bill provides that service 
providers are only required to retain location information of the kind 
‘used by the service provider in relation to the relevant service to which 
the device is connected.’ The Explanatory Memorandum elaborates on this 
provision: 
Paragraph 187A(4)(e) will provide that a service provider is not 
required to keep information about the location of a 
telecommunications device that is not information used by the 
service provider in relation to the relevant service to which the 
device is connected. This could include, for example, a record of 
which cell tower, base station or other network access point a 
device was connected to.72 
3.81 Additionally, paragraph 187A(4)(c) limits the extent to which service 
providers are required to retain information about ‘over the top’ data 
services. As the Explanatory Memorandum notes: 
The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the provider of an 
underlying service, such as an internet access service, is not 
required to keep information about communications that are 
passing ‘over the top’ of the underlying service and that are being 
carried by means of another relevant service, such as a VoIP 
service, operated by another provider.73 
70  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, pp. 32-33. 
71  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 29. 
72  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 45. 
73  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 45. 
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3.82 The Government’s proposed data set, in combination with subsection 
187A(7) of the Bill, ensures that service providers are required to keep 
location records at, and only at: 
 the time at which a device connects to and disconnects from the 
network, and 
 the beginning and end of an actual communication, such as a phone call 
or SMS, or a communications session, such as an internet access session 
which may last between several hours and many months, depending on 
the underlying technology.74 
3.83 As the Explanatory Memorandum notes: 
Subsection 187A(7) provides that for the purposes of certain 
information or documents required to be kept under paragraphs 
187A(2)(b), (c), (d) and (f), two or more communications that 
together constitute a single communications session are taken to 
be a single communication. 
The purpose of subsection 187A(7) is to ensure that providers are 
not required to record the source, destination, time, date and 
duration of a communication or the location of a device 
throughout a communications session. 
For example, a smartphone connected to a mobile data network 
may have multiple applications running in the background, each 
of which may routinely communicate with remote servers, such as 
to seek and obtain updates. As such, the smartphone may send 
and receive a near-continuous stream of communications. 
However, these communications may together constitute a single 
communications session. Absent this provision, providers could, 
for example, be required to record the location of the device on a 
near-continuous basis. The effect of the provision is that providers 
will only be required to record prescribed location information for 
the overall communication rather than its constituent 
components.75 
3.84 In evidence, Telstra confirmed that it currently retains call-related cell 
tower records—the type of location data that the Government proposes to 
prescribe for the purposes of the data retention scheme—for at least six 
years.76 The Committee also received confidential submissions from 
74  Proposed data set, item 6; Data Retention Bill, s. 187A(7). 
75  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 46. 
76  Mr Mike Burgess, Chief Information Security Officer and Mrs Kate Hughes, Chief Risk Officer, 
Telstra, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 18. 
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Vodafone and Optus setting out their current retention practices for 
location records. 
3.85 Blueprint for Free Speech questioned whether service providers would 
only be required to retain ‘limited records such as which, how and when a 
device connects to a cell phone tower’, or whether providers would 
actually be required to retain highly-specific location data, such as GPS 
information: 
[M]ost people have GPS enabled smartphones which, when used 
with other services on a smart phone (sic) that connect to the 
internet or use data is some manner, make the location of the 
device (and therefore the user) known. So, it may be the case that 
when tracking the location of a call that the most accurate location 
is to the nearest cell tower, however all communication that used 
data (which is paired with the GPS functions on a mobile phone) 
will enable pinpoint accuracy of the user’s location. 77 
3.86 The New South Wales Police Force provided the Committee with evidence 
about the granularity of the type of location data that would be accessed 
by police: 
With cell site location that we would normally get with metadata, 
we would talk about an area, for example if I am in Canberra I 
might be in Deakin or I might be somewhere—it does not specify. 
There is not the amount of specificity to say that I am in a 
particular place. We are talking about more gross data.78 
3.87 Ms Hartland explained to the Committee how the location records 
covered by the proposed data retention obligations fit within the broader 
framework of ASIO’s surveillance powers: 
The bill will not require providers to retain all the location 
information—the regular connections mobiles make to cell towers, 
for example. What the bill does require is for providers to retain 
the location information when communications occur. For 
example, what cell tower did the mobile connect to when they 
made a call? This does not amount to tracking as some people 
have suggested. If ASIO has a requirement to monitor individuals, 
other capabilities can be deployed—for example, tracking devices 
under warrant. 
The cell tower locations that will be required to be retained by the 
data retention bill will only ever provide agencies with the vicinity 
77  Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission 54, p. 6. 
78  Assistant Commissioner Malcolm Lanyon, Commander, Special Services Group, New South 
Wales Police Force, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 48. 
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of the mobile phone. This information provides useful intelligence, 
including when correlated with other intelligence over time, and 
there are some operational examples of that in our classified 
submission.79 
Should service providers be required to retain more detailed location records? 
3.88 Proposed new section 187A requires service providers to retain location 
records relating to distinct communications events. However it does not 
require service providers to keep more frequent records about the location 
of a device based on its persistent, background connection to the network, 
known as Home and Visitor Location Records (HLR and VLR, 
respectively). Victoria Police argued against this exclusion:  
There is one area Victoria Police would like to put on the record. It 
is in our written submission—that is, VLR, visitor location register 
data. The intent of the bill, as I understand it, is explicitly around 
data that arises out of communications, which VLR does not. VLR 
is effectively the handshake, as it is anecdotally referred to, 
between the phone and the tower as the phone passes the tower, 
even when there is no actual communication occurring. That has 
what I would suggest are fairly obvious benefits for law 
enforcement and within the Victorian jurisdiction we have had 
one recent very high profile homicide which caused high degrees 
of community concern and in which VLR was instrumental in 
resolving, certainly in the time frames that we were able to do. 
Victoria Police would like it to be put on the record that our view 
is that VLR should also be part of the datasets that are considered 
in this legislation.80 
3.89 The NSW Police Force supported this recommendation.81  
3.90 The Committee also received a classified briefing relating to the utility of 
HLR and VLR data to investigations. 
Committee comment 
3.91 The Committee accepts that requiring service providers to retain each of 
the types of subscriber information set out in the proposed data set, 
subject to the IWG’s recommended amendments, is necessary and 
proportionate for the purposes of safeguarding national security and the 
enforcement of the criminal law.  
79  Ms Hartland, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 5. 
80  Inspector Gavan Segrave, Intelligence and Covert Support Command, Victoria Police, 
Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 63. 
81  Detective Superintendent Arthur Kopsias, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 63. 
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3.92 The Committee acknowledges that location records are a sensitive 
category of telecommunications data included in the proposed data set. 
The Bill and proposed data set significantly curtail the detail and 
frequency of the location records that service providers would be required 
to retain.  
3.93 However, information showing a person’s approximate location at the 
time they made a communication can be vital to demonstrate associations 
and relationships between suspects, and to exclude people from suspicion. 
The Committee accepts that the retention of this data is necessary and 
proportionate for national security and law enforcement investigations.  
Types of data excluded from the data set 
3.94 Proposed new subsection 187(4) of the Bill excludes five types of 
telecommunications data from the scope of data retention obligations: 
 information that is the contents or substance of a communication, 
 web-browsing histories, 
 information relating to communications carried by third-party over-the-
top service providers, 
 information that service providers are required to destroy pursuant to 
determinations made under section 99 of the Telecommunications Act, 
and 
 detailed location records. 
3.95 The Committee did not receive any submissions expressing concern about 
the proposed exclusion of information that service providers are required 
to destroy under the Telecommunications Act. The Committee has 
addressed the issue of the retention of location records above. The 
remaining exclusions are discussed in the following pages. 
Contents or substance of a communication 
3.96 Paragraph 187A(4)(a) of the Bill provides that service providers are not 
required to retain information that is the content or substance of a 
communication. This provision gives effect to this Committee’s 2013 
recommendation that ‘any mandatory data retention regime should apply 
only to meta-data and exclude content’.82 The Committee also notes that 
section 172 of the TIA Act provides that data authorisations made under 
Chapter 4 of the TIA Act cannot authorise the disclosure of the content or 
substance of a communication. 
82  PJCIS, Report of the inquiry into potential reforms of Australia’s national security legislation, 
Canberra, May 2013, p. 192. 
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Defining ‘contents or substance’ of a communication 
3.97 The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (PJCHR) noted that 
‘what constitutes the ”content” of a communication (and would therefore 
be excluded from collection) is undefined in the bill’,83 and has expressed 
concern that this ‘could see data retained that does include aspects of 
content’.84  
3.98 The Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills also noted the 
absence of a definition of ‘content’ and noted that ‘as long as the bill does 
not contain a clear definition of ‘content’ there is a real risk that personal 
rights and liberties will be unduly dependent on insufficiently defined 
administrative powers.’85 
3.99 The Australian Human Rights Commission and the Law Council of 
Australia supported these recommendations.86 
3.100 In its submission, the Attorney-General’s Department acknowledged the 
PJCHR’s recommendation and endorsed the importance of ensuring that 
data retention obligations do not inadvertently apply to the content of 
communications. However, the Department cautioned that: 
the PJCHR’s recommendation would actually have the contrary 
effect as an exhaustive definition would not keep pace with 
technological change, leading to an increasingly wide range of 
information that may not be excluded from data retention 
obligations. The technologically-neutral approach taken to 
defining the content or substance of a communication under the 
TIA Act is consistent with the approach taken by the Privacy Act 
1988 and Part 13 of the Telecommunications Act, and is consistent 
with the 2008 views of the [Australian Law Reform Commission] 
about the desirability of technological neutrality in this field.87 
3.101  As part of its 2008 report, For your information: Australian privacy law and 
practice, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) considered the 
question of whether ‘telecommunications data’ should be defined, and 
recommended against an exhaustive definition: 
The ALRC does not recommend amending the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act to define 
83  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (PJCHR), Fifteenth Report of the 44th 
Parliament, p. 14. 
84  PJCHR, Fifteenth Report of the 44th Parliament, p. 14. 
85  Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of  Bills, First Report of 2015, p. 122. 
86  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, pp. 7-8; Law Council of Australia, 
Submission 126, p. 12. 
87  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 26. 
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‘telecommunications data’. The exclusion of a definition enables 
the legislation to remain technology neutral so that it can be 
applied to new developments in technology without the need for 
amendment.88 
3.102 The Department elaborated on this issue in its supplementary submission, 
arguing that: 
The challenges of maintaining technological neutrality in the 
context of the meaning of telecommunications data are equally 
applicable to defining content. The broad meaning of ‘content or 
substance’ of a communication in the TIA Act is capable of being 
interpreted in light of rapid changes in communications 
technology in a way that an exhaustive, static definition would 
not. 
Any new types of information that emerge as a result of rapid 
technological change would fall outside the defined list. They 
would then be excluded from the meaning of content, and the 
protections that apply to content. 
The TIA Act includes provisions which, when read in conjunction 
with a broad definition of content, create a strong incentive for the 
telecommunications industry and agencies to take a robust 
approach to protecting and accessing the content of 
communications. In particular: 
 apart from limited exceptions, it is a criminal offence for a 
service provider to disclose the content or substance of a 
communication without lawful authority 
 it is a criminal offence for officials of law enforcement and 
national security agencies to use or disclose unlawfully 
accessed stored communications except in strictly limited 
circumstances 
 there is no discretion for a court to admit unlawfully accessed 
stored communications, which includes information that has 
been wrongfully retained as data, and 
 any person who believes that the content or substance of their 
communications has been unlawfully accessed under a data 
authorisation can challenge that access and, if successful, seek 
remedies under Part 3-7 of the TIA Act.89 
3.103 From a technical perspective, Ms Brenda Aynsley, President of the 
Australian Computer Society, advised the Committee that, ‘I have been 
88  Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice, Report No. 108 (2008), p. 2485. 
89  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, pp. 6-7. 
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party to the discussions on defining content since the seventies. I do not 
have a problem with the accepted definition in use today’.90 
Can content be reliably separated from telecommunications data? 
3.104 A number of submissions questioned whether service providers would, 
from a technical perspective, be able to appropriately separate content 
from telecommunications data.91 
3.105 Mr Peter Froelich of Telstra, appearing in his capacity as a member 
representative of Communications Alliance and the AMTA, provided 
detailed evidence about the technical challenges associated with 
separating the content or substance of a communication from the 
telecommunications data associated with its transmission, for different 
types of communications. In summary, for some types of 
telecommunications data, such as email, service providers would be 
required to conduct some ‘post processing’ to separate the 
telecommunications data to be retained from the content that is not to be 
retained. He noted that:  
the technology is not overly challenging from an engineering 
function… but the concepts of unpicking it and putting it aside are 
certainly a little bit more challenging than perhaps meeting the 
standard TIA Act interception obligations.92 
3.106 For other types of communications, such as SMS messages, Mr Froelich 
indicated that separating the content from the telecommunications data 
would not be complex: 
I think text messages are not particularly onerous in that there is a 
to and a from field and a billing function for those. We discreetly 
bill for those and the actual text line does not exist in the billing 
function. That one I do not think is particularly onerous for us.93 
Web-browsing histories 
3.107 Paragraph 187A(4)(b) of the Bill provides that service providers are not 
required to keep, or cause to be kept: 
information that: 
90  Ms Brenda Aynsley, President, Australian Computer Society, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
29 January 2015, p. 84. 
91  See, for example, Mr David Vaile and Mr Paolo Remati, Submission 194, pp. 7-8; Law Council 
of Australia, Submission 126, p. 13. 
92  Mr Peter Froelich, General Manager, Special Networks Engineering, Telstra, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 41. 
93  Mr Froelich, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 41. 
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(i) states an address to which a communication was sent on 
the internet, from a telecommunications device, using an 
internet access service provided by the service provider; 
and 
(ii) was obtained by the service provider only as a result of 
providing the service. 
3.108 A note in the Bill states that ‘this paragraph puts beyond doubt that 
service providers are not required to keep information about subscribers’ 
web browsing history’, giving effect to this Committee’s 2013 
recommendation that ‘internet browsing data should be explicitly 
excluded’.94  
3.109 However, the language of the Bill establishes a broader exemption that 
covers more than merely ‘web-browsing’ data. As the Explanatory 
Memorandum makes clear: 
This provision will go further than the PJCIS Report recommended 
by ensuring that service providers are not required to keep records 
of the uniform resource locators (URLs), internet protocol (IP) 
addresses, port numbers and other internet identifiers with which 
a person has communicated via an internet access service 
provided by the service provider.95 
3.110 The IWG report provides greater detail on this exclusion: 
The proposed data set must be read in the context of the Bill, 
which limits the scope and application of the data retention 
obligations and through that the extent to which data elements 
identified in the data set must be retained. 
… 
Subparagraph 187A(4)(b)(i) ensures that internet access service 
providers are not required to keep destination information 
associated with web browsing history and other communication 
protocols for those services.  
The data retention obligations relating to an internet access 
communication session are limited to the relevant provider 
retaining the time, date and location of a subscriber when the 
service was accessed, and the time, date and location of that 
subscriber when the service was disconnected, as well as all 
internet protocol (IP) addresses and, where applicable, port 
94  PJCIS, Report of the inquiry into potential reforms of Australia’s national security legislation, 
Canberra, May 2013, p. 192. 
95  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 44. 
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numbers allocated to the subscriber during the session (and the 
associated dates and times).96 
3.111 Subsection 187A(7) of the Bill is also relevant when considering the data 
retention obligations applicable to internet access services. As noted above 
in the context of location information, this provision provides that two or 
more communications that together constitute a single communications 
session are taken to be a single communication.  
3.112 The Explanatory Memorandum states: 
The purpose of subsection 187A(7) is to ensure that providers are 
not required to record the source, destination, time, date and 
duration of a communication or the location of a device 
throughout a communications session.97 
3.113 The Explanatory Memorandum then goes on to give a detailed example of 
how data retention obligations do, and do not, apply to smartphones 
running multiple background applications. The IWG report further 
explains that the effect of s 187A(7) is that ‘data retention obligations do 
not require packet-level retention’.98 
3.114 The Attorney-General’s Department’s submission explains the underlying 
purpose of the exclusion: 
This exception is intended to ensure that providers of internet 
access services are not required to engage in session logging, 
which may otherwise fall within the scope of the destination of a 
communication. 
However, the general obligation to retain destination information 
will continue to apply to other services, such as email, messaging 
or VoIP services that are analogous to ‘traditional’ 
communications services. Providers of those and other services 
will be required to retain the destination identifiers for 
communications sent using their services. 99 
Impact on national security and law enforcement investigations 
3.115 Victoria Police, advised the Committee that the exclusion of web-browsing 
histories represents a significant, but justified exclusion from the scope of 
the proposed data set: 
From a Victoria Police point of view, if we were to look at this 
solely from a law enforcement perspective without considering all 
96  IWG, Report 1 of the Data Retention Implementation Working Group, December 2014, pp. 3-4. 
97  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 46. 
98  IWG, Report 1 of the Data Retention Implementation Working Group, December 2014, p. 4. 
99  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 28. 
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the surrounding issues which obviously this committee and the 
community need to consider, the answer would probably be, ‘Yes, 
we need that. That is fantastic.’ But, like all other stakeholders in 
these proceedings, we need to bring a degree of pragmatism to 
these discussions. … We understand the need to try to find a 
balance. I think the view of the Victoria Police would be that, 
although that is something that would be very nice to have and 
very beneficial, it raises a level of concern in the community 
around the bill and the proposed regime generally, we are 
prepared so say we can live with the proposed arrangements and 
do the best we can under that regime.100 
3.116 The New South Wales Police Force and South Australia Police expressed 
similar views.101 
Concerns about the drafting of this exclusion 
3.117 Optus noted that, while it understood the policy intent of the Bill is to 
exclude any requirement for the analysis or retention of internet packet 
address details, ‘[t]he draft legislation may not sufficiently exclude this for 
incoming communications to a customer.’102 Optus confirmed that the 
current draft data set does not require the retention of web-browsing 
information, but noted that: 
It appears open for the Regulations to require collection of the 
origin IP address by the service provider supplying the internet 
access service to the destination customer. If this occurred, it could 
enable the browsing history of the customer to be reconstructed by 
examination of where web browsing packets came from.103 
3.118 Professor George Williams of the University of New South Wales gave 
similar evidence.104 
3.119 Optus recommended that section 187A(4)(b) of the Bill could be amended 
to place beyond doubt that the regulations could not be used to require 
the retention of web-browsing history.105 
100  Inspector Segrave, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, pp. 55-56. 
101  Assistant Commissioners Malcolm Lanyon, Commander, Special Services Group, New South 
Wales Police Force and Paul Dickson, Crime Service, South Australia Police, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, pp. 55-56. 
102  Optus, Submission 86, p. 8. 
103  Optus, Submission 86, p. 8. 
104  Professor Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 4. 
105  Optus, Submission 86, p. 8. 
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3.120 The Attorney-General’s Department disagreed, arguing that Optus’ 
interpretation of the provision is ‘plainly not supported by the language of 
the Bill’: 
This reading is inconsistent with the wording of sub clause 
187A(4). The exception excludes information that: 
 a provider has only because of its provision of an internet 
access service, and 
 states addresses to which information was sent on the internet. 
As such, any information that records a person’s browsing history 
meets this test and is therefore excluded regardless of whether it is 
incoming (received) or outgoing (sent) – an incoming packet still 
states the address to which a communication was sent, because it 
responds to an instruction (the outgoing IP packet).106 
3.121 The Department also noted that the amendments to the provision 
recommended by Optus could result in unintended consequences: 
Moreover, the Department is concerned that Optus’ particular 
proposal could be read as excluding both web browsing history 
and the identifiers (IP addresses) that a provider assigns to its own 
customers. The Bill’s clear intent is that providers be required to 
retain the IP address assigned to their own customers under the 
data retention regime. The amendment proposed by Optus would 
be inconsistent with that objective.107 
Definition of the term ‘session’ 
3.122 The Explanatory Memorandum provides some guidance about how the 
term ‘session’ is to be interpreted, indicating that it is intended to apply 
flexibly to different networks and services, based on their unique 
configurations: 
Whether a series of communications constitutes a single 
communications session is a question of technical fact and will 
depend upon the objective operation of the provider’s network or 
service. This question should not be determined from the user’s 
perspective, as the provider subject to data retention obligations 
will generally be unable to assess a user’s intentions in this regard, 
and in many cases, users are unlikely to be aware of when their 
device is communicating, such as when applications installed on a 
smartphone or computer are automatically seeking and receiving 
updates.108 
106  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, pp. 12-13. 
107  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, p. 13. 
108  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 46. 
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3.123 However, Optus’ submission also noted some potential uncertainty about 
the intended meaning of this term,109 and in evidence noted that: 
It is an easy problem to identify but it is something that will 
require a lot of discussion around what a session actually is.110  
3.124 The Data Retention Implementation Working Group’s report also 
recommends that Government provide additional explanatory material 
for the term ‘session’, which, as noted above, is used within proposed new 
subsection 187A(7) of the Bill to limit the volume and type of information 
that service providers are required to retain.111  
3.125 In its supplementary submission, however, the Attorney-General’s 
Department disagreed that the current approach is ambiguous, explaining 
that: 
In relation to the term ‘session’, paragraph 187A(7) of the Bill 
provides that two or more communications that together 
constitute a single communications session are taken to be a single 
communication. With internet access sessions, this means that 
service providers will only be required to keep location records at 
the start and end of a session, which can last from a few minutes to 
several days or even weeks. For phone calls, each call will be a 
separate communication that will have separate data retention 
requirements. 
In regards to location information, the location records will be 
limited to the location of a device at the start and end of a 
communication (such as a phone call or Short Message Service 
(SMS) message). For services provided to a fixed location, such as 
an ADSL service, this requirement can be met through the 
retention of the subscriber’s service address.112 
Should service providers be precluded from retaining web-browsing information? 
3.126 The Australian Privacy Foundation argued that proposed new paragraph 
187A(4)(b) does not go far enough, as it does not prohibit the retention of 
web-browsing information: 
The problem with this is that it simply says that this information 
does not have to be retained, but it does not prevent the retention 
of this information, and it does not prevent access to this 
information under Chapter 4 of the TIA Act. Now, we believe that 
109  Optus, Submission 86, p. 9. 
110  Mr Epstein, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 25. 
111  IWG, Report 1 of the Data Retention Implementation Working Group, December 2014, p. 8. 
112  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, p. 12. 
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to say that the bill is privacy protective, because there is no 
obligation to retain this data, does not deal with the fact that the 
data may well be retained.113 
3.127 However, in recent evidence to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
References Committee in September 2014, Mr Matthew Lobb, General 
Manager Industry Strategy and Public Policy at Vodafone Hutchison 
Australia, confirmed that Vodafone, and likely other major service 
providers, was currently developing and implementing the capability to 
collect and retain at least some web-browsing history for commercial 
purposes, unrelated to the proposed data retention scheme: 
CHAIR: I want to draw three distinctions here. You can tell us 
where Vodafone sits now, and where you think your business is 
heading. One distinction that you could capture is that this 
customer downloaded X gigabytes of data in a period of time and 
that that customer was responsible for that much data transfer. 
That is very minimal. 
The second or middle tier is where you would be able to tell the 
host IP but not necessarily pages within a particular address space. 
The third tier is being able to track exactly what kind of content, 
click by click. Where is Vodafone now, and where is it heading? 
Mr Lobb: We are at the cusp of the second capability. We have 
been developing that capability. Because it is such a large amount 
of information that would need to be stored and accessed it is a 
challenge, but that is something that we have been developing. 
CHAIR: We are hearing from Telstra a little bit later in the day. I 
am presuming that this is not something that Vodafone is 
embarking upon, where you are out on some kind of limb. 
Mr Lobb: No. 
CHAIR: This is where the industry is heading? 
Mr Lobb: That is right. I am not sure where other companies are 
at, but I would expect that the capability is something that is 
evolving across the industry.114 
Data about communications passing ‘over the top’ of internet access services 
3.128 The Australian Interactive Media Industry Association (AIMIA) Digital 
Policy Group (DPG) expressed concern that service providers may be 
113  Dr David Lindsay, Vice-Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
30 January 2015, p. 78. 
114  Committee Hansard, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Canberra, 
26 September 2014, p. 20. 
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required to use deep packet inspection to extract telecommunications data 
about third-party over-the-top services passing over their network: 
It is unclear… the extent to which the proposed data retention 
regime is intended to apply to information about communications 
using ’over the top’ (OTT) services. For example, it appears from 
the categories of information that may be required to be retained 
that there is scope for the Minister to direct ISPs to collect data 
about all third party OTT services carried on their networks.115 
3.129 However, proposed new paragraph 187A(4)(c) provides that service 
providers are not required to keep: 
information to the extent that it relates to a communication carried 
by means of another relevant service operated:  
(i) by another service provider; and  
(ii) using the relevant service;  
or a document to the extent that the document contains such 
information. 
3.130 The Explanatory Memorandum states: 
The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the provider of an 
underlying service, such as an internet access service, is not 
required to keep information about communications that are 
passing ‘over the top’ of the underlying service and that are being 
carried by means of another relevant service, such as  VoIP service, 
operated by another provider.116 
3.131 Similarly, the IWG report states that: 
The obligation to retain data about a service only applies to the 
operator of that service. Providers are not required to retain data 
about the services offered by other providers. … Put another way, 
the data retention obligations do not require a service provider to 
inspect another service provider’s packets to determine what 
service may be running over the top.117 
3.132 The Department, in its submission, further explained that: 
proposed paragraph 187A(4)(c) makes clear that service providers 
are only required to keep records about the services they 
themselves provide and operate. They are not required to keep 
records about communications sent or received using third-party 
115  Australian Interactive Media Industry Association (AIMIA) Digital Policy Group (DPG), 
Submission 34, p. 7. 
116  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 45. 
117  IWG, Report 1 of the Data Retention Implementation Working Group, December 2014, p. 3. 
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communications services running ‘over-the-top’ of their network 
or service. This means that an internet access service provider, 
though not required to retain web-browsing information, would 
have to retain destination information for webmail services, for 
example, but only if it provided that webmail service itself. That 
particular provider would not be required to retain destination 
information for services its customer used, but it did not 
provide.118 
Committee comment 
3.133 The Committee accepts the evidence provided by industry representatives 
that content can be reliably separated from data for the purpose of data 
retention. The Committee notes that, currently, service providers are 
required by law to separate content from data when complying with 
historic and prospective data authorisations made under Chapter 4 of the 
TIA Act. The Committee also notes the offence provisions under both 
Part 13 of the Telecommunications Act 1997, and Chapters 2 and 3 of the TIA 
Act for the unauthorised access to or disclosure of the content of a 
communication.  
3.134 The Committee notes that the Bill does not in any way provide for 
agencies to access any content or substance of a communication, except 
under a warrant. 
3.135 The Committee accepts the evidence of the Attorney-General’s 
Department that the Bill, as drafted, is intended to exclude any obligation 
for providers of internet access services to retain web-browsing history, or 
any other destination information relating to third-party protocols passing 
over their service, and that this exclusion applies equally to incoming and 
outgoing traffic. However, ensuring that web-browsing histories are not 
required to be retained is important to ensuring the proportionality of any 
data retention regime. This issue should be further clarified in the 
Explanatory Memorandum. 
118  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 28. 
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Recommendation 7 
 The Committee recommends that the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to make clear that service providers are 
not required to keep web-browsing histories or other destination 
information, for either incoming or outgoing traffic. 
3.136 The Committee acknowledges that in some instances service providers 
may have legitimate commercial reasons to choose to retain web-browsing 
history, including allowing service providers to provide cheaper internet 
access services that are partially funded by advertising revenue based on a 
person’s web-browsing history. The collection of web-browsing 
information in that context would continue to be regulated by the Privacy 
Act and Part 13 of the Telecommunications Act.  
3.137 In regards to the definition of ‘sessions’, the Committee notes that 
individual networks and services manage ‘sessions’ in very different 
ways. The approach proposed in subsection 187A(7) is intended to allow 
service providers to adopt retention practices consistent with their existing 
session-management practices. However, the Committee is concerned that 
the proposed approach may be overly broad and may contribute to 
industry uncertainty.  
3.138 The Committee sees value in the Explanatory Memorandum clarifying 
how ‘sessions’ are to be defined.   
 
Recommendation 8 
 The Committee recommends that the Explanatory Memorandum to the  
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to provide greater clarity in defining 
‘sessions’ in proposed new subsection 187A(7) of the Bill. 
3.139 Finally, in regards to the proposed data set, the Committee accepts 
evidence that the Bill does not require service providers to keep records 
about communications sent or received using third-party communications 
services running ‘over-the-top’ of their network or service. Service 
providers are only required to keep records about the services they 
themselves provide and operate.  
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 4 
Data retention period 
The retention period 
4.1 Subsection 187C(1) of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (the Bill) provides that service 
providers must retain most telecommunications data covered by the data 
set for two years after it comes into existence. 
4.1 The exception to this general rule is ‘subscriber data’, being data covered 
by paragraph 187A(2)(a), which must be retained from when it is created 
until two years after the closure of the relevant account. However, 
subsection 187C(2) provides that regulations may still prescribe the 
shorter, two-year retention period for specified subscriber data. The 
Government’s proposed data set, included at Appendix A to this report, 
states that: 
The regulations will also limit the retention of subscriber 
information described in item 1 (c)-(f) to two years from creation 
of that data.  
4.2 Accordingly, name, address and contractual information would be 
required to be kept for the life of the account plus two years, and all other 
telecommunications data covered by the data set would be required to be 
kept for the shorter, two-year period. 
4.3 The Explanatory Memorandum explains why a longer retention period 
has been included for subscriber data: 
Subscriber records are typically generated when an account or 
service is opened, and may not be updated for many years. The 
purpose of this provision is to ensure that subscriber records 
associated with an account are available throughout the life of the 
account, and for as long as records relating to communications 
sent using that account are retained. This is intended to ensure 
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that the necessary information is available to establish a 
connection between a particular communication and the 
subscriber.1 
4.4 The Explanatory Memorandum also states that: 
A retention requirement of two years is consistent with the aim of 
the legislation and is necessary having regard to the reasonable 
requirements of national security and law enforcement agencies to 
have telecommunications data available for investigations and the 
privacy of users of the Australian telecommunications system.2  
4.5 The Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights further explains the 
necessity and proportionality of a two-year retention period: 
The retention period reflects international experience that, while 
the majority of requests for access to telecommunications data are 
for data that is less than 6 months old, certain types of 
investigations are characterised by a requirement to access to data 
up to 2 years old. These include complex investigations such as 
terrorism, financial crimes and organised criminal activity, serious 
sexual assaults, premeditated offences and transnational 
investigations. Against the particular context of the critical 
importance of telecommunications data in very serious crime 
types and security threats, the two year retention period provides 
a proportionate response to that environment.3 
General discussion 
4.6 The Australian Privacy Commissioner provided extensive evidence on 
this issue, covering the privacy implications of various retention periods, 
how the Committee should approach assessing the necessity and 
proportionality of particular retention periods, and his assessment of what 
retention period is supported by the publicly-available information. As a 
starting principle, the Commissioner stressed the need to ensure that the 
retention period is set at the minimum necessary for law enforcement and 
national security purposes: 
To minimise any impact, I would suggest that the committee 
should satisfy itself, firstly, that each item of the dataset that 
service providers would be required to collect and retain under 
the scheme is necessary and proportionate; and secondly, that the 
1  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 [Data 
Retention Bill], Explanatory Memorandum, p. 48. 
2  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 48. 
3  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 18. 
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retention period imposed in relation to each item of the dataset is 
also necessary and proportionate.4 
4.7 The Commissioner’s view was also supported by the Law Council of 
Australia.5 
4.8 A number of submissions cited various figures published by the European 
Commission showing the age breakdown for requests for access to 
telecommunications data by EU member-States.6 There was some 
variability between the figures cited, however, as different submitters 
selected different date ranges. The Attorney-General’s Department 
produced a table summarising figures released by the European 
Commission in its report, Statistics on requests for data under the directive for 
2008-2012, which appear to be the most comprehensive figures available. 
These figures are set out at Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1 Summary of age of telecommunications data requested under the EU Data Retention 
Directive in countries with two-year data retention periods, 2008-12  
 Age of telecommunications data requested (months) 
 0–3 3–6 6–9 9–12 12–15 15–18 18–21 21–24 
Percentage of 
requests 
57.81% 19.59% 8.03% 5.03% 2.80% 2.00% 1.51% 3.24% 
Cumulative 
percentage 
of requests 
57.81% 77.40% 85.43% 90.46% 93.25% 95.25% 96.76% 100.00% 
Source Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 30. 
4.9 In its submission, the Department provided a detailed justification for a 
two-year retention period, based on its assessment of the European 
Commission’s review: 
It is essential to distinguish between the frequency with which 
agencies access older data, and the importance of that data to 
investigations when it is accessed: where agencies require access to 
telecommunications data, its value does not decrease with age. 
While the review found that approximately 90% of requests for 
access relate to telecommunications data less than twelve months 
old, this number is skewed heavily by the use of 
telecommunications data in more straight-forward ‘volume crime’ 
investigations that, despite being serious in nature, can frequently 
4  Mr Timothy Pilgrim PSM, Australian Privacy Commissioner, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
29 January 2015, p. 46. 
5  Mr Peter Leonard, Chairperson, Media and Communications Committee, Business Law 
Section, Law Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 33. 
6  See, for example: Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, p. 8; Muslim Legal 
Network (NSW), Submission 198, p. 11. 
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be resolved in a shorter period of time. As such, the above 
summary obscures the fact that certain types of law enforcement 
investigations frequently involve longer investigatory periods and 
therefore require a disproportionate level of access to older 
telecommunications data.  
4.10 The Department explained that these types of investigations included: 
 counter-terrorism and organised crime investigations, which 
are often characterised by long periods of preparation. These 
investigations often require time to establish a clear pattern of 
relationships between multiple events to expose not just 
individual suspects, but entire criminal networks, especially 
where suspects are practicing sophisticated counter-
surveillance techniques 
 series of related crimes, where agencies are required to piece 
together evidence from a wide range of sources, not all of 
which may be immediately evident 
 cyber-crimes and other crimes where access to IP-based 
telecommunications data is required, due to the greater 
complexity of these investigations—the EU statistics show 
agencies are up to 7 times more likely to access IP-based data 
that is more than 12 months old than mobile telephony data 
 trafficking in human beings and drug trafficking, where there is 
often a complex division of labour between accomplices 
 serious corruption of public officials, financial crime and tax 
fraud, where offences are often only detected following audits, 
or are only reported to law enforcement agencies following 
internal investigations, requiring agencies to often access data 
that is already considerably dated 
 repeated extortion, where victims are in a relationship with the 
offender and often only seek help months or even years after 
the exploitation commenced 
 serious sexual offences, where victims may not report the 
offence for a considerable period of time after the event—for 
example, the United Kingdom Government has provided 
advice that over half of the telecommunications data used by its 
agencies in the investigation of serious sexual offences is more 
than six months old 
 serious criminal offences, particularly in relation to murder 
investigations, where extensive historical evidence must be 
assembled to prove intent or premeditation, and 
 transnational investigations, which involve significant 
challenges for agencies attempting to coordinate investigations 
across multiple jurisdictions, frequently resulting in delays 
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while preliminary information is obtained from foreign 
agencies.7 
4.11 The Department added that: 
More broadly, many crimes are not brought to the attention of the 
relevant authorities until well after the fact, and the normal 
variability in criminal investigations means that some 
investigations will continue for considerably longer than average. 
In such cases, reliable access to telecommunications data can be 
particularly important, as physical and forensic evidence will 
frequently degrade with the passage of time.8 
4.12 The Committee received a number of submissions and heard evidence 
from a number of witnesses calling for a shorter retention period, either 
for all or part of the data set.  
4.13 Blueprint for Free Speech recommended that, if the Committee 
recommended passing the Bill, the retention period should be capped at 
six months to limit the privacy and regulatory impacts. It noted that, for 
countries subject to the former EU Data Retention Directive: 
the period of storage is typically between 6-12 months. This is well 
short of the 2-year period proposed by this legislation. In fact, 
these periods are likely too long. A report on the UK experience 
demonstrated that in approximately 75% of cases over a 4-year 
period, the data sought to be accessed was less than 3 months old.9 
4.14 Similarly, the Law Institute of Victoria argued that the retention period 
should be reduced to what is ‘strictly necessary and proportionate’ and 
argued for a six month period.10 
4.15 The Australian Privacy Commissioner provided a detailed assessment of 
what retention period he believed is supported by the publicly-available 
information: 
Statistical evidence, both international and domestic, seems to 
suggest that a large proportion of investigations use 
telecommunications data that is up to or less than one-year old. 
Acknowledging that there are differing views on what this 
evidence shows, it could nevertheless support a case for a shorter 
one-year data retention period. However, the case for a two-year 
data retention scheme is less clear. It may rest on information that 
is being made available to the committee but which is not being 
7  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 31. 
8  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 31. 
9  Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission 54, p. 13. 
10  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 117.1, p. 10. 
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released publicly—I assume to ensure that it does not prejudice 
the activities of law enforcement and security agencies. It is 
therefore important that close consideration be given to whether 
the evidence provided to the committee establishes that it is 
necessary to retain each item of telecommunications data for a 
minimum period of two years or, alternatively, whether a shorter 
retention period would meet the needs of law enforcement and 
security agencies.11 
4.16 However, the Commissioner confirmed that he does not rule out a two-
year retention period being justified as necessary and proportionate,12 and  
cautioned that the Committee should have regard to the gravity of the 
matters that require access to older telecommunications data, and not 
place undue weight on the raw figures showing that such data is accessed 
in only a minority of cases: 
We should not just limit it to the number of cases because, as we 
start looking at some of these matters—I am feeling a bit odd here 
because it seems like I am starting to defend the position of the law 
enforcement and security agencies—it is about how large an 
impact they could have on the community. A particular 
investigation could be one that prevents an attack which could 
impact on hundreds or thousands of people.13 
4.17 The Commissioner also observed that, given that the proposed data set 
makes clear the Government’s intention to limit the retention period for 
items 1(c) to 1(f) of the data set to two years, rather than the life of the 
account plus two years, ‘there does not appear to be a compelling reason 
for that limitation not to be contained in the Bill.’14  
4.18 The Australian Human Rights Commission noted the EU Court of Justice’s 
conclusion that retention periods should be limited to that which is 
‘strictly necessary’,15 and that the proposed two-year retention period is ‘at 
the upper end of retention periods implemented in comparable 
jurisdictions’.16 In its submission, the Commission argued that the Bill 
should be amended to incorporate a one-year retention period on a trial 
basis, subject to the statutory review by this Committee.17 However, at a 
11  Mr Pilgrim, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 46. 
12  Mr Pilgrim, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 55. 
13  Mr Pilgrim, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 48. 
14  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 15. 
15  Digital Rights Ireland v Ireland; Kärtner Landesregierung, Seitlinger and Tschohl (joined cases  
C-293/12 and C-594/12, Court of Justice of the European Union, 8 April 2014), [64]. 
16  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, p. 9. 
17  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, pp. 8-9. 
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public hearing, the Commission’s President, Professor Gillian Triggs, 
noted that international comparison are ‘relevant evidence; it is not 
determinative’,18 and that she ‘would not argue too strongly for a year’.19   
4.19 Professor Triggs went on to argue that ‘the debate about the period is 
missing the core point’,20 and that, as the objective of data retention is to 
facilitate the better investigation of persons involved in serious crime and 
threats to security, uniform data retention is a ‘crude instrument to deal 
with a problem that is a very sophisticated one and one where 
considerably greater lengths of time may be necessary.’21 In this vein, 
Professor Triggs proposed that the uniform data retention period be 
coupled with an independent administrative mechanism to allow the 
retention period to be extended—potentially by many years—in relation 
to specific matters, such as the investigation of a serious risk to security or 
a child exploitation network.22 The Committee discussed this proposal 
with Professor Triggs in significant detail.  
4.20 The Committee also received evidence from organisations and members of 
the community in favour of the proposed two-year retention period. For 
example, Bravehearts noted the importance of a longer retention period 
for serious criminal investigations and recommended that the retention 
period be further assessed as part of the mandatory review established by 
the Bill: 
While the European Union’s period and statements from police 
demonstrate that many investigations are completed within 
months, serious crimes often necessitate access to older records as 
the criminal behaviour may span a number of years. This is 
particularly true for investigations of child sexual exploitation. 
We note that the data retention period set in the Bill is at a 
minimum of two years and support this proposal. In addition, 
Bravehearts would recommend that after a three year period, as 
part of a review of the legislation, an assessment be made as to 
whether the 2 year retention period is the most appropriate length 
of time.23 
4.21 Professor George Williams and Dr Keiran Hardy, in their capacity as 
members of the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law at the University of 
18  Emeritus Professor Gillian Triggs, President, Australian Human Rights Commission, 
Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 72. 
19  Professor Triggs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 72. 
20  Professor Triggs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 72. 
21  Professor Triggs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 71. 
22  Professor Triggs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, pp. 71-75. 
23  Bravehearts, Submission 33, p. 4. 
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New South Wales, expressed the view that, as of 9 December 2014, the 
Government had not yet justified a two-year retention period: 
The government has reasoned that data less than six months old is 
the most frequently accessed, but data up to two years old can be 
necessary for investigations into terrorism and other complex 
criminal offences.  Given that this timeframe is central to the 
operation of the regime, we believe that a stronger case needs to be 
made as to why it is necessary. … In particular, a stronger 
justification for the two-year timeframe could help to reduce 
public perceptions that the Bill is designed to allow mass 
surveillance of the population.24 
4.22 However, in evidence to the Committee on 30 January 2015, 
Professor Williams advised that he had revised his position, based on the 
submissions and evidence provided by the Attorney-General’s 
Department and government agencies: 
The first thing I will say is that that statement was made on 
9 December, when we did not have access to other submissions 
that have now provided a much higher degree of detail about this. 
Indeed, I would say that I am very pleased to see that those 
agencies are now strongly making the case as to why that two-year 
period is necessary. One thing I have looked at carefully is the 
table on page 30 of the Attorney-General’s Department’s 
submission, where, based on European data, they have also given 
an indication as to when certain data is accessed. I do not have a 
strong view on this issue, because I think it is one that depends 
very much on operational issues. I think it gets outside of my 
expertise. 
But I suppose the threshold question for me is that, based on the 
European data, over 90 per cent of all requests are made within the 
first 12 months. Is the case compelling enough to extend it for 
another 12 months, given the cost and the extension of the 
scheme? As the submission indicates, it perhaps might be justified 
if it can be shown that in fact terrorism investigations, particularly, 
tend to take place in that second 12-month period. If that is the 
case then perhaps that threshold I have indicated can be met.25 
4.23 As discussed in Chapter 6, a joint submission from a number of media 
organisations argued that the introduction of a data retention regime 
would increase the difficulty faced by journalists in gathering information 
24  Professor George Williams AO and Dr Keiran Hardy, Submission 5, p. 2. 
25  Professor Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, pp. 7-8. 
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from confidential sources.26 However, in evidence, Ms Georgia-Kate 
Schubert, Head of Policy and Government Affairs for News Corp. 
Australia, confirmed that the actual retention period is of significantly less 
concern to journalists than is the underlying ability of law enforcement 
and national security agencies to be able to identify confidential sources.27 
Industry interests 
4.24 Following a public hearing with the Communications Alliance and the 
Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA), the 
Committee requested that Telstra, Optus, Vodafone, iiNet, TPG, Next 
Telecom, M2 Group, and the Inabox Group provide submissions setting 
out their existing retention practices. These companies represent a broad 
cross-section of the telecommunications industry, including the major, 
vertically integrated carriers, large ISPs, enterprise providers, and 
companies providing dedicated services to small and medium ISPs. The 
Committee received commercially confidential submissions from Telstra, 
Optus and Vodafone,28 as well as an item of correspondence from the 
Inabox Group.  
4.25 The Director-General of Security also provided the Committee with an 
unclassified summary of ASIO’s assessment of existing industry practices 
in relation to critical categories of telecommunications data (Table 4.2),29 as 
well as a more granular, classified assessment.30  
4.26 The Committee has carefully reviewed the submissions provided by 
service providers and ASIO, and considers that ASIO’s unclassified 
assessment, reproduced in Table 4.2 below, provides a useful summary of 
existing retention practices across the telecommunications industry. 
26  Joint media organisations, Submission 125, p. 1. The joint submission was made on behalf of 
Australian Associated Press, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, APN News and Media, 
the Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Bauer Media, Commercial 
Radio Australia, Fairfax Media, FreeTV, the Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, News 
Corp. Australia, the Special Broadcasting Service, The Newspaper Works, and the West 
Australian. 
27  Ms Georgia-Kate Schubert, Head of Policy and Government Affairs, News Corp. Australia, 
Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 93. 
28  Telstra, Submission 112.1; Optus, Submission 86.1; Vodafone, Submission 130.1. 
29  ASIO, Submission 12.2, p. 5. 
30  ASIO, Submission 12.2, Appendix B; and Submission 12.3. 
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Table 4.2 Comparative ranges of retention by main service providers of historical communications 
data 
Matters to which information 
must relate 
Telephony Internet 
1. The subscriber of, and 
accounts, services, 
telecommunications devices 
and other relevant services 
relating to, the relevant service 
Up to 7 years (and longer) 90 days to 5 years 
2. The source of a 
communication 
6 weeks to 7 years 
 
62 days to 7 years (for SMS) 
0 days to 5 years 
3. The destination of a 
communication 
4. The date, time and duration 
of a communication, or of its 
connection to a relevant 
service 
5. The type of communication 
or relevant service used in 
connection with a 
communication 
Up to 7 years 90 days to 5 years 
Source Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Submission 12.2, p. 5. 
4.27 The Attorney-General’s Department and Communications Alliance 
separately drew the Committee’s attention to the Telecommunications 
Consumer Protection Code, which requires all carriage service providers 
who supply telecommunications products to consumers in Australia to 
retain ‘Billing Information’ for at least six years.31 Billing information 
includes any information necessary for the purposes of: 
 calculating and assembling charges incurred by a customer during a 
billing period, 
 applying any debits or credits outstanding or discounts due against the 
charges, and calculating the net amount payable by the customer, 
 issuing and delivering bills to the billing address, 
 handling billing enquiries, and 
 receiving and receipting payments made by the customer.32 
4.28 Optus confirmed that, for its networks and services, the general 
requirement to keep the proposed data set for two years ‘is a workable 
time period for most data types’.33 Optus also confirmed that, while the 
extended retention period for subscriber records ‘has the potential to 
create some additional record keeping complexity depending on the 
compliance approach adopted’, this requirement would overall not ‘create 
31  Telecommunications Consumer Protection Code, p. 47. 
32  Telecommunications Consumer Protection Code, p. 12. 
33  Optus, Submission 86, p. 10. 
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any significant retention burden as most of this type of information is 
already kept by Optus for longer than these periods for other legal 
reasons’.34 
4.29 A number of industry representatives also noted that, given the significant 
variation between service providers’ commercial retention practices, many 
service providers do not currently retain some of the types of 
telecommunications data covered by the proposed data set. For example, 
Mr Michael Elsegood, appearing as a member of the Communications 
Alliance and AMTA, explained that: 
On the usage side is where I think there is probably a greater 
discrepancy. Some service providers might be billing on a fairly 
bulk basis and would not be collecting fine-detail information 
about the customer’s services. In that sense, they may not have the 
detailed usage records that might be required out of a data 
retention regime. On the mobile side, any information about 
mobile location may not be being stored in systems at all because 
there is simply no business reason to keep track of where your 
customers are. From an operational point of view, you may keep 
that for a very short period of time to deal with customer 
complaints or technical complaints about the operation of your 
network. So you might keep some short-term records about how 
your network has been performing. But in the long term you 
would not be keeping that sort of stuff.35 
4.30 The Communications Alliance summarised this issue in the following 
terms:  
It is a data creation regime as well as a data retention regime, for 
all of those providers who do not presently retain everything in 
the dataset.36 
4.31 This statement was consistent with ASIO’s assessment of current retention 
practices across the telecommunications industry, which notes that some 
service providers currently retain some categories of telecommunications 
data for ‘0 days’.37 The Attorney-General’s Department noted that while 
all of the categories of telecommunications data contained in the proposed 
data set ‘exist’ on providers’ networks, as they are ‘typically required in 
the provision of the communications service itself’, some types of data 
34  Optus, Submission 86, p. 10. 
35  Mr Michael Elsegood, Member of Communications Alliance and Manager of Regulatory 
Compliance and Safeguards, Optus, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 37. 
36  Mr John Stanton, CEO, Communications Alliance, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 
2014, p. 31. 
37  See Table 4.2 above. 
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may exist only ‘fleetingly’.38 In such situations, service providers would be 
required to begin collecting and retaining such telecommunications data. 
4.32 Proposed new subsection 187A(6) of the Bill makes clear that service 
providers would be required to create any relevant information that was 
not currently retained. The Explanatory Memorandum states that: 
Subsection 187A(6) will clarify that if the information or 
documents that service providers are required to keep under 
subsection 187A(1) are not created by the operation of the relevant 
service, or if they are only created in a transient fashion, then the 
service provider is required to use other means to create this 
information or document. 
Mandatory data retention is the creation of a consistent minimum 
standard across the telecommunications industry for what data is 
to be collected and how long it is to be retained. Subsection 
187A(6) will ensure that all service providers must meet this 
minimum standard, whether or not that data is currently being 
collected or retained by the relevant service provider.39 
4.33 Optus also noted that there are likely to be a small number of cases in 
which the retention of certain categories of telecommunications data for 
particular services would be more difficult, and recommended amending 
the Bill to allow the regulations to prescribe a shorter retention period for 
‘specific or “special case” data or service types’ would enhance the 
flexibility of the overall data retention arrangements.40 
4.34 In its supplementary submission, the Attorney-General’s Department has 
advised that : 
The Department has sought to estimate the cost of implementing 
the proposed data retention obligation, including seeking to assess 
the variation in capital costs of implementation if data were to be 
retained for 12, 24 and 36 months respectively. Extending the data 
retention period for industry participants will increase the capital 
costs of implementation; however a preliminary assessment 
indicates that the costs impacts are modest, and are substantially 
less than the percentage change in the retention period.41 
38  Ms Anna Harmer, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 11. 
39  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 46. 
40  Optus, Submission 86, p. 10. 
41  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, pp. 4-5. 
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4.35 The Committee also received a confidential briefing on the preliminary 
findings of the PricewaterhouseCoopers report on the costs of 
implementing data retention. 
4.36 The Committee has considered the implications of a two-year retention 
period across a range of different data types below. 
Law enforcement and security interests 
4.37 Law enforcement and national security agencies supported a two-year 
retention period. A number of law enforcement agencies and ASIO noted 
that, from an investigative perspective, a retention period of greater than 
two years would be beneficial. However, there was recognition within the 
law enforcement and national security communities that mandatory data 
retention obligations should be used only to establish a minimum, legally-
binding standard for record-keeping.  
4.38 The Director-General of Security confirmed that ASIO supports a two-year 
retention period,42 but emphasised that due to ASIO’s unique investigative 
requirements, particularly in relation to counter-espionage investigations, 
this two-year period was the ‘minimum’ viable retention period from his 
perspective.43 ASIO’s submission stated: 
A two year retention period is a compromise from ASIO’s 
perspective – we would prefer a longer retention period due to the 
long-term nature of some security threats, the sophistication of 
foreign intelligence actors, and that intelligence lead information 
can surface many months or years after an event has occurred. For 
example, leads to individuals who have recruited spies or 
facilitated individuals to terrorist training camps require ASIO to 
examine historical connections to understand those they may have 
influenced to engage in activities prejudicial to Australia’s 
security.44 
4.39 ASIO and the Attorney-General’s Department advised the Committee that 
the proposed two year retention period is the result of ‘extensive’ 
engagement between the Attorney-General’s Department, and law 
enforcement and national security agencies. In the course of these 
consultations, ASIO had advocated for a retention period of up to five 
years, however the Department concluded that the shorter, two-year 
retention period would be proportionate to the legitimate ends of 
42  Mr Duncan Lewis AO DSC CSC, Director-General of Security, ASIO, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 64. 
43  Mr Lewis, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 66. 
44  ASIO, Submission 12.1, p. 9. 
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safeguarding national security and public safety, and the enforcement of 
the criminal law.45  
4.40 ASIO addressed the Australian Privacy Commissioner’s comments in 
relation to the potential distinction between the number of authorisations 
made for access to telecommunications data more than two years old, and 
the relative gravity of the subject matter of the investigations to which 
those authorisations relate: 
A point that was made by one of the previous witnesses here was 
that the data we pull from deeper into the time period is quite 
often the most important because it will be some critical piece of a 
major inquiry. I would also—and this is a particular and peculiar 
requirement for ASIO—reinforce the point that counterintelligence 
investigations have a very long sine wave.46 
4.41 The Australian Federal Police (AFP) emphasised that, while the majority 
of criminal investigations relate to relatively recent conduct, complex and 
serious investigations often require access to telecommunications data 
from a considerable time ago: 
The nature of criminal investigations means that the bulk of 
matters subject to investigation relate to relatively recent conduct. 
However, where those investigations relate to historical events, the 
investigation will likely be more complex, relate to more serious 
conduct, or both. While the volume of requests for 
telecommunications data beyond 12 months old is likely to be 
lower than for more recent data, the relative value of that data is 
likely to be more significant. 
An example of historical events that may be the subject of 
investigation are international child protection operations, where 
information on Australian IP addresses are identified. This process 
may take a significant amount of time, meaning that data could be 
more than a year old before it becomes available to Australian 
authorities. Delays in the provision of information may relate to: 
 Lack of control over prioritisation or legal processes in foreign 
partner agencies; 
 Administrative processes associated with international 
cooperative 
 arrangements; 
 Establishment of coordinated international operational activity; 
 Technical difficulties in analysis of source data.47 
45  Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 68. 
46  Mr Lewis, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 66. 
47  AFP, Submission 7, p. 3. 
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4.42 The AFP stressed that the value of telecommunications data does not 
diminish with age, and that in many cases its value will increase as other 
sources of evidence are lost: 
[T]here is no clear correlation between the age of the information 
and its intrinsic value. Depending on the type of investigation, 
telecommunications data could be as important five years after an 
event as it is in the immediate aftermath. Moreover, in complex 
cases the value of older data may increase, particularly where 
physical evidence has eroded or (as is the case [in] cyber 
investigations) it is non-existent, making telecommunications data 
the key piece of information and evidence available.48 
4.43 Deputy Commissioner Michael Phelan noted that agencies are often not in 
a position to even begin investigations for some time after a crime has 
been committed, due to delays in criminal activity being brought to their 
attention: 
You are actually beholden to when the originating information 
comes to you not from when the offence occurred. So an offence 
occurred last year, three years ago, two years ago, 10 years ago but 
you can only start the investigation when you know about it. That 
has sometimes been lost on some of our commentators, that they 
think the offence occurred and straightaway we have access to the 
information. That is not true.49 
4.44 The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) 
explained the particular importance of older data to anti-corruption 
investigations: 
The sophistication of corrupt networks (and organised criminals 
generally) develops over time. If left undisturbed, it is likely that 
they will become competent at counter-surveillance and increase 
their ability to defeat law enforcement efforts.  
… 
The means and frequency of contact with each individual varies 
over time, making it difficult to know how wide a corrupt network 
is, or how deep the compromise may be. Older data can be more 
useful, since it increases the chances of hidden relationships being 
discovered.50 
48  AFP, Submission 7.1, p. 5. 
49  Deputy Commissioner Michael Phelan APM, Australian Federal Police, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 75. 
50  Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, Submission 48, p. 5. 
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4.45 ACLEI also provided the Committee with a detailed case study analysing 
the role that 18-month old telecommunications data played in Operation 
Heritage/Marca. The investigation, which began in 2011, uncovered a 
drug importation ring involving corrupt Customs and Department of 
Agriculture officials that had been operating since at least 2007. Initial 
investigations considered a particular associate as being benign. However, 
subsequent analysis of telecommunications data up to 18 months old 
demonstrated that this associate did, in fact, have corrupt connections, had 
been involved in criminal conduct, and was in fact a central figure in the 
conspiracy. The associate had, however, become more cautious over time 
and had adopted more sophisticated tradecraft that enabled him to avoid 
other forms of detection, including in the initial stages of Operation 
Heritage/Marca.51  
4.46 From the perspective of a state police force, the New South Wales Police 
Force (NSW Police) argued that a longer retention period would be 
preferable: 
Whilst two years may be appropriate for the majority of offences 
investigated by the Commonwealth, such as national security, 
drug and online sexual offences, states are also responsible for 
investigating a range of criminal offences, including murders, 
sexual assaults and robberies, which are often historical or take 
years to investigate prior to a suspect being identified.  
… 
The need for data retention for extended periods is even more 
important at the moment, as DNA, trace evidence and other 
forensic science becomes more sophisticated and it is possible to 
test against older crime exhibits, resulting in the identification of 
suspects years after offences being committed.52  
4.47 NSW Police provided the Committee with a detailed account of the types 
of matters currently under investigation dating back more than five years: 
[T]o perhaps clarify that this is not just rhetoric, we have some 
records on our books at the moment that justify data in excess of 
five years. Whilst they are minimal, as Mr Lanyon has alluded 
to—minimal in terms of the volume of requests that are handled 
up-front in the first six to 12 months—we have nearly 1,000 cases 
involving most-serious fraud, unsolved homicides, historical 
51  Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, Submission 48, pp. 7-8. 
52  Assistant Commissioner Mal Lanyon APM, Commander, Special Services Group, New South 
Wales Police Force, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 43. 
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sexual assaults, and a lot of clear-up armed robberies. They are 
fairly complex crimes in that batch.53 
4.48 Victoria Police similarly advised the Committee that: 
If we are looking at an investigation that may be afoot three, four, 
five or six years after a communication, almost invariably it is 
going to be an investigation of great significance. Law enforcement 
is not going to take on an incident that occurred that long ago, 
unless it is a homicide, a sex crime, a crime of significant personal 
violence, a counterterrorism inquiry or something of that nature. 
The other point I would make, and I think it has already been 
borne out in other evidence before you, is that the reality is that 
the bulk of these types of inquiries are made when this data is 
relatively new. Minimal inquiries are made father out. But again, 
they are ones that pertain to investigations that are probably of 
greater import.54 
4.49 NSW Police also highlighted to the Committee that law enforcement 
agencies are not only required to access telecommunications data as part 
of criminal investigations, but are also required to access such information 
at the request of prosecutors and defendants in the course of proceedings, 
which can occur months or even years after the investigation itself 
concludes: 
[W]hen a court proceeding comes up, whether it is a trial, a 
hearing or a committal, somewhere down the track, whether it is 
two, three, four or five years, we get requests from the DPP and 
from the defence in terms of alibis, in terms of checking out a 
particular witness’s statement, a particular location or a particular 
subscriber. So we get after the fact type requests for metadata.55 
4.50 South Australia Police further argued that the importance of 
telecommunications data aged more than two years’ old is likely to 
increase into the future, rather than decrease: 
If we got to two years, from an investigative perspective that is a 
retrograde step, especially when you are dealing with more and 
more historical offences, be they murders or historical sex offences, 
which do require that information. All of us around the table here 
53  Detective Superintendent Arthur Kopsias APM, Commander, Telecommunications 
Interception Branch, New South Wales Police Force, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 
2015, p. 52. 
54  Inspector Gavan Segrave, Intelligence and Covert Support Command, Victoria Police, 
Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 51. 
55  Detective Superintendent Kopsias, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 52. 
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would understand that the reliance on and use of electronic 
devices such as those we are talking about is not going to go away. 
It is increasing. So we will become more and more reliant on this 
sort of technology in the future. 
From a law enforcement perspective and, I would imagine, also 
from a security perspective, the longer the data is kept the better 
because there will be investigations where we would ordinarily 
have sought information that goes back beyond two years. This is 
about trying to create a minimum standard that is level across the 
industry. As the department has already said, there are internet 
providers now who routinely hold this information for up to seven 
years and perhaps longer, depending on the way their systems are 
configured. From a policing perspective, that would be beneficial 
to us. But this is about creating a minimum standard. … Two years 
is a time frame that law enforcement and security agencies have 
accepted. That is appropriate in the circumstances, but I can see 
instances where we will still claw back further than two years if 
the data is held. If data is not held under this regime then it is not 
available to us.56 
4.51 NSW Police expressed concern that the proposed two year retention 
period would not prevent service providers from reducing their current 
retention practices to a two-year minimum, which would significantly 
reduce the period of time for which certain types of telecommunications 
data are retained: 
The reason that New South Wales has asked for that period of two 
years, particularly with call charge records and reverse call charge 
records and subscriber checks to be longer than that period is that 
there is nothing to stop a service provider keeping for commercial 
purposes what are only billing records, after two years.57  
4.52 On 4 December 2014, the Committee wrote to the heads of the ACC, AFP, 
ASIO and State and Territory police forces to request information about 
their agencies’ access to and use of both stored communications and 
telecommunications data. In particular, the Committee sought information 
about the age breakdown of historical telecommunications data for which 
access was sought in each of the past five years. 
56  Assistant Commissioner Paul Dickson, Crime Service, South Australia Police, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 52. 
57  Assistant Commissioner Lanyon, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 51. 
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4.53 Some were unable to provide the Committee with information about the 
age breakdown of historical telecommunications data for which access 
was sought. For example, the Western Australia Police stated that: 
the systems used do not permit interrogation to identify the age of 
the data requested. Each request would have to be manually 
checked to identify the date range, and WA Police is unable to 
allocate resources required to provide the information without 
affecting core policing services.58 
4.54 South Australia Police was able to provide the Committee with an age 
breakdown for the historic telecommunications data for which access was 
sought. Between 1 July 2010 and 31 June 2014: 
 data less than three months old was sought in between 36.9 per cent 
and 38.9 per cent of authorisations, 
 data between three months old and 12 months old was sought in 
between 0.1 per cent and 1.2 per cent of authorisations, and 
 data more than 12 months old was sought in between 61 per cent and 
62.1 per cent of authorisations.59 
4.55 Queensland Police advised that, while its record keeping systems were not 
designed to specifically record the requested information, it had 
attempted to manually analyse the available information for the 2013 and 
2014 calendar years: 
Although the data showed a strong tendency towards recent 
information this is attributable to the fact [that] most offences are 
reported soon after occurring and investigations that use a high 
volume of telecommunications information, such as drug matters, 
are focused on current real time events. 
The sample set did show at least 10% of authorisations were for 
information over 12 months old; however the sample set is 
considered to be too small to provide a reliable indication of the 
true requirement for and value of information more than 12 
months old. Anecdotally, it is offences such as cold case homicide, 
historical sex offences and other serious offences where new 
suspects are identified that require older telecommunications 
data.60  
4.56 In public evidence, Ms Kerri Hartland, Acting Director-General of 
Security, explained that: 
58  Western Australia Police, Submission 11, p. 2. 
59  South Australia Police, Submission 9, pp. 2-3. 
60  Queensland Police, Submission 19, pp. 2-3. 
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Around 10 per cent of the requests are for periods of 12 months or 
more, leading into periods of up to two years and beyond. Those 
cases relate to—10 per cent may seem small number—our most 
serious and complex cases. Typically, these relate to activities of 
hostile foreign nationals or nations engaged in spying and 
influence operations against Australia.61  
4.57 The Committee also received a classified submission from ASIO 
containing the number of data authorisations made by ASIO over the past 
five years, as well as a breakdown of the age of data requested. The 
information contained in that classified submission is consistent with Ms 
Hartland’s evidence. It is also consistent with the previous evidence of the 
former Director-General of Security, Mr David Irvine, to the Senate Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs References Committee that the number of 
authorisations made by ASIO for access to telecommunications data each 
year is ‘proportionate… with other individual agencies.’62  
4.58 The New South Wales Ministry for Police and Emergency Services 
provided the Committee with a confidential submission containing 
detailed statistics on its use of telecommunications data.63 NSW Police also 
provided some information on its use of telecommunications data in at a 
public hearing: 
Of the 122,000 requests for telecommunications data New South 
Wales submitted in the previous year, 4,358 of those requests 
related to a period greater than two years for retention. Whilst as a 
percentage this may not appear large, it represents a significant 
number of offences which may be solved with the access to the 
information after two years. It is worth pointing out that, of those 
requests for greater than two years’ data, the most common 
offence was murder, followed by sexual assault and then 
robbery.64 
4.59 Communications Alliance and the AMTA confirmed that the majority of 
requests received by service providers from agencies ‘relate to data that is 
6 months old or younger’.65  
4.60 The Committee also received supplementary submissions from Telstra, 
Optus and Vodafone setting out the age-breakdown of requests for 
61  Ms Kerri Hartland, Acting Director of Security, ASIO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
17 December 2014, p. 5. 
62  Mr David Irvine AO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 21 July 2014, p. 10. 
63  New South Wales Ministry for Police and Emergency Services, Submission 199. 
64  Assistant Commissioner Lanyon, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 43. 
65  Communications Alliance and AMTA, Submission 6, p. 8. 
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telecommunications data each service provider had received. Telstra’s 
submission showed that, in the 2014 calendar year: 
 79% of requests related to data less than six months old, 
 11% of requests related to data more than 12 months old, and 
 4% of requests related to data more than 24 months old.66 
4.61 Vodafone’s and Optus’ submissions contained a higher level of detail and 
were provided to the Committee on a confidential basis. 
4.62 However, at a public hearing Vodafone noted that its experience in 
relation to telephony data is that approximately three quarters of all 
requests relate to data less than six months old, while approximately 15 
per cent of requests relate to data more than 12 months old.67 The figures 
contained in Vodafone’s confidential submission are consistent with this 
evidence, 68 and the figures provided by Optus were broadly consistent 
with those provided by Telstra and Vodafone.69 
4.63 A number of witnesses, from both Government and industry, cautioned 
that the age breakdowns for access to historic telecommunications data are 
limited by industry’s current retention practices and so reflect the age of 
data that agencies are able to access, rather than the age of data that may 
be of benefit to law enforcement and national security investigations.70  
4.64 Optus also noted that the statistical information available about the age 
breakdown of requests may be misleading due to a number of factors that 
would tend to understate the importance of access to older 
telecommunications data to investigations, and in particular for 
investigations into suspects using particular counter-surveillance 
techniques: 
The one thing I would say is to exercise some caution in drawing 
immediate conclusions about where the volume of requests lies in 
terms of the age of the information, because I think you always 
have to apply a matrix about the seriousness of the request and the 
preservation regimes which might operate in tandem. 
… 
There is one other thing that perhaps I would say. This is 
particularly Optus specific, and it is not necessarily drawn out in 
66  Telstra, Submission 112.2, p. 2. 
67  Mr Matthew Lobb, General Manager, Industry Strategy and Public Policy, Vodafone 
Hutchison Australia (Vodafone), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 60. 
68  Vodafone, Submission 130.2. 
69  Optus, Submission 86.2. 
70  See, for example, Queensland Police, Submission 19, p. 3; Mr Elsegood, Optus, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 34. 
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the table that we have provided to the committee in confidence, 
but it is worth noting. We have a large, prepaid mobile base of 
customers and, indeed, are suppliers to resellers, who also do that. 
And there a number of reasons why people might prefer prepaid 
phones. The turnover of prepaid accounts can sometimes be 
greater. That does tend to explain a little bit why there is 
disproportionate interest in that particular cohort of customers. I 
think that does influence some of the timing and the age of the 
data that has been looked at to date.71 
Retention periods for particular data types 
4.65 While the above discussion focused on the overall retention period, the 
Committee also received more granular evidence on the necessity and 
proportionality of retaining particular types of telecommunications data. 
4.66 The following pages discuss this evidence with regard to five semi-distinct 
classes of information: 
 subscriber or account-holder records, 
 IP address allocation records; 
 telecommunications data relating to telephony services, other than 
location records, 
 telecommunications data relating to internet-based communications 
services, such as email, VoIP and messaging applications, and 
 location records. 
Subscriber records 
4.67 ASIO’s unclassified assessment of industry retention practices indicated 
that there is some considerable variation in the periods for which service 
providers retain the range of subscriber records that are covered by item 1 
of the Government’s proposed data set, however, this variability relates 
primarily to subscriber records for internet-based services.72 
4.68 Communications Alliance described subscriber records as being ‘more 
static’ than usage information, and advised that providers ‘keep most of 
that sort of information for two years or so’.73 As noted earlier, 
Communications Alliance also drew the Committee’s attention to the 
requirements under the Telecommunications Consumer Protection Code 
71  Mr David Epstein, Vice-President, Corporate and Regulatory Affairs, Optus, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, pp. 20-21. 
72  ASIO, Submission 12.2, p. 5. 
73  Mr Elsegood, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 37. 
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to retain ‘billing information’, which includes many subscriber records, for 
at least six years.74 
4.69 Similarly, Vodafone advised the Committee that it had ‘always held the 
traditional telephony metadata—billing records, account holders—for 
certainly longer than two years’.75 
IP address allocation records 
4.70 Vodafone argued that IP address allocation records should be retained for 
no more than six months. Vodafone based this argument on the relative 
privacy sensitivity of this information, evidence about access rates from 
European jurisdictions, and the relative utility of historic IP address 
allocation records. In relation to the privacy sensitivity of this category of 
telecommunications data, Vodafone expressed the view, informed by 
customer feedback, that IP address allocation records are more sensitive 
than other categories of telecommunications data, and should therefore be 
retained for no more than six months: 
Traditional metadata is generally account information and phone 
numbers, and often that information is in the White Pages and so 
on. The feedback we are getting from consumers is that that kind 
of information is less sensitive than IP identifier information.76 
4.71 However, Vodafone also explained that an IP address allocation record ‘is 
essentially analogous to a telephone phone number, where a customer, 
when they access the internet, gets assigned an IP identifier so that they 
can carry out access to the internet’.77 
4.72 The Committee also notes Vodafone’s previous evidence to the Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, referred to above, 
that it intends to implement capability to collect these records for its own 
business purposes.78 
4.73 The Attorney-General’s Department’s submission took an opposing view 
to Vodafone, arguing that: 
For internet access services, the types of telecommunications data 
that service providers would be required to retain (subscriber 
records and IP address allocation records) are less privacy 
74  Mr Stanton, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 39. 
75  Mr Lobb, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 62. 
76  Mr Matthew Lobb, General Manager, Industry Strategy and Public Policy, Vodafone 
Hutchison Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 60. 
77  Mr Lobb, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 60. 
78  Mr Lobb, Committee Hansard, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 
Canberra, 26 September 2014, p. 20. 
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sensitive than the records they would be required to retain for 
‘traditional’ telephony services (including call-charge and limited 
location records).79 
4.74 Vodafone also highlighted the European Commission’s Evaluation Report, 
which concluded that the majority of law enforcement requests for access 
to telecommunications data are for data less than six months old.  
However, Vodafone confirmed that it had only very limited experience 
with law enforcement requests for IP address allocation records.80  
4.75 Vodafone further advanced the argument that law enforcement agencies 
would be relatively less interested in IP address allocation records aged 
more than six months old, compared to traditional telephony records aged 
more than six months old: 
Certainly our view is that IP identifier metadata would be of most 
use more immediately than telephony metadata. That is because it 
is ever-changing. I think it is going to be potentially useful in 
regard to IP telephony. I think there are other ways of overseeing 
that. But when you are talking about an ‘under surveillance’ 
website, an agency will be looking at a dodgy website, and IP 
identifier accesses that website and the agency wants to find out 
who that person is, it is unlikely that that will be in two years 
hence. It is much more likely to be an immediate offence.81 
4.76 In evidence, Optus advised the Committee that it did retain IP address 
allocation records, albeit with some variability between different 
services.82  
4.77 The Committee received confidential evidence from ASIO, Optus and 
other service providers on this issue about their current retention practices 
for IP address allocation records.83 This evidence showed a great deal of 
variability between service providers, and even between services provided 
by the same provider, ranging from negligible through to well in excess of 
two years. 
4.78 In its submission, the Attorney-General’s Department noted that agencies 
are actually significantly more likely to need access to IP-based 
telecommunications data aged more than 12 months old compared to 
other types of telecommunications data, due to the more complex nature 
of cybercrime investigations. Additionally, the Committee notes that the 
79  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 32. 
80  Mr Lobb, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, pp. 68-69. 
81  Mr Lobb, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 64. 
82  Mr Elsegood, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 21. 
83  Optus, Submission 86.1; ASIO, Submission 12.2, Appendix B. 
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inherently global nature of internet-based communications means that the 
assistance of foreign law enforcement agencies is a more common 
requirement in investigations where such communications are involved. 
The Department stated: 
certain types of law enforcement investigations frequently involve 
longer investigatory periods and therefore require a 
disproportionate level of access to older telecommunications data. 
These types of investigations include, but are not limited to: 
… 
 cyber-crimes and other crimes where access to IP-based 
telecommunications data is required, due to the greater 
complexity of these investigations 
… 
 transnational investigations, which involve significant 
challenges for agencies attempting to coordinate investigations 
across multiple jurisdictions, frequently resulting in delays 
while preliminary information is obtained from foreign 
agencies.84 
4.79 The Department also drew the Committee’s attention to the findings of the 
European Commission in its Evaluation Report, and in particular that, for a 
range of operational reasons, law enforcement agencies were seven times 
more likely to require access to IP-based telecommunications data aged 
more than six months old, compared to telecommunications data relating 
to mobile telephone services aged more than six months old.85 
4.80 The Committee also received a supplementary confidential submission 
from Optus which confirmed that the age-profile of requests for IP-based 
data is significantly older than for other data types, despite the significant 
variation in retention practices between Optus services.86 
4.81 The Uniting Church Justice and International Mission Unit drew the 
Committee’s attention to the Australian Institute of Criminology’s 
findings in a 2009 research paper on the grooming of children online for 
future sexual exploitation, which highlights the critical importance of 
access to IP address allocation records for the investigation of this 
particularly pernicious crime: 
The modern criminal, using the same devices as today’s teenagers, 
communications with Voice over Internet Protocol, video instant 
messaging, cellular camera phone, and text messaging in 
84  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 31. 
85  European Commission, Evaluation Report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), 
p. 22, referred to in Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 31. 
86  Optus, Submission 86.2. 
 
136  
 
computer slang that is foreign to most police officers and parents. 
The trail to uncover this valuable investigation resource often 
starts with a forensic examination, but this trail quickly grows cold 
as Internet Service Providers overwrite logs and data retention 
periods expire. All police agencies are facing the same challenge 
when dealing with computer forensics. Police managers must find 
a way to examine an increasing number of digital devices, each 
containing an immense volume of data, in a timely manner and 
with limited resources.87 
4.82 The case study of Operation Drakensberg, provided by the AFP, 
exemplifies the above points. In November 2013, the UK police referred 
552 IP addresses suspected of accessing child exploitation material on a 
UK-based website that was compromised for a short period of time in late 
2011 to the AFP for further investigation. The AFP received more than 
5 500 referrals for online child exploitation matters from international law 
enforcement agencies for in 2014,88and confirmed to the Committee during 
a private briefing that the two-year delay in the referral in Operations 
Drakensberg was the result of ordinary and proper investigative 
procedures conducted in the UK, and is not uncommon  for such 
international referrals. 
4.83 Bravehearts noted that ‘[f]or child sex offenders advances in on-line 
technologies are continuing to provide increased opportunities; including 
for grooming victims, accessing child exploitation material and 
networking’,89 and supported a two-year retention period ‘as a critical tool 
for supporting the investigation of child sexual exploitation matters’.90  
Telecommunications data relating to telephony services 
4.84 Communications Alliance and the AMTA confirmed that, for telephony 
services, the Government’s proposed data set and two-year retention 
period would not significantly alter existing industry practice: 
Industry notes that an appropriately defined data set relating to 
the standard telephone service and a requirement to retain such 
87  Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Online child grooming: a literature review of the misuse of social 
networking sites for growing children for sexual offences, Australian Institute of Criminology 
Research and Public Policy Series 103, 2009, p. 82, quoted in Uniting Church in Australia, 
Justice and International Mission Unit, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, Submission 76, p. 5. 
88  AFP, Submission 7.2, p. 2. 
89  Bravehearts, Submission 33, p. 2. 
90  Bravehearts, Submission 33, p. 4. 
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for a period of two years, as requested by agencies and proposed 
by Government, would be close to current industry practice.91 
4.85 In evidence to the Committee, Communications Alliance further 
confirmed that the proposed data retention scheme for the Public 
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) (which includes fixed, mobile and 
satellite telephony networks) ‘has zero impact. You have the data 
anyway’.92  
4.86 Vodafone also confirmed that it would continue to hold 
telecommunications data for its telephony services for in excess of two 
years, irrespective of any new data retention obligations imposed by this 
Bill.93 
4.87 NSW Police argued for the retention period for subscriber and telephony 
data to be extended to six years, to match the existing industry standard 
set out in the Telecommunications Consumer Protection Code: 
My concern is that, regarding some of the data which I feel is least 
intrusive, if I can put it that way, and would be of concern, we 
have the potential to have it for a lesser period of time than we 
currently do. My submission to the Committee was that we could 
consider expanding that period or keeping that persion as it was 
for that data, which would be an extension of what the Bill is 
currently proposing.94 
Telecommunications data related to internet-based services 
4.88 Communications Alliance and the AMTA submitted that: 
Industry is… far from convinced that a two year retention period 
for IP-related data is either necessary, justifiable, cost-effective, or 
in the public interest.95 
4.89 Communications Alliance gave further evidence on these issues: 
There are storage, maintenance and other costs associated with IP 
data, which is typically growing at a much faster rate than 
telephony data; the longer you need to store it the more it is going 
to cost. Also, there is a general recognition in many of those [EU] 
jurisdictions that it is the younger data, overwhelmingly, that is 
91  Communications Alliance and the AMTA, Submission 6, p. 7. 
92  Mr Peter Froelich, Industry Member, Communications Alliance, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
17 December 2014, p. 39. 
93  Mr Lobb, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 64. 
94  Assistant Commissioner Lanyon, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 58. 
95  Communications Alliance and the AMTA, Submission 6, p. 7. 
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useful to the pursuit of serious crime and national-security 
issues.96 
4.90 However, Communications Alliance and the AMTA also noted that there 
is a diversity of views within the telecommunications industry about 
whether a uniform retention period would result in a simpler and cheaper 
system: 
That said, there is some debate among our members as to whether 
the potential greater simplicity of having a uniform retention 
period for all services is  outweighed by the expense of and 
complexities of building to a longer than necessary retention 
period for non-telephone data.97 
4.91 Accordingly, Communications Alliance and the AMTA recommended 
that the Bill be amended to require service providers to retain data for a 
period ‘in the order of 6 months’ in conjunction with a provision that 
‘make[s] it clear that such data can be retained for up to two years without 
exposing the CSP to a potential breach of the Privacy Act’.98 
4.92 The Australian Interactive Media Industry Association (AIMIA) Digital 
Policy Group (DPG), which represents the Australian digital industry and 
therefore has interests relating primarily to internet-based services, 
supported Communications Alliance’s position,99 and suggested that the 
two-year retention period goes ‘well beyond what international 
experience suggests is necessary for effective law enforcement’.100 
4.93 Communications Alliance argued that the cost to industry of retaining 
telecommunications data relating to internet-based services is likely to 
increase exponentially, rather than linearly, beyond a two-year retention 
period: 
I guess the costs are not strictly incremental but more exponential. 
In terms of the way that data growth is in the industry at the 
moment, as you start to blow out the time period from two years 
to three years, four years, five years or whatever you propose, the 
volume of data usage on an internet-type service is growing at a 
factor of 10 times. So you will have those exponential growths on 
96  Mr Stanton, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 38. 
97  Communications Alliance and the AMTA, Submission 6, p. 7. 
98  Communications Alliance and the AMTA, Submission 6, p. 8. 
99  Australian Interactive Media Industry Association (AIMIA) Digital Policy Group, Submission 
34, p. 3. 
100  AIMIA Digital Policy Group, Submission 34, p. 3. 
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top of the basic incremental growth of the length of time you want 
to store the data.101 
4.94 However, Telstra disagreed with the proposition that the retention period 
would have either a ‘significant’ or ‘exponential’ impact on the capital or 
operational cost of any data retention scheme: 
The costs will change if the prescribed period changes. We have 
costed to two years. If that were to change, then our costings 
would change. Will we get substantially different costs? Probably 
not, because a lot of the capital cost is setting up the systems to 
extract this data.  
… 
I am not sure that we necessarily agree on the use of the word 
‘significant’. It certainly has an impact on cost, because the more 
data there is then the greater the task to continue to maintain that 
database, make it accessible and then to interrogate when 
required. With changes it becomes more complex. So there is a 
relationship between the retention period and the cost of the 
scheme. I am not sure that we would go as far as saying it is 
significant, but it is certainly a factor.102 
4.95 Mr Chris Berg, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Public affairs, argued that 
there is a fundamental distinction between the types of 
telecommunications data associated with traditional telephony services, 
such as voice calls or SMS, and the internet-based communications 
covered by the proposed data set, such as VoIP and email: 
[I]nternet activity and telephone activity are not parallels. They 
operate under substantially different technological paradigms, and 
they have vastly different social profiles. Where telephone 
conversations are an adjunct to our lives, internet access is central 
to it – an enormous amount of interaction with the world is done 
through the internet. What we do on the internet is part of our 
private domain to a degree that telephone conversations are not. 
We live our lives online – to a great degree our work, private lives, 
our leisure, and our personal and professional relationships are 
mediated by digital technologies.103 
4.96 Telstra’s submission argued in favour of a single fixed retention period 
across all technologies and data types. In part, Telstra’s position was based 
101  Mr Froelich, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 35. 
102  Mr James Shaw, Director, Government Relations, Telstra, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
29 January 2015, pp. 14, 20. 
103  Mr Chris Berg, Senior Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs, Submission 94, pp. 4-5. 
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on the size and complexity of Telstra’s own network and service 
offerings.104 Telstra also argued strongly that a single retention period 
would prevent criminals from migrating to alternative services to evade 
lawful surveillance, and would promote competitive neutrality in a 
rapidly evolving technological environment: 
[O]bligations should be technologically agnostic to the greatest 
extent possible. For example, one set of retention obligations 
should not apply to traditional technologies, such as PSTN or 
mobile voice and SMS services, while different obligations apply 
to competing technologies, such as Voice over IP or instant 
messaging. Not only would asymmetric regulatory obligations put 
providers of the traditional services at a competitive disadvantage, 
it would create a perverse incentive from criminals to circumvent 
scrutiny by the agencies by using the alternative services.105 
4.97 The Committee notes the findings of the European Commission’s 
Evaluation Report on the Data Retention Directive, that ‘internet-related 
data tend to be requested later than other forms of evidence in the course 
of criminal investigations’,106 and that EU law enforcement agencies are 
significantly more likely to access internet-related data that is aged more 
than 12 months compared to other types of telecommunications data.107 
4.98 The Attorney-General’s Department argued that internet-based 
communications services are similar in functionality, from a user’s 
perspective, to traditional telephony services, and so should be required to 
retain analogous records.108 
4.99 The Data Retention Implementation Working Group (IWG) noted that the 
data set adopts a technologically-neutral approach, and that ‘some 
European nations encountered challenges with the EU Data Retention 
Directive’s technically specific approach, which has inhibited its 
application to new technologies.’109 The Attorney-General’s Department 
similarly highlighted the importance of a technologically neutral approach 
and the importance of drawing on international experience.110 The 
104  Telstra, Submission 112, p. 3. 
105  Telstra, Submission 112, p. 3. 
106  European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), 2011, p. 22. 
107  European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), 2011, p. 22. 
108  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 32. 
109  Data Retention Implementation Working Group (IWG), Report 1 of the Data Retention 
Implementation Working Group, December 2014, p. 5. 
110  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 25. 
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Department cited the Netherlands Government’s review of its data 
retention laws, which concluded that: 
It is not quite clear on the basis of which arguments the retention 
periods for telephone and internet traffic data vary. It is possible 
that arguments pertaining to privacy issues (in part) underlie this 
distinction. However, the nature of the internet data stored, 
effectively doesn’t pose a greater infringement on individual 
privacy when compared to the nature of telephony data. 
… 
The retention period of six months for internet data is considered 
unanimously to be too short by the criminal investigations 
professionals and experts. This is particularly so for complex cases 
where such data can be useful.111 
4.100 The IWG industry members noted that ‘significant technological change is 
likely to occur within the Australian telecommunications industry, with 
potential for significant technological evolution even in the short term.’112 
Location records 
4.101 The Committee received a range of evidence about the privacy sensitivity 
and utility of location records, which has been discussed above.  
4.102 Communications Alliance provided evidence to the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs References Committee that location data ‘is 
typically not kept for long periods of time today but would need to be’.113 
The confidential submissions received from service providers indicated 
that retention practices for location records vary considerably, both 
between providers and between individual services offered by the same 
provider, with records not being kept for some services, and being kept 
for well in excess of two years for others. 
4.103 The Attorney-General’s Department acknowledged that, ‘Arguably, 
location records are less intimately linked to the remainder of the data set’, 
but that the contextual information that could be provided to other 
telecommunications data by knowing the location from which a 
communication was made was particularly important, including to 
exculpate individuals from suspicion: 
111  Netherlands Government, The Dutch Implementation of the Data Retention Directive, p. 139. The 
Netherlands Government had implemented laws requiring telephony data to be retained for 
12 months, and internet-related data to be retained for six months. 
112  IWG, Report 1 of the Data Retention Implementation Working Group, December 2014, p. 5. 
113  Mr Stanton, Committee Hansard, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References 
Committee, Canberra, 2 February 2015, p. 9. 
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For example, where a suspect makes a phone call immediately 
after the time a crime was committed, that phone call may appear 
suspicious. However, location records showing the phone call was 
made several suburbs from the scene of the crime would tend to 
remove that person from suspicion.114 
International comparisons 
4.104 The Department provided the Committee with a summary of past and 
present retention practices across 35 Western countries.115 
Communications Alliance and the AMTA also provided the Committee 
with a summary of past and present retention practices across 25 Western 
countries.116  
4.105 There were a limited number of inconsistencies between the two 
summaries. In summary, 26 countries previously required or currently 
require a uniform retention period for both ‘traditional’ telephony data 
and internet-based data. Of those countries: 
 South Africa specified a 3-year retention period, 
 Poland specified a 2-year retention period, 
 Latvia specified an eighteen-month retention period, 
 twelve specified a twelve-month retention period,117  and 
 eleven specified a 6-month retention period, 118 although the Swiss 
Government has introduced new laws into its Parliament to increase its 
retention period to 12 months.  
4.106 The remaining nine countries specified different retention periods for 
different types of telecommunications data: 
 two specified a two-year period for fixed and mobile telephony data, 
and a one-year period for internet access, email and telephony data,119  
 the United States specified an 18-month period for telephony data, and 
does not require the retention of internet-based data, 
114  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, pp. 32-33. 
115  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, pp. 38–40. 
116  Communications Alliance 
117  Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, 
Portugal, Finland and the United Kingdom. 
118  Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania, Sweden 
and Switzerland. 
119  Ireland and Italy. 
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 Slovenia specified a 14-month period for fixed and mobile telephony 
data, and an eight-month period for internet access, email and 
telephony data, 
 Brazil specified a 12-month period for IP connection logs, such as IP 
address allocation records, a 6-month period for IP access logs, such as 
web-browsing history, and does not require the retention of telephony 
data, 
 Hungary specified a 12-month period for all telecommunications data, 
except for unsuccessful call attempts, which are retained for six months, 
 two specified a 12-month period for fixed and mobile telephony data, 
and a six-month period for internet access, email and telephony data,120 
and 
 Malta specified a 12-month period for fixed, mobile and internet 
telephony data, and a six-month period for internet access and email 
data.  
4.107 In summary, 19 out of 34 countries have passed laws requiring the 
retention of internet-related data for at least 12 months,121 and six out of 33 
countries have implemented different retention periods for telephony and 
internet-related data.122 
4.108 The Australian Human Rights Commission argued that the retention 
periods selected by other countries are ‘relevant evidence’ for this 
Committee, but are ‘not determinative’.123  
4.109 The Attorney-General’s Department similarly indicated that the proposed 
data retention regime had drawn on international experience, rather than 
being identical to regimes in place in Europe.124 
4.110 As noted above, the Department and Vodafone each drew the 
Committee’s attention to the European Commission’s Evaluation Report, 
which discussed the experience of EU nations under the former Data 
Retention Directive. The Report acknowledges that access to 
telecommunications data more than six months old is ‘less frequent’, but 
argues that access to older data can be ‘crucial’: 
Firstly, internet-related data tend to be requested later than other 
forms of evidence in the course of criminal investigations. Analysis 
120  The Netherlands and Slovakia. 
121  The United States does not require the retention of internet-based data and so has not been 
counted. 
122  The United States does not require the retention of internet-based data, and Brazil does not 
require the retention of telephony data. As such, these countries have not been counted. 
123  Professor Triggs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 72. 
124  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 25. 
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of fixed network and mobile telephony data often generates 
potential leads which result in further requests for older data. For 
example, if during an investigation a name has been found on the 
basis of fixed network or mobile telephony data, investigators may 
want to identify the Internet Protocol (IP) address this person has 
been using and may want to identify with whom that person has 
been in contact over a given period of time using this IP address. 
In such a scenario, investigators are likely to request data allowing 
the tracing also of communications with other IP addresses and 
the identity of the persons who have used those IP addresses. 
Secondly, investigations of particularly serious crimes, a series of 
crimes, organised crime and terrorist incidents tend to rely on 
older retained data reflecting the length of time taken to plan these 
offences, to identify patterns of criminal behaviour and relations 
between accomplices to a crime and to establish criminal intent. 
Activities connected with complex financial crimes are often only 
detected after several months. Thirdly, and exceptionally, Member 
States have requested traffic data held in another Member State, 
which can usually only release these data with judicial 
authorisation in response to a letter rogatory issued by a judge in 
the requesting Member State. This type of mutual legal assistance 
can be a lengthy process, which explains why some of the 
requested data was in these cases over six months old.125  
4.111 The European Commission also identified that, while the majority of 
requests for access to telecommunications data in the EU were made 
within a few months or even weeks of the communication taking place, 
there were four types of criminal investigation for which older data 
tended to be required, being: 
 terrorism and organised crime, 
 serious sexual offences, 
 substantiating previous intent to commit illegal activities, and 
 large cross-border cases.126 
4.112 The Commission further noted that, the adoption of flat-rate, unlimited 
use contracts and services had, prior to the introduction of mandatory 
data retention obligations, significantly impacted the availability of 
telecommunications data for investigative purposes. The Commission 
cited the examples of Germany, where the proportion of users with such 
125  European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), 2011, p. 22. 
126  European Commission, Evidence for necessity of data retention in the EU, 2013, pp. 4-5. 
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plans ‘rose from 18% in 2005 to 87% in 2009’ and noted that it had received 
advice from both data protection authorities and service providers that 
data about such services was of ‘minimal business value and are only 
stored in a retrievable form because of mandatory data retention.’127 
4.113 The Committee notes that major providers have begun offering such 
unlimited use plans in Australia, but not at the rates observed in 
Germany.  
4.114 As noted above, the Committee’s attention was also drawn to the 
Netherlands Government’s review of its data retention laws. The review 
concluded inter alia that a six month retention regime was ‘considered 
unanimously to be too short by the criminal investigations professionals 
and experts. This is particularly so for complex cases where such data can 
be useful.’128 The review also noted that a 12 month retention period was 
adequate for the majority of cases, but that ‘there are cases where for 
longer term investigations it is insufficient.’129 
Committee comment 
4.115 The length of time for which telecommunications data is retained has 
direct implications for both the necessity and the proportionality of the 
scheme. 
4.116 Evidence received from ASIO, law enforcement agencies and service 
providers consistently showed that between 10 and 15 per cent of data 
authorisations made by Australian agencies are for data which is in excess 
of one year old. However, these requests disproportionately relate to 
investigations into serious and complex criminal activity, serious matters 
of national security (particularly counter-espionage investigations), and 
other complex cases. Despite constituting only a minority of all access 
requests, the public interest in the effective resolution of these matters is 
particularly strong.  
4.117 The Committee notes that agencies consider a two year retention period to 
be a compromise and the minimum amount of time that would be 
acceptable from a national security and law enforcement perspective.  
4.118 The Committee also notes that current retention practices are not uniform 
across the industry. Some service providers will be required to begin 
collecting telecommunications data that they do not currently hold for 
their business purposes. Other providers that do currently collect and 
retain the data will need to retain it for longer periods. In many cases, 
127  European Commission, Evidence for necessity of data retention in the EU, 2013, p. 5. 
128  Netherlands Government, The Dutch Implementation of the Data Retention Directive, p. 139. 
129  Netherlands Government, The Dutch Implementation of the Data Retention Directive, p. 89. 
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however, service providers currently collect and retain 
telecommunications data covered by the proposed data set for well in 
excess of two years.  
4.119 On the basis of the evidence provided, the Committee considers that a 
two-year retention period is necessary and proportionate. This two-year 
period would run from the time a particular communication is made, in 
the case of communications-related data, or from the time an account is 
closed, in the case of account-holder data. 
4.120 The Committee acknowledges that a two-year retention period would 
place Australia at the upper end of retention periods adopted in other 
jurisdictions. Of the 35 Western countries identified as having 
implemented mandatory data retention obligations, only Italy, Ireland, 
Poland and South Africa require service providers to retain some or all 
telecommunications data for two years or more. However, the Committee 
accepts the unequivocal evidence of the national security and law 
enforcement agencies, which is supported by the international evidence, 
that a retention period of up to two years is necessary and proportionate 
for a range of investigations into particularly serious types of criminal and 
security-relevant activity. 
4.121 The Committee received a confidential briefing on the costings from the 
Attorney-General’s Department, which is discussed in greater detail later 
in this report. The analysis presented to the Committee as part of that 
briefing showed that reducing the retention period to 12 months would 
decrease the cost of the scheme by only five to six per cent.130 Further, 
varied retention periods for different elements of the data set would risk 
undermining the efficacy of the scheme as a whole. 
4.122 The Committee notes that longer retention periods may aid particular 
investigations. However, the effective conduct of serious national security 
and criminal investigations must be balanced against the degree to which 
a two-year retention period could interfere with the privacy, freedom of 
expression and other rights of ordinary Australians. For many service 
providers, a two-year retention period will not represent a substantial 
change to existing retention practices.  
4.123 The Committee notes that the proposed two-year retention period would 
not impact the ability of service providers to retain telecommunications 
data for longer than two years for their legitimate business purposes. 
 
130  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.4, p. 2. 
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Recommendation 9 
 The Committee recommends that the two-year retention period 
specified in section 187C of the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be maintained.  
4.124 The Committee notes that as a consequence of its earlier recommendation 
that the data set be contained in primary legislation, there may be some 
consequential amendments required to section 187C of the Bill that will 
need to be addressed. These may include consequential amendments to 
specify the appropriate retention period for different kinds of subscriber 
data that are covered by proposed new paragraph 187A(2)(a). 
Should providers be required to destroy data at the end 
of the retention period? 
4.125 Subsection 187C(3) of the Bill provides that service providers are not 
precluded from retaining telecommunications data covered by their data 
retention obligations for longer than two years. The Explanatory 
Memorandum notes that: 
This means, for example, that service providers will not be 
prevented by new section 187C from retaining 
telecommunications data for longer than two years for their own 
lawful business purposes. 
However, the Australian Privacy Principles (APPs), as set out in 
Schedule 1 of the Privacy Act 1988 (the Privacy Act), will still apply 
to service providers and their dealings with the 
telecommunications data that is personal information and that is 
required to be retained under the new Part 5-1A of the TIA Act. 
For example, APP 11.2 requires entities to take reasonable steps to 
destroy personal information or to ensure that the information is 
de-identified where the entity no longer needs the information for 
a reason set out in the APPs. Where the required retention period 
for telecommunications data under the new Part 5-1A of the TIA 
Act expires, entities may be required to destroy or de-identify such 
information if it constitutes personal information.131 
4.126 The Victorian Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection noted that 
the Bill does not require the destruction of telecommunications data at the 
131  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 49. 
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end of the retention period.132 This issue was also highlighted by the EU 
Court of Justice in its decision.133 
4.127 In its submission, Electronic Frontiers Australia argued that s. 187C(3) of 
the Bill, which provides that service providers are not precluded from 
retaining data for longer than the prescribed period, should be removed 
from the Bill, and that service providers should instead be prohibited from 
retaining any telecommunications data for longer than two years.134 
However, in evidence to the Committee, Mr Lawrence conceded that ‘it 
may not be of significant harm for [s. 187C(3)] to remain there’, after it was 
pointed out  that carriers routinely retain data for longer periods for their 
business purposes, and that the Privacy Act 1988 continues to prohibit 
service providers from retaining data for any longer than required for 
those business purposes.135  
Committee comment 
4.128 The Committee understands that proposed new subsection 187C(3) is 
intended to operate as an avoidance of doubt provision. It is not intended 
to override the existing requirement under APP 11.2 that service providers 
destroy or de-identify information when it is no longer required for a 
legitimate purpose.  
4.129 The Committee received a range of public and classified evidence from 
service providers, which is outlined in greater detail above, showing that 
service providers currently retain a wide range of telecommunications 
data for longer than the proposed two-year retention period, for their own 
business purposes and in compliance with other regulatory obligations, 
such as the Telecommunications Consumer Protection Code. The 
Committee considers that it is entirely appropriate for service providers to 
continue retaining such telecommunications data for longer than two 
years where they have a legitimate business purpose to do so, or in 
accordance with another regulatory obligation. 
4.130 However, the proposed new data retention obligations will require service 
providers to retain some types of telecommunications data for longer than 
they otherwise would for their business purposes, or even to begin 
collecting and retaining particular types of telecommunications data for 
the first time. In these situations, the Committee is concerned that service 
providers should not retain such telecommunications data for longer than 
132  Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection (Victoria), Submission 39, p. 11.  
133  Digital Rights Ireland v Ireland and Kärntner Landesregierung (joined cases C-293/12 and C-
594/12), [67]. 
134  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 97, pp. 4-5. 
135  Mr Lawrence, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 28. 
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the proposed two-year retention period without a legitimate business or 
regulatory purpose. 
 
Recommendation 10 
 The Committee recommends that the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2014 clarify the requirements for service providers with 
regard to the retention, de-identification or destruction of data once the 
two year retention period has expired 
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Application to particular services, and 
implementation, cost and funding 
arrangements 
Application to certain service providers 
5.1 Proposed new subsection 187A(3) of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (the Bill) 
sets out which services will be subject to data retention obligations, subject 
to the exclusions set out in proposed new section 187B. Obligations will 
apply to communications services provided by carriers, carriage service 
providers, internet service providers or prescribed service providers, 
provided that they have communications-related infrastructure in 
Australia.  
5.2 However, obligations will not apply in relation to services provided by 
carriage service providers to: 
 a person’s ‘immediate circle’, within the meaning of section 23 of the 
Telecommunications Act; or 
 only to places that are all in the ‘same area’, within the meaning of 
section 36 of that Act. 
Application to ‘offshore’ and ‘over-the-top’ providers 
5.3 Proposed new subsection 187A(3) provides that data retention obligations 
will apply to a service if: 
(a) it is a service for carrying communications, or enabling 
communications to be carried, by means of guided or 
unguided electromagnetic energy or both; and  
152  
 
(b) it is a service:  
(i) operated by a carrier; or 
(ii) operated by an internet service provider (within the 
meaning of Schedule 5 to the Broadcasting Services Act 
1992); or  
(iii) of a kind prescribed by the regulations; and 
(c) the person operating the service owns or operates, in Australia, 
infrastructure that enables the provision of any of its relevant 
services;  
but [do] not apply to a broadcasting service (within the meaning of 
the Broadcasting Services Act 1992). 
Application to ‘offshore’ providers 
5.4 The Explanatory Memorandum confirms that data retention obligations: 
will apply to a service if the person operating the service owns or 
operates infrastructure in Australia relating to any of its services, 
irrespective of whether the person owns or operates infrastructure 
in Australia relating to the particular service in question.1 
5.5 Communications Alliance and the Australian Mobile Telecommunications 
Association submitted that the exclusion of offshore providers may place 
Australian service providers at a competitive disadvantage.2 
5.6 The Internet Society of Australia noted that the exclusion of offshore 
providers will:  
[R]esult in significant ‘gaps’ in the data retained… and is therefore 
likely to undermine the efficacy of this legislation’s stated purpose 
of providing the means to identify activities that represent a 
potential security risk.3 
5.7 In its submission, the Attorney-General’s Department acknowledged that 
data retention obligations would not apply to a number of service 
providers that have a significant presence in the Australian market, but 
that do not have infrastructure in this country. However, the Department 
noted that the potential impact of this ‘gap’ on agencies’ investigative 
capabilities is mitigated by three factors: 
1  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 [Data 
Retention Bill], Explanatory Memorandum, p. 43. 
2  Communications Alliance and the Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association 
(AMTA), Submission 1, p. 17. 
3  Internet Society of Australia, Submission 122, p. 9. 
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Providers offering services from infrastructure based offshore may 
be subject to separate local legislation relating to their retention of 
data. Offshore based companies are able to assist Australian law 
enforcement, to the extent that the laws of their home countries 
permit them to do so. Additionally, as a party to the Council of 
Europe Cybercrime Convention, Australian law enforcement 
agencies are able to obtain expedited assistance from 43 countries 
to obtain telecommunications data held in those countries that is 
relevant to Australian investigations.4 
5.8 Commissioner Andrew Colvin of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) has 
subsequently addressed the concerns expressed by some about the 
exclusion of offshore providers, and explained the role that data retention 
will play in reducing what is an existing, rather than a new issue for law 
enforcement and national security agencies: 
people need to leave a digital fingerprint, effectively, so even if 
you are using a Gmail account for instance, you’re using an over 
the top provider that is an application provided by an overseas 
company that may be out of the reach of legislation, you still need 
to make a footprint somewhere where you connect to the internet. 
This is about that basic identifier of who it was that connected to 
the internet at that time.5 
5.9 At a public hearing, the Internet Society acknowledged that: 
My impression is that it will be difficult for this government to 
actually regulate some body that is based overseas. However, you 
can incorporate regulation for an entity that is based in Australia.6  
5.10 The Department also noted that attempting to impose extra-territorial data 
retention obligations would:  
give rise to significant jurisdictional and conflict-of-laws issues 
including where, for example: 
 providers are already subject to data retention laws in their 
own jurisdiction, leading to the provider being subject to 
inconsistent Australian and foreign obligations, and 
4  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, p. 18. 
5  Commissioner Andrew Colvin APM OAM, Australian Federal Police (AFP), Transcript of the 
Prime Minister, the Hon. Tony Abbott MP, Joint Press Conference with the Hon. Michael Keenan MP, 
Minister for Justice and Mr Andrew Colvin APM OAM, Commissioner of the Australian Federal 
Police, AFP Headquarters, Melbourne, 5 February 2015, p. 5. 
6  Ms Holly Raiche, Chair of the Policy Committee, Internet Society of Australia, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 88. 
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 providers are subject to data minimisation obligations in their 
own jurisdiction, leading to the provider being subject to 
contradictory obligations to retain and delete 
telecommunications data.7 
Definition of ‘infrastructure’ 
5.11 The Australian Interactive Media Industry Association (AIMIA) Digital 
Policy Group (DPG) recommended that, to avoid data retention 
obligations being expanded to cover offshore providers of ‘over-the-top’ 
services beyond what Parliament intended, the term ‘infrastructure in 
Australia’ should be defined to mean ‘physical hardware located within 
Australia that is critical to the deployment of communication carriage 
services offered to people in Australia.’8 The Law Council of Australia,9 
Communications Alliance and the Australian Mobile Telecommunications 
Association also noted that the definition of ‘infrastructure’ is uncertain.10 
5.12 The Attorney-General’s Department confirmed, in its submission, that 
data retention obligations are intended to ‘apply to providers that own or 
operate infrastructure, such as servers, routers and/or cables, within 
Australia that enables one or more of their communications services’, and 
that the purpose of this requirement is to ‘ensure that service providers 
cannot avoid their data retention obligations by off-shoring part of their 
infrastructure or outsourcing the provision of some services to overseas 
entities’. 
Application to providers of ‘over-the-top’ services 
5.13 The Australian Information Industry Association advised the Committee 
that a number of its members were uncertain about whether ‘over-the-top’ 
services, such as web-based email, VoIP or cloud service would be subject 
to data retention obligations.11 
5.14 The Australian Privacy Commissioner also considered that the Bill’s 
application to over-the-top services was unclear, raising potential 
challenges for his office as a regulator: 
We are just not clear whether they do fall in necessarily to the 
services that it is proposed be covered by the Bill. I think from a 
regulator’s point of view, that is possibly a bit of a challenge 
7  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 24. 
8  Australian Interactive Media Industry Association (AIMIA) Digital Policy Group (DPG), 
Submission 34, p. 8. 
9  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 9. 
10  Communications Alliance and the AMTA, Submission 6, p. 10. 
11  Ms Suzanne Campbell, Chief Executive Officer, Australian Information Industry Association, 
Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 31. 
 
APPLICATION TO PARTICULAR SERVICES, AND IMPLEMENTATION, COST AND FUNDING 
ARRANGEMENTS 155 
 
because, if we are not clear about whether those services do fall in 
or not, it is hard to be sure whom or what services we are 
supposed to be regulating—if we are to take some of our more 
proactive regulatory roles that I have described or if in fact we are 
going to be, say, pursuing individual complaints about a matter.12 
5.15 However, in evidence to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
References Committee’s current inquiry, Communications Alliance 
explained that: 
Our understanding is that, if it is an over-the-top application that 
is not provided by the service provider, the service provider is not 
required to retain those data. Whether or not those data have to be 
retained by anybody depends on whether they are an operator 
providing a communications service in Australia.13  
Committee comment 
5.16 The Committee supports the intended operation of proposed new 
paragraph 187A(3)(c). It is appropriate that data retention obligations 
apply in respect of services provided to Australian customers, even where 
infrastructure used by the service provider to deliver that service is not 
located in Australia. 
5.17 The Committee also accepts that limiting the application of data retention 
obligations to companies that are within Australia’s territorial jurisdiction 
is an appropriate measure, as it avoids subjecting multinational companies 
to competing and potentially irreconcilable legal obligations. The primary 
effect of this limitation is that data retention obligations will apply to 
‘over-the-top’ services provided by service providers with infrastructure 
in Australia, but will not apply to ‘over-the-top’ services provided by 
wholly-offshore companies. 
5.18 The Committee acknowledges that the exclusion of over-the-top services 
provided by wholly-offshore companies may have capability implications, 
to the extent that those companies do not retain relevant 
telecommunications data about their customers. However, the Committee 
notes the evidence it has received that data retention laws have been 
implemented or are under active consideration in most Western nations, 
and that Australian agencies are able to obtain relatively rapid assistance 
from law enforcement counterparts in these countries when seeking access 
12  Mr Timothy Pilgrim PSM, Australian Privacy Commissioner, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
29 January 2015, p. 53. 
13  Mr John Stanton, CEO, Communications Alliance, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 2 February 
2015, p. 12. 
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to telecommunications data. Additionally, the Committee considers that 
any benefits to agencies’ investigative capabilities or to competitive 
neutrality that might flow from extending data retention obligations to 
offshore providers must be weighed against the additional complexity 
that would result, particularly in light of the significant challenges in the 
enforcement of extraterritorial laws. The Committee notes that the United 
Kingdom Government has gone as far as to appoint a Special Envoy to 
attempt to resolve this complexity.14 
5.19 The Committee notes that section 187A(3)(c) applies only to providers that 
have, in Australia, ‘infrastructure that enables the provision of any of its 
relevant services’ (emphasis added). The term ‘relevant service’ is defined 
in subsection 187A(1), and relates only to services that, among other 
things, are services ‘for carrying communications, or for enabling 
communications to be carried’. Accordingly, the Bill as drafted applies 
only to companies that have, in Australia, infrastructure that enables the 
provision of communications services. It would not appear to apply to a 
broader class of infrastructure, such as buildings or marketing databases. 
5.20 Nevertheless, the Committee notes evidence from industry that there 
remains some uncertainty about the intended meaning of the term 
‘infrastructure’ as used in paragraph 187A(3)(c) of the Bill and considers 
this matter should be addressed in order to put the matter beyond doubt. 
This clarification would support the Bill’s intent to exclude overseas 
providers of ‘over-the-top’ services from the proposed data retention 
obligations.  
 
Recommendation 11 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to 
define the term ‘infrastructure’ in greater detail, for the purposes of 
paragraph 187A(3)(c). 
Exclusion of services provided to an ‘immediate circle’ or ‘single area’ 
5.21 Subsection 187B(1) of the Bill provides that data retention obligations do 
not apply to a service provider in relation to relevant services that are 
14  Government of the United Kingdom, Cabinet Office and Home Office, ‘Sir Nigel Sheinwald 
appointed Special Envoy on intelligence and law enforcement data sharing’, Press Release, 
19 September 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sir-nigel-sheinwald-
appointed-special-envoy-on-intelligence-and-law-enforcement-data-sharing> viewed 26 
February 2015.  
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provider only to a person’s ‘immediate circle’ (such as corporate or 
university intranets) or only within places that are in the ‘same area’ (such 
as a Wi-Fi hotspot in a café or library). 
5.22 Several submissions expressed concern that the exclusion of data retention 
obligations from these services would undermine the effectiveness of the 
regime.15 For example, the Internet Society of Australia argued that: 
It appears that anybody seeking to evade the provisions of the Bill 
could simply become a student somewhere and communicate 
within that educational institution without detection.16 
5.23 The Chair of the Policy Committee for the Internet Society of Australia 
explained some of the complexity of attempting to regulate some of these 
services: 
In that situation [immediate circles], they are provided generally 
by a service provider under contract with a particular firm. So 
those are in one sense commercial agreements that you do not 
unpick … So in some cases we are dealing with definitions in the 
Telecommunications Act that mean some areas are not covered. If 
you read the Attorney-General’s [Department’s] submission, they 
are relaxed about some of that. They understand the difficulty in 
covering some of this.17 
5.24 The Attorney-General’s Department explained that telecommunications 
services provided within a single area had been excluded from the scope 
of the scheme based on an assessment that the utility of data relating to 
those services would be outweighed by the regulatory burden: 
That particular section is excluded because of an assessment that, 
while that data is useful, the compliance burden and impost upon 
the providers of those same-area services is a significant one, and 
the intention of the regime is to provide a targeted response 
around a range of data that is useful. Naturally, agencies have a 
range of tools at their disposal to access communications and 
identify the behaviours and communications of suspects, but there 
is a particular exclusion there which relates back to a particular 
compliance burden for the providers of those services.18 
15  See, for example, Mr Brian Ridgway, Submission No, 20, p. 5. 
16  Internet Society of Australia, Submission 122, p. 8. 
17  Ms Raiche, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 86. 
18  Ms Anna Harmer, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 7. 
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5.25 Universities Australia, the peak body representing 39 Australian 
universities, welcomed the Government’s decision to exclude universities 
from data retention obligations under the Bill, noting that there would be 
a ‘significant administrative burden and cost for universities if they were 
required to collect and retain data that is currently not required for their 
internal purposes’.19 The submission also expressed concern at the power 
of the Communications Access Co-ordinator to declare, pursuant to 
proposed new subsection 187B(2), that data retention obligations would 
apply to a particular service provided to an immediate circle or single 
area, such as a publicly-accessible Wi-Fi network operated by a university 
across a campus.20 The University of Sydney and the Society of University 
Lawyers made submissions in similar terms.21 
5.26 The Attorney-General’s Department also confirmed that a range of data 
would continue to be retained in relation to such services, ensuring that 
critical lead information remains available for law enforcement and 
national security investigations: 
Without going into too great a detail about the operational 
practices of agencies, data may be accessible at a different point in 
the process. The fact that a particular coffee shop is not required to 
retain data in relation to who it provides its free Wi-Fi to does not 
preclude data from being accessed at a different point in the 
process, so the excludes are an illustration or a representation of 
the proportionality of the data retention measure in that it targets 
appropriate points in the process and provides data for key 
telecommunications services.22 
5.27 The AFP expanded on the operational implications of this exclusion for 
law enforcement agencies: 
If I may, how it would work in an operation sense is that, if an 
internet café or a coffee shop has a service provided by Telstra, we 
would know that that internet café service accessed their system 
from between the internet café and Telstra at a given point in time, 
but we would not know which device within that café accessed 
their internal Wi-Fi router or modem to do it. It is similar to if it is 
a home; out of the six or seven or eight phones or devices inside, 
you do not know which one has accessed it. However, it is a gap in 
that sense, but it does not mean that we do not have other 
technologies or other abilities to exploit that situation. It is just 
19  Universities Australia, Submission 84, p. 1. 
20  Universities Australia, Submission 84, pp. 1-2. 
21  University of Sydney, Submission 93, p. 1; Society of University Lawyers, Submission 98, p 1. 
22  Ms Harmer, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 75. 
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another investigative technique. For example, we would know 
that, if a person is in that area, they are using that particular Wi-Fi 
network, maybe, and then could use other techniques. So it is not 
the end of the world but, like anything else—I think the state 
police gave the evidence—it would be nice to have and it would be 
great for law enforcement. We have to do the proportionality test 
as well, though.23 
5.28 The New South Wales Police Force advised the Committee that, from an 
operational perspective, the Bill as drafted ‘will not go all the way, but we 
will be able to do other things, other investigative processes’.24 
5.29 However, the Australian Intelligence Security Organisation (ASIO) 
advised the Committee that the exclusion of these services does carry an 
element of risk: 
[B}eing able to understand in national security matters the detail of 
the connectivity of an individual of interest – delivered through 
Wi-Fi services provided by carriers, businesses, local government 
and the community – will be critical. ASIO would argue against 
wide scale exemption of Wi-Fi network access providers from data 
retention obligations. At minimum, identifying details of the 
device, the Wi-Fi point of connection and the date-time stamp of 
the connection should be retained.25 
5.30 Victoria Police raised similar issues from a law enforcement perspective:  
Without meaning to sound flippant, from a law enforcement point 
of view, I would have thought that that is self evident: that if we 
have got areas within our community that persons can go to and 
engage in communications where they are less likely to come 
under notice or be discovered, the persons in our community who 
wish to or choose to do that because they are undertaking criminal 
activity, or actions that they do not want to come to the attention 
to law enforcement, will naturally gravitate to those areas.26 
23  Deputy Commissioner Michael Phelan APM, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, 
p. 75. 
24  Detective Superintendent Arthur Kopsias APM, Commander, Telecommunications 
Interception Branch, New South Wales Police Force, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 
2015, p. 56. 
25  ASIO, Submission 12.2, p. 7. 
26  Inspector Gavan Segrave, Intelligence and Covert Support Command, Victoria Police, 
Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 57. 
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Declaration that obligations apply to particular services provided to an 
‘immediate circle’ or ‘same area’ 
5.31 Subsection 187B(2) permits the Communications Access Co-ordinator 
(CAC) to declare that data retention obligations apply to one or more 
services provided by a service provider that would otherwise be excluded 
under subsection 187B(1).  
5.32 The Attorney-General’s Department advised the Committee that: 
Based on the experience of law-enforcement and national security 
agencies the Bill presumes that those service providers should not 
be covered by data retention obligations. However, the CAC can 
declare data retention obligations on certain otherwise excluded 
service providers. The CAC can declare a service provided to a 
person’s ‘immediate circle’ or to a ‘same area’ to have data 
retention obligations if the interests of national security and law 
enforcement agencies require that the service should. The Bill 
presumes that those particular types of services should not have 
data retention obligations, but that presumption can be rebutted.27 
5.33 The Australian Privacy Commissioner noted that, while the CAC is 
required to take a range of considerations into account when declaring a 
service, the CAC is not required to take into account the impact of such a 
declaration on the privacy of individuals. Accordingly, the Commissioner 
recommended that, if the declaration-making power is retained, the CAC 
should be required to consider the ‘objects of the Privacy Act’ and consult 
with the Commissioner before making such a declaration.28 
Committee comment 
5.34 The Committee accepts that exclusions set out in proposed new 
section 187B are the result of a compromise to limit the privacy impact and 
regulatory impost of the proposed regime. The Committee notes that the 
exclusions do not worsen the current situation, and also accepts that 
national security and law enforcement agencies will retain a range of 
investigative capabilities that can be used where service providers do not 
retain detailed telecommunications data as a result of these exclusions.  
5.35 However, the Committee notes its previous recommendation, as part of its 
Report of the inquiry into potential reforms of Australia’s national security 
legislation, that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 ‘be 
amended to make it clear beyond doubt that the existing obligations of the 
telecommunications interception regime apply to all providers (including 
27  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, p. 18. 
28  Australian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 26. 
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ancillary service providers) of telecommunications services accessed 
within Australia’.29  
5.36 There was a strength of opinion from some Committee members that 
publicly-accessible Wi-Fi networks and services provided to a single area 
should be included in the scope of the Bill. This should be a matter for 
future review and, the Committee considers that the ongoing 
appropriateness of these exclusions should be reviewed in light of the 
investigative experience. 
 
Recommendation 12 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
and national security and law enforcement agencies provide the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security with 
detailed information about the impact of the exclusion of services 
provided to a single area pursuant to subparagraph 187B(1)(a)(ii) as  part 
of the Committee’s review of the regime, pursuant to section 187N of the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2014. 
5.37 The ability of the CAC to declare that data retention obligations apply to a 
particular service provided to an ‘immediate circle’ or ‘same area’ allows 
for the limited expansion of the regime in circumstances where there is a 
particular law enforcement or security interest at stake. However, such an 
expansion will also have privacy implications. As such, it would be 
appropriate for the CAC to be required to consider the objects of the 
Privacy Act when making such a declaration. Consultation with the 
Privacy Commissioner in relation to the privacy impact may assist the 
CAC in his or her consideration in circumstances where there is 
uncertainty. The Committee also considers that oversight of the 
declaration-making power would be strengthened if the Committee were 
to be notified in each instance that a declaration is made. 
 
29  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), Report of the Inquiry into 
Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, Canberra, May 2013, p. 56. 
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Recommendation 13 
 The Committee recommends that proposed section 187B in the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to require the Communications Access 
Co-ordinator to consider the objects of the Privacy Act 1988 when 
considering whether to make a declaration under proposed subsection 
187B(2). If there is any uncertainty or a need for clarification, the Co-
ordinator should consult with the Australian Privacy Commissioner on 
that issue before making such a declaration.  
Further, the Co-ordinator should be required to notify the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security of any declaration made 
under 187B(2) as soon as practicable after it is made. 
Prescription of additional kinds of service providers in regulations 
5.38 Subparagraph 187A(3)(b)(iii) establishes a regulation-making power, 
permitting additional kinds of service providers to be prescribed. 
However, this regulation-making power is subject to limits: data retention 
obligations will only apply to communications services provided by 
prescribed service providers that have communications-related 
infrastructure in Australia.  
5.39 The Explanatory Memorandum states that a regulation-making power is 
required on the basis that: 
The telecommunications industry is highly innovative and 
increasingly converged. Sophisticated criminals and persons 
engaged in activities prejudicial to security are frequently early 
adopters of communications technologies that they perceive will 
assist them to evade lawful investigations. As such, a regulation-
making power is required to ensure the data retention regime is 
able to remain up-to-date with rapidly changes to communications 
technologies, business practices, and law enforcement and 
national security threat environments.30 
5.40 In its First Report for 2015, the Scrutiny of Bills Committee stated that it 
‘considers that the range of communications service providers to which 
the data retention obligations will apply is a core element of the proposed 
scheme’ and recommended that ‘the types of service providers subject to 
30  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 43. 
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the data retention obligations should be set out in the primary legislation 
to allow full Parliamentary scrutiny’.31  
5.41 The Law Council of Australia supported the Scrutiny of Bills Committee’s 
recommendation.32 
Committee comment  
5.42 The Committee considers that expanding the scope of the proposed data 
retention scheme to apply to new classes of service providers would raise 
significant questions of policy that would be more appropriately 
considered by the Parliament. However, the Committee acknowledges 
that rapid changes in technology may require data retention obligations to 
be applied to a different range of service providers, potentially in response 
to emergency circumstances.  
 
Recommendation 14 
 To provide for emergency circumstances, the Committee recommends 
that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended so that the Attorney-General can 
declare additional classes of service providers under the following 
conditions: 
 The declaration ceases to have effect after 40 sitting days of 
either House, 
 An amendment to include the class of service provider in 
legislation should be brought before the Parliament before the 
expiry of the 40 sitting days, and 
 The amendment should be referred to the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security with a minimum of 15 
sitting days for review and report. 
Implementation plans, exemptions and variations  
5.43 Divisions 2 and 3 in Schedule 1 to the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (the Bill) contain 
31  Scrutiny of Bills Committee, First Report of 2015, p. 120. 
32  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 9. 
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details of the proposed data retention implementation plans and 
exceptions from the mandatory data retention obligations. 
5.44 This section focuses on Divisions 2 and 3 and provides an overview of the 
issues raised by submitters. 
Implementation plans 
5.45 Division 2 of the Bill introduces ‘the development of data implementation 
plans.’33 The Explanatory Memorandum states that the plans are intended 
to: 
allow the telecommunications industry to design a pathway to full 
compliance with their telecommunications data retention 
obligations within 18 months of the commencement of those 
obligations, while also allowing for interim measures that result in 
improved data retention practices.34 
5.46 The Attorney-General’s Department, in its submission, indicated that it 
had broadly modelled the implementation plan process after the 
Broadcasting Services Act 1992 for the conversion to digital television.35 
5.47 The Department added that the process aims to: 
 allow service providers to develop and implement more cost-
effective solutions to their data retention obligations, for 
example, by aligning the implementation of such solutions with 
a provider’s internal business planning and investment cycles, 
or by modifying networks or services to allow data to be 
collected and retained more efficiently 
 ensure that service providers achieve substantial compliance 
with their data retention obligations early in the 
implementation phase by encouraging interim data retention 
solutions, for example, by increasing storage capacity for 
existing databases to approach the two year retention period, or 
by prioritising the implementation of full data retention 
capability for some services or kinds of data 
 facilitate engagement between industry and Government on the 
above issues 
 provide regulatory certainty for industry during the 
implementation phase—once approved, a plan may only be 
varied if both the service provider and the CAC 
[Communications Access Co-ordinator] agree, and 
 provide certainty for agencies that critical capability gaps will 
be mitigated in a timely fashion.36 
33  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 49. 
34  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 49. 
35  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 34. 
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5.48 Optus supported the introduction of data retention implementation plans, 
agreeing with the Attorney-General’s Department that they provided 
certainty for industry: 
Optus supports the policy mechanism of data retention 
implementation plans as they can afford service providers the 
business certainty provided by a graduated and approved 
pathway to compliance.37 
5.49 At its appearance at a public hearing, Optus added that while the 
implementation plan timetables were workable, it may take up to two 
years to fully implement the requirements due to logistical complexities: 
In terms of the scoping and the conceptualisation it is not a 
particularly difficult task because there is not a great variation. The 
real question lies with the logistics of the capacity to store 
consistent datasets across a very wide range of platforms for 
certain periods, particularly when data usage is growing and 
indeed when networks are, historically, in a very high state of 
transition.38 
5.50 Optus commented in its submission that it would be beneficial to enhance 
the implementation plans: 
To afford service providers with greater business, planning and 
compliance certainty it would be beneficial if the effect of data 
retention implementation plans was also explicitly stated as being 
a mechanism to provide prima facie evidence of day 1 compliance 
with section 187A(1). That is, if a provider can demonstrate that it 
has successfully executed against its approved data retention 
implementation plan, the Bill should allow for the 
Communications Access Coordinator to deem that to be 
equivalent to compliance with section 187A(1) being achieved at 
the end of the implementation phase for this Part.39 
5.51 Optus also recommended that the implementation plan could be 
‘expanded to play a central role in any compliance or interpretive dispute 
in the initial three year period of the data retention scheme’.40 
5.52 Optus did, however, put forward the view that  
36  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 34. 
37  Singtel-Optus (Optus), Submission 86, p. 11. 
38  Mr David Epstein, Vice-President, Corporate and Regulatory Affairs, Optus, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 15. 
39  Optus, Submission 86, p. 11. 
40  Optus, Submission 86, p. 12. 
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a service provider’s ability to achieve compliance within these 
timeframes is subject to risk because of the dependency on timely 
and comprehensive decision-making on implementation plans and 
exemptions by the Communications Access Co-ordinator.41 
5.53 Optus also questioned whether the CAC, enforcement agencies, and 
security authorities would have sufficient resources to consider and 
respond to the large number of data retention implementation plans in a 
timely manner, recommending that: 
section 187H (1) (b) (i) be amended such that the data retention 
implementation plans cease to be in force 18 months after the 
Communications Access Coordinator has completed assessment 
and approval of a service provider’s implementation plan, or, for 
any amended component of a plan, 18 months from the time that 
each component of the implementation plan is finally agreed by 
the service provider and the Communications Access 
Coordinator.42 
5.54 The Australian Privacy Commissioner supported the use of data retention 
plans, indicating that they helped provide certainty: 
I support the proposal to permit service providers to seek 
approval of a data retention implementation plan, as this will help 
to provide regulatory certainty about providers’ obligations 
during the implementation phase of the proposed data retention 
scheme.43 
5.55 The Commissioner called for the implementation plans to be enhanced ‘to 
include further details of the type of information service providers should 
include in an implementation plan’.44 The Commissioner suggested that 
the Explanatory Memorandum could be amended to include these 
additional details, stating: 
The implementation plan should also include details of the 
measures the service provider proposes to implement to ensure 
that information that will be collected and retained under the plan 
is protected from misuse, interference and loss and from 
unauthorised access, modification and disclosure. … [T]his will 
ensure that the appropriate security protections are in place before 
service providers are required to collect and store any additional 
41  Optus, Submission 86, p. 12. 
42  Optus, Submission 86, p. 13. 
43  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 25. 
44  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 25. 
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information under the scheme (or an approved data retention 
implementation plan).45 
5.56 The Commissioner also recommended that section 187F of the Bill be 
amended to require that the CAC ‘take these security measures into 
account when deciding whether to approve an implementation plan’.46 
5.57 In his submission, the Commissioner highlighted that the CAC must, 
under section 187G of the Bill, give a copy of the implementation plan to 
enforcement agencies and security authorities and invite them to provide 
comments on the plan. The Commissioner recommended that this section 
be amended to ‘include a requirement for the CAC to give a copy of the 
implementation plan to the [Australian Privacy] Commissioner and invite 
the Commissioner to provide comments’.47 
5.58 Electronics Frontiers Australia agreed with the Commissioner that the 
‘potential privacy impact for users’ should be included for consideration 
as part of the implementation plan.48  
5.59 Electronics Frontiers also put forward its concerns that there was a risk 
that the implementations plans would be used too broadly: 
There is therefore a significant risk that implementation plans will 
be used for everything. That is, all retention that takes place will 
be negotiated on a case-by-case basis between a government 
coordinator and a given service provider. The criteria for 
determining whether an implementation plan is acceptable are 
extremely broad—they go so far as s187F(2)(f): ‘any other matter 
that the Coordinator considers relevant’.49 
5.60 Dr John Selby, Professor Vijay Varadharajan and Dr Yvette Blount of 
Macquarie University held a similar view, recommending that security 
measures be taken into account when deciding whether to approve 
implementation plans: 
… the decision to approve a data retention plan should include 
analysis of whether a service provider has implemented a level of 
security sufficient to protect metadata sensitive to their most-at-
45  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 25. 
46  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 25. 
47  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 26. 
48  Electronics Frontiers Australia, Submission 97, p. 5. 
49  Electronics Frontiers Australia, Submission 97, p. 5. 
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risk business customers (rather than the precautions necessary to 
protect the average risk exposure of their business customers).50 
5.61 The Pirate Party Australia expressed its belief that the implementation 
plans could be more intrusive on privacy arguing that there was not 
sufficient justification for the data retention plans to be kept confidential.51 
5.62 The Australian Information Industry Association questioned whether the 
proposed 18 month implementation plan period was sufficient ‘given the 
infrastructure required to comply with the requirements’.52 
5.63 At a public hearing, the Attorney-General’s Department advised that 
during the course of the Data Retention Implementation Working Group’s 
discussions, service providers expressed the view that the proposed draft 
dataset does provide service providers with sufficient information to 
prepare implementation plans.53 
5.64 In its supplementary submission, the Department argued that the period 
for which implementation plans are in force should not be extended: 
Under the Bill a DRIP would cease to be in force 18 months 
following commencement of the obligation. The Department 
acknowledges the importance of certainty for industry participants 
subject to the obligations, and notes that the inclusion of both 
delayed commencement and a Data Retention Implementation 
Plan respond to and indeed exceed the period requested by 
industry to achieve compliance with the proposed obligation. 
However, the Department is also conscious of the potential for 
delay in implementing data retention obligations due to factors 
exclusively within the control of service providers. The 24 month 
period for service providers to reach full compliance meets the 
dual objectives of giving providers sufficient time to plan, develop 
and install their capabilities, while giving law enforcement and 
security agencies certainty that the implementation will be 
achieved within the extended implementation phase supported by 
the Bill.54 
50  Dr John Selby, Professor Vijay Varadharajan and Dr Yvette Blount, Macquarie University, 
Submission 114, p. 5. 
51  Pirate Party Australia, Submission 124, p. 11. 
52  Australian Information Industry Association, Submission 109, p. 3. 
53  Ms Harmer, Attorney-General’s Department, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, 
p. 24. 
54  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, p. 14. 
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Committee Comment 
5.65 The Committee notes the suggestions raised by submitters that the data 
implementation plans should include additional information on how data 
will be collected, retained and protected. The Committee also received a 
range of evidence about the security of retained data more broadly, which 
is discussed in Chapter 7.  
5.66 The Committee is aware that service providers already have a number of 
obligations under the Privacy Act 1998 and the Australian Privacy 
Principles, the Telecommunications Act 1997, the Telecommunications 
(Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999, and the 
Communications Alliance Telecommunications Consumer Protections 
Code, which all provide details on how an individual’s private 
information is to be collected, retained and protected. However, the 
Committee considers that the security of retained data is a critical issue 
and the community must be able to have confidence in the security of 
stored data. 
5.67 Accordingly, the Committee has made a number of recommendations to 
ensure the security of retained data at Chapter 7 of this report. 
5.68 The Committee also notes the recommendation that the Australian Privacy 
Commissioner should be given an oversight role in assessing service 
providers’ data retention implementation plans. The Committee is 
conscious of the administrative burden such a requirement could place on 
the implementation plan approval process, and does not consider it has 
received sufficient evidence on the matter to form a view. 
Exemptions and variations 
5.69 Under Division 3 of the Bill, the Communications Access Co-ordinator 
may exempt or vary the obligations imposed on a specified service 
provider.55 
5.70 In its submission, the Attorney-General’s Department stated that the 
proposed section 187K, which provides for the CAC to grant exemptions 
or variations, will: 
allow the CAC to exempt a specified service provider, or a 
specified class of service providers, from the data retention 
obligations, or to vary the provider’s obligations. The proposed 
exemption process is modelled on the current exemption regime 
for ‘interception capability’, which is the existing requirement 
55  Proposed section 187K of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Bill 2014. 
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under the [Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979] for 
providers to develop and implement technical capabilities that 
enable them to execute interception warrants.56 
5.71 The Department added that: 
The exemption process would allow the data retention obligation 
to be tailored appropriately: 
 a service might be exempted entirely 
 an exemption could apply in respect of a particular type of 
data, or 
 an exemption could reduce the retention period for defined 
services and/or types of data.57 
5.72 The Department highlighted that the CAC was required to consider a 
number of issues prior to granting an exemption, including: 
 the interests of law enforcement and national security, for 
example data relating to a particular service may currently be of 
relatively lower relevance to investigations 
 the cost to a service provider of complying with data retention 
obligations in relation to the relevant service, and if that cost 
would be disproportionately high, and 
 the objects of the Telecommunications Act 1997, which includes 
matters such as the long-term interests of end-users of carriage 
services or of services provided by means of carriage services, 
the efficiency and international competitiveness of the 
Australian telecommunications industry, and the availability of 
accessible and affordable carriage services that enhance the 
welfare of Australians.58 
5.73 Additionally, when making a decision on granting an exemption, the CAC 
may: 
also take into account the service provider’s history of compliance, 
alternative data retention arrangements that the service provider 
has identified, and any other relevant issues. Exemptions may also 
be appropriate for trial services that are not being used or made 
available to the public, and where data retention capability is 
being developed but is not yet in place.59 
5.74 The Law Council of Australia was of the view that the exemptions from 
data retention obligations were not clear: 
56  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 35. 
57  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 35. 
58  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 35. 
59  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 35. 
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It is not clear why the proposed scheme draws certain distinctions 
in permitting exemptions from data retention obligations. The 
decision of the Communications Access Co-ordinator (CAC) may 
be expressed broadly and may specify service providers in any 
way, for example by reference to a class of service providers.60 
5.75 The Council also sought to clarify the Australian Communications Media 
Authority’s (ACMA) role in reviewing decisions by the CAC to grant an 
exemption or variation: 
It is also unclear whether the Australian Communications Media 
Authority (ACMA) will have the power to review a decision by 
the CAC to grant an exemption or variation. As currently drafted, 
it appears that ACMA only has the power to review 
implementation plans. It is unclear whether an exemption or 
variation will constitute part of a service provider’s 
implementation plan or be a separate process not subject to ACMA 
review.61 
5.76 The Council called for the Explanatory Memorandum to be amended ‘to 
ensure ACMA is empowered to review the exemption and variation 
scheme’.62 
5.77 In its submission, the Law Council also noted that the Explanatory 
Memorandum was silent on: 
why merits review by an independent body such as the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal [AAT] is unavailable for 
decisions made by the ACMA in relation to implementation plans 
and CAC to grant an exemption or variation.63 
5.78 The Council highlighted that ‘a number of ACMA’s other decisions which 
affect service providers are subject to AAT review’.64 It argued that 
administrative decisions should be subject to merits review, stating: 
Unless there are valid reasons for its exclusion, an administrative 
decision not to exempt or vary a particular telecommunications 
service provider’s telecommunications data retention obligations 
is likely to adversely affect the interests of that provider – for 
example, in terms of the implementation and maintenance costs of 
storing the data securely – and should therefore be subject to 
60  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, pp. 9-10. 
61  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 10. 
62  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 10. 
63  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 10. 
64  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 10. 
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merits review. This is particularly pertinent given that judicial 
review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 
will not be available. No valid reason for exclusion of such 
decisions from merits review has been identified by the 
Government.65 
5.79 The Council recommended that the Explanatory Memorandum be 
amended to: 
 more clearly explain why the scheme proposes to apply to 
certain forms of media and not others 
 provide for merits review for decisions made by the ACMA in 
relation to implementation plans and by the CAC to grant an 
exemption or variation or explain why merits review is not 
available 
 make it clear that a service provider would be able to make a 
complaint to the Commonwealth Ombudsman in relation to a 
decision by ACMA or the CAC.66 
5.80 At a public hearing, Optus expressed concerns about the capacity for a 
minister or CAC to provide exemptions for classes of service.67 Optus 
called for a: 
… good definition of an exemption regime that could enable a 
discussion about that. I cannot see why it could not be in an 
instrument that can be subject to some external scrutiny …68 
5.81 The Australian Information Industry Association put forward the view 
that the proposed section on exemptions in the Bill was ambiguous and 
could lead to ‘potential scope creep’.69 
5.82 The Communications Alliance and the Australian Mobile 
Telecommunications Association (AMTA), in their joint submission, 
expressed their belief that red tape could be limited by appropriate 
exemption provisions.70 
5.83 The Communications Alliance and AMTA asked that consideration be 
given to exempting a number of services up-front, including: 
 over the top services such as IPTV, on-demand movie services and 
Fetch TV, 
65  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, pp. 10-11. 
66  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 11. 
67  Mr Epstein, Optus, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 17. 
68  Mr Epstein, Optus, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 17. 
69  Australian Information Industry Association, Submission 109, p. 3. 
70  Communications Alliance and the AMTA, Submission 6, p. 11. 
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 bespoke customer solutions, as typically offered to large corporate 
customers, 
 services supplied where end user is not identifiable at the Carrier/CSP 
level (metrowave, virtual private local access network service, ethernet 
over copper, 10 GbE point-to-point, or internet (access) service), 
 services used for machine to machine communications (extranet 
solution or machine to machine), and 
 broadcast/content services (Satellite broadcast or on demand movie 
services).71 
Committee Comment 
5.84 The proposed sections 187G(4) and (5) ‘provide for the role of the ACMA 
in relation to a proposed amendment of a service provider’s 
implementation plan’.72 These subsections will require the CAC to refer 
disputes over proposed implementation plan amendments to ACMA for 
determination.73 
5.85 As noted in the Explanatory Memorandum: 
ACMA is the industry regulator for the telecommunications 
industry, and has substantial expertise relating to the technical and 
commercial operation of the industry. As such, the ACMA is the 
appropriate body to review any dispute over a request to amend a 
data retention implementation plan.74 
5.86 The Committee therefore agrees with the Law Council of Australia that 
the ACMA should also have a role in reviewing any disputes over 
proposed implementation plan exemptions or variations. 
 
Recommendation 15 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 and accompanying 
Explanatory Memorandum be amended to enable the Communications 
Access Co-ordinator to refer any disputes over proposed 
implementation plan exemptions or variations to the Australian 
Communications Media Authority for determination. 
71  Communications Alliance and the AMTA, Submission 6, pp. 11, 24-25. 
72  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 53. 
73  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 53. 
74  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 53. 
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5.87 The Committee is not convinced of the merits of exempting certain 
services up-front and believes the Bill provides significant scope to apply 
for exemptions where appropriate. 
5.88 The Committee notes that decisions made under the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 are not subject to review by the AAT, and 
are exempt from review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) 
Act 1977. This is consistent with the long-standing practice in relation to 
decisions relating to national security.75 
Cost of data retention 
5.89 A number of submitters and witnesses raised concerns about the potential 
cost impacts of data retention. 
5.90 The Australian Communications Consumer Action Network (ACCAN) 
highlighted the risk that, should service providers pass through any 
increased costs as a result of data retention to consumers, the impact 
would be felt disproportionately by those on the lowest incomes within 
society. 
We already see many consumers going without to pay their phone 
and internet bills, and so we are very concerned about the level of 
cost that may be associated with this system. … [W]e are very 
concerned that this will cause a distortion in the marketplace and 
make things very, very difficult for consumers.76 
5.91 Telstra summarised the ways in which the proposed scheme would create 
costs for Telstra and other service providers, stating that the scheme 
would create: 
both capital costs and operational costs. The impact on our 
business comes not just from the new data we must collect but 
from the requirement to extract, index, store and retrieve upon 
request from the dataset, as well as security measures needed to 
impact the data.77 
5.92 As part of its 2013 inquiry, this Committee received a number of estimates 
from the telecommunications industry about the potential cost of 
implementing a data retention scheme. For example: 
75  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, Schedule 1, item (d). 
76  Ms Narelle Clark, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Australian Communications Consumer 
Action Network (ACCAN), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 80. 
77  Mr James Shaw, Director, Government Relations, Telstra, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
29 January 2015, p. 7. 
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 The AMTA and Communications Alliance estimated that data retention 
could cost between $500m and $700m, across industry;78 and 
 iiNet estimated that data retention would cost approximately $400m, 
across industry.79 
5.93 A number of submitters to this inquiry also drew the Committee’s 
attention to the costs incurred in implementing data retention overseas. 
For example: 
 The Pirate Party Australia drew the Committee’s attention to the UK 
Government’s assessment that retaining IP address allocation records, 
which are a central feature of the Government’s proposed data set, will 
cost £26.6m over ten years to establish and operate.80 This equates to 
approximately $0.10 per person, per year.81 
 The Law Institute of Victoria cited data that Deutsche Telekom 
(Germany’s largest telecommunications company with 39.1m mobile 
and 13.3m fixed broadband customers in 2008),82 incurred capital 
expenses of €5.2m implementing data retention.83 This equates to 
approximately $0.15 per customer.84 
5.94 However, these cost estimates do not necessarily reflect the cost of the 
current proposed scheme. The Committee notes that the estimates 
provided by service providers in 2012 were prepared without the benefit 
of draft legislation or a proposed data set, and that many of the estimates 
were premised on providers of internet access services being required to 
retain web-browsing histories,85 which would have involved the collection 
of a ‘stupendous’86 volume of data.  
78  AMTA and Communications Alliance, Submission 114 (PJCIS Inquiry into Potential Reforms of 
Australia’s National Security Legislation), p. 14. 
79  Mr Steve Dalby, Chief Regulatory Officer, iiNet Ltd, Committee Hansard, Sydney, 27 September 
2012, p. 48. 
80  Pirate Party Australia, Submission 124, p. 14, citing European Commission, Report from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Evaluation Report on the Data Retention 
Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC); and Wilfried  Gansterer and Michael Ilger, Data Retention — 
The EU Directive 2006/24/EC from a Technological Perspective, Wien: Verlag Medien und Recht, 
2008. 
81  Based on the population of the United Kingdom being 64.1m, and exchange rate of GBP 1.00 = 
AUD 1.98. 
82  Deutsche Telekom, Annual Report 2008, pp. 52, 58. 
83  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 117, p. 10. 
84  Based on an exchange rate of EUR 1.00 = AUD 1.47. 
85  See, for example: AMTA and Communications Alliance, Submission 114, p. 14; Mr Steve Dalby, 
iiNet Ltd, Committee Hansard, Sydney, 27 September 2012, p. 48 (PJCIS Inquiry into Potential 
Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation). 
86  Mr Steve Dalby, iiNet Ltd, Committee Hansard, Sydney, 27 September 2012, p. 48. 
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5.95 By comparison, the current proposal is to require the providers of internet 
access services to collect IP address allocation records, which iiNet 
advised at the time could be retained ‘for a very long time at very little 
cost’.87   
5.96 Optus stated in evidence that the cost of the proposed scheme would be 
would significantly lower than some of the previous estimates, and would 
potentially reduce further as discussions around exempting particular 
services progressed: 
[Y]ou will be aware of numbers that have been speculated about 
for similar regimes that have been proposed in the past, 
particularly in 2012-13. There were also some proposals in 2010. 
Some of those have been speculated about in the media. Our view 
is that, while the costs are substantial, what is proposed now, 
though, would be considerably below the upper end of what has 
been speculated about for previous proposed regimes. Indeed, as 
discussions proceed, if some of the refinements being discussed 
proceed further we can see the costs being reduced further.88 
5.97 Similarly, the figures for overseas regimes necessarily reflect the regimes 
implemented in those jurisdictions, rather than the regime and data set 
proposed by this Bill. 
5.98 In the context of the current inquiry, service providers were unwilling to 
publicly advise the Committee of their estimated cost impact due to the 
commercially sensitive nature of such figures.89  
5.99 In September 2014, the Attorney-General’s Department engaged 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, a consultancy, to model the cost of 
implementing mandatory data retention. In its supplementary submission, 
the Department confirmed that these consultations include ‘a 
representative sample of the telecommunications industry’ and that 
refinements of cost estimates are ongoing.90 
5.100 Optus explained why, as a service provider, it was not in a position to 
provide a definitive cost estimate to PricewaterhouseCoopers. In 
particular, Optus noted that, while it had been able to provide ‘ballpark 
87  Mr John Lindsay, Chief Technology Officer, iiNet Ltd, Committee Hansard, Sydney, 
27 September 2012, p. 50. 
88  Mr Epstein, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 14. 
89  See, for example: Mr Shaw, Telstra, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 7; Mr 
Matthew Lobb, General Manager, Industry Strategy and Public Policy, Vodafone Hutchison 
Australia (Vodafone), Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, pp. 62, 64; Mr Epstein, 
Optus, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 14. 
90  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, p. 5. 
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estimates’ of the cost of implementing mandatory data retention,91 it 
would not be able to definitively model its costs until the legislation is 
fully enacted and implemented, as ‘settled law is ultimately the arbiter’: 
For example, the deliberations of this committee might affect the 
requirements. When those sorts of things are more settled—that is 
the reality of this.92 
5.101 Vodafone noted that it was continuing to engage with the Attorney-
General’s Department about technical options that Vodafone may be able 
to implement to reduce the volume of data it may need to collect and 
store. These options would reduce costs.93 
5.102 Optus also noted that its final costings would depend on which services 
are granted exemptions under the legislation and that, while there is a 
‘pretty mature and, indeed longstanding understanding’ within industry 
and Government about which services are relevant for national security 
and law enforcement purposes,94 final decisions on these matters could 
not be made until the Bill receives Royal Assent.95 
5.103 The Attorney-General’s Department confirmed that there had been 
‘various iterations of PricewaterhouseCoopers’ draft reporting’, but 
advised that a draft or finalised version of the report document itself 
would likely not be able to be provided to the Committee due to Cabinet 
confidentiality.96 
5.104 However, on 9 February 2015, the Attorney-General’s Department 
provided the Committee with a two-hour confidential briefing on the 
preliminary findings of the PricewaterhouseCoopers report. The 
Committee also received an unclassified version of the Department’s 
opening remarks for that briefing, which the Committee has accepted as a 
submission and made available on its website.97 Based on this briefing, the 
Committee understands that the upfront capital costs of implementing 
data retention will be between approximately $188.8million and 
$319.1million.98 
5.105 The Department also advised the Committee that: 
91  Mr Epstein, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 14. 
92  Mr Epstein, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 18. 
93  Mr Lobb, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 62. 
94  Mr Epstein, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 19. 
95  Mr Elsegood, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, pp. 18-19. 
96  Mr Chris Moraitis PSM, Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 71. 
97  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.4. 
98  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.4, p. 1. 
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The retention period will have only a modest impact upon the 
costs.  PwC have estimated that should the retention period 
increase by 12 months, the cost to industry would increase 
between $11.4 million and $20.9 million. 
Alternatively, reducing the retention period by 12 months would 
decrease the costs between 5 per cent and 6 per cent. This amounts 
to a decrease in costs of between $11.4 million and $16.6 million.99 
Impact on small and medium-sized enterprises 
5.106 Several submitters and witnesses raised concerns that the scheme could 
impose disproportionate costs for smaller service providers, who would 
have limited capacity to absorb any significant capital expenses. For 
example, Mr Chris Berg, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Public Affairs, 
argued that: 
This cost will have significant effects on the shape of the 
telecommunications industry. The cost of regulatory compliance is 
not evenly distributed among firms of all sizes. It will be relatively 
more expensive for low-budget telecommunications providers – 
who do not, and have no business desire to store masses of data 
currently – to implement the government’s full data retention 
scheme. Regulations favour large incumbent firms over smaller 
ones.100 
5.107 Similarly, ACCAN stated that: 
The information available suggests that the costs associated with 
the scheme are not marginal per user but are predominately fixed 
for each telecommunications provider. As such, it is likely that 
smaller providers – with fewer users – would have to pass on a 
disproportionately higher cost to their customers.101 
5.108 ACCAN further argued that there was the potential for smaller providers 
to be priced out of the market as a result of increased costs – that is, data 
retention could have an anti-competitive impact, unless appropriate 
funding arrangements are put in place.102 
5.109 On the other hand, Telstra argued that this view may be ‘a little bit 
simplistic’: 
99  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.4, p. 1. 
100  Mr Chris Berg, Senior Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs, Submission 94, p. 11. 
101  ACCAN, Submission 120, p. 8. 
102  ACCAN, Submission 120, p. 9. 
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We think the complexity of systems, numbers of systems and the 
like mean that on a per-subscriber basis you could find that it will 
vary according to factors other than just the size of the ISP or 
carrier. If you are providing only a simple broadband service but 
you have a large number of customers, as opposed to a carrier that 
has multiple systems—mobile platforms, fixed platforms, IP 
platforms, the old PSTN—then you have a multitude of products 
across them. That complexity adds significantly to the cost of 
extracting and indexing and collecting that information. So, we 
would not agree with the proposition that says that the cost of 
implementation is directly linked to the size. We think complexity 
is a very important factor. 103 
5.110 Similarly, Optus argued that the cost impact, and therefore the 
reimbursement, would likely vary significantly between providers: 
You will have heard evidence already, and it is very apparent 
from some of the representations you will have heard from our 
industry group, the Comms Alliance, that there is a great deal of 
variation in capability, in capital capability and, indeed, in call. 
There are hundreds, I think over 600, service providers in 
Australia at the moment. Some of them are quite small outfits who 
may not have the capability themselves. A lot of these outfits are, 
of course, drawing wholesale services from some of us major 
providers. For some of our major wholesale customers, for 
example, if they have an interception capability plan, it is 
essentially our interception capability plan, which we are running 
for them on a wholesale basis. I cannot see why that sort of thing 
could not be accommodated in this regime when you are 
negotiating plans with individual providers, which might obviate 
the need for a standard set of expenditure or hardware or software 
requirements. 
So, accordingly, it is likely to vary. Some people may want to go 
down one path; others might want to go down another. What I can 
tell you is that, as occurs today, the vast bulk of the burden will 
fall to the three largest carriers, in particular the two largest 
carriers.104 
103  Mr Shaw, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 12. 
104  Mr Epstein, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 19. 
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Government funding for service providers  
5.111 The major telecommunications companies acknowledged the importance 
of communications-related information to safeguarding national security 
and combating serious crime, and the commitment of industry to assist in 
this area.105 For example, Telstra stated that: 
Protecting its citizens is one of the state’s most fundamental roles. 
The use of telecommunications data is critical to modern policing 
and national security. It helps save the lives of Australians and 
solve serious crime. … One of the obligations that come with being 
a telecommunications carrier and internet service provider in 
Australia is the requirement to provide lawful assistance to the 
agencies. This is a profound responsibility for industry and one we 
take very seriously.106 
5.112 However, service providers generally recommended that the cost of data 
retention should be funded by Government. For example, Optus argued 
that: 
If Government considers there is a net benefit to the community of 
imposing these obligations (in the national interest) then it should 
also be prepared to contribute to the costs and assist in a practical 
manner via capital funding to at the affected providers to make the 
expected benefit come about.107 
5.113 ACCAN noted that, without Government funding, providers are likely to 
pass on some or all of any costs incurred as a result of data retention to 
consumers, with a potentially regressive impact for Australians on low 
incomes. ACCAN and argued that: 
Therefore, to ensure that costs passed on to consumers are 
minimised, ACCAN supports the view that government should 
bear the cost of the mandatory data retention scheme. 
Furthermore, in line with the public policy theory of user-pays, the 
federal government should cover the costs because the scheme is 
being implemented as a policy objective of the government rather 
than of the telecommunications industry. Government funding, 
while falling on taxpayers, would be less regressive than 
necessitating recovery from consumers.108 
105  Communications Alliance and the AMTA, Submission No. 6, p. 2; Mr Lobb, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 66; Mr Epstein, Committee Hansard 
106  Mr Shaw, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2014, p. 7. 
107  Optus, Submission 86, p. 21.  
108  ACCAN, Submission 120, p. 8. 
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5.114 ACCAN also drew the Committee’s attention to a recommendation made 
by the Internet Society of Australia that industry costs could be funded in 
one of two ways: 
 Relevant law enforcement and national security agencies could 
subsidise the telecommunications provider’s capital 
implementation costs and pay the true cost of each access 
request they make; and 
 A public subsidy could be made available to 
telecommunications providers and calculated and allocated in 
an effective manner.109 
5.115 If Government does not cover the entire cost of data retention, ACCAN 
recommended that any funding arrangements should be made 
proportional to a provider’s subscriber base, to minimise anti-competitive 
impact.110 
5.116 The Government has undertaken to make a ‘substantial contribution’ to 
both the cost of implementation and the operation of the scheme.111 
Australian service providers are currently able to recover the costs of 
complying with data authorisations on a ‘no profit, no loss’ basis.112 
5.117 In response to a question from the Committee, the Attorney-General’s 
Department provided a summary of how other jurisdictions have funded 
the implementation of mandatory data retention: 
The European Commission’s Evaluation Report on the Data 
Retention Directive, published in 2011, examined the funding 
models for data retention. The reimbursement of costs is 
categorised either as operational expenditure (e.g. operating costs 
related to operating the business, devices, components, equipment 
or facilities) or capital expenditure (e.g. cost of developing or 
providing infrastructure, overheads such as wages facilities’ rent 
and utilities). The Evaluation reported that a majority of the 
countries (13 countries including Ireland, Greece, Portugal and 
Poland) pay neither operational nor capital costs. Six countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Lithuania and Netherlands) 
109  ACCAN, Submission 120, p. 8, quoting Internet Society of Australia, ‘Ten questions about 
metadata retention’, 6 August 2014, <http://www.isoc-au.org.au/Media/ISOC-
AU_Ten_questions_metadata_retention20140806.pdf> viewed 26 February 2015.  
110  ACCAN, Submission 120, p. 9. 
111  The Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, Minister for Communications, House of Representatives 
Hansard, 30 October 2014, p. 12562. 
112  Telecommunications Act 1997, section 314. 
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provide only operational costs. Only the UK and Finland pay both 
operational and capital costs.113 
5.118 The New South Wales Police Force drew the Committee’s attention to the 
2005 Report of the Review of the Regulation of Access to Communications (the 
Blunn Review).114 The Blunn Review recommended, among other things, 
that the capital expenses associated with the telecommunications 
interception and access regime should be allocated ‘where they are best 
able to be managed’. That is, that service providers should bear the capital 
expenses associated with developing and incorporating capabilities into 
their networks, while agencies should bear the costs associated with each 
interception warrant or request for access to telecommunications data.115 
Committee comment 
5.119 The Committee also notes that services providers are currently entitled to 
recover their actual costs in complying with a data authorisation on a ‘no 
profit, no loss’ basis. The Bill does not propose to alter that arrangement. 
5.120 In regards to a mandatory data retention regime, in its 2013 report this 
Committee recommended that these ‘costs incurred by providers should 
be reimbursed by the Government’.116 
5.121 In this course of this inquiry, the Committee has heard significant 
concerns about the potential cost-impact of mandatory data retention, 
particularly in relation to small and medium-sized ISPs, which may not 
have the financial wherewithal to fund any significant capital expenditure.  
5.122 As noted above, the Committee received a confidential briefing on the 
costings from the Attorney-General’s Department and the opening 
statement from that briefing has been accepted as a submission and 
published on the Committee’s website.117 Indicative costing estimates for 
industry’s implementation of the data retention scheme, based on 
PricewaterhouseCoopers analysis, suggested that the upfront capital cost 
of the regime would be between $188.8 million and $319.1 million. 
5.123 The Committee accepts that it may not be in the public interest for 
Government to fully fund the costs of implementing data retention in all 
cases. As the Blunn Review noted, there is a strong economic argument 
113  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, p. 5. 
114  Detective Superintendent Kopsias, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 56. 
115  Mr Anthony Blunn AO, Report of the Review of the Regulation of Access to Communications, pp. 
49-50. 
116  PJCIS, Report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, 
Canberra, May 2013, p. 192. 
117  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.4. 
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that costs should be borne by the party best able to mitigate those costs. 
Service providers are better placed to develop efficient solutions to their 
data retention obligations, for example through outsourcing, or innovative 
technical solutions. Without at least a degree of cost discipline, there is a 
genuine risk that some service providers may engage in the sort of ‘gold 
plating’ that has been experienced in other sectors. 
5.124 Further, as a number of service providers have acknowledged, their 
services also enable and facilitate serious criminal activity and threats to 
national security. There is an argument that service providers should bear 
some of the cost of addressing these external harms.  
5.125 The Committee notes that only two out of 21 countries identified in the 
European Commission’s Evaluation Report have provided up-front funding 
for the capital costs of data retention.  
5.126 Accordingly, the Committee welcomes the Australian Government’s 
commitment to make a ‘substantial contribution’ to the costs of 
implementing and operating the scheme. The Committee expects that 
national security and law enforcement agencies will continue to contribute 
to the operational costs associated with accessing data under the scheme 
under the existing ‘no profit, no loss’ arrangements. In determining how 
to appropriately assist industry with capital costs associated with the 
mandatory data regime, the Committee considers that there are a number 
of factors which should characterise any funding model. 
5.127 An appropriately developed funding model offers the opportunity for an 
approach that mitigates any potential anti-competitive impacts on small 
and medium-sized businesses, and reduces pass-through costs to 
consumers, while encouraging industry to implement their obligations in 
a cost-effective manner. 
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Recommendation 16 
 The Committee recommends that the Government make a substantial 
contribution to the upfront capital costs of service providers 
implementing their data retention obligations. When designing the 
funding arrangements to give effect to this recommendation, the 
Government should ensure that an appropriate balance is achieved that 
accounts for the significant variations between the services, business 
models, sizes and financial positions of different companies within the 
telecommunications industry. In particular, the Committee recommends 
that the Government ensure that the model for funding service 
providers: 
 provides sufficient support for smaller service providers, who 
may not have sufficient capital budgets or operating cash flow 
to implement data retention, and privacy and security controls, 
without up-front assistance; 
 minimises any potential anti-competitive impacts or market 
distortions; 
 accounts for the differentiated impact of data retention across 
different segments of the telecommunications industry; 
 incentivises timely compliance with their data retention 
obligations; 
 provides appropriate incentives for service providers to 
implement efficient solutions to data retention; 
 does not result in service providers receiving windfall 
payments to operate and maintain existing, legacy systems; and 
 takes into account companies that have recently invested in 
compliant data retention capabilities in anticipation of the 
Bill’s passage. 
 
 6 
Authority to access stored communications 
and telecommunications data 
Introduction 
6.1 This chapter addresses Schedule 2 of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (the Bill), 
which contains amendments in respect of restrictions on access to stored 
communications and telecommunications data.  
6.2 The Committee is mindful that a range of other significant issues 
concerning the adequacy of the existing regime for access to 
telecommunications data contained in the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) were raised in evidence.  Given the 
interdependent nature of the data retention regime and the 
telecommunications data access regime the Committee also considers 
those issues in this chapter. 
6.3 In its simplest form, the Bill aims to restrict access to data required to be 
retained under the regime. It proposes to separate the access to different 
types of information that is authorised for different types of agencies. 
Namely the Bill proposes that those agencies considered ‘criminal law-
enforcement agencies’ under the provisions set out in the Bill are 
authorised to access stored communications under warrant.  
6.4 Other agencies, which are considered to be ‘enforcement agencies’ under 
the provisions set out in the Bill, are to be authorised to access 
telecommunications data. Criminal law-enforcement agencies would also 
be considered to be enforcement agencies, and so would have access to 
telecommunications data.  
6.5 This chapter contains the following sections: 
186  
 
 Access to stored communications under warrant for criminal law 
enforcement agencies 
⇒ Which agencies should be able to access stored communications? 
⇒ Authorisation process for accessing stored content 
 Access to historical telecommunications data for enforcement agencies  
⇒ The basis for a telecommunications data access regime 
⇒ Which agencies should be able to access historical 
telecommunications data? 
⇒ Authorisation process for accessing historical telecommunications 
data 
⇒ Destruction of accessed telecommunications data. 
Access to stored communications 
6.6 The following section examines the proposed access and authorisation 
processes of agencies which are considered criminal law enforcement 
agencies under the provisions set out in the Bill. 
Which agencies should be able to access stored communications? 
The current position 
6.7 The TIA Act currently provides that stored communications may be 
accessed by enforcement agencies under a stored communications warrant 
to investigate a ‘serious contravention’ of the law.1  
6.8 Stored communications are distinct from the telecommunications data 
being considered in respect of the data retention regime. A stored 
communication is defined in section 5 of the TIA Act: 
stored communication means a communication that: 
(a) is not passing over a telecommunications system; and 
(b) is held on equipment that is operated by, and is in the 
possession of, a carrier; and 
(c) cannot be accessed on that equipment, by a person who is not 
a party to the communications, without the assistance of an 
employee of the carrier.  
1  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), Part 3-3. 
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6.9 Examples of stored communications include emails or SMS messages held 
by a carrier.2  Significantly, access to a stored communication will provide 
access to the content of the communication. 
6.10 ‘Enforcement agency’ is defined in section 5 of the TIA Act as:  
(a) the Australian Federal Police; or  
(b) a Police Force of a State; or 
(c) the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity; or 
(d) the ACC; or 
(e) the Crime Commission; or the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption; or  
(f) the Police Integrity Commission; or  
(g) the IBAC; or  
(h) the Crime and Misconduct Commission; or  
(i) the Corruption and Crime Commission; or  
(j) the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption; or  
(k) an authority established by or under a law of the 
Commonwealth, a State or a Territory that is prescribed by the 
regulations for the purposes of this paragraph; or  
(l) a body or organisation responsible to the Ministerial Council for 
Police and Emergency Management – Police; or  
(m) the CrimTrac Agency; or  
(n) any body whose functions include:  
(i) administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty; 
or 
(ii) administering a law relating to the protection of the 
public revenue. 
6.11 In its submission the Attorney-General’s Department explains that, for the 
purposes of paragraph (k), the only authority named in the regulations is 
the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service.3 It goes on to state: 
Paragraph (n) of the definition of enforcement agency is broad and 
includes a wide range of Commonwealth, State, Territory and 
local government agencies. Examples of agencies that have 
accessed telecommunications data can be found in Chapter 3 of the 
TIA Act Annual Report 2012-13.4 
2  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 43. 
3  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 43. 
4  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 44. 
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6.12 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) interception 
warrants also authorise access to stored communications.5 
Proposed amendment to authority to access stored communications 
6.13 The Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights in the Bill’s 
Explanatory Memorandum states: 
The Bill will amend the TIA Act to provide that only criminal law-
enforcement agencies are able to access stored communications 
(and to require the preservation of stored communications).  
Criminal law-enforcement agencies will be defined to mean: 
 interception agencies (Commonwealth , State and Territory 
police and anti-corruption agencies) that are able to obtain 
warrants to intercept communications under the TIA Act; 
 the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
(Customs); 
 authorities or bodies declared by the Minister as criminal law-
enforcement agencies.6 
6.14 In its submission, the Attorney-General’s Department explained the 
rationale for the proposed amendment: 
Only agencies that have a demonstrated need to access the content 
of stored communications, and are subject to appropriate privacy 
and oversight arrangements, should be eligible to do so. In 
addition, it should be clear either on the face of the TIA Act or in 
secondary legislation (such as declarations) which agencies are 
eligible to apply for stored communications warrants or issue 
preservation notices. 
These amendments also recognise the greater privacy sensitivity of 
stored communications as compared to telecommunications data.  
Unlike telecommunications data, stored communications reveal 
the content and the substance of a person’s communications with 
others. The Bill therefore continues the current division in the TIA 
Act between criminal-law enforcement agencies and enforcement 
agencies, with the difference being that under the amendments 
proposed in the Bill only criminal-law enforcement agencies will 
be able to access stored communications content.7 
6.15 In respect of the particular agencies listed as criminal law enforcement 
agencies the Attorney-General’s Department noted that: 
5  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), section 109. 
6  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 [Data 
Retention Bill], Explanatory Memorandum, p. 9. 
7  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 48. 
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in practice only the interception agencies, Customs, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and ASIC have 
obtained stored communications warrants in recent years. The 
reason for the lower number of agencies obtaining stored 
communications warrants is that an agency must be investigating 
a serious contravention (which generally excludes offences 
punishable by less than three years’ imprisonment) in order to 
apply for a stored communications warrant. This high threshold 
for obtaining a warrant excludes most enforcement agencies from 
such access in practice.8 
Attorney-General’s discretion in declaring a criminal law enforcement agency 
6.16 A number of submitters endorsed the aim of reducing the range of 
agencies able to access stored communications but did not agree that the 
Bill satisfactorily achieved this objective. For example, Professor George 
Williams and Dr Keiran Hardy of the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public 
Law submitted that: 
as the Bill would allow the Attorney-General to declare other 
authorities and bodies as criminal law enforcement agencies, 
uncertainty will remain over who will be able to apply for stored 
communications warrants. In making such a declaration, the 
Attorney-General must consider a range of factors, including 
whether the authority is involved in ‘investigating serious 
contraventions’. This wording suggests that only organisations 
involved in investigating serious breaches of the criminal law will 
be declared under the provision. However, it is not a limiting 
factor. The Attorney-General could declare any authority or body 
as a criminal law enforcement agency, so long as he or she 
considers the specified range of factors in doing so. In particular, 
the Attorney-General may consider ‘any other matter’ that he or 
she considers relevant. It is therefore possible that agencies 
involved in enforcing fines and protecting the public revenue – 
including the Australian Taxation Office, local councils, or bodies 
responsible for enforcing copyright infringements – could be 
reinstated with the power to apply for warrants to access stored 
communications.9  
6.17 In their submission, Professor Williams and Dr Hardy went on to 
recommend that:  
8  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 47. 
9  Professor George Williams AO and Dr Keiran Hardy, Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, 
University of New South Wales, Submission 5, p. 4. 
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To achieve greater clarity in the definition of ‘criminal law 
enforcement agency’, and to appropriately limit access to stored 
communications in line with the government’s intended purposes, 
we believe that the matter listed in the proposed s 110(4)(a) should 
limit the Attorney-General’s declaration-making power. That is, 
the Attorney-General should only be able to declare an authority 
or body as a criminal law enforcement agency if he or she is 
satisfied that the agency is involved in ‘investigating serious 
contraventions’.10  
6.18 The Australian Privacy Foundation made a similar recommendation in 
relation to the Attorney-General’s declaration making power, though 
recommended the threshold be raised to ‘authorities or bodies responsible 
for investigating serious criminal offences, serious allegations of public 
corruption, or serious threats to national security’. The Foundation added: 
Moreover, in exercising the determination-making power, the APF 
recommends that the Attorney-General be specifically required to 
take into account the effect of a determination on the right to 
privacy.11 
6.19 The Australian Communications Consumer Action Network (ACCAN) 
also held the view that agencies added to the list of criminal law 
enforcement agencies should ‘meet the definition of a body investigating 
serious offences, as defined in the TIA Act’.12  
6.20 Other submitters were of the view that the Attorney-General’s power to 
make a declaration avoided the proper Parliamentary scrutiny, and that 
the power should be removed in its entirety. For example the Internet 
Society of Australia stated: 
Defining such organisations in regulations instead of the primary 
legislation means additions to the list will not receive 
parliamentary scrutiny that should be afforded to the granting of 
these powers.13 
6.21 The Internet Society went on to propose the following recommendation: 
Amend the Bill to remove the power of the Attorney-General to 
expand the Bill’s existing list of ‘enforcement agencies’ and 
‘criminal law-enforcement agencies’. Alternatively, if 
recommendations are adopted to limit grounds on which access is 
given, confine the declaration power of the Attorney-General to 
10  Professor Williams and Dr Hardy, Submission 5, p. 4. 
11  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, p. 24. 
12  Australian Communications Consumer Action Network (ACCAN), Submission 120, p. 10. 
13  Internet Society of Australia, Submission 122, p. 6. 
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those bodies or agencies that are involved in the prevention 
and/or detection of a ‘serious offence’ as defined in the [TIA 
Act].14  
6.22 The Law Council of Australia expressed the view that  
the Attorney-General’s ability to further expand the agencies 
which can access stored communications or telecommunications 
data by way of regulation, unacceptably reduces the level of 
Parliamentary scrutiny of fundamental elements of the Bill,  
and recommended: 
The Bill should be amended so that the agencies that may have 
access to: … 
 Stored communications are by way of a list scheduled to the 
legislation – not via regulation or other legislative or executive 
instrument.15 
6.23 The Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills expressed similar 
concerns with the declaration power, and added: 
If the proposed approach is to be retained, the committee seeks the 
Attorney-General’s advice as to whether the disallowance process 
can be amended to provide for increased Parliamentary oversight. 
This committee notes that this could be achieved by: 
 requiring the approval of each House of the Parliament before 
new regulations come into effect (see, for example, s 10B of the 
Health Insurance Act 1973); or 
 requiring that regulations be tabled in each House of the 
Parliament for five sitting days before they come into effect 
(see, for example, s 79 of the Public Governance, Performance 
and Accountability Act 2013).16 
6.24 In response to the proposal for limitation of criminal law enforcement 
agencies to those in the Bill, the Attorney-General’s Department stated in 
its submission: 
The Attorney-General, as First Law Officer, is well placed to 
consider whether an authority or body should be an enforcement 
agency (or a criminal law-enforcement agency) … 
The ministerial declaration process is the most appropriate 
method to determine which of the wide range of agencies across 
Australia should be able to exercise the non-interception TIA Act 
powers. This is because ministerial declarations afford flexibility to 
14  Internet Society of Australia, Submission 122, p. 6. 
15  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, pp. 14-15. 
16  Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Alert Digest No. 16 of 2014, p. 6. 
 
192  
 
take into account changes made to agency structures and 
functions. Commonwealth, State and Territory governments 
regularly change the law enforcement responsibilities of agencies 
through amendments to administrative arrangements orders and 
Acts of Parliaments. The speed at which such responsibilities can 
shift means that the availability of TIA Act powers to a particular 
body also needs to be both responsive and transparent.17 
6.25 In response to a question on whether this Committee should be 
empowered to oversight the Attorney General’s declaration making 
power, Professor George Williams stated: 
It would be a welcome safeguard because it would provide a level 
of scrutiny that is not otherwise there. Of course, your committee 
already fulfils similar roles with regard to proscription and other 
forms of Attorney’s decisions. So that would not be inappropriate, 
but still I think it does not get to the heart of the concern that many 
people are expressing: that there should be greater clarity about 
the point of not only which organisations but, as you have 
indicated, the self-serve nature once declared that they can access 
the information.18  
Committee comment 
6.26 Given the intrusive nature of warrants that authorise access to stored 
communications, the Committee considers that the range of agencies able 
to obtain such warrants needs to be carefully circumscribed to ensure that 
access to stored communications is limited to agencies with appropriate 
functions and which are subject to appropriate safeguards. 
6.27 The Committee notes the concerns of submitters in respect of the 
Attorney-General’s broad discretion to declare an agency as a criminal law 
enforcement agency, including agencies which may not have functions in 
respect of serious contraventions.  
6.28 The Committee considers it appropriate for criminal law-enforcement 
agencies to be listed in the primary legislation. However the Committee 
accepts that there may be emergency circumstances where a more rapid 
response is required, and that there is merit in the Attorney-General being 
able to declare an agency as a criminal law-enforcement agency  in such 
circumstances.  
6.29 These declarations should only be made in regard to agencies whose 
functions include investigating serious contraventions, and such a 
17  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, pp. 48-49. 
18  Professor Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p.6.  
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declaration should only be in effect for 40 sittings days of either House of 
the Parliament. This timeframe enables legislative amendment to be 
brought before the Parliament and for this Committee to review any 
proposed amendment to list an agency as a criminal law enforcement 
agency.  
6.30 In regard to the threshold that is to apply for eligibility to be declared a 
criminal law enforcement agency, the Committee notes the distinction 
between investigation of a serious offence defined in section 5D of the TIA 
Act and which applies to interception warrants (broadly, offences 
punishable by seven years imprisonment or more); and the investigation 
of a serious contravention, defined in section 5E of the TIA Act, which 
includes additional offences punishable by 3 years imprisonment or 
significant fine, and which applies to stored communications warrants. 
The Committee recognises that there is merit in the view that threshold for 
agencies which can access telecommunications content under warrant, 
whether interception or stored communications, should be consistent. 
6.31 This Committee previously considered the distinction between the two 
thresholds in its 2013 report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of 
Australia’s National Security Legislation. In that inquiry the Committee was 
not able, upon the evidence before it, to reach a final position about the 
appropriate threshold for access to telecommunications and stored 
communication, and recommended the Attorney-General’s Department 
examine the standardisation of thresholds for accessing the content of 
communications. The Committee reiterates this comment in the context of 
this inquiry. 
6.32 The Committee accepts that, for the purposes of the Bill, the Attorney-
General’s declaration power should be limited to agencies investigating 
serious contraventions as defined in section 5E of the TIA Act. The 
Committee is of the view that the amendments will result in a more 
appropriate and transparent limitation of agencies than is currently the 
case. However, the Committee is also of the view that the standardisation 
of thresholds for agencies to access content of communications should be 
examined as part of the Government’s holistic review of the TIA Act.  
6.33 In respect of whether an additional obligation to consider privacy should 
be included, the Committee notes that the Attorney-General is required 
under s.110A(4) of the Bill to have regard to whether the declaration 
would be in the public interest, and also whether the body or authority is 
required to comply with the Australian Privacy Principles (APPs) or a 
binding scheme that provides a level of protection of personal information 
comparable to that provided by the APPs (‘a binding scheme’). The 
Committee also notes Recommendation 8 ii. of the Australian Privacy 
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Commissioner’s submission in which he recommended some additional 
characteristics which ought to apply to a binding scheme in respect of the 
declaration of an enforcement agency.19 The Committee considers those 
additional characteristics are also appropriate to be applied to 
consideration of a binding scheme in the context of the Attorney-General’s 
declaration of a criminal law enforcement agency.  
 
Recommendation 17 
 The Committee recommends that criminal law-enforcement agencies, 
which are agencies that can obtain a stored communications warrant, be 
specifically listed in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Act 1979.   
To provide for emergency circumstances, the Committee recommends 
that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended so that the Attorney-General can 
declare an authority or body as a criminal law-enforcement agency 
subject to the following conditions: 
 the declaration ceases to have effect after 40 sitting days of 
either House; 
 an amendment to specify the authority or body as a criminal 
law-enforcement agency in legislation should be brought 
before the Parliament before the expiry of the 40 sitting days; 
and 
 the amendment should be referred to the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security with a minimum of 15 
sittings days for review and report. 
Further, consistent with the existing provisions of the Bill, the Attorney-
General must have regard to the factors listed in proposed paragraphs 
110A(4)(b)-(f), and must also be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the 
functions of the agency include investigating serious contraventions. 
 
19  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 7. 
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Recommendation 18 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014, or its Explanatory 
Memorandum, or both, be amended to provide that the characteristics of 
a binding scheme referred to in proposed subparagraph 110A(4)(c)(ii) of 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 include a 
mechanism: 
 for monitoring the authority or body’s compliance with the 
scheme; and 
 to enable individuals to seek recourse if their personal 
information is mishandled. 
The Committee notes that the Australian Privacy Commissioner 
currently has these functions in relation to Commonwealth agencies, 
and some States have privacy commissions which would be well placed 
to perform these functions within these jurisdictions. Other 
jurisdictions may need to expand the functions of their existing 
oversight bodies, or establish new oversight arrangements to meet these 
requirements.  
 
Recommendation 19 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
review whether: 
 the agencies which may access the content of communications 
(either by way of interception warrants or stored 
communications warrants) under the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 should be standardised, and 
 the Attorney-General’s declaration power contained in 
proposed section 110A of the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 in respect of criminal law-enforcement 
agencies should be adjusted accordingly.  
The Committee further recommends that the Attorney-General report to 
Parliament on the findings of the review by the end of the 
implementation phase of the data retention regime. 
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Listing of the Australian Securities & Investments Commission as a criminal law 
enforcement agency 
6.34 The proposed definitions of law enforcement agency and criminal law 
enforcement agency in the Bill do not include the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC).  
6.35 In its submission ASIC stated: 
ASIC, which currently has the ability to access both types of 
material for certain law enforcement purposes, is excluded from 
the proposed definition of ‘criminal law enforcement agency’, 
even though it has major criminal law enforcement functions and 
obligations. Accordingly, ASIC’s existing powers in this field will 
be removed if the TIA Bill is enacted in its current form.20  
6.36 ASIC explained its role as a major criminal law enforcement agency, its 
current use of stored communications in proving serious offences, and the 
accountability requirements that apply: 
ASIC is, among other things, a major criminal law enforcement 
agency. The types of white collar crime investigated and 
prosecuted by ASIC are both notoriously difficult to prove and 
capable of causing immense harm to Australia’s financial system. 
This harm includes damage to the integrity of Australia’s financial 
markets, and devastation to individual victims who risk losing 
their houses and life savings … 
ASIC’s express criminal law enforcement functions and 
obligations extend to the investigation and prosecution of 
“prescribed offences” and “serious offences”, as defined in 
sections 5(1) and 5D of the TIA Act … 
Stored communications are a proven valuable source of 
intelligence to ASIC and constitute crucial evidence for proving 
serious offences which ASIC is primarily responsible for 
investigating and prosecuting. Between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 
2013 ASIC sought and obtained 19 such warrants … 
Any use of telecommunications data or stored communications 
obtained by ASIC is strictly restricted by:  
 obligations imposed on ASIC under the TIA Act;  
 ASIC's obligation to comply with the Australian Privacy 
Principles, which arises because ASIC is an "APP entity" within 
the meaning of s 6(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) [the Privacy 
Act]; and  
20  Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), Submission 24, p. 2. 
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 section 127 of the ASIC Act, which imposes an additional 
obligation upon ASIC to protect the confidentiality of such 
information.  
ASIC also maintains strict internal procedures to protect privacy 
and ensure we meet all of our obligations when exercising our 
powers.21 
6.37 In response to a question from the Committee on this issue, the Attorney-
General’s Department stated: 
The list of agencies that are included on the face of the legislation 
are ones that the parliament has already recognised explicitly has 
those that should have access to data. They are already included 
either in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act as 
it currently stands or in regulations made under it as ones who 
should have access to telecommunications data. The bill reflects 
the parliament’s existing intention that those agencies have access. 
All other agencies have the ability to seek a declaration, to the 
extent that they are agencies involved in the enforcement of the 
criminal law, protection of public revenue et cetera—those 
categories that I have mentioned—to enable them to access data. 
You have given one example, ASIC, but there are a number of 
agencies that do have functions in the enforcement of the criminal 
law and protection of public revenue and have used data in the 
past and consider it to be an important part of the tools that they 
would use.22 
6.38 In its submission, ASIC argued that making its power contingent on a 
ministerial declaration introduced legal uncertainty that is not justified: 
It is possible that if ASIC applied to the Minister to be included in 
such a declaration it would meet the criteria set out in the TIA Bill. 
However, there is no certainty that the Minister would make a 
declaration. If a declaration were made, ASIC considers that it 
would be a sub-optimal outcome because:  
 as the making of a declaration would be a challengeable 
decision, it would result in some legal uncertainty about the 
nature and extent of ASIC’s powers in this field, which would 
reduce the efficiency of ASIC’s investigations and prosecutions 
and may encourage legal challenges by alleged offenders;  
 such a declaration may be limited by subject matter or be 
subject to a sunset provision, or be otherwise subject to 
21  ASIC, Submission 24, pp. 3, 12, 14. 
22  Ms Anna Harmer, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 23. 
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restrictive or onerous conditions not applicable to analogous 
agencies included within the statutory definition; and  
 even if a declaration were made by the current Minister at the 
time the Bill became operational that was not limited by subject 
matter or time, such a declaration would not bind a future 
Minister and might be revoked or otherwise varied (the 
Minister could revoke the declaration at any time under 
proposed subsection 110A(8)).23 
6.39 In response to this submission, the Attorney-General’s Department stated: 
In terms of the specific issue that ASIC raised this morning, as I 
understand it, they reflected that perhaps a declaration as an 
agency would put them on a weaker footing than they might 
currently be at the moment. With respect to ASIC -- and we have 
had discussions with them on this point—I do not agree that that 
is the case. In actual fact, a declaration puts them on a stronger 
footing than is currently the case. ASIC’s ability to access data at 
the moment relies on their ability to fall within that very broadly 
and non-specifically cast definition of ‘enforcement agency’, which 
does not identify them by name; it relies on them falling within 
that broad class of agencies who are involved in enforcement of 
the criminal law and related functions. A declaration as an agency 
would actually give very specific certainty that ASIC is prescribed 
for the purposes of accessing data. And I think if anything it puts 
them on a stronger footing rather making them more susceptible 
to challenge on the basis on which they can access the data.24 
6.40 Professor George Williams, in response to a question from the Committee 
about ASIC’s submission, stated: 
I will say that personally I was surprised that ASIC was not on 
that list given its role in investigating quite serious crimes 
involving what can be significant criminal penalties. It would be 
much better for the list to be exhaustive and to include the 
appropriate bodies in the first place. As to adding bodies in the 
future: certainly challenges could be possible. The minister makes 
a decision that could be the subject of a variety of legal challenges, 
and that ultimately might be quite significant in proceedings 
because, if you can undermine the ability of the body to get the 
information, perhaps you might even be able to prevent the 
admission of that information in court proceedings and so prevent 
a prosecution. 
23  ASIC, Submission 24, pp. 16-17. 
24  Ms Harmer, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 70.  
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That said, I think it is actually going to be quite difficult, if all the 
procedures are followed, to stop appropriate bodies being 
declared, and that is because, as I indicated in my opening 
remarks, the key clause is three, and it actually does not set down 
any criteria.25 
6.41 The Uniting Church Justice and International Mission Unit submitted that 
the definition of criminal law enforcement agency should be expanded to 
include the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and ASIC: 
The new law will limit access to the information to be kept to 
criminal law enforcement agencies … and we believe it should be 
expanded to include the ATO and ASIC so that these agencies do 
not suffer a reduction in their capacity to fight tax evasion and 
corporate fraud respectively.26 
Committee comment 
6.42 The Committee recognises the importance of carefully circumscribing the 
agencies which are designated as ‘criminal law enforcement agencies’ to 
ensure that only agencies involved in investigating serious contraventions 
of the law and subject to appropriate safeguards may seek warrants to 
access stored communications.  
6.43 On the evidence provided, the Committee considers that ASIC is an 
appropriate agency to be a ‘criminal law enforcement agency’. In 
particular, the Committee notes that ASIC’s functions include 
investigating serious offences; that access to stored communications is, 
and will continue to be, of assistance in its investigations of serious 
offences; and that ASIC is subject to appropriate accountability 
requirements and safeguards including the Australian Privacy Principles.  
6.44 The Committee notes from the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 – Annual Report for the year ending 30 June 2013 that the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has also 
previously lawfully accessed stored communications. The Committee has 
received private correspondence from the ACCC noting the importance of 
the ability to access telecommunications data and stored communications 
to the performance of its functions and foreshadowing that, if it is not 
named in the legislation, it will likely seek a declaration as a criminal law-
enforcement agency. The Committee considers that the ACCC is also an 
appropriate agency to be a ‘criminal law-enforcement agency’. 
25  Professor Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 6.  
26  Uniting Church in Australia, Justice & International Mission Unit, Synod of Victoria and 
Tasmania, Submission 76, p. 9. 
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Recommendation 20 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to list 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) as criminal 
law-enforcement agencies under proposed section 110A of the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. 
Authorisation process for accessing stored communications 
6.45 The Attorney-General’s Department explained the current process for 
accessing stored communications, including the requirement to obtain a 
stored communications warrant: 
Section 108 of the TIA Act prohibits persons from accessing a 
stored communication held by a C/CSP, except as provided for in 
that section (such as access under a warrant).  
Section 110 of the TIA Act permits an enforcement agency to apply 
to an issuing authority (an appointed judicial officer or member of 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) for a stored communications 
warrant to access stored communications content.  
The application can be made in relation to the investigation of a 
‘serious contravention’, which is defined in section 5E of the TIA 
Act to include (amongst other things) offences punishable by 
imprisonment by three years or more or contraventions rendering 
an individual liable to pay a pecuniary penalty of 180 penalty 
units (currently equivalent to $30,600, on the basis of $170 per 
penalty unit) or more. 
Under section 116 of the TIA Act, an issuing authority may issue a 
stored communications warrant if the issuing authority is satisfied, 
amongst other matters, that information likely to be obtained 
would be likely assist in the investigation of a serious 
contravention. The issuing authority must also have regard to: 
 the impact on any person’s privacy; 
 the gravity of the conduct; 
 how much the information would assist in the investigation; 
 whether other methods of investigation would be available or 
effective.27 
27  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 43. 
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6.46 In its submission, the Australian Privacy Foundation noted that the Bill 
does not change the threshold for the obtaining of stored communications 
warrants. The Foundation recommended that the higher ‘threshold that 
applies to real time interceptions – which requires that an investigation 
should relate to a “serious offence”’28,  should apply to access to stored 
communications: 
[T}he higher threshold should apply to access to both real-time 
communications and stored content, and require that such access 
relate to investigations of serious criminal offences (i.e. offences 
punishable by imprisonment for at least 7 years, as opposed to the 
current 3 years applying to stored communications), serious 
allegations of public corruption, or serious threats to national 
security. Given the extremely serious privacy implications of 
access to telecommunications data, the APF further submits that 
access to such data should be subject to the same thresholds as 
apply to communications content.29 
Committee comment 
6.47 The Committee notes the distinction between the threshold for an 
interception warrant being, amongst other things, the investigation of a 
‘serious offence’; and the threshold for a stored communications warrant 
being, amongst other things, the investigation of a ‘serious contravention’.  
6.48 Additionally, the Committee acknowledges the significance of this issue in 
the context of the current Bill and recognises that there may be some merit 
in greater consistency in the thresholds for warrants for access to 
telecommunications content. However, there has been insufficient 
evidence received to come to a conclusion as to whether, and how, the 
threshold for a stored communications warrant should be amended.  
6.49 Accordingly, the Committee reiterates the recommendation made in its 
2013 Report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National 
Security Legislation for an examination of the standardisation of thresholds 
for accessing the content of communications.30 
28  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, p. 25. 
29  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, p. 25. 
30  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), Report of the Inquiry into 
Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, May 2013, Recommendation 6, p. 30. 
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Access to historical telecommunications data 
6.50 As indicated earlier, the Bill aims to restrict access to data required to be 
retained under the regime. It proposes to separate the access to different 
types of information that is authorised for different types of agencies. The 
previous section has examined the proposed access and authorisation 
process for agencies that are considered to be criminal law-enforcement 
agencies under the provisions set out in the Bill. Criminal law-
enforcement agencies are authorised to access stored communications 
under warrant. Criminal law enforcement agencies are also considered to 
be enforcement agencies. 
6.51 The following section examines the proposed access and authorisations 
processes for agencies which are considered to be ‘enforcement agencies’ 
under the provisions set out in the Bill. The Bill proposes that enforcement 
agencies be authorised to access historical telecommunications data.  
The basis for a telecommunications data access regime 
6.52 In recognition of the personal and sensitive nature of the information that 
telecommunications carriers, carriage service providers and related bodies 
or persons may hold, the Telecommunications Act 1997 
(Telecommunications Act) protects certain information associated with 
telecommunications.   
6.53 The Telecommunications Act provides that carriers, carriage service 
providers, and certain other persons must protect the confidentiality of 
information that relates to: 
(a)     the contents of communications that have been, or are being, 
carried by carriers or carriage service providers; and 
(b)     carriage services supplied by carriers and carriage service 
providers; and 
(c)     the affairs or personal particulars of other persons.31 
6.54 The penalty for contravening the relevant confidentiality provisions 
contained in the Telecommunications Act is imprisonment for up to two 
years.32 
6.55 The disclosure or use of protected information is authorised in limited 
circumstances. Chapter 4 of the TIA Act sets out a regime by which certain 
agencies can authorise the disclosure of such information or documents—
with the important exception that it does not permit the disclosure of the 
31  Telecommunications Act 1997, section 270 (simplified outline). 
32  Telecommunications Act 1997, Part 13, Division 2. 
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contents or substance of a communication.33 In practice this allows the 
specified agencies to authorise the disclosure of telecommunications data. 
Significantly, access is not restricted to the categories of 
telecommunications data proposed to be retained under the Bill.  
6.56 The regime in Chapter 4 of the TIA Act distinguishes between access to 
existing information or documents (referred to as historical 
telecommunications data) and access to prospective information or 
documents that will come into existence during the period for which the 
relevant authorisation is in force (referred to as prospective 
telecommunications data). 
6.57 Law enforcement and security agency evidence consistently highlighted 
the critical importance of this access regime to their operations. The 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) stated in its submission: 
Chapter 4 of the TIA Act currently allows a range of agencies to 
lawfully access telecommunications data by way of authorised 
request to domestic communications providers.  This 
telecommunications data has provided information fundamental 
in enabling the AFP to effectively investigate and prevent crime 
across the full suite of the AFP’s functions including counter 
terrorism, serious and organised crime, firearm and drug 
trafficking, child protection operations, cybercrime, crimes against 
humanity such as slavery, people smuggling and human 
trafficking, as well as community policing in the ACT and airports 
… 
Access to historical telecommunications data is an elementary 
building block across the vast majority of AFP investigations into 
serious crimes. Analysis of AFP investigations commenced in the 
first quarter of 2014-15 confirms that telecommunications data was 
used in 92% of Counter Terrorism investigations, 100% of 
Cybercrime investigations, 87% of Child Protection investigations, 
and 79% of Serious Organised Crime investigations.34 
6.58 The Police Federation of Australia stated: 
Access to metadata is an essential policing tool. On one hand it is 
frequently used to eliminate people from ongoing investigations 
because the data demonstrates that the person concerned was not, 
at the relevant time, in the relevant place or did not communicate 
with the suspect.  Thus it narrows the field of suspects. 
33  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, section 172. 
34  Australian Federal Police (AFP), Submission 7.1, pp. 3, 5. 
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On the other hand it assists police to establish people involved in a 
particular incident, relevant connections between individuals 
involved, the movement of people at particular times, and the 
incidence of communications between such people.35 
6.59 South Australia Police stated at a public hearing: 
Access to metadata plays a central role in almost every criminal 
investigation, including investigations into murder, sexual assault, 
drug trafficking and kidnapping. In the offence of murder, the 
ability to actually identify people who have contacted each other is 
quite critical. It is the same in cases of child exploitation and, 
obviously, serious and organised crime matters, where you may 
have people involved in illicit drug-taking or dealing in drugs.36 
Which agencies should be able to access telecommunications data? 
The current position 
6.60 The TIA Act currently provides that ASIO or an ‘enforcement agency’ may 
authorise the disclosure of historical telecommunications data.  The term 
‘enforcement agency’ is defined in section 5 of the TIA Act.37 
6.61 The Explanatory Memorandum explains the regime in the following 
terms: 
Access to telecommunications data is regulated by Chapter 4 of 
the TIA Act, which permits an ‘enforcement agency’ to authorise a 
carrier to disclose telecommunications data where it is reasonably 
necessary for the enforcement of the criminal law, a law imposing 
a pecuniary penalty, or the protection of the public revenue … 
There are separate provisions enabling access by ASIO for 
purposes relevant to security. 
Currently under the TIA Act, an enforcement agency is broadly 
defined as all agencies empowered to intercept 
telecommunications content as well as bodies whose functions 
include administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or 
administering a law relating to the protection of the public 
revenue.  The range of agencies that are enforcement agencies and 
which are capable of authorising the disclosure of 
telecommunications data is broad and includes Commonwealth, 
35  Police Federation of Australia, Submission 72, p. 2. 
36  Mr Paul Dickson, Assistant Commissioner, South Australia Police, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 42. 
37  See also paragraphs 6.7 and 6.8 which set out the definition of ‘enforcement agency’. 
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State, Territory and local government agencies as well as non-
government or quasi-government bodies that carry out relevant 
functions.38 
6.62 In the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 – Annual 
Report for the year ending 30 June 2013, over 70 agencies were identified 
as having issued authorisations to historic telecommunications data. In its 
submission the Attorney-General’s Department stated: 
The range of agencies that are enforcement agencies and which 
authorise the disclosure of telecommunications data is broad and 
includes local councils, State and Commonwealth government 
departments, agencies such as Centrelink and bodies as the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.39 
Proposed amendment to ‘enforcement agency’ 
6.63 Schedule 2 of the Bill contains an amendment to the definition of 
enforcement agency. 
Schedule 2 will amend the existing definition of ‘enforcement 
agency’ to limit access to telecommunications data to criminal law-
enforcement agencies and authorities or bodies that have been 
declared by the Minister to be an ‘enforcement agency’.40 
6.64 The Explanatory Memorandum notes these amendments are consistent 
with Recommendation 5 of the previous Committee’s Report of the Inquiry 
into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation that the 
number of agencies able to access telecommunications data be reduced.41 
That recommendation stated: 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s 
Department review the threshold for access to telecommunications 
data. This review should focus on reducing the number of 
agencies able to access telecommunications data by using gravity 
of conduct which may be investigated utilising 
telecommunications data as the threshold on which access is 
allowed.42 
6.65 In its submission, the Attorney-General’s Department explained the effect 
of the proposed amendment as follows: 
38  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 19. 
39  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 45. 
40  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 66. 
41  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 66. 
42  PJCIS, Report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, 
Canberra, May 2013, p. 46. 
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New section 176A will create a new definition of ‘enforcement 
agency’ to replace the definition of ‘enforcement agency’ currently 
found in section 5 of the TIA Act. The new definition of 
enforcement agency in section 176A will include criminal law-
enforcement agencies (as set out in new section 110A) and any 
authority or body declared by the Attorney-General to be an 
enforcement agency  … 
The new definition of enforcement agency replaces the existing 
open-ended approach of permitting any agency with functions 
relating to the enforcement of laws administering a pecuniary 
penalty or protection of the public revenue from automatically 
having access to the power to authorise the disclosure of 
telecommunications and seek stored communication warrants … 
Agencies that would no longer be ‘enforcement agencies’ on the 
face of the legislation include the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC), the Australian Taxation Office 
(ATO), the Department of Defence (in particular, the Australian 
Defence Force Investigative Service), the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (in particular, the Passports Office), the 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Racing NSW, 
the Victorian Department of Environment and Primary Industries, 
the Wyndham City Council, and RSPCA South Australia. 43 
6.66 The Department notes that when making a declaration the Attorney-
General is required to consider a number of factors: 
When considering whether to declare an authority or body to be 
an enforcement agency the Attorney-General will be required to 
consider: 
 whether the authority or body has relevant law enforcement 
functions; 
 whether the obtaining of historic telecommunications data 
would assist the authority or body in performing those 
functions; 
 whether the authority or body is governed by an appropriate 
privacy regime; 
 whether the authority or body will have processes to comply 
with its obligations under the TIA Act; 
 whether the declaration would be in the public interest.44 
6.67 In its submission the Department explained the rationale for the 
amendment: 
43  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 46. 
44  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 46. 
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The principle behind the reduction in the number of agencies that 
can access telecommunications data is that only agencies that have 
a demonstrated need to access such information, and are subject to 
appropriate privacy and oversight arrangements, should be 
permitted to do so. In addition, it should be clear on the face of 
either the TIA Act or in delegated instruments (such as 
declarations) which authorities or bodies are enforcement 
agencies.45 
6.68 The Department noted that, in principle, all agencies charged to enforce 
laws should have access to the necessary tools to carry out their functions, 
but acknowledged the risk of undermining public confidence in the 
regime if access is too broad or granted to agencies without appropriate 
controls in place: 
In principle, any agency or organisation charged by an Australian 
parliament to enforce laws should have access to the necessary 
tools to carry out their statutory functions. However, the emerging 
trend of a wider range of smaller, non-traditional agencies and 
bodies accessing data without external oversight risks 
undermining public confidence in the integrity of the regime. In 
particular, these authorities do not always have internal processes, 
controls and oversight in place to the same degree as traditional 
law enforcement agencies.46 
Attorney-General’s discretion in declaring an enforcement agency 
6.69 A number of submissions expressed support for the Government’s aim of 
reducing the number of agencies able to access telecommunications data. 
For example the Australian Human Rights Commission stated in its 
submission: 
The Commission supports the Bill’s proposal to confine the 
number of agencies that may access retained telecommunications 
data. The Commission notes that this is consistent with the Court 
of Justice of the European Union’s decision, which states that the 
number of persons authorised to access and subsequently use the 
communications data should be limited to that which is strictly 
necessary.47 
45  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 45. 
46  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 42. 
47  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, p. 10. 
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6.70 However, a number of submissions also expressed a concern that the 
change to the definition of enforcement agency does not satisfactorily limit 
the range of agencies covered by the definition.   
6.71 The Law Institute of Victoria stated in its submission: 
Even more concerning is that the Bill leaves wide open the critical 
question of what authorities or bodies will be listed as an 
‘enforcement agency’ and therefore be able to access the retained 
data. 
This clause gives the Attorney-General the power to list by 
legislative instrument any authority or body with functions to 
enforce criminal law or administer a law imposing a pecuniary 
penalty or relating to the protection of the public revenue. These 
functions are incredibly broad and reflect the existing and 
problematic situation where an unknown number of diverse 
federal, state and even local government entities currently access 
telecommunications data. 
In this context, it seems unlikely that the Bill will significantly limit 
the range of agencies permitted to access telecommunications 
data.48 
6.72 The Institute recommended that ‘the agencies which can access 
telecommunications data must be exhaustively set out in the legislation’.49   
6.73 Mr Scott Millwood identified a number of risks with the breadth of the 
declaration regime: 
Further agencies can be added by Regulation at the discretion of 
the Government, leaving the data retention regime susceptible to 
scope and purpose creep … 
The wider the scope of access, the greater the risk of a breach – 20 
agencies with thousands of personnel with access to highly 
sensitive data on a massive scale, would send a chill through most 
Chief Security Officers. 
A prudent data system would ensure restricted access to the data 
pool, by limiting both agencies and personnel who have 
authorised access.50 
6.74 The Law Council of Australia noted the range of agencies that could 
potentially be declared, and stated: 
48  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 117, pp. 11-12. 
49  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 117, p. 11. 
50  Mr S Millwood, Submission 121, pp. 9-10. 
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Vesting such a power in the Minister, notwithstanding 
disallowance procedures available to parliament, may significantly 
increase the ambit of the legislation and frustrate the intention of 
the Parliament. Even if a regulation was in force for a short period 
of time, this would be sufficient for any number of agencies, not 
previously authorised by the Parliament, to obtain stored 
communications data or telecommunications data.… 
The Bill should be amended so that the agencies that have access 
to: 
… telecommunications data under the scheme are the agencies: 
 that may have access to telecommunications data warrants; and 
 listed in a schedule to the legislation – not in regulation or other 
legislative or executive instrument.51 
6.75 The Australian Privacy Commissioner expressed a similar view: 
Given public concern about telecommunications data being 
accessed for the investigation of relatively minor offences, I 
consider that it is more appropriate that any expansion of the 
definition of ‘enforcement agency’ is made by an amendment to 
the TIA Act itself …52 
6.76 As noted earlier, in respect to the definition of ‘criminal law enforcement 
agency’ the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills also 
expressed concerns that the power to include additional enforcement 
agencies should be in primary legislation rather than by ministerial 
declaration, and added: 
If the proposed approach is to be retained, the committee seeks the 
Attorney-General’s advice as to whether the disallowance process 
can be amended to provide for increased Parliamentary oversight. 
This committee notes that this could be achieved by: 
 requiring the approval of each House of the Parliament before 
new regulations come into effect (see, for example, s 10B of the 
Health Insurance Act 1973); or 
 requiring that regulations be tabled in each House of the 
Parliament for five sitting days before they come into effect 
(see, for example, s 79 of the Public Governance, Performance 
and Accountability Act 2013).53 
6.77 The Australian Privacy Commissioner noted the Senate Standing 
Committee’s view, and stated: 
51  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p.15. 
52  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 22. 
53  Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Alert Digest No. 16 of 2014, p. 6. 
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As an alternative, the Committee suggested that the disallowance 
process for this type of ministerial declaration be amended to 
require the scrutiny of each house of Parliament. Although my 
preferred approach would be for any amendment to be made by 
an amendment to the TIA Act, I consider that this could offer an 
alternative approach.54 
6.78 The Commissioner further expressed the view that, if the declaration 
power is to be retained, the Minister, when having regard to the matters 
set out in subsection 176A(4), should also have regard to: 
whether such a binding scheme provide a mechanism: 
 for monitoring the authority or body’s compliance with the 
scheme, and 
 to enable individuals to seek recourse if their personal 
information is mishandled.55 
6.79 In addition, the Commissioner recommended that subsection 176A(5) of 
the Bill be amended to require the Commissioner to be consulted before 
making a declaration under subsection 176A(3).56 
6.80 In response to concerns about the declaration process, the Attorney-
General’s Department stated in its submission: 
The Attorney-General, as First Law Officer, is well placed to 
consider whether an authority or body should be an enforcement 
agency (or a criminal law-enforcement agency) … 
The ministerial declaration process is the most appropriate 
method to determine which of the wide range of agencies across 
Australia should be able to exercise the non-interception TIA Act 
powers. This is because ministerial declarations afford flexibility to 
take into account changes made to agency structures and 
functions. Commonwealth, State and Territory governments 
regularly change the law enforcement responsibilities of agencies 
through amendments to administrative arrangements orders and 
Acts of Parliaments. The speed at which such responsibilities can 
shift means that the availability of TIA Act powers to a particular 
body also needs to be both responsive and transparent.57 
6.81 The Department also noted that the Attorney-General will have the ability 
to revoke a declaration and will have the ability to impose conditions, 
providing ‘a further ability to restrict access to telecommunications data in 
54  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 23. 
55  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 23. 
56  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 24. 
57  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, pp. 48-49. 
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a manner consistent with and proportionate to the functions of the 
agency’.58 
6.82 Professor George Williams and Dr Keiran Hardy of the Gilbert + Tobin 
Centre of Public Law proposed that enforcement agencies should be 
defined with greater specificity, but identified an alternative in the event 
that it is not practicable to list all relevant agencies in the legislation: 
If it is not practicable to list all relevant authorities that will have 
access to metadata, the legislation should at least specify the types 
of authorities that will have access (such as local council, and 
authorities responsible for taxation). These categories should be 
appropriately considered by Parliament as part of the primary 
legislation. In addition, the power to declare authorities or bodies 
as enforcement agencies should be limited to those organisations 
that enforce the criminal law, impose pecuniary penalties or 
protect the public revenue.59 
6.83 A number of submitters identified similar concerns with the potential 
breadth of the range of enforcement agencies, and proposed instead that 
the Attorney-General’s declaration making power should be limited to 
agencies investigating serious offences or threats to national security. For 
example, Open Knowledge Australia stated that: 
the range of agencies that could gain access to telecommunications 
data if the Bill is passed in its current form is, in fact, broader then 
under the present regime. 
Given the extent and sensitive nature of the data likely to be 
retained, OKFNau urges that the range of enforcement agencies 
given access to telecommunications data retained under the Bill be 
limited to those investigating serious criminal offences and 
activities threatening national security.60 
6.84 The councils for civil liberties across Australia also expressed their 
concerns with the breadth of the declaration power, and that some 
additional clear criteria should be added to the declaration power: 
The issue of who will have access to stored telecommunications 
data of every internet provider customer in Australia is of great 
significance in the determination of the proportionality of this 
intrusion into the privacy rights of persons who are not suspected 
of any involvement in unlawful activity … 
58  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 48. 
59  Professor Williams and Dr Hardy, Submission 5, p. 5. 
60  Open Knowledge Australia, Submission 110, p. 4. 
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The CCLS recommend that a clearer and tighter definition of types 
of organisation which can be declared as enforcement agencies be 
specified in the bill and these be limited to those whose functions 
include:  
 i) enforcement of the criminal law; or administering a law 
imposing a pecuniary penalty; or administering a law relating 
to the protection of the public revenue; and 
 ii) some additional clear criteria which would ensure that only 
agencies dealing with serious crime or serious unlawful actions 
are included.61 
6.85 The Australian Privacy Foundation was of the view that a declaration 
power should be limited to those agencies able to access content: 
[A]ccess to telecommunications data (or metadata) now poses 
equivalent risks to privacy, and in some instances manifestly 
greater risks, than access to communications content. 
Consequently, the APF recommends that there should be no 
distinction between authorities and bodies entitled to apply for a 
stored communications warrant and those entitled to access 
telecommunications data, such that the ability to access such data 
should be confined to authorities or bodies responsible for 
investigating serious criminal offences, serious allegations of 
public corruption, or serious threats to national security.62 
6.86 In response to a query as to whether any thought had been given to a 
practical way to put some ‘hard markers’ in the declaration power to 
exclude some groups and some functions that are clearly outside the scope 
of what is intended, the Attorney-General’s Department stated: 
The bill, I think, in some respects is intended to do precisely that. It 
identifies the class of agencies that may have a legitimate need to 
access data in the performance of their functions. So agencies that 
are involved in the enforcement of the criminal law, the 
administration of pecuniary penalties and the protection of public 
revenue are ones that the parliament has already envisaged 
through the legislation as it currently stands may be have a need 
to access data. The bill imposes an additional limitation upon that 
and says that, rather than your membership of that broad class 
creating an ability to access data, in addition there should be a 
requirement that the Attorney-General explicitly consider the 
extent to which data is required in support of those particular 
functions, the particular oversight arrangements that apply for an 
61  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 129, p. 20. 
62  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, p. 24. 
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agency that wishes to access data and the extent to which that 
agency is the subject of binding privacy obligations. So the bill 
does insert a new mechanism to ensure that it is very clear which 
agencies are included and to provide key thresholds around that. 
There will be a clear list of agencies that have access to data, and 
for those that are not in there it will be clear that they do not.63 
6.87 When asked by the Committee if there was a situation where a non-
government organisation, body, or group, could ever be declared, the 
Department stated:   
The threshold around who can be declared is one that is defined 
by reference to the function—so, as I have said, enforcement of the 
criminal law and/or laws protecting public revenue or imposing a 
pecuniary penalty. It is typically the case that governments confer 
those functions upon government agencies however they might be 
described. We have seen over the operation of the current 
arrangements that a number of bodies have functions in that 
regard and, therefore, have had access to the data arrangements. 
So the precise constitution of a body that would be the subject of a 
declaration is naturally determined by the extent to which 
governments confer upon agencies or bodies functions in relation 
to the enforcement of criminal law. Enforcement of the criminal 
law is typically regarded as a function of the state, and so, as a 
general observation, I would say that those functions are conferred 
on government bodies, but the precise definition that is used in the 
legislation is around the characterisation of functions of those 
bodies.64 
Committee comment 
6.88 The Committee welcomes the Attorney-General’s reform of the scope of 
agencies which may access telecommunications data. This measure 
implements the previous Committee’s Recommendation 5 in its 2013 
Report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security 
Legislation. 
6.89 The Committee recognises that the degree of intrusion into privacy 
resulting from access to telecommunications data will depend 
significantly on the type and amount of telecommunications data 
accessed.  The Committee considers that in the context of the modern 
telecommunications environment, and in particular the proposed data 
63  Ms Harmer, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 23. 
64  Ms Harmer, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 29. 
 
 
214  
 
retention regime, there is potential for access to telecommunications data 
to amount to a very significant intrusion into privacy by an agency.  
6.90 The Committee notes the concerns of submitters in respect of the 
Attorney-General’s broad discretion to declare an agency as an 
‘enforcement agency’, including agencies which may not have functions in 
respect of serious contraventions of the law. In particular, while the 
Attorney-General is required to have regard to certain matters, his or her 
discretion to declare an agency an enforcement agency is not otherwise 
fettered on the face of the legislation. 
6.91 For this reason, consistent with proposed measures to safeguard access to 
stored communications, the Committee considers that those agencies able 
to access telecommunications data should be listed in the legislation.  
6.92 The Committee notes that excluded agencies may be able to access 
telecommunications data as part of a joint investigation with a listed 
enforcement agency.65 
6.93 However the Committee also accepts that there may be emergency 
circumstances where a more rapid response is required, and that there is 
merit in the Attorney-General being able to declare an agency as an 
enforcement agency. In these circumstances, the Committee considers it 
appropriate to direct the Attorney-General’s declaration power to those 
agencies whose functions include enforcement of the criminal law, 
administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty, or administering a law 
relating to the protection of the public revenue.  
6.94 Further, such a declaration should only be in effect for 40 sittings day of 
either House of the Parliament. This timeframe enables legislative 
amendment to be brought before the Parliament and for this Committee to 
review any proposed amendment to list an agency as an enforcement 
agency.  
6.95 While the Committee considers it would be a matter of good practice for 
the Attorney-General to consult with the Australian Privacy 
Commissioner and Ombudsman before making a declaration, it is not 
considered necessary to insert a mandatory consultation requirement for 
this in the legislation. 
6.96 When considering whether an authority or body is required to comply 
with a binding scheme that provides a level of protection of personal 
information that is comparable to the level provided by the Australian 
Privacy Principles, for the purposes of proposed subparagraph 
176A(4)(c)(ii), the Committee agrees with the Australian Privacy 
Commissioner’s proposal that regard should also be had to whether such 
65  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 45. 
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a binding scheme provides mechanisms for monitoring an agency’s 
compliance with the scheme, and enabling individuals to see recourse if 
personal information is mishandled. 
 
Recommendation 21 
 The Committee recommends that enforcement agencies, which are 
agencies authorised to access telecommunications data under internal 
authorisation, be specifically listed in the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979.   
To provide for emergency circumstances the Committee recommends 
that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended so that the Attorney-General can 
declare an authority or body as an enforcement agency subject to the 
following conditions: 
 the declaration ceases to have effect after 40 sitting days of 
either House; 
 an amendment to specify the authority or body as an 
enforcement agency in legislation should be brought before the 
Parliament before the expiry of the 40 sitting days; and 
 the amendment should be referred to the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security with a minimum of 15 
sitting days for review and report. 
Further, consistent with the existing provisions of the Bill, the Attorney-
General must have regard to the factors listed in proposed paragraphs 
176A(4)(b)-(f), and must also be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the 
functions of the agency include enforcement of the criminal law, 
administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty, or administering a 
law relating to the protection of the public revenue. 
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Recommendation 22 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014, or the Explanatory 
Memorandum, or both, be amended to provide that the characteristics of 
a binding scheme referred to in proposed subparagraph 176A(4)(c)(ii) of 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 include a 
mechanism: 
 for monitoring the authority or body’s compliance with the 
scheme; and 
 to enable individuals to seek recourse if their personal 
information is mishandled. 
The Committee notes that the Australian Privacy Commissioner 
currently has these functions in relation to Commonwealth agencies, 
and some States have privacy commissions which would be well placed 
to perform these functions within these jurisdictions. Other 
jurisdictions may need to expand the functions of their existing 
oversight bodies, or establish new oversight arrangements to meet these 
requirements. 
Access for civil litigation purposes 
6.97 Currently, access to telecommunications data is not restricted solely to 
ASIO and enforcement agencies. Telecommunications data may be 
lawfully disclosed by telecommunications carriers and carriage service 
providers to other bodies and persons in specific circumstances as set out 
in Division 3 of Part 13 of the Telecommunications Act. That Division, 
amongst other things, makes provision for disclosure where required or 
authorised by or under law, and by witnesses summoned to give evidence 
or produce documents.66 
6.98 A number of submitters expressed concerns, in the context of the data 
retention scheme, that telecommunications data will be able to be accessed 
for civil litigation or other purposes not related to law enforcement. For 
example, the Communications Alliance and Australian Mobile 
Telecommunications Association (AMTA) raised concerns in respect of the 
implications of the availability of retained metadata for use in civil 
proceedings: 
There has been understandable public concern expressed that, 
once it is clear that increased volumes of metadata are being 
66  Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), s.280. 
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retained by CSPs for a specified period, these data will become a 
‘honey-pot’ for civil litigants, who may seek court orders to obtain 
access to metadata for use in civil proceedings. Such actions could 
stem from Family Law cases and all manner of commercial 
disputes. 
If such a practice were to become commonplace there are serious 
financial implications to CSPs. Moreover, such a practice would be 
manifestly outside the intended objectives of a data retention 
regime, and therefore should be guarded against.67 
6.99 Communications Alliance elaborated further at a public hearing: 
At the outset, we recognise this may be a difficult issue to tackle, 
given that civil litigants do have rights to seek discovery for those 
sorts of data. I guess our concern is that, once it is known—
through the requirements of the data set—exactly what data is 
being retained by each service provider and for how long, that 
may generate a tsunami of action in commercial disputes, in 
marital disputes and in many other cases where the data is being 
mined in circumstances where we may not be able to recover costs 
for all sorts of purposes that the data retention bill was not 
designed to facilitate …  
Our concern, I guess, is that this is a high-profile exercise and it 
will put it very clearly in the public consciousness that a defined 
set of data is available from every service provider, and we think it 
may start an industry, if you like …68 
6.100 Mr Alexander Lynch expressed the view that access to 
telecommunications data without warrant should be limited to national 
security and serious criminal investigations, and should not be available 
for civil litigation: 
Metadata should be available without a warrant only for national 
security investigations and the investigation of serious crimes. 
Data retention legislation should specify that the metadata being 
retained is only available to named intelligence, police, border and 
biosecurity agencies only for those specific purposes, and that it is 
not legal nor is it the Government’s intent that the records be 
available for other purposes, such as civil litigation.69 
67  Communications Alliance Ltd and Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association 
(AMTA), Submission 6, pp. 14-15. 
68  Mr John Stanton, CEO, Communications Alliance, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 
2015, p. , Canberra, 17 December 2015, p. 5. 
69  Mr Alexander Lynch, Submission 1, p. 1. 
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6.101 Mr Chris Berg of the Institute of Public Affairs also expressed concerns 
with the availability of telecommunications data for civil proceedings : 
It is also deeply concerning that mandatory data retention will 
inevitably be a feature of civil litigation. Any information that is 
created can be accessed by a subpoena with the permission of a 
court. While many citizens may believe that democratic 
governments act in their own best interest most of the time, they 
might not believe the same about their fellow citizens, who they 
may have to face in future litigation. This has been the experience 
of other nations with data retention laws. One investigation of 
Polish data retention laws found that ‘more and more often traffic 
and location data is requested by the parties in civil disputes such 
as divorce and alimentary disputes.’ The prospect of a semi-
permanent record of travel data being available for personal 
litigation is unlikely to be welcomed by Australian voters.70 
6.102 Mr Iain Muir foreshadowed access of telecommunications data by 
copyright holders for the purposes of pursuing those in breach of their 
rights: 
Copyright holders will demand access to these stores of metadata 
likely pressing down on service providers via threats of litigation. 
These will be used in turn to self police their intellectual 
property. Typically done via threats of legal action with pressure 
to settle out of court for whatever they see fit, mostly from those 
who can least afford it. Furthermore the victims of such unfair 
litigation may not have even downloaded the offending file  
as theft of wi-fi is depressingly common.71 
6.103 The Australian Privacy Foundation also noted a risk of scope creep in use 
of the data in both civil and criminal litigation: 
Given the volume of data that will be retained by carriers and 
ISPs, there will be considerable pressure for such data to be 
accessed and used for purposes other than law enforcement and 
national security. In particular, there will be immense pressure for 
the data to be accessed and used in both civil and criminal legal 
proceedings by parties who are not authorised to access the data 
under the TIA Act. In terms of criminal law proceedings, 
prosecutors will have clear incentives to seek to access data on the 
basis of speculation alone; while defence lawyers will have 
incentives to request access to potentially exculpate their clients. 
70  Mr Chris Berg, Senior Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs, Submission 94, p. [6]. 
71  Mr Iain Muir, Submission 28, p. 1. 
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And further, Courts may clearly order the disclosure of records 
wherever relevant across a broad range of cases. In terms of civil 
litigation, the data exists as a ‘honey-pot’ for a broad range of 
actors. Parties to disputes in family law, and in all manner of 
commercial disputes (involving, for example, trade secrets, 
intellectual property, and defamation) will likely seek disclosure of 
retained metadata. For instance, Communications Minister 
Turnbull and the AFP have announced that data records could be 
made available for copyright litigation purposes. Claims that the 
data will not be used by agencies for purposes other than those 
permitted under the TIA Act are simply disingenuous, as the Bill 
does not impose any limitations on access to the data by means of 
other legal avenues, including conventional litigation processes.72 
6.104 The Law Institute of Victoria, in its supplementary submission, proposed 
that access should be prohibited otherwise than in accordance with the 
provisions of the TIA Act:  
The LIV strongly recommends access to telecommunications data 
should be limited to the purposes of the Bill, i.e. preventing, 
detecting and prosecuting crime and terrorist activities. As such, 
access should be prohibited otherwise than in accordance with the 
provisions of the TIA Act. Such a prohibition should apply to the 
courts, as well as other persons. Such a provision could be 
modelled on s 57 of the Meat Industry Act 1993 (Vic). 
To ensure that telecommunications providers can still use the data 
to deliver services, there should also be an exception to the 
prohibition, which permits telecommunications providers to use 
and disclose the telecommunications data for business purposes 
necessary to deliver the telecommunications or internet services.73 
6.105 Mr Scott Millwood included a similar recommendation in his submission: 
An appropriate amendment would prohibit Service Providers 
from providing metadata about communications to any third 
party, except as required to provide their services or as mandated 
by the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act or 
permitted under the Privacy Act.  
This would limit scope and ensure that the concern that metadata 
might be accessed for other legal processes, including civil 
litigation, is addressed. 
72  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, pp. 15–16. 
73  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 117.1, p. [9]. 
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It is also recommended in the interests of transparency, 
accountability and good governance.74 
6.106 Telstra noted that it expected to receive an increase in court orders to 
make customer data available, and recommended that industry be given 
the ability to recover costs: 
If enacted, the Data Retention Bill would increase the volume of 
data we are required to retain and is likely to also raise public 
awareness of this fact.  As a result, we expect to receive an increase 
in the number of court orders we receive to make customer data 
available to the courts as part of civil litigation proceedings that 
otherwise does not involve Telstra. These court orders can already 
be quite resource intensive to comply with today as they often 
require telecommunications company to interpret data for the 
courts. Also industry does not have the option of cost recovery on 
court orders. Telstra recommends that industry be given the 
ability to recover the costs arising in providing information in 
response to court orders.75 
6.107 In its submission Telstra also noted a risk of agencies excluded from the 
TIA Act regime using other statutory powers to access 
telecommunications data: 
However, we note that as a result of the proposed amendments to 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, there 
is now uncertainty as to whether these organisations can revert to 
using coercive notice to produce or investigatory powers 
(provided to these bodies under other State or Commonwealth 
legislation) to access this data. We would recommend additional 
wording be included in the legislation to ensure there is no back 
door for these organisations to get access to retained data under 
other pieces of legislation.76 
6.108 The Law Council of Australia noted the ability for agencies and other 
persons to obtain access to telecommunications data under other laws and 
recommended that access to telecommunications data under other laws or 
by court process should be precluded: 
The Bill does not limit in any way disclosures of data required to 
be retained where those disclosures are mandated by laws other 
than the Bill …  
74  Mr Scott Millwood, Submission 121, p. 15. 
75  Telstra, Submission 112, p. 5. 
76  Telstra, Submission 112, p. 4. 
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A variety of Federal, State and Territory Acts empower particular 
agencies to compel disclosure. For example, section 29 of the Crime 
Commission Act 2012 (NSW) provides that an executive officer with 
special legal qualifications may, by notice in writing served on a 
person require the person to appear before the Commission at a 
particular time and place and produce to that officer a document 
or thing specified in the notice, being a document or thing that is 
relevant to an investigation.  
Subpoenas are frequently already issued to third parties by courts, 
including ISPs, to produce records. Further, parties to prospective 
or current litigation might seek such retained data as part of the 
discovery.  
In the absence of any restriction upon access to 
telecommunications data under other Federal, State or Territory 
laws or court process requiring disclosure of information or 
documents, there are obvious concerns about the privacy and 
security of telecommunications data held by authorised collecting 
agencies. Significant risks include attempting to determine 
journalists’ sources, cases involving alleged infringement of online 
copyright, family law proceedings, civil claims involving use of 
machinery or motor vehicles, class actions or other legal 
proceedings.  
The Law Council recommends that access authorised by other 
Federal, State, or Territory laws, or pursuant to court process 
should be precluded to ensure that the impact of the Bill is clear 
and limited to achieving its stated purpose.77 
6.109 The Law Council of Australia, also noted alternatives in a public hearing:  
Our submission is that the bill should be amended to preclude 
access. An alternative submission would be that it proscribes 
access so that access would only be permitted if and where 
particular access or classes of access were permitted by regulation 
… 
I can envisage that regulations might allow access either by 
agency, by specified level of court or by class of action.78 
6.110 In response to a question from this Committee as to whether there may 
need to be some change in respect of this issue, the Attorney-General’s 
Department stated: 
77  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 21. 
78  Mr Peter Leonard, Chairperson, Media and Communications Committee, Business Law 
Section, Law Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 37. 
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It is the case, obviously, that data that is already available and data 
that will become available in accordance with data retention is 
available and amenable to other lawful process, including in the 
civil space whether that be through subpoena or other orders for 
production. Production in other contexts itself raises a number of 
challenges and the ability for persons in those proceedings to 
adduce such evidence as is relevant to their proceedings, and of 
course it extends into such matters as family law, other 
commercial situations other than the rights space, which has been 
the subject of some coverage. It is the case that that data would be 
available and it has been for some time and is amenable to that 
process.79 
6.111 In a supplementary submission the Attorney-General’s Department 
expressed concerns with restricting the availability of telecommunications 
data so as to prevent its availability for civil litigation: 
Access to telecommunications in civil and administrative 
proceedings is, and will continue to be important for plaintiffs to 
protect their interests and rights. Data can be of particular 
importance where civil proceedings are closely linked to a criminal 
matter. Proceedings where data may be relevant include proceeds 
of crime actions, civil child protection investigations, apprehended 
violence orders and actions involving incidents of stalking and 
harassment, which often involve the use of a carriage service. In 
the Department’s view, there is a strong public interest in 
telecommunications data continuing to be accessible to plaintiffs. 
… Limiting or restricting access to telecommunications data in 
court proceedings may also give rise to constitutional risks relating 
to the separation of powers by limiting the scope of judicial 
discretion to obtain the information necessary to assist the court in 
exercising its judicial function.80 
Committee comment 
6.112 The Committee notes that telecommunications data is currently accessed 
under existing laws by persons or entities other than law enforcement and 
national security agencies using exceptions to the prohibition on 
disclosure contained in Division 3 of Part 13 of the Telecommunications 
Act. The Committee considers that the majority of these exceptions, for 
example in respect of emergency management, or the business needs of 
service providers, should continue to apply. 
79  Ms Harmer, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 22.  
80  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.3, p. 1. 
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6.113 However, the Committee holds concerns in respect of a possible increase 
in the frequency and volume of telecommunications data accessed by civil 
litigants as a result of the implementation of the proposed data retention 
regime, and has paid careful heed to suggestions that such access be 
restricted.  
6.114 The Committee is aware of the potential for unintended consequences 
resulting from a prohibition on courts authorising access to data retained 
under the data retention scheme. The potential for possible interference 
with judicial power was also raised in evidence. 
6.115 Nonetheless, the Committee considers that the proposed data retention 
regime is being established specifically for law enforcement and national 
security purposes and that as a general principle it would be 
inappropriate for the data retained under that regime to be drawn upon as 
a new source of evidence in civil disputes.  
6.116 The Committee considers that the Bill should be amended to include a 
prohibition on civil litigant access to telecommunications data retained for 
the purpose of complying with the mandatory data retention regime. The 
Committee considers that this prohibition should only apply in respect of 
data retained solely for the purposes of the data retention regime. It 
should not apply more broadly to telecommunications data retained for 
other purposes, such as data that is currently retained for the business 
needs of the service provider.  
6.117 The Committee considers that the amendment should include a regulation 
making power to enable provision for appropriate exclusions, such as 
family law proceedings relating to violence or international child 
abduction cases, and that the Minister for Communications and Attorney-
General review this measure. 
6.118 The Committee does not wish to prescribe how a regulatory power would 
work when it comes to what should be excluded. This will be a matter that 
will have to be reviewed and further considered by the Attorney-General. 
224  
 
Recommendation 23 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to 
prohibit civil litigants from being able to access  telecommunications 
data that is held by a service provider solely for the purpose of 
complying with the mandatory data retention regime.  
To enable appropriate exceptions to this prohibition the Committee 
recommends that a regulation making power be included. 
Further, the Committee recommends that the Minister for 
Communications and the Attorney-General review this measure and 
report to the Parliament on the findings of that review by the end of the 
implementation phase of the Bill. 
Personal access 
6.119 In its submission, the Law Council of Australia highlighted the 
importance of individuals being able to seek access to their own 
telecommunications data: 
An exception should be provided for individuals seeking to access 
their own telecommunications data. This may be essential, for 
example, in a criminal trial where an individual believes that 
telecommunications data may establish their innocence. If 
government agencies are able to access the telecommunications 
data of individuals to establish a prosecution, the Law Council 
considers that it is also appropriate for individual’s to access such 
data to be able to establish a defence, or to understand the 
evidence and charges against them.81 
6.120 The Pirate Party Australia expressed that there was some uncertainty as to 
whether users would be able to access telecommunications data they have 
generated.  
It is unclear whether provision will be made for subscribers and 
users to inspect or otherwise gain access to the retained data they 
and people using their accounts have generated. Under the 
Privacy Act 1988 companies have a general obligation to allow 
individuals to inspect and correct personal data that they hold. 
However, journalist Ben Grubb was (and appears to remain) 
engaged in a dispute with Telstra over a request for their personal 
telecommunications data. This issue ought to be resolved, and 
81  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 21. 
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preferably individuals would be permitted to inspect the records 
held.82 
6.121 Telecommunications industry representatives raised concerns in their 
submissions in respect of the costs of personal access by customers to 
telecommunications data stored as part of the data retention regime.  
6.122 The Communications Alliance and AMTA proposed that it should be 
explicit that carriers and carriage service providers are not required to 
provide individuals access on demand to all retained data, while 
reinforcing their right to access to their stored personal information: 
The Bill does not explicitly address the question of whether 
individuals should have the right under Australian Privacy 
Principle 12, to make demands upon CSPs to provide access to 
their personal metadata, especially the metadata captured by the 
mandatory data retention scheme … 
The size and cost of the task for a CSP to pull together and make 
available all the metadata relating to an individual should not be 
underestimated. The prospect of potentially millions of 
Australians making such requests to CSPs is little short of 
frightening. Such a scenario would generate enormous expense 
and resource demands on CSPs, for no clear or positive outcome. 
CSPs would need to create purpose-built security and 
management systems to meet the additional demands imposed on 
them by this new requirement. 
The Associations stress that we are not advocating any restriction 
on customer access to the Personal Information stored by CSPs 
about their customers – data such as billing information, address 
and identification details. This information should continue to be 
freely available to customers …83 
6.123 When asked at a public hearing for comment on this concern, the 
Attorney-General’s Department stated: 
There are a couple of things we can provide some preliminary 
comments on, at this stage. As Communications Alliance has 
probably flagged, there are arrangements under which people can 
access their own personal information. The Privacy Act provides a 
mechanism for individuals to request their own personal 
information. What is ‘personal information’ depends on the 
circumstances, but it is information that reasonably leads to the 
identification of a particular individual. What that is will depend 
82  Pirate Party Australia, Submission 124, p. 12. 
83  Communications Alliance and AMTA, Submission 6, p. [15]. 
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on the circumstances and will depend on what the information is, 
the circumstances in which it is received and how access is 
arranged. Particularly in the telecommunications context, that can 
vary according to network configurations—whether a particular 
data point is one that identifies an individual. Nevertheless, it is 
the case that, to the extent that carriers have personal information, 
individuals may apply to those carriers and request their personal 
information. Indeed, industry is entitled to recover the reasonable 
cost and is entitled to charge for the provision of personal 
information under that Privacy Act framework.84 
6.124 In his submission, the Australian Privacy Commissioner provided a 
detailed response to the concerns expressed by the Communications 
Alliance and AMTA: 
Organisations within the meaning of the Privacy Act are required 
to comply with the APPs when handling personal information that 
they collect and retain. If the Bill is passed, this will include 
personal information collected and retained in compliance with 
the proposed data retention scheme by service providers covered 
by the Privacy Act. APP 12 requires those service providers to give 
an individual access to any personal information that the provider 
holds about the individual on request, subject to certain exceptions 
(such as where giving access would be likely to prejudice one or 
more enforcement related activities conducted by, or on behalf of, 
an enforcement body). APP 12 also sets out minimum access 
requirements, including the time period for responding to an 
access request, how access is to be given, and that a written notice, 
including the reasons for the refusal, must be given to the 
individual if access is refused. 
Under APP 12, an organisation may impose a charge on an 
individual for giving access to their personal information, 
provided the charge is not excessive …85 
6.125 In its submission, Telstra identified the potential for an increased 
regulatory burden imposed by the Privacy Act in respect of retained data: 
If compliance with the Bill increases the amount of personally 
identifiable information we hold about our customers, then it will 
increase the regulatory burden imposed on industry by the 
Privacy Act … 
84  Ms Harmer, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 30.  
85  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, pp 36-37. 
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On top of our obligation under the Privacy Act to protect against 
data breaches, the manner in which the data will need to be held 
to comply with the Bill may mean that Telstra could be required to 
make this data available to individual customers in response to an 
access request for personal information.86 
6.126 Telstra noted in such a case that additional costs will be incurred, and that 
such costs may not be able to be fully recovered by charging customers for 
providing access to personal information: 
Providing this information to customers is not the same as 
providing information to authorised enforcement agencies and 
would involve additional costs, for example in verifying a 
customer’s identity and redacting information on incoming calls to 
protect the privacy of other individuals. There is a fundamental 
difference between responding to a reasonably precise and limited 
request from agencies for information to dealing with blanket 
requests for all personal information about an individual. 
The costs associated with the systems, processes and labour, 
required to verify customer requests and retrieve the relevant 
data, has not been taken into account by Telstra in determining the 
cost impacts of the Data Retention Bill. Telstra does have the 
ability to charge customers for providing access to personal 
information, but we consider it a real risk that we would not be 
able to fully recover our costs in light of the Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner’s (OAIC) Australian 
Privacy Principles Guidelines on charging for access requests.87 
Committee comment 
6.127 In regards to personal access, the Committee notes Australian Privacy 
Principle 12 but considers that individuals should have an unambiguous 
right to access their personal telecommunications data retained under the 
mandatory data retention regime. The Committee recommends 
amendments to the Bill to clarify the right to access personal data retained 
under the data retention regime.  
6.128 The Committee notes that telecommunications service providers are 
currently able to recover the cost under the Privacy Act 1988 and considers 
that this model should apply to these arrangements.  
 
86  Telstra, Submission 112, pp. 4-5. 
87  Telstra, Submission 112, p. 5. 
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Recommendation 24 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to make 
clear that individuals have the right to access their personal 
telecommunications data retained by a service provider under the data 
retention regime. Telecommunications service providers should be able 
to recover their costs in providing such access, consistent with the model 
applying under the Privacy Act in respect of giving access to personal 
information. 
Authorisation process for accessing historical telecommunications 
data 
6.129 At a public hearing, the Attorney-General’s Department confirmed that 
the Government does not intend to amend the existing authorisation 
process in the Bill: 
MR DREYFUS: …This bill—and if you can confirm—is not 
dealing in any way with the powers that there presently are for 
ASIO, the Australian Federal Police or other police forces to access 
telecommunications information. Is that right?  
Ms Harmer:  The only amendment to the access arrangements is to 
reduce the number of agencies who can access the data, but the 
access thresholds are not changed.88 
6.130 However, the Committee notes that a significant number of submissions 
have raised concerns with the adequacy of the existing authorisation 
process or expressed the view that additional safeguards are necessary in 
light of the proposed data retention regime. 
6.131 The remainder of this chapter will examine the following issues raised in 
evidence in the context of the proposed data retention regime: 
 whether a warrant issued by an independent body (or similar process) 
should be required to authorise access to telecommunications data; 
 whether the statutory thresholds for access to historic 
telecommunications data should be adjusted;  
 whether additional requirements for access should apply in respect of 
privileged or other sensitive communications; 
88  The Hon Mr Dreyfus QC MP and Ms Anna Harmer, acting First Assistant Secretary, Attorney-
General’s Department, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 8. 
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 whether additional requirements in respect of destruction of 
telecommunications data in the possession of agencies are required. 
The current position 
6.132 The Explanatory Memorandum provides an overview of the process for 
obtaining access to historical telecommunications data: 
The TIA Act establishes a process of authorisation for access to 
telecommunications data that requires senior management to 
authorise access to this data before it is disclosed to an agency.  
The authorisation process requires the authorised officer to 
consider the need for access to this information on a case-by-case 
basis in accordance with a prescriptive legal framework.89 
6.133 In its submission, the Attorney-General’s Department provided further 
detail on which officers may authorise disclosure under the existing 
internal authorisation process: 
‘Authorised officers’ of enforcement agencies may authorise the 
disclosure of telecommunications data under the TIA Act. 
Authorised officer are defined in section 5 of the TIA Act to 
include the following: 
 i. the head of an enforcement agency; or 
 ii. a deputy head of an enforcement agency; or 
 iii. a person who holds an office or position in the enforcement 
agency that is covered by an authorisation in force under 
subsection 5AB(1). 
Under section 5AB of the TIA Act, an agency head may authorise, 
in writing, management offices or positions within their agency for 
the purposes of authorising access to telecommunications data.90 
6.134 The Department also described the legislative thresholds that apply when 
officers of an organisation are considering telecommunications data access 
authorisations: 
Chapter 4 of the TIA Act sets out the mechanisms for ASIO and 
the enforcement agencies to authorise the disclosure of data for a 
variety of lawful purposes. 
Section 178 of the TIA Act allows an authorised officer of an 
enforcement agency to authorise a C/CSP to disclose historic 
telecommunications data if the disclosure is reasonably necessary 
for the enforcement of the criminal law … 
89  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 19. 
90  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 42. 
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Section 178A of the TIA Act allows an authorised officer of a police 
force to authorise a C/CSP to disclose historic telecommunications 
data to assist in locating a missing person. 
Section 179 of the TIA Act allows an enforcement agency to 
authorise a C/CSP to disclose historic telecommunications data if 
the disclosure is reasonably necessary for the enforcement of law 
imposing a pecuniary penalty or for the protection of the public 
revenue … 
For all of the above disclosure authorisation powers, section 180F 
of the TIA Act requires an authorised officer to take the privacy 
impact into account when making any such authorisation.91 
6.135 The authorisation process for ASIO is similar. The Director-General of 
Security, a Deputy Director-General of Security, or an approved ASIO 
officer may authorise access to historical telecommunications data where 
they are satisfied that the disclosure would be in connection with the 
performance by ASIO of its functions.92 
6.136 In response to a request from this Committee to outline how the process of 
access works, the New South Wales Police Force (NSW Police) explained: 
All of our inspectors and above—we call them commissioned 
officers—… 
They are all authorised under the act—I think it is section 5AB. 
They are authorised officers to approve metadata requests under 
section 178 of the TIA act. They are in the field, say, at a particular 
location. Someone puts the request up to the inspector. They call in 
the boss. They discuss it—a particular crime has just been 
committed or is about to be committed—and there is a process in 
place. There will be discussion. There is a cost involved too. The 
constable or the detective will need to talk to the boss to make sure 
that everyone is happy, and costs will obviously be paid for the 
metadata. They look at the privacy aspects of the particular crime 
and the safeguards. There is a process on the computer called our 
‘I Ask’ system. They log in online. They put down a narrative of 
the brief and so on. It goes through to the ‘I Ask’ system at 
Parramatta where it is approved. That system then talks to the 
carrier’s system and it is vetted by ‘I Ask’, which is done by 
another inspector. There is more supervision and vetting, and the 
data is obtained from the carrier. At the local level, the inspector 
will approve that particular request. They will look at all the 
91  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 42. 
92  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, section 175. 
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safeguards, facts and circumstances to justify the request, and so 
on. It goes to ‘I Ask’. There is another vetting process at ‘I Ask’, 
and then the carrier accesses the records back to the officer who 
requested the data under the process.… 
It is standardised, accounted, documented, recorded …93 
Should a warrant from an independent authority be required? 
6.137 A significant number of submitters have expressed the view that there is a 
need for an increase in procedural protections in respect of agency access 
to telecommunications data.  
6.138 For example, in their submission, Professor Geroge Williams and Dr 
Keiran Hardy raised the following concern: 
We are concerned by the prospect that enforcement agencies will 
effectively be able to access metadata on a ‘self-serve’ basis. Given 
that metadata can reveal a significant amount of identifying 
information about an individual, we believe that greater 
procedural protections for accessing metadata should apply…. 
This could be achieved through a warrant process along the lines 
of that allowing access to stored communications.… 
Metadata is not trivial information and enforcement agencies 
should not be free to access that information wherever doing so is 
reasonably necessary to enforce minor infringements, such as 
parking or library fines.94 
6.139 The councils for civil liberties across Australia highlighted that, without 
prior oversight, any abuse of the legal parameters could only be detected 
after the fact. The councils argued the necessity of judicial oversight prior 
to access: 
The CCLS greatest concern about the proposed safeguards is the 
lack of prior oversight of the operation of enforcement agencies 
access to telecommunications meta-data … 
It is clearly unacceptable for the ‘enforcement agencies’ or ASIO to 
be their own authorisers of access to such personal information. 
Any oversight of their processes and detection of any abuse of the 
legal parameters could only be detected post hoc. 
There is an obvious and well tested, traditional safeguard that 
should be included in the bill. Access to both retrospective and 
prospective meta-data under the proposed scheme should only be 
93  Detective Superintendent Arthur Kopsias, APM, Telecommunications Interception Branch, 
New South Wales Police Force, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, pp. 58-59.  
94  Professor Williams and Dr Hardy, Submission 5, p. 5-6. 
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on the basis of a prior warrant authorisation from a judicial 
authority.95 
6.140 The Committee notes that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights also recommended use of a warrant: 
[T]he committee notes that the proposed oversight mechanisms in 
the bill are directed at reviewing access powers after they have 
been exercised. However, the statement of compatibility does not 
address the question of why access to metadata under the scheme 
should not be subject to prior review though a warrant system, as 
is the case for access to other forms of information under the TIA 
Act. 
The committee considers that requirements for prior review would 
more effectively ensure that the grant of access to metadata under 
the scheme would be consistent with the right to privacy. 
The committee therefore recommends that, so as to avoid the 
unnecessary limitation on the right to privacy that would result 
from a failure to provide for prior review, the bill be amended to 
provide that access to retained data be granted only on the basis of 
a warrant approved by a court or independent administrative 
tribunal, taking into account the necessity of access for the purpose 
of preventing or detecting serious crime and defined objective 
grounds.96 
6.141 A number of submitters expressed their support for the Parliamentary 
Human Rights Committee recommendation. Blueprint for Free Speech 
recommended that any access to telecommunications data should be 
supported by a warrant on the terms set out by that Committee.97 The Law 
Institute of Victoria noted the Human Rights Committee’s 
recommendation and expressed the view that judicial oversight  should be 
required. Mr Josh O’Callaghan referred to the Committee’s 
recommendation and highlighted the protection warrants provide: 
I also have an issue with current system we have; which allows the 
warrantless access (without judicial oversight; under any 
circumstance) of the existing telecommunications networks.… 
By removing the process to obtain warrants, citizens are losing 
their right for judicial protection against corruption and abuse.98 
95  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 129, pp. 15-16. 
96  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Fifteenth Report of the 44th Parliament, p. 18. 
97  Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission 54, p. 14. 
98  Mr Josh O’Callaghan, Submission 29, p. 1. 
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6.142 The Australian Human Rights Commission recommended in its 
submission that an independent authorisation system by a court or 
administrative body be implemented. As with a number of other 
submitters, the Commission noted that access to telecommunications data 
may not be any less intrusive than access to content: 
The current regime allows agencies to access communications data 
without a warrant but mandates a warrant for access to the 
content of communications. The Commission considers that a 
warrant system is necessary for the access to communications data 
as well. This is especially the case given the question of whether 
the distinction between content and communications data for the 
purposes of the right to privacy can be legitimately maintained … 
Contrary to the claims made in the Explanatory Memorandum, the 
Commission considers the retention of and access to 
communications data may not be any less intrusive than retention 
of and access to content. The requirement to store communications 
data on each and every customer just in case that data is needed 
for law enforcement purposes is a significant intrusion on the right 
to privacy and justifies a warrant system for access to it.99 
6.143 The Commission also referred to international precedent for use of 
warrants to access telecommunications data: 
The Commission notes that the Court of Justice of the European 
Union considered that an independent administrative or judicial 
body should make decisions regarding access to the retained 
communications data on the basis of what is strictly necessary … 
Further, requiring a warrant to access metadata is not without 
precedent in other countries. In the EU, eleven Member States 
require judicial authorisation for each request for access to 
retained data. In three Member States judicial authorisation is 
required in most cases. Four other Member States require 
authorisation from a senior authority but not a judge.100 
6.144 In its submission, the Commission noted the safeguards that apply under 
the existing legislation and the Bill, but expressed the concern that they 
only apply after a power has been exercised. 
While these safeguards are important checks on the scheme, they 
are all directed at reviewing access powers after they have been 
exercised. The Commission considers that a warrant or 
authorisation system for access to retained data by a court or 
99  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, p. 11. 
100  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, pp. 10-11. 
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administrative body provides a more effective safeguard to ensure 
that the right to privacy is only limited where strictly necessary.101 
6.145 Australian Lawyers for Human Rights explained why, in its view, a 
warrant to access telecommunications data is necessary: 
Today, warrants should be required to access metadata so that (1) 
individuals may not be investigated by government bodies 
without proper cause, and so that (2) an appropriate check or 
balance is applied through the mechanism by which the warrant is 
obtained from the courts. 
To remove the requirement for prior authorisation via a warrant is 
to undermine both democracy and the rule of law by reducing the 
checks and balances essential to a democratic system.102 
6.146 The Human Rights Law Centre expressed the view that a warrant or other 
prior approval process is necessary, and also expressed the need for a 
notification and review mechanism: 
A warrant or other similar prior approval process is necessary to 
ensure that issues of privacy are considered by an independent 
authority and that there is sufficient evidence to avoid a fishing 
expedition … 
The absence of a warrant or other independent authorisation 
process prior to access and use of the stored data gives rise to 
serious concerns regarding the propriety, and apparent propriety, 
of the access and use … 
A warrant or similar prior approval process should also provide a 
mechanism for individuals to be notified and have the opportunity 
to challenge the legality of access to their telecommunications 
data. Notification could occur after access where ex parte approval 
was necessary for law enforcement or national security purposes. 
This process should mitigate the concern that the right to an 
effective remedy is being impermissibly interfered with because 
individuals are unable to challenge decisions or applications in 
relation to their stored metadata because they are never informed 
of the decisions or applications.103 
6.147 The Parliamentary Human Rights Committee similarly recommended a 
requirement for individuals to be notified that their data has been subject 
101  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, p. 12. 
102  Australian Lawyers for Human Rights, Submission 88, p. 7. 
103  Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 71, p. 8. 
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to an application for authorisation to access, and recommended a process 
to allow individuals to challenge such access.104 
6.148 Mr Scott Millwood strongly advocated for the use of a targeted warrant 
system for accessing telecommunications data: 
While oversight provisions are a welcome inclusion in the Bill, an 
oversight function by the Commonwealth Ombudsman is not 
comparable with the meaningful judicial oversight provided by 
the targeted warrant system. This submission recommends that 
serious consideration be given to ensuring access to metadata is 
governed by a warrant system, in which judicial consideration can 
be given to the requirements of necessity and proportionality. This 
would simultaneously address the requirement of a legal avenue 
for remedy for victims of violations of their rights to privacy under 
the data retention regime.105 
6.149 Mr Millwood also noted the risk of telecommunications data being used 
for political purposes, a concern that was reflected in a number of 
submissions to this inquiry: 
The hard truth is, systems of mass surveillance are inevitably used 
to target political opposition. It is conceivable that use or misuse of 
an individual’s metadata could cause great damage to an 
individual’s right to freedom of expression and right to participate 
in Australian public life.106 
6.150 Guardian Australia similarly expressed its concerns with the lack of a pre-
disclosure independent oversight mechanism for access to 
telecommunications data, and also proposed the use of a public interest 
monitor in such a process: 
Guardian Australia submits that it is reasonable for the public to 
expect that authorisation from an independent, appropriately 
qualified person ought to be required before metadata is accessed. 
Independent authorisation is such a commonly occurring feature 
of the safeguards used by democratic societies in the context of 
surveillance schemes that the Committee is requested to 
investigate further, to test seriously the agencies’ claims about cost 
in time and money, and to recommend an appropriate process for 
independent authorisation prior to access. 
… The Committee is requested to recommend the creation of an 
independent Public Interest Monitor role. A suitably qualified and 
104  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Fifteenth Report of the 44th Parliament, p. 21. 
105  Mr Millwood, Submission 121, p. 14 
106  Mr Millwood, Submission 121, p. 16. 
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experienced person should have the primary function of testing 
the arguments of agencies which seek to conduct surveillance and 
of articulating the privacy and others interests which ought to be 
weighed by the decision-maker.107 
6.151 The Australian Privacy Foundation and the councils for civil liberties 
across Australia also expressed support for a public interest monitor in the 
context of a warrant or similar process.108 
6.152 In response to suggestions that a warrant regime should be used, law 
enforcement and security agencies noted the existing protections and 
safeguards that apply and raised significant concerns in respect of the 
impact such a requirement would have on their operations. 
6.153 The AFP explained its concerns with a warrant requirement to access 
telecommunications data in its submission: 
The AFP considers that, given the existing safeguards, constraints 
and processes governing the authorisation regime, and the 
extended oversight provisions under the Bill, that a warrant 
scheme for access to telecommunications data would not 
significantly improve accountability or transparency of the 
scheme. Rather, the AFP considers that such a scheme would 
generate unnecessary administrative burden and costs on both 
agencies seeking access to telecommunications data and on the 
issuing authority for such warrants. 
32. The AFP is concerned that the time (not even counting the 
financial cost) required per request to prepare and progress a 
warrant for telecommunications data would reduce operational 
responsiveness in time sensitive cases and create a bureaucratic 
burden, diverting investigative resources from the field. The AFP 
conservatively estimates, based on other warrant applications that 
the process for preparing such a warrant would take at least 8 
hours of dedicated work. Extending this to the existing rate of 
requests for telecommunications data, this would equate to a 
requirement for over 100 staff to be solely committed to warrant 
preparation duties. 
33. A scheme requiring agencies to obtain a warrant for historical 
telecommunications data would also create a significant additional 
burden on the already stretched Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
and judicial system, who would be required to consider 
107  Guardian Australia, Submission 132, pp. 12-13. 
108  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, p. 3; Councils for civil liberties across Australia, 
Submission 129, p. 16. 
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approximately 25,000 applications from the AFP alone every 
year.109 
6.154 In its submission, ASIO explained its concerns with a warrant mechanism, 
and also noted the extensive safeguards that currently apply: 
ASIO’s concern with implementing a warrant regime for data 
access is its impact on our operational response and agility: the 
significant bureaucratic overlay such a scheme would impose and 
the consequential delay in assessing and responding to emerging 
security threats before they are realised.110 
6.155 At public hearing, representatives of New South Wales, South Australia 
and Victoria police forces explained to the Committee how metadata is 
used and the impact a warrant process could have on their operations. 
South Australia Police stated: 
Metadata is really just about where the communication occurred, 
when it occurred, place, time—those sorts of issues. As you quite 
rightly say, it does not actually relate to the content of that 
metadata. Often, when we seek that metadata, we are just looking 
for information because we do not really have much else to go on. 
We are using that information tool to find out what contact, what 
communication, the suspects or the victim have had and to then go 
and speak to those individuals to find out what is the relationship 
and just going through that process, as any good investigator 
should do. Really it is an intelligence tool to provide us with 
information to assist us with that investigation. Often the metadata 
does not get us anywhere because it is not relative to the 
investigation.111 
6.156 The NSW Police noted the impact a warrant regime could have: 
[T]he first 24 hours in a homicide investigation is critical, a 
significant time delay to go under a warrant regime would 
significantly impact on both the effectiveness and certainly the 
efficiency of criminal investigations … 
I would say the balance at the moment is quite appropriate in 
terms of metadata. As I said, internally there are checkpoints that 
we need to go through to get there. There is external oversight—
and I can have Superintendent Kopsias talk in terms of the 
telecommunications interception act and Ombudsman, 
Commonwealth and state, oversighting. In the initial stages of an 
109  AFP, Submission 7.1, pp. 12-13.  
110  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Submission 12.1, p. 48. 
111  Assistant Commissioner Dickson, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 45. 
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investigation, it is really about gathering information as quickly as 
we can so we can try to narrow down suspects, try to identify 
communications and found the investigation and the direction we 
are going to go with it. If a significant layer of bureaucracy is put 
on top of that, that will significantly impede investigations. I 
would think that they are appropriate, and I certainly take note of 
Mr Byrne's comments before. But when you look at the significant 
number of inquiries that are made for metadata each year and the 
way that they are handled compared to the response we do get 
from both the state and Commonwealth Ombudsman, I think we 
have the processes very appropriate.112 
6.157 NSW Police added this further comment on the potential impact of a 
warrant regime: 
From a New South Wales Police Force prospective, the volume of 
our metadata requests if we put a warrant regime on top of the 
metadata scheme would—I will make a bold statement—virtually 
cripple our organisational capacity to effectively deal with 
organised crime and serious crime. I would make that statement to 
you. It is not just responding during business hours; it is also after 
hours. We respond to kidnappings and other serious crime after 
hours and on weekends. You would need after-hours people to do 
that type of work. Just the sheer volume of metadata and TI 
requests would hamper our investigative capacity. 
In terms of oversight, I do not think a warrant scheme would add 
more to due diligence and to the accountability and oversight 
process currently in place at the moment. As Mr Lanyon told you, 
we have enough internal processes and accountability schemes in 
place to ensure governance and equitable practices are adhered to 
at all times in compliance with the legislative practices that we 
adhere to.113 
6.158 Victoria Police added: 
[I]f we were to move to a judicial warrant situation for metadata, 
one of the things I think it would throw up in terms of an anomaly 
is that telecommunications interception warrants, by definition, 
require metadata within the applications—and quite a deal of 
metadata—to substantiate the application. We would effectively 
be moving to a situation where, in a lot of instances, we would 
112  Assistant Commissioner Malcolm Lanyon APM, New South Wales Police Force, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, pp. 46, 47. 
113  Detective Superintendent Arthur Kopsias APM, New South Wales Police Force, p. 47. 
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need a warrant to obtain the information that we would need to 
obtain the warrant. I think that would raise a whole range of issues 
as well.114 
6.159 A number of submitters did not accept agency concerns regarding the 
impact of a warrant requirement on the ability to perform their functions. 
The councils for civil liberties across Australia submitted: 
The CCLS do not accept the argument that having to access a 
warrant will impose an unmanageable administrative burden on 
the agencies or ASIO. The warrant process provides an important 
procedural safeguard without any great inconvenience. Such 
inconvenience and administrative burden that does accompany it, 
is a reasonable and necessary trade-off for such significant 
intrusion into the privacy rights of the community.115 
6.160 The Law Council of Australia acknowledged that an increase in warrant 
applications would result, but considered that this would cause agencies 
to only apply for access in cases when an interference with privacy was 
considered necessary: 
The Law Council understands that there are concerns that a 
warrant-based system would limit the ability of law enforcement 
and national security agencies to employ what is often the lowest 
risk, least resource-intensive and least intrusive investigative tool. 
The Law Council does not agree that the method of access to 
retained communications should be the paramount consideration. 
Rather, protection and oversight of rights of privacy should be 
paramount … 
The Law Council acknowledges that a warrant-based system for 
access to telecommunications data would increase the number of 
warrant applications. However, it would serve as an important 
deterrent for agencies to only apply for access when an 
interference with privacy is considered necessary.  
The Law Council rejects the argument that, even if accompanied 
by increased resourcing, a warrant regime would distort the 
ability of issuing authorities to perform their day-to-day functions 
as members of the judiciary or AAT. This is an issue of adequate 
resourcing of the Courts and the AAT. The government has a 
responsibility to sufficiently resource those bodies charged with 
supervision of such activities to ensure that rights of privacy are 
not unnecessarily infringed upon. 
114  Inspector Gavin Segrave, Victoria Police, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 49. 
115  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 129, p. 16. 
 
240  
 
6.161 In response, the Attorney-General’s Department provided a number of 
reasons why it did not consider a warrant regime appropriate: 
The benefits of introducing a warrant regime would be 
outweighed by the impact on agencies’ ability to combat serious 
crime and protect public safety. Timely access to 
telecommunications data can provide agencies with vital leads 
before evidence can be lost or destroyed. However, warrant 
applications are resource intensive, and can take days, if not 
weeks, to prepare and complete. Delaying an agency’s ability to 
begin an investigation by this length of time would seriously harm 
their ability to investigate crimes or threats to national security. 
Telecommunications data is used most commonly in the early 
stages of an investigation, when evidence is at risk of being lost, or 
where victims might be in imminent risk of danger. For example, a 
police force investigating a suspected kidnapping would often 
begin their investigation by seeking information about whom the 
victim had been communicating with immediately prior to their 
kidnapping. Early information about the whereabouts of the 
victim would increase the chances of a successful rescue. 
Warrants are also typically reserved for the most intrusive powers, 
such as the power to enter a home, intercept phone calls, or access 
stored communications. Many information-gathering powers that 
are exercised by agencies under Commonwealth, State and 
Territory laws do not rise to that level of intrusiveness and may be 
exercised without a warrant. Examples of such powers are powers 
to obtain banking, financial and healthcare records. The power to 
access data is only of the same level of intrusiveness as these 
powers. Non-warranted access to information is a normal part of 
any law enforcement framework. 
Furthermore, to require a warrant in this circumstance would be 
counterintuitive to the fundamental tenet of proportionality 
because telecommunications data serves to establish the case for 
more intrusive powers to be deployed under a warrant. 
6.162 The Attorney-General’s Department also noted that precedent for non-
warranted access to information is found in a number of areas within the 
existing Australian legal system: 
[W]hile there are warrants for access to some types of information 
and tools, warrants are typically reserved for those tools that are 
most intrusive. The committee has already commented today on 
telecommunications interception warrants, but there are a range of 
other warrants for more intrusive steps—search warrants et cetera. 
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However, access under alternative mechanisms is certainly by no 
means unprecedented. Indeed, it is common through ‘notice to 
produce’ authorisation processes et cetera to access more routine 
ranges of information that are less intrusive. Telecommunications 
data, as we said, is a basic data point. It is typically used at the 
beginning of investigations to commence inquiries, to identify 
inquiries and to pursue those. It is a relatively less intrusive range 
of information. It is also often required to progress investigations 
quickly and to provide the information that is then required to 
support something like an interception warrant. So it then 
supports warranted access to other tools.116 
6.163 Professor Williams and Dr Hardy acknowledged the significant 
administrative burden of a judicial warrant process and proposed a 
ministerial warrant process as an alternative. 
We accept that a warrant process along these lines could pose a 
significant administrative burden to law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies investigating serious criminal offences and 
threats to national security. As such, a preferable alternative might 
be to implement a ministerial warrant process. This could be 
incorporated into existing ministerial warrant processes where 
available to ensure maximum efficiency without compromising 
procedural safeguards … 
A ministerial warrant process would allow law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies to access metadata in a timely fashion whilst 
ensuring that there is enhanced political accountability for the 
regime.117 
6.164 Appearing before the Committee, Professor Gillian Triggs, President of 
the Australian Human Rights Commission, acknowledged the issues with 
the imposition of a warrant process and suggested some more nuanced 
administrative process should be adopted: 
We suggest that some form of administrative—possibly judicial 
but for practical purposes administrative—body be developed in 
advance of the access or collection process so that there is some 
form of control … If it is accepted that a warrant is necessary for 
content, I think it at least has to be further explored why it is not 
necessary to have a warrant at the beginning of the process. 
Again, I am conscious of the concerns that the warrant process can 
be time consuming, expensive and difficult to establish, and that is 
116  Ms Harmer, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014. 
117  Professor Williams and Dr Hardy, Submission 5, p. 6. 
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very important when we are dealing with critical questions of life 
and serious criminal offences. So we would suggest that, rather 
than going necessarily through a warrant process, some more 
nuanced process of administrative authorisation be adopted which 
is simpler, clearer and cleaner …118 
6.165 The Attorney-General’s Department referred to the use of generic 
warrants in some European jurisdictions, but noted the United Kingdom’s 
Interception of Communications Commissioner’s concerns in respect of 
how proportionality can be judged properly under such schemes, and 
expressed concern that use of a generic warrant may result in important 
checks being removed: 
The Australian scheme is comparable to that which exists in the 
UK where a disclosure of information to be sought individually 
which allows the proportionality of each particular disclosure to 
be considered separately. This is required by section 180F of the 
TIA Act, which provides that authorising officers must have 
regard to whether any interference in the privacy of any person or 
persons that may result from a particular disclosure is justifiable, 
having regard to the likely relevance and usefulness of the 
information and the reason why the disclosure or use is proposed 
to be authorised. 
Those considerations are important checks that would possibly be 
lost from the investigative process if ‘generic’ whole-of-
investigation warrants were to be adopted. The checks may be lost 
as the issuing authority would be required to decide whether or 
not to authorise disclosure of information without knowing the 
relevance of particular pieces of information to an investigation or 
the privacy impact of any such disclosures. 
The Department’s view is that the current law and policy settings 
in the TIA Act are preferable, as they require the person 
authorising the disclosure of this basic investigative material to 
turn their mind to privacy and proportionality considerations 
when deciding whether or not to authorise particular 
disclosures.119 
6.166 The Australian Privacy Commissioner had considered a ‘generic’ warrant 
and concluded in his submission that it would not be effective: 
118  Professor Gillian Triggs, President, Australian Human Rights Commission, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 29 January, p. 71. 
119  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 19. 
 
AUTHORITY TO ACCESS STORED COMMUNICATIONS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA 243 
 
There has also been discussion of an alternative requirement for 
enforcement and security agencies to obtain a ‘generic’ warrant to 
access telecommunications data. This was discussed at the hearing 
on 17 December 2014, where an example was given of a warrant to 
authorise access to telecommunications data for all terrorism 
investigations. I do not consider that such a generic warrant 
regime (as discussed at the hearing) would provide the necessary 
level of scrutiny to be effective to increase the current level of 
oversight of the disclosure of telecommunications data.120 
6.167 In a supplementary submission, the Commissioner also considered the 
issue of additional safeguards that might be introduced for the use of 
telecommunications data for more minor crimes. The Commissioner 
proposed three alternatives, the first being the introduction of a warrant, 
and the second being a more restricted warrant regime applying in 
relation to minor offences: 
An alternative to introducing a blanket warrant requirement, 
could be an amendment to Chapter 4 of the TIA Act to require 
enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant where access to 
telecommunications data is sought in relation to the investigation 
of an offence other than a 'serious contravention', as defined in s 
5E of that Act. 
While the requirement to obtain a warrant in relation to minor 
offences may appear counterintuitive, such an approach would 
recognise the urgency of requests for telecommunications data 
necessary for the investigation of serious offences and threats to 
national security. This is also in-keeping with the intention of the 
proposed data retention scheme, which has focused on the need to 
ensure that Australian enforcement and security agencies have 
access to the information they require to combat such serious 
offences and threats.121 
6.168 The third alternative suggested by the Commissioner was amending 
section 180F of the TIA Act to require authorised officers to have regard to 
additional factors: 
[T]he Bill could amend s 180F of the TIA Act to explicitly require 
an authorised officer to have regard to the following additional 
factors: 
 the seriousness of the offence, 
120  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 20.  
121  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92.1, p. 3. 
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 whether there are any other reasonable methods of 
investigating the offence, that do not involve the use of 
telecommunications data, available to the enforcement agency, 
and 
 the likely impact on the community of the enforcement agency 
not being able to access the relevant telecommunications 
data.122 
6.169 During a public hearing, the Committee asked Professor George Williams 
and Dr Keiran Hardy whether the Single Point of Contact (SPoC) 
mechanism, as used in the United Kingdom, would be a useful safeguard 
to include in the Data Retention Bill. In a supplementary submission, 
Professor Williams and Dr Hardy outlined the scheme and expressed the 
view that it would not resolve issues of external oversight. 
A SPoC is an accredited individual (or group of individuals) in a 
public authority who acts as a ‘gatekeeper’ before requests for 
communications data are submitted to a senior authorising officer. 
For example, if a junior police officer wanted to access 
communications data under Part 1, Chapter 2 of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK), he or she would first submit 
an application to the SPoC. The SPoC would then consider the 
merits and lawfulness of that request, and provide advice on its 
drafting, before sending it to a senior designated officer to be 
authorised. 
We believe that such a scheme could be a useful addition to the 
Bill currently before the Committee, but it would not resolve the 
Bill’s major issues. A SPoC regime would not add any external 
oversight or political accountability to the proposed data retention 
regime, as it would operate internally within enforcement agencies 
and criminal law enforcement agencies. It would also not resolve 
other key issues raised by the Bill, such as whether local councils 
should have access to metadata for the purpose of enforcing fines 
and the like. We believe that the government should focus on 
resolving these key issues in the primary legislation.123 
Committee comment 
6.170 A number of submitters raised concerns regarding the authorisation 
process for access to telecommunications data. In particular some 
submitters argued that access to telecommunications data is no less 
122  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92.1, pp. 3-4. 
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intrusive than access to the content of telecommunications, and 
consequently that the same pre-access approval processes should apply. 
6.171 The Committee acknowledges that in some circumstances access to 
telecommunications data can represent a significant privacy intrusion. 
However, the Committee notes the evidence provided that 
telecommunications data and telecommunications content are not used in 
the same way by law enforcement and security agencies, and does not 
consider that the same authorisation processes must necessarily apply. 
However the Committee has paid particular attention to assessing the 
adequacy of existing safeguards and oversight mechanisms for 
authorisation of access to telecommunications data. 
6.172 The formulation of safeguard and oversight mechanisms in this context 
requires a careful balancing of competing public interests – maximising 
accountability, integrity and protection of liberty while minimising 
adverse impacts on both the ability and the agility of agencies to perform 
their legitimate functions of enforcing the law and safeguarding the 
Australian community. 
6.173 During the conduct of this inquiry, the Committee has received 
compelling evidence that the introduction of a warrant process (judicial or 
ministerial) for access to telecommunications data would significantly 
impede the operational effectiveness of agencies and that this would be to 
the detriment of the protection of the Australian community. The 
Committee was not convinced that a ‘generic’ warrant would be a suitable 
alternative. 
6.174 After close consideration of the evidence, the Committee concludes that 
the existing internal authorisation regime contained in the TIA Act is 
appropriate, noting the other safeguards and oversight mechanisms that 
apply. 
Thresholds for authorising access to telecommunications data 
6.175 Some submitters raised concerns that the threshold for authorising access 
to telecommunications data is not proportionate to the level of privacy 
intrusion that may arise under the regime. Some proposed that the 
thresholds for agencies to access telecommunications data should be 
amended to include a requirement as to the gravity of the offence/security 
matter being investigated. For example, the Australian Privacy 
Foundation stated in its submission that it considers there is a strong case 
for applying the current threshold for accessing content to agency access 
to telecommunications data: 
Given the extent to which access to telecommunications data my 
interfere with the right to privacy just as much as access to 
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communications content, the APF consider there is a strong case 
for introducing a uniformly high threshold for access to both 
communications content and telecommunications data.124 
6.176 The Law Institute of Victoria recommended that access to 
telecommunications data be restricted to criminal law enforcement 
agencies for preventing, detecting or prosecuting serious crimes.  In 
reaching this conclusion the Institute stated: 
This Bill does not refer to ‘serious crime’. There are no criteria 
which would ensure that data is only accessed or used for 
purposes of prevention, detecting or prosecuting serious crime or 
even matters that constitute criminal offences. The Bill goes 
beyond a legitimate purpose. The agencies that can be classified 
as ‘enforcement agencies’ can access data related to their function 
of enforcing offences that impose pecuniary penalties and/or 
protect public revenue.125 
6.177 The Australian Human Rights Commission noted the Court of Justice 
decision in respect of the EU Data Retention Directive, and concluded that 
access to historical telecommunications data should be limited to 
sufficiently serious crimes: 
As outlined above, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
found that the EU Data Retention Directive was not a 
proportionate interference with the right to privacy. One of the 
reasons for this was that it considered that access and use of the 
data should be restricted to the prevention, detection or 
prosecution of defined, sufficiently serious crimes. 
The Commission considers that access to communications data 
should be restricted to sufficiently serious crimes to warrant the 
intrusion on the right to privacy.126 
6.178 The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its review of the 
Bill, recommended changes to the existing authorisation scheme to 
address concerns in respect of the existing threshold for access to 
telecommunications data: 
The lack of a threshold, relating to the nature and seriousness of 
the offence, for access to retained data appears to be a 
disproportionate limitation on the right to privacy. The committee 
considers that to ensure a proportionate limitation on the right to 
privacy, an appropriate threshold should be established to restrict 
124  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, pp. 24-25. 
125  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 117, p. 12. 
126  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 42, p.  9. 
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access to retained data to investigations of specified threatened or 
actual crimes that are serious, or to categories of serious crimes 
such as major indictable offences (as is the current threshold for 
requiring the option of trial by jury). The committee is additionally 
concerned that the threshold of ‘reasonably necessary’ for the 
enforcement of offences may lack the requisite degree of precision.  
The committee therefore recommends that the bill, so as to avoid 
the disproportionate limitation on the right to privacy that would 
result from disclosing telecommunications data for the 
investigation of any offence, be amended to limit disclosure 
authorisation for existing data to where it is ‘necessary’ for the 
investigation of specified serious crimes, or categories of serious 
crimes.127 
6.179 A number of submitters to this inquiry support the Parliamentary Human 
Rights Committee’s recommendation. For example, the Victorian 
Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection stated: 
The Bill should be amended to include clearly defined objective 
thresholds for access to retained data by criminal law enforcement 
agencies. These thresholds should be set taking into account the 
public interest, including consideration of the principles of 
proportionality, necessity, effectiveness, and transparency. Access 
should only be available in relation to serious offences, for 
example, offences that attract significant periods of imprisonment. 
The PJCHR recommendation to limit disclosure authorisation for 
existing data to where it is necessary for the investigation of 
specified serious crimes, or categories of serious crimes is 
supported.128 
6.180 The Human Rights Law Centre noted the Human Rights Committee’s 
recommendation and added: 
The failure to set out objective criteria restricting access and use of 
data for the purpose of preventing and detecting carefully defined 
serious offences or of conducting criminal prosecutions was one of 
the key criticisms levelled at the Directive in the Digital Rights 
decision. 
The same criticism was raised in Germany in relation to legislation 
intended to implement the Directive into German law. The 
legislation was found to be disproportionate and unconstitutional, 
in part because the stored data could be accessed for a wide 
127  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Fifteenth Report of the 44th Parliament, p. 16. 
128  Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection (Victoria), Submission 39, p. 7. 
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variety of purposes, rather than strictly for the investigation of 
serious crimes.  
The Bill should establish a gravity threshold so that retained 
metadata can be accessed and used only where it is necessary for 
investigating serious crimes; not minor or trivial offences.129 
6.181 The Muslim Legal Network (NSW) expressed the view that access to data 
should be restricted to investigations of terrorism related offences only: 
[W]e strongly believe that not only should the type of enforcement 
agencies that can access retained data be restricted, but the 
purpose of accessing the retained data should be limited to the 
investigations of terrorism related offences only. The overriding 
rationale of data retention, if it is to be accepted into Australian 
law, should be one of targeted surveillance and not mass 
surveillance. Mass surveillance is ineffective, disproportionate and 
a woefully inadequate response to the threat of terrorism.130 
6.182 In its submission the Attorney-General’s Department highlighted the 
importance of access to telecommunications data for all investigations, 
serious or otherwise: 
Telecommunications data is critical to the investigation of almost 
any criminal activity, serious or otherwise, and almost any activity 
prejudicial to security that has been facilitated, enabled or carried 
out via communications technology. For online investigations, 
telecommunications data is, in many cases, the primary form of 
information used by law enforcement agencies to identify, 
investigate, prevent and prosecute these serious crimes and threats 
to national security. It is used in almost all national security 
investigations conducted by the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO), including almost all counter-terrorism, 
espionage and intelligence investigations, and all cyber-security 
investigations. 
Telecommunications data can provide important leads for 
agencies, including evidence: 
 of connections and relationships between persons of interest 
 of suspects’ movements and behaviours 
 of events immediately before and after a crime, and 
 to exclude people from suspicion. 
Telecommunications data is also foundational information 
required as a necessary precondition to more intrusive 
129  Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 71, p. 10. 
130  Muslim Legal Network (NSW), Submission 198, p. 10. 
 
AUTHORITY TO ACCESS STORED COMMUNICATIONS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA 249 
 
investigative tools such as access to stored communications and 
telecommunications interception. Conversely, it is always 
desirable to rule innocent parties out from suspicion as early as 
possible, both to prevent any unnecessary intrusion on their 
privacy, and to ensure that scarce investigative resources are used 
efficiently. While all investigative techniques involve some degree 
of intrusion, the use of telecommunications data is one of the least 
privacy intrusive investigative tools available to agencies.131 
6.183 The Department noted restricting access to ‘serious crime’ would have ‘an 
unquantified impact on the investigation of crime types that agencies’ currently 
have the capabilities to investigate’.132 
6.184 The Department also explained its view that introduction of a threshold 
for access to telecommunications data based on the seriousness or gravity 
of an offence would be in contravention of the Cybercrime Convention: 
As a party to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 
Australia has international obligations to make access to 
telecommunications data available for the investigation of all 
criminal offences. Article 14(2) of the Cybercrime Convention 
requires parties to ensure that telecommunications data is 
available for the investigation of any criminal offence, not just 
serious offences. Accordingly, amendments that reduce the 
number of agencies that have access to telecommunications data 
based on the gravity of the conduct in question would contravene 
Australia’s obligations under the Convention. However, 
Australia’s obligations under the Cybercrime Convention do not 
preclude reducing the range of agencies that have access to data, 
because Australia’s obligations under the Cybercrime Convention 
relate only to the availability of telecommunications data for all 
offences, without specifying the range of agencies which must 
have access to such data.133 
6.185 At a public hearing the Australian Privacy Commissioner noted that in his 
submission he had proposed that the Bill be amended to limit the 
purposes for which telecommunications data can be used and disclosed to 
the investigation of serious crime and threats to national security. 
However, the Commissioner went on to revise his position, noting the 
Attorney-General’s Departments advice in respect of the application of the 
Cybercrime Convention: 
131 Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 5. 
132  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.2, p. 5. 
133  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 42. 
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[S]ince lodging that submission, I note that the Attorney-General's 
Department has suggested that to meet Australia's obligations 
under the Council of Europe's cybercrime convention access to 
telecommunications data cannot be limited in this way. If that is 
the case then I consider that further thought needs to be given to 
what additional safeguards might be put in place when access is 
for the purpose of the investigation of minor offences.134 
6.186 Subsequent to the hearing, the Commissioner provided a supplementary 
submission in which he set out a number of suggestions for additional 
safeguards that might be put in place. This included implementation of a 
warrant regime, or amending section 180F of the TIA Act to require an 
authorised officer to have regard to the seriousness of the offence and the 
likely impact on the community of the enforcement agency not being able 
to access telecommunications data for the investigation of that offence.135 
Committee comment 
6.187 The Committee has considered very carefully the views expressed that 
telecommunications access should be limited to sufficiently serious 
matters, such as serious contraventions of the law or serious national 
security issues. 
6.188 The Committee notes that the level of intrusion into privacy incurred by 
accessing telecommunications data will vary depending on the particular 
circumstances, including the nature and volume of the 
telecommunications data accessed. The Committee also notes the 
complexities in balancing the competing public interests of individual 
privacy with enforcement of the law and protection of national security.  
6.189 On balance, the Committee considers that the requirement in section 180F 
should be replaced with a more stringent requirement for the authorising 
officer to be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the particular disclosure 
or use of telecommunications data being proposed is proportionate to the 
intrusion into privacy.   
6.190 In making this decision, the authorising officer should have regard to a list 
of specified factors, including the gravity of the conduct being 
investigated, the reason why the disclosure is proposed to be authorised, 
and the likely relevance and usefulness of the information to the 
investigation.   
134 Mr Timothy Pilgrim, Australian Privacy Commissioner, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
29 January 2015, p. 47. 
135  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92.1, pp. 1-4. 
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6.191 A similar requirement should apply in respect of authorisations made by 
ASIO officers. The Committee notes that this could be achieved by 
appropriate amendments to the mandatory guidelines issued to ASIO by 
the Attorney-General. 
6.192 The Committee also considers that enhanced accountability and oversight 
in respect of agencies’ authorisation powers are necessary to provide 
reassurance to the Parliament and the community, and has addressed this 
further in Chapter 7. 
 
Recommendation 25 
 The Committee recommends that section 180F of the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 be replaced with 
a requirement that, before making an authorisation under Division 4 or 
4A of Part 4-1 of the Act, the authorised officer making the authorisation 
must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that any interference with the 
privacy of any person or persons that may result from the disclosure or 
use is justifiable and proportionate. 
In making this decision the authorised officer should be required to 
have regard to:  
 the gravity of the conduct being investigated, including 
whether the investigation relates to a serious criminal offence, 
the enforcement of a serious pecuniary penalty, the protection 
of the public revenue at a sufficiently serious level or the 
location of missing persons; 
 the reason why the disclosure is proposed to be authorised; and 
 the likely relevance and usefulness of the information or 
documents to the investigation. 
 
Protection of client legal privilege and journalist sources 
6.193 A number of submitters expressed significant concerns with agencies 
accessing privileged or otherwise sensitive telecommunications data. 
6.194 The Law Institute of Victoria raised concerns that the Bill lacks safeguards 
to protect confidential and privileged information: 
The Bill contains no safeguards to protect confidential and 
privileged information, such as communications subject to client 
legal privilege, health records and journalists’ sources. The lack of 
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such safeguards was one of the flaws highlighted by the CJEU in 
assessing the EU Data Retention Directive: 
… it does not provide for any exception, with the result that it applies even to 
persons whose communications are subject, according to rules of national law, 
to the obligation of professional secrecy. 
As illustrated above, telecommunications data is capable of 
revealing substantial information, and this could include 
information about communications between a lawyer and their 
client. For example, information exchanged by email or calls about 
potential witnesses between the lawyer and associates of the client, 
experts or other relevant parties, could disclose a defence case. A 
litigation strategy or case theory could be identified based on 
witnesses or experts contacted by the lawyer. 
The Bill should contain specific safeguards to prevent disclosure of 
potentially privileged and confidential information. This issue 
could be taken into account as part of the warrant process and 
may in appropriate circumstances give an individual an 
opportunity to challenge access on the basis of privilege. 
6.195 Mr Brian Ridgway noted his concern with the lack of an exception for 
professional privilege: 
The Bill makes no provision for the exception of professional 
privilege so that metadata associated with: 
 lawyers and their clients 
 doctors and their patients 
 journalists and their contacts 
 Members of Parliament and their correspondents 
will be able to be collected, accessed and analysed along with 
everything else.136 
6.196 The Law Council of Australia noted that: 
although telecommunications data alone may not reveal the 
content or substance of lawyer/client communications, it would, 
at the very least, be able to provide an indication of whether: 
 a lawyer has been contacted; 
 the identity and location of the lawyer; 
 the identity and location of witnesses; 
 the number of communications and type of communications 
between a lawyer and a client, witnesses and the duration of 
these communications.137 
136  Mr Brian Ridgway, Submission 20, p. 4. 
137  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 20. 
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6.197 The Council emphasised the fundamental importance of client legal 
privilege, and concluded that: 
where access to retained data is sought relating to a lawyer’s 
communications, it is essential that agencies seeking access 
demonstrate how privileged and confidential communications will 
be protected before a warrant can be issued and that sanctions for 
non-compliance be included.138 
6.198 The Council also expressed the view that the scheme’s application to other 
relationships whose communications are subject to the obligation of 
professional confidentiality regimes needs to be reconsidered, and made 
two recommendations in respect of privileged or sensitive data: 
 Where access to retained data is sought for persons with legal 
obligations of professional confidentiality, there should be a 
requirement for agencies seeking access to demonstrate how 
privileged and confidential communications will be protected 
before a warrant can be issued. 
 The TIA Act should include a legislative presumption that will 
ensure notice to lawyers and journalists in all but the most 
exceptional cases where access to retained telecommunications 
data is sought.139 
6.199 In response to concerns in respect of client legal privilege, the Attorney-
General’s Department noted that: 
At common law, legal professional privilege attaches to the 
content of privileged communications, not to the fact of the 
existence of a communication between a client and their lawyer 
(See: National Crime Authority v S [1991] FCA 234). This distinction 
is demonstrated in the routine practice of parties to proceedings 
filing affidavits of documents listing documents in their 
possession that are not being produced on the ground of privilege, 
thereby disclosing the fact of the existence of the document…140 
6.200 The Department further noted the statutory restrictions preventing the 
accessing of content under the telecommunications data access regimes, 
and concluded: 
As such, the data retention regime, and agencies’ powers to access 
telecommunications data more broadly, do not affect or authorise 
the disclosure of the content of any communication, including any 
privileged communication.141 
138  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 22. 
139  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 23. 
140  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 21. 
141  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 21. 
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6.201 The Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance (MEAA) expressed concerns, 
shared by a number of other submitters, that the proposed data retention 
regime would have a significant impact on the freedom of the media to 
perform its role: 
MEAA believes that any moves to increase the level of surveillance 
of journalists and their sources by intrusive means such as the data 
retention proposed in the Bill will harm the ability of journalists to 
scrutinise the powerful and hold them to account, to expose 
corruption, to champion and campaign for important issues, and 
to gain the trust of our audience and our sources.142 
6.202 MEAA went on to explain the reliance of journalists on confidential 
sources and their concern that the Bill threatens the confidentiality of 
those sources: 
Journalists rely on sources of information to carry out these duties. 
At times, those sources request anonymity – perhaps because they 
are in fear or could be subject to some form of violence, 
harassment or intimidation, particularly if they are a 
‘whistleblower’. 
The Bill threatens to expose the identity of sources and journalists 
as well as the communications between them and information 
they exchange. 
The Bill will undoubtedly undermine the crucial ethical obligation 
of journalists to protect the identity and information of 
confidential sources. 
This erosion of journalist privilege that is the consequence of the 
Bill will have a chilling effect on whistleblowers seeking to expose 
illegality, corruption or wrongdoing.143 
6.203 The MEAA noted that the majority of legal jurisdictions, including the 
Commonwealth, recognise the principle of journalist privilege, and 
recommended that the Bill not proceed, but if it does: 
that appropriate checks and balances be introduced to ensure that 
the national security laws cannot be used to impede, threaten, 
contain or curtail legitimate reporting of matters in the public 
interest and that journalists and their confidential sources are free 
to continue to interact and communicate without being subjected 
to surveillance that would undermine the principles of press 
freedom.144 
142  Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Submission 90, p. 3. 
143  Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Submission 90, p. 3. 
144  Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, Submission 90, pp. 9-10. 
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6.204 In response to suggestions that special status be afforded to the 
telecommunications data of journalists, the Attorney-General’s 
Department noted the importance for the powers to apply generally and 
that legitimate whistleblowers would be protected by public interest 
disclosure legislation: 
Disclosures of data are available to support the enforcement of the 
criminal law, administration of pecuniary penalties and the 
protection of the public revenue. It is not appropriate to afford a 
special status to particular types of communications as powers of 
this type should, by their nature, be applied generally. However, 
to the extent that concerns relate to the disclosure of the identity of 
legitimate whistle-blowers, it is important to note that such 
persons have specific protection under the Public 
Interest Disclosures Act 2013 (PID Act). The effect of those 
protections is that disclosures by legitimate whistle-blowers are 
not criminal acts. Accordingly, telecommunications data would 
not be available by reason of the disclosure.145 
6.205 A submission by joint media organisations noted a recent report by 
Human Rights Watch in respect of the United States that large-scale 
surveillance makes it difficult for journalists to communicate with sources 
securely. The submission noted: 
The cumulative impact of these matters is a chilling effect on news 
gathering through increasing the perceived risks to sources 
including whistleblowers – in an environment which has also 
heightened the risk to news gathering by criminalising some 
reportage and not providing adequate protections for some 
categories of whistleblowers.146 
6.206 Private Media raised similar concerns in its submission, noting the 
importance of the media as a watchdog, and the critical importance of 
protecting confidential sources: 
Whistleblowers and confidential sources are fundamental to this 
media role. Without individuals who are prepared to reveal 
wrongdoing and provide transparency, the media is unable to 
perform this role and powerful interests can operate with less 
accountability. For such individuals, anonymity and 
confidentiality are crucial … It is thus critical that the media is able 
to offer confidential sources protection – and this is already 
145  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, pp. 21-22. 
146  Joint media organisations, Submission 125, p. 3. 
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recognised in federal legislation such as the Evidence Amendment 
(Journalists Privilege) Act 2010. 
However, a data retention scheme of the kind proposed in the Bill 
will make it significantly easier for powerful interests -- whether 
governments, well-resourced individuals or corporations – to 
pursue, harass, prosecute and intimidate whistleblowers who 
contact media outlets, because information relating to who has 
contacted journalists via any form of electronic communication 
will be stored for two years …147 
6.207 Private Media referred in its submission to upcoming changes in the 
United Kingdom, and suggested similar arrangements should be 
introduced in Australia: 
The UK government, which last year introduced its own version of 
data retention, has acknowledged that police misuse of powers to 
access metadata had been ‘entirely inappropriate’ and will change 
the UK’s data access laws to require police to obtain a warrant if 
they want to obtain a journalists’ metadata, with a presumption 
that access would not be granted if the journalist was acting in the 
public interest.148 
6.208 On this issue the Attorney-General’s Department provided the following 
evidence in their submission: 
On 9 December 2014, the UK Home Office published a draft Code 
of Practice discussion paper on access to data. This issue of access 
to journalists’ telecommunication during the investigation of 
crimes had been raised as an issue by that profession. The draft 
code of practice makes clear that communications data is not 
subject to any form of professional privilege. However, the Code 
notes that access to data relating to some professions may have a 
higher degree of privacy interference (the draft code specifies 
doctors, lawyers, journalists, MPs and ministers of religion). 
Some media reports had suggested that the UK Government was 
considering requiring law enforcement agencies to obtain 
warrants to access journalists’ data. Rather than warrants, the 
Home Office proposes that authorising officers should give special 
consideration to necessity and proportionality when considering 
authorising the disclosure of data relating to the particular 
professions noted above.149 
147  Private Media, Submission 77, p. 2. 
148  Private Media, Submission 77, p. 2. 
149  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 22. 
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6.209 The supplementary submission from joint media organisations 
emphasised the concern of those organisations that the collection and 
storage of metadata could be accessed to identify journalists’ sources, 
making it less likely that sources will share information and consequently 
have a chilling effect on reporting in the public interest.  The submission 
proposed a tiered range of amendments to address this concern which can 
be summarised (in descending order of preference) as follows: 
 media exemption from all three tranches of national security legislation; 
 media exemption for the Bill; 
 requirement for a warrant to access metadata of journalists and their 
sources; 
 persons empowered to authorise requests to access data must be 
limited to the most senior officials of an agency, and the threshold for 
access must be more objective.150 
Committee comment 
6.210 The Committee recognises that certain telecommunications data has the 
potential to possess an additional level of sensitivity because of the nature 
of the relationship of those communicating, including client legal privilege 
that applies to certain communications between lawyers and their clients, 
and journalist relationships with confidential sources. 
6.211 In the context of client legal privilege the Committee notes the evidence 
from the Attorney-General’s Department that privilege attaches to the 
content of the communications, and that access to telecommunications 
data will not include any such content.  
6.212 The Committee acknowledges the evidence from the Law Council of 
Australia that telecommunications data can nonetheless reveal a range of 
information about the communications between a lawyer and client from 
which certain inferences may be able to be made. 
6.213 However, the Committee does not consider, on the evidence available, 
that there is a need for additional legislative protection in respect of 
accessing telecommunications data that may relate to a lawyer.   
6.214 In the context of journalists and their sources, the Committee notes the 
capacity for telecommunications data to be used to identify confidential 
sources. The Committee acknowledges the claims that this may have a 
‘chilling impact’, although the Committee also notes that in some 
circumstances, such as the investigation of serious crimes, it may be 
150 Joint media organisations, Submission 125.1, pp. 1-3. 
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appropriate and proper for journalists to be investigated by law 
enforcement agencies. 
6.215 The Committee acknowledges the importance of recognising the principle 
of press freedom and the protection of journalists’ sources. The Committee 
considers this matter requires further consideration before a final 
recommendation can be made. 
6.216 In the absence of pre-access oversight by an independent body, the 
Committee also considers it reasonable to require the Ombudsman or 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), as appropriate, to be 
notified of the making of an authorisation which is for the purpose of 
determining the identity of a journalist’s sources. 
 
Recommendation 26 
 The Committee acknowledges the importance of recognising the 
principle of press freedom and the protection of journalists’ sources. 
The Committee considers this matter requires further consideration 
before a final recommendation can be made.  
The Committee therefore recommends that the question of how to deal 
with the authorisation of a disclosure or use of telecommunications data 
for the purpose of determining the identity of a journalist’s source be 
the subject of a separate review by this Committee. 
The Committee would report back to Parliament within three months.  
In undertaking this inquiry, the Committee intends to conduct 
consultations with media representatives, law enforcement and security 
agencies and the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. 
The review will also consider international best practice, including data 
retention regulation in the United Kingdom. 
 
AUTHORITY TO ACCESS STORED COMMUNICATIONS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA 259 
 
Recommendation 27 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Act 1979 be amended to require agencies to provide a copy 
to the Commonwealth Ombudsman (or Inspector General of 
Intelligence and Security (IGIS) in the case of ASIO) of each 
authorisation that authorises disclosure of information or documents 
under Chapter 4 of the Act for the purpose of determining the identity 
of a journalist’s sources. 
The Committee further recommends that the IGIS or Commonwealth 
Ombudsman be required to notify this Committee of each instance in 
which such an authorisation is made in relation to ASIO and the AFP as 
soon as practicable after receiving advice of the authorisation and be 
required to brief the Committee accordingly. 
Destruction of accessed telecommunications data 
6.217 The TIA Act does not currently contain any requirements in in respect of 
destruction of telecommunications data accessed by enforcement agencies 
or ASIO. The Law Council of Australia identified in its submission this 
lack of destruction requirements in respect of accessed data, and 
supported the inclusion of such a requirement: 
Chapter 4 of the TIA Act does not require enforcement agencies to 
destroy in a timely manner telecommunications data containing 
personal information which is irrelevant to the agency or no 
longer needed. 
The Law Council strongly supports the inclusion of provisions 
which establish positive obligations of this kind.151 
6.218 The Law Institute of Victoria similarly queried what requirements will be 
put in place to ensure the timely destruction of retained data by agencies 
after the purpose for which the data was requested has been satisfied.152 
6.219 At a public hearing, the IGIS noted the lack of a legislative requirement for 
ASIO to delete telecommunications data that is no longer needed: 
My second point is about what happens to data once it has been 
lawfully obtained by ASIO. This is an issue that is actually broader 
than telecommunications data, but it is highlighted by the increase 
in the volume of data that would be available under the proposed 
scheme. There are certainly good reasons ASIO may need to keep 
151 Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 25. 
152 Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 117, p. 5. 
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some data for a long time. But there is other data that, although it 
is obtained lawfully, turns out not to be relevant to security or is 
no longer relevant to security after a period of time. The balance 
between security and privacy, in my view, requires that this 
information should not be retained indefinitely, and I think that 
the general public would expect that material found not to be 
relevant to security would be deleted after a period of time. 
There are currently provisions that allow for the destruction of 
data by ASIO, but at the moment there seems to be little or no 
legislative requirement for ASIO to delete telecommunications 
data or other material that is no longer needed. In 2010 my 
predecessor looked at the retention of data by ASIO and suggested 
that ASIO should modify its policies and practices. The agreement 
between ASIO and the National Archives of Australia was 
reviewed in 2012, and the subject of the retention and destruction 
of data by ASIO is a focus for my office this year. While this 
project is ongoing, I do think this matter could also usefully be 
examined as part of the review of the Attorney-General's 
guidelines previously proposed by this committee and agreed to 
by government.153 
6.220 When asked by the Committee whether there should be a compulsion for 
the agency, when it is finished with the data and it is not of any use in 
terms of legal purposes, to destroy the data, the IGIS stated: 
I can understand that there would be an impost in terms of 
resources to assess that at a certain point in time. However, I think 
that needs to be balanced against what I would consider to be the 
general public expectation that, if matter is found to be not 
relevant to security or no longer relevant to security, it should be 
deleted. I am not sure that balance is correct at the moment.154 
6.221 The IGIS was also asked by the Committee to comment on whether there 
could be elements of the information that ASIO holds, such as pattern of 
life analysis, that they retain to see where investigations might take those 
patterns into the future. Dr Thom stated: 
153 Dr Vivienne Thom, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 37. 
154 Dr Vivienne Thom, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 40. 
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Absolutely. There is a large amount of information that would 
have to be retained forever according to the guidelines, and I have 
no concerns about that at all.155 
6.222 In response to a question on this issue from the Committee on whether the 
Bill should contain a mandatory destruction component, Professor George 
Williams gave his opinion that such a regime would be appropriate: 
I think that would allay community concerns that their private 
information may be sought, perhaps legitimately, but then held for 
an extremely long period of time—well past the nature of the 
investigation—and perhaps looked at again sometime down the 
track in less appropriate circumstances. I think the community 
concern about what some see as a blanket surveillance regime is 
that the onus is on parliament to make sure a scheme is designed 
that is very well tailored to the problem. And there is a problem 
that needs to be met here. We need a bill that removes many of the 
quite significant loose ends, that being one of them, that as yet 
have not been adequately dealt with.156 
Committee comment 
6.223 The Committee acknowledges the importance of ensuring that agencies 
are subject to appropriate obligations in respect of the retention and 
destruction of telecommunications data. In this respect the Committee 
notes the application of the various federal and state privacy and archives 
obligations, as well as agency specific legislation. 
6.224 The Committee considers it has not received sufficient evidence to form a 
conclusion as to whether there is a need for a discrete obligation for 
destruction of telecommunications data to be inserted into the TIA Act, 
and if so, what form that requirement should take. 
6.225 In respect of ASIO, the Committee notes that the agreement between ASIO 
and the National Archives was reviewed in 2012 and notes that the 
retention and destruction of data by ASIO is to be a focus for the IGIS this 
year. The Committee welcomes these ongoing discussions between the 
IGIS and ASIO in respect of destruction of information, and the planned 
review of the Attorney-General’s Guidelines later this year. 
  
155 Dr Vivienne Thom, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 40. 
156  Professor George Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 7. 
 
262  
 
Recommendation 28 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
oversee a review of the adequacy of the existing destruction 
requirements that apply to documents or information disclosed 
pursuant to an authorisation made under Chapter 4 of the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and held by 
enforcement agencies and ASIO.  
The Committee further recommends that the Attorney-General report to 
Parliament on the findings of the review by 1 July 2017. 
 
 
 7 
Safeguards and oversight 
Introduction 
7.1 The Committee accepts the need for a mandatory data retention scheme, 
and notes it is of critical importance that any such regime includes 
appropriate safeguards to ensure accountability and protect the privacy of 
individuals. 
7.2 Strengthening safeguards and privacy in line with community 
expectations was one of the objectives of the Attorney-General’s 
Department’s 2012 discussion paper, Equipping Australia against emerging 
and evolving threats, which formed the basis for this Committee’s 2012-2013 
inquiry into reforms to national security legislation. 
7.3 On the basis of the discussion paper, the Committee examined matters 
relating to privacy protection and oversight arrangements during that 
inquiry. Some of the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations are 
reflected in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (the Bill). 
7.4 In this chapter, the Committee examines specific safeguards and oversight 
mechanisms set out in the Bill. In particular, the role of the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman is significantly expanded, with the 
Ombudsman empowered to inspect, inquire into and report on the issuing 
of preservation notices and agencies’ access to stored communications and 
telecommunications data.  
7.5 The chapter also examines matters raised in evidence that are outside the 
scope of the Bill, but which were addressed by the Committee in the 
previous inquiry, including a mandatory data breach notification scheme. 
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Commonwealth Ombudsman 
7.6 This section sets out the elevated role of the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
and the enhanced safeguards and oversight arrangement that will apply in 
relation to Chapters 3 and 4 of the TIA Act.  
7.7 In its 2013 report, the Committee noted the limitations of the existing 
regime and broad support expressed by submitters for a revised oversight 
arrangement. The Committee recommended that a review of the oversight 
arrangements under the TIA Act be undertaken by the Attorney-General’s 
Department and, in relation to any mandatory data retention legislation, 
that it include inter alia: 
oversight of agencies’ access to telecommunications data by the 
ombudsman and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security.1 
7.8 Some of the identified limitations of the existing arrangement include: 
 no oversight regime for Commonwealth, State and Territory 
enforcement agencies accessing telecommunications data, 
 the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s role in relation to preservation 
notices and access to stored communications is limited to monitoring 
compliance by agencies with their record destruction and record-
keeping obligations, and 
 no public reporting obligation.2 
7.9 The Committee notes that the regime proposed in the Bill was developed 
in consultation with the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s office.3 
7.10 According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the proposed provisions in 
Schedule 3, including powers, scope and reporting obligations: 
are intended to enable the Ombudsman to provide public 
assurance and to enhance levels of transparency and public 
accountability.4 
1  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), Report of the Inquiry into 
Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, Canberra, May 2013, pp. 19-22, 192. 
2  Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 74, p. 2. 
3  Ms Katherine Jones, Deputy Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 3. 
4  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 [Data 
Retention Bill], Explanatory Memorandum, p. 81. 
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Overview of provisions 
7.11 The Bill amends the TIA Act to establish a record-keeping, inspection and 
oversight regime relating to: 
 the issue of preservation notices by criminal law-enforcement 
agencies, 
 the access to, and dealing with, stored communications by 
criminal law-enforcement agencies, and  
 the access to, and dealing with, telecommunications data by 
criminal law-enforcement agencies and enforcement agencies.5 
7.12 In evidence to the Committee, the Commonwealth Ombudsman noted 
that while the Bill expands the Ombudsman’s role in relation to Chapters 
3 and 4, it will not affect his role in relation to Chapter 2 of the TIA Act, 
which remains limited to assessing compliance with destruction and 
record keeping requirements.6 
7.13 The proposed amendments will require Commonwealth, State and 
Territory enforcement agencies to keep prescribed information and 
documents necessary to demonstrate that they have exercised their 
powers under Chapters 3 and 4 in accordance with their obligations under 
the TIA Act. Proposed sections 151 and 186J list the information or records 
that must be retained in some detail. The Explanatory Memorandum 
explains that: 
the specificity of the oversight provisions is intended to provide 
sufficient clarity to enable agencies to be properly versed as to 
what the Ombudsman would require to be kept and made 
available at inspections.7 
7.14 An agency must retain the relevant documents for a period of three years 
or until the Ombudsman reports to the Minister under section 186J.  
7.15 A proposed new Division 1 will replace existing Divisions 1 and 2 of Part 
3-5 of the TIA Act and a new Chapter 4A will set out the Ombudsman’s 
role and powers. Proposed section 186B will require the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman to inspect the records of an enforcement agency. In doing so, 
the Ombudsman’s powers will include: 
5  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 80. 
6  Mr Colin Neave, Commonwealth Ombudsman, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, 
p. 42. 
7  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 80. 
 
266  
 
 full and free access to all records of the agency relevant to the 
inspection, including the power to take copies of or extracts from 
records, 
 access to premises, and 
 requiring staff of an agency to give the Ombudsman any information in 
the staff member’s possession or that they have access to that is relevant 
to the inspection. 
7.16 The Ombudsman also has the power to obtain information either in 
writing or by requiring an officer to answer questions, and there are 
penalties for failure to comply. Further, a person cannot be excused on the 
basis that they might incriminate themselves or make themselves liable to 
a penalty. 
7.17 The Ombudsman must report to the Minister at the end of each financial 
year and must present his or her report to the Parliament. 
7.18 The proposed regime is similar to that contained in Part 6 of the 
Surveillance Devices Act 2004. 
7.19 The Explanatory Memorandum states: 
Tailored oversight provisions in relation to the use by agencies of 
preservation notices and their access to and dealing with stored 
communications are important inclusions in the Bill because:  
 the use of preservation notices by criminal law-enforcement 
agencies potentially impacts on individual privacy, in that 
agencies can use such notices to ensure that carriers and 
carriage service providers preserve the private stored 
communications of persons where the agency intends to later 
apply to for a stored communications warrant to access those 
communications in connection with the investigation of a 
serious contravention, and 
 the access to and dealing with stored communications by 
criminal law-enforcement agencies also potentially impacts on 
individual privacy. As such, it is important that access to, and 
dealing with, such communications occurs only as permitted 
under the TIA Act.8 
Matters raised in evidence 
7.20 The Commonwealth Ombudsman, Mr Colin Neave, commented on the 
proposed regime, advising the Committee that: 
8  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 85. 
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Overall, we support the proposed provisions regarding the 
expanded and additional oversight functions for the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, under Chapters 3 and 4 of the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, regarding the 
preservation and access to stored communications and access to 
telecommunications data. The proposed emphasis of the 
inspection roles and reporting requirements align with the work 
that we presently do in the office. The minister to whom we 
report—and this is a provision we support—must also table in 
parliament my report on the results of our inspections, thus 
making it publicly available.9 
7.21 Mr Neave went on to state that: 
we are satisfied that the design of the oversight functions 
proposed by the bill are sufficient for my office to provide the 
expected level of assurance that agencies are meeting their 
obligations in complying with powers under Chapters 3 and 4 of 
the act.10 
7.22 Finally, Mr Neave emphasised to the Committee that his office has ‘the 
necessary expertise and experience to perform the functions.’11 
7.23 However, while the Ombudsman’s office has the requisite expertise and 
experience, Mr Neave also told the Committee that it does not have the 
resources necessary to perform this additional role. Mr Neave explained 
that: 
Over the past 10 years the Ombudsman’s presence in the area of 
overseeing agencies’ use of covert, coercive and intrusive powers 
has grown significantly. We no longer just investigate matters of 
administration on complaint or on our own motion of action taken 
by the majority of Australian government agencies. The role of 
providing public assurance that agencies are using their intrusive 
powers as parliament intended is a key function of the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman. This oversight is extremely 
important, for, unlike the matters about which my office receives 
complaints, the public would not—and in most cases should not—
9  Mr Colin Neave, Commonwealth Ombudsman, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, 
p. 42. 
10  Mr Colin Neave, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 42. 
11  Mr Colin Neave, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 42. See also, 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 74, p. 1. 
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have knowledge of agencies undertaking these covert and 
intrusive activities. 
Under nine different regimes authorising these types of powers, 
during a financial year my office currently oversees approximately 
20 Commonwealth, state and territory enforcement agencies; 
conducts 60 inspections and reviews; generates approximately 100 
reports on the result of these inspections; and regularly reports to 
parliament on the results of our oversight activities. However, I 
am concerned that this bill is proposing expanded and new 
oversight functions in an environment where my office continues 
to have oversight functions without any additional resources. Just 
lately, we were empowered with an oversight role in relation to 
preservation notices under Chapter 3 of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 and the delayed notification 
search warrants under Part IAAA of the Crimes Act 1914, as well 
as the role of Norfolk Island ombudsmen. All the additional 
important functions were prescribed without any funding to my 
office. 
The oversight function being proposed under Chapter 4 will 
significantly increase our inspection workload. If my office 
continues to be the prescribed statutory oversight function 
authority without funding, this will reduce the level of assurance 
that we can provide in overseeing covert and intrusive powers. 
Furthermore, this pressure reduces my office’s ability to provide 
effective oversight of other extraordinary powers of law 
enforcement where we do not have a statutory inspections role.  
… 
I should also say in relation to resources that our strong preference 
is for the Ombudsman’s office to be directly funded for the 
oversight role. If the bill is passed, there should be a budget 
mechanism for my office to receive departmental appropriations 
directly and not through other departments.12 
7.24 Participants in the inquiry generally supported the expanded role for the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman.13 Mr Matthew Lobb of Vodafone 
commented in relation to the Ombudsman’s role: 
12  Mr Colin Neave, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, pp. 42-43. 
13  Mr James Shaw, Director, Government Relations, Telstra, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
29 January 2015, p. 13; Mr Michael Griffin AM, Commissioner, Australian Commission for 
Law Enforcement Integrity, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 34; Mr Matthew 
Lobb, General Manager, Industry Strategy and Public  Policy, Vodafone, Committee Hansard, 
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Undoubtedly, there are our obligations—privacy obligations and 
data retention obligations—and the Privacy Commissioner can 
play that role. But it not must not be overlooked that we see the 
role of the Ombudsman as ensuring that the law enforcement 
agencies’ activities are consistent with the legislation; and we think 
it is important that the Ombudsman play a role in telling the 
public that they can trust what the law enforcement agencies are 
doing. I think that is a very important role, particularly as we 
expand that function.14 
7.25 The Privacy Impact Assessment prepared by the Australian Government 
Solicitor described the Ombudsman’s expanded role as ‘privacy 
enhancing’ as it will provide a mechanism to identify specific instances of 
non-compliance as well as any general agency practices which may create 
a risk of non-compliance.15 
7.26 Other submitters recognised the need for additional funding. For example, 
in their joint submission, Dr John Selby, Professor Vijay Varadharajan and 
Dr Yvette Blount stated: 
the Bill does not include specific provisions for additional funding 
for the Commonwealth Ombudsman so as to be able to adequately 
resource its new oversight task. Oversight without sufficient 
resources provides only the illusion of scrutiny, rather than the 
actual scrutiny necessary to determine whether the intrusive 
powers being granted to government agencies by this legislation 
are being used in a limited, proper manner, and not being 
abused.16 
7.27 Similarly, the councils of civil liberties across Australia stated: 
The Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Office is not well resourced. 
This is a significant and important new role. It is obviously 
Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 60; Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, 
Submission 48, p. 8; Uniting Church Justice and International Mission Unit, Submission 76, p. 10; 
Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia, Submission 100, p. 2; Australian 
Communications Consumer Action Network, Submission 120, p. 11; Mr Scott Millwood, 
Submission 121, p. 14; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, p. 3; Guardian Australia, 
Submission 132, p. 12; Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 28. 
14  Mr Matthew Lobb, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 67. 
15  Australian Government Solicitor, Privacy Impact Assessment: Proposed amendments to the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, 15 December 2014, p. 24 (appended to 
Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27). 
16  Dr John Selby, Professor Vijay Varadharajan and Dr Yvette Blount, Submission 114, p. 8. 
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important that the Government provides additional resources to 
the Ombudsman to allow this role to be implemented effectively.17 
7.28 In contrast to others, the Muslim Legal Network (NSW) argued that 
oversight by the Commonwealth Ombudsman was inadequate and will 
not provide accountability and transparency.18  
7.29 While generally supporting the Ombudsman’s role, the councils of civil 
liberties across Australia drew attention to Australia’s obligations under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
[T}he Government should provide for effective oversight which 
will ensure accountability for arbitrary or unlawful interference by 
enforcement agencies with the right to privacy as required by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 33 
Moreover, the ICCPR states that parties must ensure victims of 
violations of the Covenant have an effective remedy.19 
7.30 The councils went on to argue: 
The Ombudsman’s oversight role will neither provide for effective 
oversight nor provide any remedy or sanction for unlawful access. 
Under the provisions in Schedule 3, unlawful conduct on the part 
of enforcement agencies in accessing telecommunications data 
may never come to light, because the Ombudsman is not required 
to report on any contravention of the TIA Act. Moreover, there is 
no requirement to inform a person whose telecommunications 
data had been accessed. In fact, to do so would be an offence 
punishable by 2 years imprisonment pursuant to s181B of the TIA 
Act.  
In the circumstances, unlawful access to telecommunications data 
will likely go unknown and even if the Ombudsman reports on 
such conduct, there is no provision for any sanction.20 
7.31 The Law Council of Australia also expressed concern that there is no 
provision for oversight of the manner in which investigations are 
conducted.21 
17  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 129, p. 15. See also Guardian Australia, 
Submission 132, p. 18; Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 28. 
18  Muslim Legal Network (NSW), Submission 198, p. 8. 
19  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 129, p. 14. 
20  Councils for civil liberties across Australia, Submission 129, pp. 14-15. 
21  Mr Peter Leonard, Chairperson, Media and Communications Committee, Law Council of 
Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 32. 
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7.32 In evidence to the Committee, the Australian Privacy Commissioner 
suggested that oversight of agencies’ compliance with Chapter 4 would 
more effectively sit with his office rather than the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman. His reasons for this suggestion were as follows: 
 combining oversight responsibilities would enable the Commissioner to 
monitor the handling of telecommunications data ‘throughout its 
lifecycle – that is, from collection to disclosure to destruction’, 
 it would provide a holistic approach to oversight of the scheme, 
improve transparency and ensure administrative simplicity, 
 the Commissioner has the expertise required to understand and 
address the privacy impacts that may arise from the handling of the 
large volume of personal information that would be available to 
enforcement agencies if the Bill is passed, and 
 the Commissioner has existing processes and procedures necessary for 
assessing enforcement agencies’ compliance with Chapter 4 of the TIA 
Act.22 
Committee comment 
7.33 The Committee supports the substantially expanded role for the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman outlined in the Bill. The Committee 
considers that the elevated position of the Commonwealth Ombudsman is 
an essential safeguard that will provide significant reassurance to the 
Parliament and the community. 
7.34 The Committee notes that the proposed regime was developed in 
consultation with the Ombudsman and that he considers his office has the 
necessary expertise and experience to fulfil this function. 
7.35 The Committee has significant concerns however about the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s statements about the lack of resources 
available to his office to fulfil this oversight function. The Committee 
agrees with the Ombudsman that, without appropriate resources, the level 
of assurance that can be provided by the Ombudsman’s office will be 
reduced. 
7.36 The Committee considers that the Government should provide additional 
financial resources for the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman in 
line with the Ombudsman’s increased oversight responsibilities. 
22  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 34. 
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Recommendation 29 
 The Committee recommends that the Government consider the 
additional oversight responsibilities of the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman set out in the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 and ensure that the 
Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman is provided with additional 
financial resources to undertake its enhanced oversight responsibilities. 
7.37 While the Committee notes the concerns of some participants regarding 
the Ombudsman’s role, the Committee considers that it is the appropriate 
body to undertaken oversight of Chapters 3 and 4 of the TIA Act. The 
Committee considers that the effectiveness of this safeguard mechanism is 
a matter that should be considered when this Committee undertakes its 
legislated review of the mandatory data retention scheme. 
7.38 The Committee also notes the view of the Australian Privacy 
Commissioner about oversight of Chapter 4 of the TIA Act. However the 
Committee did not receive sufficient evidence on this matter to conclude 
that the proposed oversight arrangement, as outlined in the Bill, should be 
amended. 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 
7.39 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) currently 
oversights and reports on access to telecommunications data by the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), under the Inspector-
General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986. 
7.40 ASIO is the only Australian intelligence agency falling within the 
oversight remit of the IGIS that has the authority under the TIA Act to 
request telecommunications data from carriers.23 
7.41 In her submission, the IGIS explained her office’s oversight: 
OIGIS staff regularly examine ASIO telecommunications data 
authorisations as part of the regular program of inspection of 
ASIO inquiries and investigations. During these inspections, 
OIGIS staff review the records of a selected sample of cases. The 
23  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission 131, p. 4. 
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inspection team looks at records associated with activities that 
form part of the ASIO inquiry or investigation. This includes 
telecommunications data authorisations (historical and 
prospective), warrants, and any other activities that form part of 
the inquiry or investigation. 
In relation to telecommunications data authorisations, the 
inspections examine: 
 whether the authorisation was approved at the appropriate 
level, noting that approval for prospective data authorisations 
must be at a higher level than historical data authorisations 
 whether the collection of that information is related to ASIO’s 
functions 
 whether there was compliance with the Attorney-General’s 
Guidelines, in particular whether the activity was proportionate 
to the gravity of the threat, and whether there was sufficient 
justification for not using less intrusive methods to obtain the 
data.24 
7.42 The Bill does not propose any changes to the IGIS’s oversight role as 
outlined. 
7.43 In her submission, the IGIS indicated that ASIO has demonstrated a 
consistently high level of compliance with the organisation’s obligations.25 
7.44 The Committee sought the IGIS’s views on a recommendation by the Law 
Council of Australia that: 
ASIO’s record keeping procedures in relation to preservation 
notices, stored communications and telecommunications data, 
should be brought into line with other enforcement agencies under 
proposed sections 151 and 186A of the TIA Act; and 
IGIS should be required to inspect those records annually in 
similar terms to proposed subsection 186B(1) of the TIA Act.26 
7.45 In response, the IGIS told the Committee: 
Based on my experience, I do not see the need for such an 
amendment in that ASIO records are comprehensive anyway and 
we have full access to ASIO records. Although we are not required 
in my legislation to conduct particular inspections, we have 
hitherto seen ASIO powers as intrusive and always conducted 
24  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission 131, pp. 4-5. 
25  Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Submission 131, p. 5. 
26  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 29. 
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those inspections. For a small office, I think we do need to have the 
flexibility to adjust our resources according to what we consider to 
be most sensitive at any particular time. Having said that, we 
would never ignore the use of these powers by ASIO. We would 
always conduct inspections. In my view, the current system is 
working perfectly well and I do not see the need to have more 
prescriptive legislation for our oversight.27 
Committee comment 
7.46 As noted above, the Bill does not propose any changes to current 
arrangements for the oversight of ASIO by the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security. The Committee notes the IGIS’ comments 
concerning the adequacy of this regime and the organisation’s high level 
of compliance with its obligations.  
Review by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security  
7.47 Recommendation 43 of the Committee’s 2013 report recommended, in 
relation to a mandatory data retention regime, that ‘the effectiveness of the 
regime be reviewed by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence 
and Security three years after its commencement’.28 
7.48 Proposed section 187N of the Bill provides that the Committee: 
must review the operation of [Part One] as soon as practicable 
after the third anniversary of the end of the implementation phase 
for this Part … [and] give the Minister a written report of the 
review.  
7.49 Therefore, in practical terms, the review would not commence until five 
years after the Bill receives royal assent. 
7.50 The Explanatory Memorandum justifies this timeframe as follows: 
The data retention scheme will not be fully functional until at least 
two years after its commencement as industry begins to collect and 
retain the required data in accordance with the implementation 
27  Dr Vivienne Thom, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 41. 
28  PJCIS, Report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, 
Canberra, May 2013, p. 193. 
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arrangements. In addition, investigations and prosecutions span 
many years, and they provide the most effective barometer 
through which the data retention scheme is best empirically 
assessed. Review three years after the conclusion of the 
implementation phase will provide both practical industry 
experience and a sound evidence base for considering the 
operation of the scheme.29 
7.51 In terms of the scope of the review, the Australian Privacy Commissioner 
advocated that: 
Given the scope and the privacy impact of the proposed data 
retention scheme is determined, to a large extent, by the 
regulations … the review should include detailed consideration of: 
 the types of services prescribed by the regulations, and 
 whether … the types of telecommunications data prescribed by 
the regulations is the minimum amount of personal information 
necessary to meet the needs of enforcement and security 
agencies.30 
7.52 The Commissioner also considered that the review should require the 
collection of further quantitative evidence about the necessity of the 
scheme, including the age of telecommunications data used in 
investigations or serious offences and national security threats.31 
7.53 Some participants advocated for the inclusion of a sunset clause in the Bill. 
The Australian Privacy Commissioner considered that a sunset clause for 
expiry of the scheme five years after the implementation period would: 
provide industry, law enforcement and security agencies and the 
public with assurance that the Parliament will consider the 
effectiveness of the scheme and any oversight measures within a 
definite timeframe. Further, it will also provide those stakeholders 
with assurance that they will have further opportunity to 
comment on the necessity and proportionality of any data 
retention scheme that is implemented.32 
7.54 In its submission, Guardian Australia also supported a sunset provision in 
the Bill. Guardian Australia argued that the scheme should also be 
reviewed by the PJCIS after two years, stating ‘[b]y 2017, the results of the 
29  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 18. 
30  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 37. 
31  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 38. 
32  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, pp. 37-38. 
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2016 UK review of its similar scheme should be available to inform the 
Committee’s work’.33 
7.55 Other submitters advocated for an annual review by the Committee.34 
Committee comment 
7.56 The Committee notes the rationale that has been presented for a longer 
period prior to review of the mandatory data retention scheme by this 
Committee. The Committee agrees with the importance of having a sound 
evidence base that draws on practical experience to inform its 
considerations.  
7.57 On balance, the Committee considers that two years after the 
implementation period of the regime provides an appropriate timeframe 
to adequately review its operation. The Committee considers it is desirable 
that a report be presented to the Parliament within three years of the end 
of this implementation period.  
 
Recommendation 30 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to 
require the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security 
to commence its review no later than the second anniversary of the end 
of the implementation period. 
The Committee considers it is desirable that a report on the review be 
presented to the Parliament no later than three years after the end of the 
implementation period. 
7.58 Further, Committee considers that there are a number of matters that 
should be included in the terms of reference for that review. In particular, 
the Committee advises that the scope of the review should include: 
 the effectiveness of the scheme, 
 the appropriateness of the dataset and retention period, 
 costs, 
33  Guardian Australia, Submission 132, p. 9. 
34  Muslim Legal Network (NSW), Submission 198, p. 9; Pirate Party Australia, Submission 124, 
p. 11. 
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 any potential improvements to oversight, 
 regulations and determinations made, 
 the number of data breaches, and  
 the number of complaints about the scheme to relevant bodies. 
7.59 The effectiveness of that review will require statistical data on many of the 
matters listed above. However, during the course of this inquiry, the 
Committee was informed on numerous occasions that the data it sought 
was not collected. The Committee considers that, to facilitate an effective 
future review, it is essential that appropriate statistical data be retained by 
agencies. 
7.60 The Committee notes that records of data access requests must be kept for 
three years or until the Ombudsman has made a report about those 
records. To assist its review, the Committee recommends that agencies be 
required to retain records for the period from commencement of the 
regime until the Committee’s review is concluded.  
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Recommendation 31 
 At the time of the review required to be undertaken by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security under 
proposed section 187N of the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014, the Committee 
recommends that the Attorney-General request the Committee to 
examine the following issues: 
 the effectiveness of the scheme, 
 the appropriateness of the dataset and retention period, 
 costs, 
 any potential improvements to oversight, 
 regulations and determinations made, 
 the number of complaints about the scheme to relevant bodies, 
and 
 any other appropriate matters. 
To facilitate the review, the Committee recommends that agencies be 
required to collect and retain relevant statistical information to assist the 
Committee’s consideration of the above matters. The Committee also 
recommends that all records of data access requests be retained for the 
period from commencement until the review is concluded. 
Finally the Committee recommends that, to the maximum extent 
possible, the review be conducted in public. 
7.61 With regard to the proposed sunset clause, the Committee acknowledges 
the comments of the Australian Privacy Commissioner concerning the 
opportunity for further input from stakeholders. The Committee considers 
however that the matters identified by the Commissioner can be 
considered during the Committee’s mandated review.  
7.62 In this instance, the Committee concurs with the views of Professor 
George Williams of the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, who argued: 
I would actually prefer a narrower regime that deals properly with 
the issue. I have not put forward the need for a sunset clause, and 
that is because I think it would be much better to get the 
legislation in the form it ought to be. This measure is not unknown 
in other countries; there are many nations that have data retention 
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regimes. We already have a form of ad hoc data retention in 
Australia. I would say, though, that if we do not incorporate the 
sort of safeguards that many of the submissions are urging then a 
sunset clause and a mandatory review would be necessary, but it 
would be very inadequate to do that as opposed to just getting the 
legislation right in the first place.35 
7.63 The Committee also notes that Recommendation 43 of its 2013 report 
recommended a mechanism for oversight of the scheme by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. This part of 
the recommendation has not been addressed in the Bill. The Committee 
has, however, made recommendations throughout the report concerning 
aspects of the mandatory data retention regime that it considers should be 
subject to oversight by this Committee. 
7.64 Given the expansion of the Committee’s oversight and review role 
through both this Bill and the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment 
(Foreign Fighters) Act 2014, the Committee sees development benefits in 
agencies providing a standing secondee to the Department of the House of 
Representatives, which provides staff to support the Committee. The 
Committee’s expectation is that any secondee arrangement would be open 
to supplementation should this be required for more complex inquiries. 
 
Recommendation 32 
 The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General coordinate the 
provision of a standing secondee or secondees to the secretariat of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, in 
recognition of the additional oversight and review requirements 
associated with the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign 
Fighters) Act 2014 and the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014. 
 
35  Professor George Williams, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 5. 
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Annual reporting 
7.65 In its 2013 report, the Committee recommended that there should be an 
annual report to Parliament on the operation of any mandatory data 
retention scheme.36 
7.66 Proposed section 187P of the Bill provides that an annual report on the 
operation of Part 1 of the Bill must be prepared as soon as practicable after 
30 June each year. This report is to be included in the report required 
under subsection 186(2) of the TIA Act. 
Committee comment 
7.67 To promote transparency and accountability, the Committee considers 
that the annual report should include details relating to: 
 costs of the scheme, 
 use of implementation plans, 
 category of purpose for accessing data, including a breakdown of types 
of offences, 
 age of data sought, 
 number of requests for traffic data, and 
 number of requests for subscriber data. 
7.68 The Committee also considers it would be useful for the Attorney-
General’s Department to provide an annual briefing to the Committee on 
the matters included in this report. 
 
36  PJCIS, Report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, 
Canberra, May 2013, p. 193. 
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Recommendation 33 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to 
require the annual report prepared under section 187P to include: 
 costs of the scheme, 
 use of implementation plans, 
 category of purpose for accessing data, including a breakdown 
of types of offences, 
 age of data sought, 
 number of requests for traffic data, and 
 number of requests for subscriber data. 
The Committee also recommends that the Attorney-General’s 
Department provide the Committee with an annual briefing on the 
matters included in this report. 
7.69 Further, as discussed in Chapter 6, the Committee recognises concerns 
raised by inquiry participants about the types of offences for which data 
retained under the proposed scheme may be accessed. To provide 
reassurance to the Parliament and the community, the Committee 
considers that enhanced accountability and oversight is prudent.  
7.70 As set out in Chapter 6, the Committee has recommended that when 
authorising access to telecommunications data, any interference with the 
privacy of any person that may result from the disclosure must be 
justifiable and proportionate. Authorising officers would be required to 
have regard to the gravity of the conduct being investigated, the reason for 
the proposed disclosure, and its likely relevance and usefulness to the 
investigation. 
7.71 The Committee also welcomes the expanded powers of the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman to oversight agencies’ access to 
telecommunications data under Chapter 4 of the TIA Act. 
7.72 The Committee considers that the oversight provided by the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman and Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security (in relation to ASIO) would be further enhanced by greater 
Parliamentary involvement in monitoring the regime. This could be 
achieved through this Committee being empowered to review relevant 
annual reports, in line with House of Representatives Standing Order 
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215(c) and Senate Standing Order 25(20), which enable legislative and 
general purpose standing committees to initiate inquiries into matters 
raised in the annual reports of departments and agencies. 
7.73 This will require legislative change to, for the first time, enable the 
Committee to look at operational matters in the limited area of 
authorisation of access to telecommunications data relating to ASIO and 
the AFP, consistent with the Committee’s remit. As with other sensitive 
material, these matters would be dealt with in private. The Committee 
also suggests that State governments look at putting in place oversight 
provisions in this area. 
 
Recommendation 34 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to 
provide that the Committee may inquire into any matter raised in the 
annual report prepared under proposed section 187P, including where 
this goes to a review of operational matters. 
Legislative change to the Intelligence Services Act 2001 should be 
implemented to reflect this changed function. 
The Committee further recommends that the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman and Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 
provide notice to the Committee should either of them hold serious 
concerns about the purpose for, or the manner in which, retained data is 
being accessed. 
Privacy protections and data security 
7.74 Essential to the integrity of a mandatory data regime must be the 
assurance of privacy protections and mechanisms to ensure the security of 
data. The following sections examine the requirements to comply with the 
Australian Privacy Principles, concerns regarding the security of retained 
data, and in the event of data breaches, a possible mandatory data breach 
notification scheme.  
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Privacy Act 1988 and Australian Privacy Principles 
7.75 The Attorney-General’s Department noted that improper access to 
telecommunications data is a criminal offence punishable by up to two 
years imprisonment. The Department also noted that telecommunications 
providers that retain information are subject to the Privacy Act 1988 (the 
Privacy Act) and Telecommunications Act 1997 (the Telecommunications 
Act), which require providers to deal with information in a manner that is 
consistent with those laws.37 
7.76 Schedule 1 of the Privacy Act contains 13 Australian Privacy Principles 
(APPs), which dictate the standards, rights and obligations for the 
handling, holding, accessing and correction of personal information.38 The 
APPs generally apply to Australian government agencies, private sector 
organisations with an annual turnover of $3 million or more, and some 
private sector organisations, such as health providers, with an annual 
turnover of less than $3 million.39 
7.77 APP 11 concerns the security of personal information and states: 
11.1 If an APP entity holds personal information, the entity 
must take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances 
to protect the information: 
(a) from misuse, interference and loss; and 
(b) from unauthorised access, modification or 
disclosure. 
11.2 If: 
(a) an APP entity holds personal information about an 
individual; and 
(b) the entity no longer needs the information for any 
purpose for which the information may be used or 
disclosed by the entity under this Schedule; and 
(c) the information is not contained in a 
Commonwealth record; and 
37  Ms Anna Harmer, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, p. 28. 
38  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘About Privacy’, 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/about-privacy> viewed 26 February 2015. 
39  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Australian Privacy Principles’, 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-act/australian-privacy-principles> viewed 
26 February 2015. 
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(d) the entity is not required by or under an Australian 
law, or a court/tribunal order, to retain the 
information;  
The entity must take such steps as are reasonable in the 
circumstances to destroy the information or to ensure that 
the information is de-identified.40 
7.78 The Privacy Impact Assessment prepared by the Australian Government 
Solicitor observed that ‘a threshold consideration is whether the service 
providers to which the new regime will apply are entities which are 
required to comply with the Privacy Act’.41 The Assessment then went on 
to state: 
We understand from discussions with officers of the Department 
that the vast majority of service providers will be organisations 
within the meaning of the Privacy Act and thus subject to the 
Privacy Act. However, we understand there are a small number of 
service providers that may be a small business operator within the 
meaning of s 6D of the Privacy Act, and for that reason may not be 
required to comply with the Privacy Act.42 
7.79 The Australian Privacy Commissioner also highlighted that different 
service providers may be subject to different levels of oversight in relation 
to the handling and retention of personal data. For example, they might be 
APP entities, subject to state/territory legislation in some, but not all, 
jurisdictions, or have a small business exemption. 43 
7.80 The Commissioner argued that: 
As the Bill is intended to standardise the types of 
telecommunications data that are collected and retained by service 
providers, the protections and oversight that apply to the handling 
of that information should also be standardised.44 
7.81 The Commissioner went on to make two recommendations: 
40  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Privacy Fact Sheet 17: Australian Privacy 
Principles’, January 2014, <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-fact-
sheets/other/privacy-fact-sheet-17-australian-privacy-principles> viewed 26 February 2015. 
41  Australian Government Solicitor, Privacy Impact Assessment: Proposed amendments to the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, 15 December 2014, p. 9 (appended to 
Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27). 
42  Australian Government Solicitor, Privacy Impact Assessment: Proposed amendments to the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, 15 December 2014, p. 9 (appended to 
Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27). 
43  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 31. 
44  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 32. 
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 First, that all providers be subject to the Privacy Act, and  
 Secondly, should the first recommendation not be adopted, that all 
service providers comply with binding rules made by the Australian 
Privacy Commissioner.45 
7.82 Mr Mark Newton, submitting in a private capacity, made a similar point: 
The vast majority of ISPs in Australia are small enough to remain 
below the thresholds required for protection of private data under 
the Privacy Act, yet the Bill contains no stipulations at all about 
how the data should be collected, how it can be used, where it can 
be stored, and what ISPs are permitted to do with it outside the 
purpose for which it has been collected. And yet this data 
constitutes the most extreme example imaginable of ‘Personally 
Identifying Information’, being specifically intended for the 
frictionless mass identification of individuals. 
It is inexplicable that such privacy-sensitive legislation can be 
proposed in this day and age without any reference whatsoever to 
the Privacy Act 1998 or the Australian Privacy Principles regulated 
by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner.46 
7.83 FutureWise similarly commented that the Bill: 
does not impose any requirements for data security or privacy on 
the carriage service providers, but seems to rely on the provisions 
of the Privacy Act. However, not all services providers will fall 
within the scope of the Privacy Act in which case there is little 
privacy protection at all.47 
7.84 The Privacy Impact Assessment noted that the Government had decided 
against legislative amendment to deem all service providers to be 
organisations for the purposes of the Privacy Act because: 
 carriage service providers within the meaning of the 
Telecommunications Act are required to observe and comply 
with the Communications Alliance Telecommunications 
Consumer Protections Code (the Code). The Code is registered 
under Part 6 of the Telecommunications Act by the ACMA, 
which has powers to enforce compliance. A key principle 
enshrined in the Code is that consumers ‘will enjoy open, 
honest and fair dealings with their Supplier, and have their 
45  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 8. 
46  Mr Mark Newton, Submission 123, pp. 7-8. 
47  FutureWise, Submission 128, p. 14. 
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privacy protected’ (our emphasis), and several provisions of the 
Code relate to protection of privacy. 
 The functions of the Telecommunications Industry 
Ombudsman (TIO) include investigating and facilitating the 
resolution of complaints about any interference with the 
privacy of an individual by a telecommunications provider, 
both in terms of non-compliance with applicable privacy 
requirements under the Privacy Act (such as the APPs) and also 
breach of any applicable industry specific privacy standards. 
Most service providers will be within the jurisdiction of the 
TIO, and if an individual believes their privacy has been 
breached and is unable to resolve the matter with the service 
provider, they will be entitled to seek the assistance free of 
charge from the TIO through its dispute resolution scheme.48 
7.85 Some submitters expressed general dissatisfaction with the present 
regime. The Victorian Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection, for 
example, disagreed that the security regime overseen by the Australian 
Privacy Commissioner was a suitable mechanism to assess industry’s 
compliance with the Australian Privacy Principles as well as monitoring 
industry’s non-disclosure obligations under the Telecommunications 
Act.49 
7.86 Australian Lawyers for Human Rights also considered the Australian 
Privacy Principles to be inadequate, arguing that: 
There are numerous areas in which the Privacy Principles will not 
fit well with the Bill and will need to be modified.50 
7.87 Similarly, the Australian Privacy Foundation submitted that: 
the current legal controls on the use, disclosure and security of 
such data, including those established under the Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth) and Part 13 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), are 
inadequate.51 
Data security 
7.88 The Bill is silent on the issue of data security. This issue was raised, 
however, by numerous submitters to the inquiry. 
48  Australian Government Solicitor, Privacy Impact Assessment: Proposed amendments to the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, 15 December 2014, pp. 9-10 (appended to 
Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27). 
49  Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection (Victoria), Submission 39, p. 9. 
50  Australian Lawyers for Human Rights, Submission 88, pp. 2-3. 
51  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, p. 2. 
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7.89 Many submitters generally cited data security as a concern.52 Other 
submitters expressed more particular concerns that: 
 the stored data would become a target or ‘honey pot’,53 both for those 
with criminal or malicious intent and those with civil litigation claims,54 
particularly if stored in a single location rather than across multiple 
platforms, 
 the Bill does not prevent offshore storage,55 
52  M Hope, Submission 18, p. 1; B Ridgway, Submission 20, p. 4; J O’Callaghan, Submission 29, p. 1; 
D Donnelly, Submission 30, p. 2; Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection (Victoria), 
Submission 39, p. 9; H Murdoch, Submission 40, p. 1; F Maley, Submission 49, p. 1; W Delaforce, 
Submission 51, p. 1; B Skurrie, Submission 63,  p. 1; M Deerbon, Submission 65,  p. 1; Name 
withheld, Submission 78, p. 1; C Cresswell, Submission 79, p. 2; Australian Lawyers for Human 
Rights, Submission 88, p. 6; Ms Terri Butler MP, Submission 91, p. 7; Mr Chris Berg, Senior 
Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs, Submission 94, p. [8]; Amnesty International Australia, 
Submission 95, p. 3; Dr Paul Bernal, Submission 99, p. 6; R Graf, Submission 105, pp. 4-5; Dr John 
Selby, Professor Vijay Varadharajan and Dr Yvette Blount, Submission 114, p. 4; Law Institute 
of Victoria, Submission 117, p. 5; Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, 
Submission 120, p. 11; S Millwood, Submission 121, p. 12; M Newton, Submission 123; p. 6; Law 
Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 21; FutureWise, Submission 128, p. 14; A Naughton, 
Submission 136, p. 1; G Curtis, Submission 141; p. 3; A/Professor Einar Thorsteinsson, 
Submission 147, p. 1; A Layton-Bennett, Submission 151, p. 2; A Barut, Submission 172, p.1; C 
Sanderson, Submission 173, p. 1; A Cavanna, Submission 191, p. 1. 
53  Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection (Victoria), Submission 39, p. 11; V Hesse, 
Submission 15, p. 1; F Maley, Submission 49, p.1; A Doodkorte, Submission 53, pp.1-2; M 
Setiawan, Submission 60, p. 2; Ms Terri Butler MP, Submission 91, p. 9; P Schnackenburg, 
Submission 103, p. 1; F Rauch Valenti, Submission 104, p. 1; R Graf, Submission 105, p. 5; 
T Darling, Submission 113, p. 1; Name withheld, Submission 116, p. 1; Australian 
Communications Consumer Action Network, Submission 120, p. 11; Pirate Party Australia, 
Submission 124, p. 10; FutureWise, Submission 128, p. 13; A Layton-Bennett, Submission 151, p. 2; 
Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, p. 15; A Naughton, Submission 136, p. 1; 
G Curtis, Submission 141; p. 3; R Lammers, Submission 148, p. 1; J McPherson, Submission 153, p. 
2; E Stocker, Submission 163, p. 1; S Vicarioli, Submission 175, p. 1; L Milne, Submission 179, p. 1; 
S Whitewood, Submission 181, p. 1; Name withheld, Submission 188, p. 2; Name withheld, 
Submission 192, p. 2. 
54  Communications Alliances and ATMA, Submission 6, p. 14; B Ridgway, Submission 20, p. 3; 
Private Media, Submission 77, p. [2]; Ms Terri Butler MP, Submission 91, p. 8, 14; Mr Chris Berg, 
Senior Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs, Submission 94, [5]; R Graf, Submission 105, pp. 4-5; 
Australian Information Industry Association, Submission 109, p. 4; M Newton, Submission 123; 
p. 6; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 75, p. 16; Law Council of Australia, Submission 
126, p. 21. 
55  P Freak, Submission 26, p. 1; Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection (Victoria), 
Submission 39, p. 10; A Cooksley, Submission 43, p. 1; M Setiawan, Submission 60, p. 2; Name 
withheld, Submission 78, p. 1; R Graf, Submission 105, pp. 4-5; Australian Information Industry 
Association, Submission 109, p. 4; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 117, p. 5; S Millwood, 
Submission 121, pp. 12-13; M Newton, Submission 123; p. 6; Pirate Party Australia, Submission 
124, p. 10; Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 21; A Naughton, Submission 136, p. 1; 
H Stock, Submission 152, p. 1; A Layton-Bennett, Submission 151, p. 2; K Matchett, Submission 
162, p. 1; A Cavanna, Submission 191, p. 1;. 
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 the Bill does not explicitly require data to be destroyed at the end of the 
retention period,56 and 
 substantial amounts of data will need to be retained under the scheme, 
increasing the level of risk.57 
7.90 The Privacy Impact Assessment noted that due to the obligations imposed 
by the scheme: 
There is naturally a concern that the longer the period for which 
data is required to be retained, the greater the risk the security of 
that data may be compromised.58 
7.91 While acknowledging that currently there are risks to the security of data 
that must be managed, Telstra also explained to the Committee that the 
requirement to create a centralised platform for retention of data under the 
Bill creates an enhanced target. Telstra commented at a public hearing: 
[Y]ou are quite right to say that the existence of a large dataset 
with a lot of personal and other information contained within it 
could be an attraction for people for a variety of reasons.59 
7.92 Telstra also acknowledged that additional measures will be required to 
secure customer data. Telstra indicated that it would continue to invest in 
the necessary systems and that the company was ‘well placed to 
implement these additional security measures’.60 
7.93 Electronic Frontiers Australia also outlined concerns with the security of 
retained data: 
[T]his legislation will result in the creation of what will be massive 
databases of very, very valuable personal information that will be 
honey pots to organised crime and to any sort of person that can 
potentially access it. Now, the scope of risk, for example, for 
systems administrators who must look after this data to be 
compromised in some way is very high. As Steve Dalby from iiNet 
said in a room not far from here last year, when asked about this, 
‘Look, we’re a business; we're going to try and find the lowest cost 
56  Amnesty International Australia, Submission 95, p. 3; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 117, 
p. 5; Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 21; FutureWise, Submission 128, p. 13. 
57  Victorian Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection, Submission 39, p. 10. 
58  Australian Government Solicitor, Privacy Impact Assessment: Proposed amendments to the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, 15 December 2014, p. 18 (appended to 
Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27). 
59  Mr James Shaw, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 8. 
60  Telstra, Submission 112, p. 4; Mr James Shaw, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 29 January 2015, 
p. 7. 
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option for storing this data, and right at the moment the lowest 
cost option for storing data is in China’. So there is a very real risk 
also—as this committee, I am sure, is only too well aware—of this 
sort of information being compromised by foreign intelligence 
agencies as well.61 
7.94 Arguing that the existing security regime is not ‘fit for purpose’, the 
Victorian Privacy Commissioner made the following points: 
 APP 11 is the only security obligation created by the Privacy Act 1988 
and is too abstract to provide concrete security guidance, 
 the Privacy Act does not apply to 90 percent of the private sector 
because of the small business exemption, 
 the Bill does not prevent retained data being transmitted to, and stored 
in, offshore cloud computing services that are under the control of 
foreign corporations and foreign governments, 
 the amount of data that will be stored is magnitudes greater than at 
present, 
 the Australian Privacy Commissioner does not have direct jurisdiction 
over contracted service providers, and 
 commercial entities (that will store the data) are not required to adhere 
to the same level of data security standards as government agencies.62 
7.95 The Law Council of Australia raised concerns that ‘there does not appear 
to be a minimum set of standards for government agencies and service 
providers to ensure security of retained telecommunications data’.63 
7.96 Mr Tom Courtney, submitting in an individual capacity, argued: 
As storing the data will have to be implemented by the ISP’s it will 
not necessarily have the appropriate security controls. It is the 
very likely that ISPs will implement the cheapest solution at the 
expense of security which would lead to this data being easily 
hacked by any malicious person or organisation.64 
7.97 The Explanatory Memorandum states: 
61  Mr Jon Lawrence, Executive Officer, Electronic Frontiers Australia, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 29 January 2015, p. 26. 
62  Victorian Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection, Submission 39, pp. 9-11. 
63  Law Council of Australia, Submission 126, p. 24. 
64  Mr Tom Courtney, Submission 23, p. 1. 
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The Privacy Act and proposed Telecommunications Sector 
Security Reforms (TSSR) will, in combination, require service 
providers to do their best to prevent unauthorised access to and 
unauthorised interference with retained telecommunications data. 
In addition, the Privacy Commissioner will continue to have 
oversight of carriers’ collection and retention of personal 
information under the Bill where service providers are subject to 
the Privacy Act, including the ability to conduct assessments to 
ensure compliance with the APPs.65 
7.98 As noted above, APP 11 requires APP entities to take reasonable steps to 
protect information from misuse, interference, loss and authorised access, 
modification or disclosure. The Attorney-General’s Department noted that 
while the Bill includes no additional requirement to destroy retained data, 
APP 11.2 requires entities to destroy personal information when no longer 
required for legitimate purposes.66 
7.99 It is important to recognise, however, that not all providers are APP 
entities. 
7.100 The Explanatory Memorandum notes, however, that non-APP entities are 
subject to the data protection obligations set down in Part 13 of the 
Telecommunications Act 1997, and are subject to oversight from the 
Information Commissioner.67 
7.101 The need for additional protection of data has been acknowledged by the 
Government and is expected to occur through the Telecommunications 
Sector Security Reform. The Minister for Communications, the Hon 
Malcolm Turnbull MP, stated in his second reading speech: 
The government is also considering reforms to strengthen the 
security and integrity of Australia’s telecommunication 
infrastructure by establishing a security framework for the 
telecommunications sector. This will provide better protection for 
information held by industry in accordance with the data retention 
scheme. The government expects this reform will be finalised well 
before the end of the data retention implementation period.68 
7.102 In this regard, the Attorney-General’s Department commented that: 
65  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 13. 
66  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 33. 
67  Data Retention Bill, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 13. 
68  Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, Minister for Communications, House of Representatives Official 
Hansard, No. 18 2014, Thursday, 30 October 2014, p. 12563. 
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[I]t is preferable to implement a holistic security framework for the 
telecommunications sector, rather than imposing specific, 
standalone and potentially duplicative security obligations that 
apply only to a relatively narrow subsection of the information 
held by industry.69 
7.103 In 2013, this Committee recommended that any legislation for a proposed 
data retention regime should ensure that the retained telecommunications 
data is ‘stored securely by making encryption mandatory’.70  
7.104 On this issue, the Department noted that: 
Using the word ‘encryption’ does beg the question of what type of 
encryption and to what standard and in what respect. I think it 
certainly reflects the intent of this committee, and the 
recommendation was understood as being about importing a 
degree of protection for the data. But it is fair to say that, in our 
engagement with the industry, while some providers asked for 
certainty and for a prescriptive approach to how to go about doing 
things, others have been very clear on the fact that being very 
prescriptive about how a measure should be implemented fetters 
their ability to run their businesses, which of course are ones that 
they must run at a profit.71 
7.105 In a supplementary submission, the Department further advised the 
Committee that: 
In relation to mandatory encryption of retained data, there may be 
complexity in imposing such a requirement. Placing encryption on 
new databases could be a simple and inexpensive process. 
However, retro-fitting encryption on existing legacy systems is 
likely to be a more difficult and expensive endeavour for industry. 
This could particularly be the case of the significant amounts of 
telephony information held on legacy networks.72 
7.106 Optus explained to the Committee that encryption was one of many 
potentially valuable tools for securing retained data: 
I think it is worthwhile and imminently conceivable. Clearly you 
would look at all the security and preventive regimes—encryption 
69  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27, p. 37. 
70  PJCIS, Report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, 
Canberra, May 2013, p. 192. 
71  Ms Harmer, Attorney-General’s Department, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, 
p. 73. 
72  Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 27.3, p. 1. 
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is one of them, and segregating data. … If it is a well-defined 
database and it is not the entire set of data or processes that we 
maintain, it should be a relatively straightforward task to 
segregate it for security purposes, and possibly encrypt it, if need 
be. It is a sensible thing to have things like electronic sand traps—
all the access protocols that we apply to the most sensitive 
information already.73 
7.107 Communications Alliance provided similar evidence: 
Mr Stanton: The service providers already need to comply with 
the government's Information Security Manual and with the 
Protective Security Policy Framework, which are both pretty 
stringent requirements that need to be met today. Peter, perhaps 
you might be better placed to address the question directly. 
Mr Froelich: I think the two documents, the PSPF and the ISM, 
that John has raised are trigger documents. In fact, whenever we 
go through any cost-recovery exercise with the government those 
are part of the compliance objectives the government puts in front 
of us. So we have very stringent requirements around security. 
But, beyond that, as an industry, we have every reason and every 
intention to protect the privacy and security of our customers. For 
our industry members, there would be no reason why we do 
anything less with their data under this regime than we do under 
anything else. All of those security structures and tools available to 
us—firewalls, physical security and encryption—we would put in 
place to ensure that our customers' privacy and security is 
maintained along with the interface with government as well. 
Those are standard practices now in the way we deal with law 
enforcement and national security and the way we deal with 
customers' data.74 
7.108 The Australian Privacy Commissioner indicated that he considered a 
security framework for the telecommunications sector should be in place 
‘before service providers are required to collect and store any information’ 
under the data retention regime.75 Further: 
73  Mr David Epstein, Vice-President, Corporate and Regulatory Affairs, Optus, Committee 
Hansard, Canberra, 30 January 2015, p. 22. 
74  Mr John Stanton, Chief Executive Officer, Communications Alliance and Mr Peter Froelich, 
Industry Member, Communications Alliance, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 17 December 2014, 
pp. 39-40. 
75  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 36. 
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If this is not possible, my recommendation that the Bill be 
amended to require a service provider’s data retention 
implementation plan to specify, in relation to each service, the 
steps that the provider will take to protect the information 
becomes essential.76 
Mandatory data breach notification 
7.109 In its 2013 report, the Committee recommended in relation to mandatory 
data retention that any legislation include ‘a robust, mandatory data 
breach notification scheme’.77 This recommendation has not been 
implemented as part of the Bill.  
7.110 In evidence, the Australian Privacy Commissioner noted the risks 
associated with a data breach and expressed the view that one effective 
mechanism to manage this risk is a mandatory data breach notification 
scheme.78 The Commissioner made the following comment in relation to 
this issue: 
By creating a large repository of personal information, the 
proposed data retention scheme increases the risk and possible 
consequences of a data breach. This is because the challenge of 
effectively securing that information from misuse, interference and 
loss, and from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure will 
become more difficult as technology evolves. For example, the 
large volume of personal information held by service providers 
will be an attractive target for people with malicious intent and/or 
criminal intent. One way to help manage the impact on 
individuals affected by a data breach involving 
telecommunications data is to amend the Bill to include a 
mandatory data breach notification requirement that applies to 
service providers.79 
7.111 The Commissioner noted national and international trends that reflect an 
increase in the number and severity of data breaches.80 The Commissioner 
also pointed out that: 
76  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 36. 
77  PJCIS, Report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, 
Canberra, May 2013, p. 192. 
78  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, pp. 8, 10, 11. 
79  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 11. 
80  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 29. 
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Australian service providers have experienced significant issues in 
handling and keeping personal information secure. Major 
telecommunications services providers that will be covered by the 
scheme are amongst the 20 entities most complained about to our 
office. Further, since 2010, major telecommunications companies 
have been the subject of 13 Commissioner’s own motion 
investigations.81 
7.112 In the Commissioner’s view, notification is an important mitigation 
strategy for any individuals affected by a data breach. For this reason, the 
Commissioner recommended that the Bill be amended: 
to include an obligation for service providers to notify the 
Commissioner and affected individuals in the event that they 
experience a data breach affecting telecommunications data 
collected and retained under the scheme (and where other 
appropriate conditions are met, such as where the data breach 
could give risk to a real risk of serious harm to affected 
individuals).82 
7.113 The Australian Information Industry Association also indicated its 
support for ‘the development of a mandatory security standard and 
reporting and auditing requirements particularly in regard to any security 
breaches’.83 
7.114 Similarly, the Law Institute of Victoria expressed strong support for a 
mandatory data breach notification scheme: 
The LIV strongly recommends that the Privacy Act 1988 be 
amended in accordance with the recommendation of the 
Australian Law Reform Commission to introduce an obligation to 
notify the Privacy Commissioner and affected individuals in the 
event of a data breach (commonly referred to as a mandatory data 
breach notification scheme). This amendment will ensure that 
persons who are affected by breaches are aware of them and can 
seek legal remedies and mitigates the unintended consequences 
identified in scenarios 5, 6 and 8 [outlined in their submission].84 
7.115 At present, the Australian Privacy Commissioner accepts data breach 
notifications on a voluntary basis and has published guidelines to assist 
81  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 29. 
82  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 30. 
83  Australian Information Industry Association, Submission 109, p. 4; See also, Electronic Frontiers 
Australia, Submission 97, p. 27. 
84  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 117.1, p. [10]. 
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organisations to respond to a data breach involving personal 
information.85 
7.116 The Commissioner noted, however, that although notification of data 
breaches to the Commissioner and affected individuals may be a 
reasonable step, ‘it is not an express requirement under the Privacy Act’.86  
7.117 The Privacy Amendment (Privacy Alerts) Bill 2013 lapsed on prorogation 
of the 43rd Parliament and was reintroduced as a private Senator’s Bill on 
20 March 2014. 
7.118 This Bill would amend the Privacy Act to introduce mandatory data 
breach notification provisions for agencies and organisations that are 
regulated by the Privacy Act. The Explanatory Memorandum for the Bill 
described mandatory data breach notification as: 
a legal requirement to provide notice to affected persons and the 
relevant regulator when certain types of personal information are 
accessed, obtained, used, disclosed, copied, or modified by 
unauthorised persons. Such unauthorised access may occur 
following a malicious breach of the secure storage and handling of 
that information (e.g. a hacker attack), an accidental loss (most 
commonly of IT equipment or hard copy documents), a negligent 
or improper disclosure of information, or otherwise.87 
7.119 The scheme would be consistent with a recommendation of the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC), which considered that notification 
should be provided ‘to those whose privacy had been infringed when data 
breaches causing “a real risk of serious harm” occurred’.88  
7.120 Further, the ALRC considered notification should be compulsory ‘unless it 
would impact upon a law enforcement investigation or was determined 
by the regulator to be contrary to the public interest’.89 
85  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 29. See also, ‘Data breach 
notification guide: a guide to handling personal information security breaches’, August 2014, 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-guides/data-breach-
notification-a-guide-to-handling-personal-information-security-breaches> viewed 26 February 
2015. 
86  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 92, p. 28. 
87  Privacy Amendment (Privacy Alerts) Bill 2014, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 2. 
88  Privacy Amendment (Privacy Alerts) Bill 2014, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 2. 
89  Privacy Amendment (Privacy Alerts) Bill 2014, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 2. 
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Committee comment 
7.121 The Committee notes that the Bill does not prescribe how retained 
communications data is to be stored or any specific security standards. As 
with protection and oversight, the Privacy Commissioner considered that 
the security standards should also be standardised at a level that is 
commensurate with the risk to privacy. The Committee agrees with this 
view. 
7.122 The Committee considers that in the absence of the Telecommunications 
Sector Security Reform, interim measures to bring all providers into a 
consistent privacy regime are a necessary step. On the basis of the 
evidence received, the Committee considers it would be appropriate to 
require all providers to be subject to either the Australian Privacy 
Principles or binding rules of the Australian Privacy Commissioner. 
7.123 The Committee notes that there is precedent for requiring small businesses 
to comply with the Australian Privacy Principles. Small businesses with 
an annual turnover of less than $3 million that are required to collect and 
retain customer, financial and transaction records under the Anti-Money 
Laundering/Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 are also required to 
comply with the Australian Privacy Principles.90 
7.124 The Committee is mindful, however, of the regulatory burden on small 
providers. For this reason, the Committee has recommended that the 
Government’s funding model provide sufficient support for smaller 
service providers who may be unable, amongst other things, to implement 
privacy controls without up-front assistance.91 
 
90  Privacy Act 1998, s. 6E(1A). 
91  See recommendation 16 of this report. 
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Recommendation 35 
 Having regard to the regulatory burden on small providers with an 
annual turnover of less than $3 million, the Committee recommends that 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to require all service providers to be 
compliant, in respect of retained data, with either the Australian Privacy 
Principles or binding rules developed by the Australian Privacy 
Commissioner. 
7.125 The Committee acknowledges the security risks associated with the 
proposed mandatory data retention scheme and the potential for 
increased unlawful access to personal information. The Committee 
considers that the security of retained data is a critical issue and the 
community must be able to have confidence in the security of stored data. 
The Committee addressed telecommunications security and the proposed 
Telecommunications Sector Security Reform in its 2013 report.92 Noting 
the Minister’s statement in his second reading speech, the Committee is 
strongly of the view that these reforms should be finalised and 
implemented prior to the end of the implementation period for this Bill. 
7.126 The Committee notes that the Bill does not currently provide for 
mandatory encryption of data retained under the scheme, which was 
recommended by the Committee in its 2013 report.93 In the absence of the 
sector-wide Telecommunications Sector Security Reform, which might 
dictate security or encryption standards, interim measures that are as or 
more effective will be required in relation to the proposed data retention 
regime.  
7.127 Consequently, the Committee sought additional information from 
telecommunications service providers on the capacity to implement 
mandatory encryption for data retained under the scheme. Based on this 
information and other evidence provided, the Committee considers that 
data encryption is a necessary and appropriate measure in order to secure 
retained data and that this requirement should be included in the Bill. The 
Committee considers that security standards should be developed in 
consultation with the Data Retention Implementation Working Group and 
should be incorporated into regulations. The Committee notes that 
mandatory encryption may cause technical difficulties in relation to some 
92  PJCIS, Report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, 
Canberra, May 2013, Chapter 3. 
93  PJCIS, Report of the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, 
Canberra, May 2013, Recommendation 42, p. 192. 
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existing systems used by service providers, and considers that the 
Communications Access Co-ordinator should be able to authorise other 
robust security measures, as appropriate, in respect of those instances. 
7.128 A mandatory data breach notification scheme is considered one effective 
mitigation strategy for those affected by a data breach. While the 
Committee notes that this issue is the subject of broader consideration 
within Government, the Committee considers that there must be a scheme 
in place prior to implementation of the Bill. The Committee considers that 
a mandatory data breach notification scheme would provide a strong 
incentive for service providers to implement robust security measures to 
protect data retained under the data retention regime. 
7.129 The Committee discussed the importance of security of stored data in 
relation to its location. The Committee agreed that this underlies the 
importance of implementing the Telecommunications Sector Security 
Reform (TSSR). The TSSR Bill should be referred to this Committee. In its 
consideration, the Committee will consider issues relating to the location 
of stored data and security. 
 
Recommendation 36 
 The Committee recommends that the Government enact the proposed 
Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms prior to the end of the 
implementation phase for the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014. 
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Recommendation 37 
 The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be amended to 
require service providers to encrypt telecommunications data that has 
been retained for the purposes of the mandatory data retention regime. 
To give effect to this recommendation, the Committee recommends that 
the Data Retention Implementation Working Group develop an 
appropriate standard of encryption to be incorporated into regulations, 
and that the Communications Access Co-ordinator be required to 
consider a provider’s compliance with this standard as part of the Data 
Retention Implementation Plan process. 
Further, the Communications Access Co-ordinator should be given the 
power to authorise other robust security measures in limited 
circumstances in which technical difficulties prevent encryption from 
being implemented in existing systems used by service providers. 
 
Recommendation 38 
 The Committee recommends introduction of a mandatory data breach 
notification scheme by the end of 2015. 
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Concluding comments 
7.130 Through the process of this inquiry, the Committee has considered the 
current utility of telecommunications data to law enforcement and 
national security investigations. The Committee has noted the 
inconsistency and degradation of current retained telecommunications 
data, possible future reductions in retained data and the serious impact 
this may have on national security and public safety.   
7.131 Accordingly, the Committee considered carefully the rationale for a 
mandatory data retention scheme, and has concluded that such a regime is 
justified as a necessary, effective and proportionate response. The 
Committee therefore supports the intention of the Bill. 
7.132 While it is imperative to equip security and law enforcement agencies 
with the capability to conduct investigations, these powers must be 
contained by appropriate authorisations and balanced by oversight and 
safeguards. In considering each provision of the Bill, the Committee has 
sought to confirm that adequate safeguards and oversight mechanisms are 
in place. The Committee considers that the recommendations made in this 
report serve to strengthen the functioning and integrity of the proposed 
data retention regime. 
7.133 The Committee thanks the contributors to the inquiry for their input. 
 
Recommendation 39 
 The Committee recommends that, following consideration of the 
recommendations in this report, the Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 be passed. 
Dan Tehan MP 
Chair 
February 2015 
 A 
Appendix A – Proposed data set 
Source: Attorney-General’s Department. 
  
Data Retention Bill – Proposed data set 
The Australian Government has introduced a Bill to oblige telecommunications providers to retain a limited set 
of telecommunications data (‘metadata’) for two years. 
It is not the content or substance of a communication and it is not a person’s web-browsing history. Agencies 
will continue to need to obtain a warrant to access the content of a communication.  
The categories of data that industry will be asked to retain is set out in the legislation. The categories of data are 
based closely on the European Union Data Retention Directive. Regulations will provide further details about 
what is to be collected and greater technical specificity under each of these categories. This will enable 
flexibility as technology changes and provide more certainty and consistency for industry.  The regulations will 
also limit the retention of subscriber information described in item 1 (c)-(f) to two years from creation of that 
data. 
The draft set has been released publicly with the Bill and referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security for review and public consultation. There will also be ongoing consultation and review 
with a joint government/industry Expert Working Group, which has been set up to settle implementation, the 
data set and funding of the scheme. 
Kinds of information to be kept 
Matters to which 
information must 
relate 
Draft data set Explanation and examples 
1. The subscriber 
of, and accounts, 
services, 
telecommunications 
devices and other 
relevant services 
relating to, the 
relevant service 
The following: 
(a) any information that is one or both 
of the following: 
(i) any name or address 
information; 
(ii) any other information for 
identification purposes; 
relating to the relevant service, 
being information used by the 
service provider for the purposes of 
identifying the subscriber of the 
relevant service; 
(b) any information relating to any 
contract, agreement or 
arrangement relating to the relevant 
service, or to any related account, 
service or device; 
(c) any information that is one or both 
of the following: 
(i) billing or payment 
information; 
(ii) contact information; 
relating to the relevant service, 
being information used by the 
service provider in relation to the 
relevant service; 
This category includes customer identifying 
details, such as name and address. It also 
includes contact details, such as phone 
number and email address. This 
information allows agencies to confirm a 
person’s identity or link a service or account 
to a person.  
This category also includes details about 
services attached to account, such as the 
unique identifying number attached to a 
mobile phone, or the IP address allocated 
to an internet access account or service. 
This category further includes billing and 
payment information. This can be a 
valuable source of information for law 
enforcement agencies. For example, even 
if someone has lied about other identifying 
details, it is more difficult to falsify payment 
information.  
Information about the status of a service 
can include when an account has been 
enabled or suspended, a relevant service 
has been enabled or suspended or is 
currently roaming, or a telecommunications 
device has been stolen. 
Information about metrics relating to the 
relevant service, such as available 
bandwidth, or historic aggregate upload 
and download volumes, is useful in law 
Matters to which 
information must 
relate 
Draft data set Explanation and examples 
(d) any identifiers relating to the 
relevant service or any related 
account, service or device, being 
information used by the service 
provider in relation to the relevant 
service or any related account, 
service or device; 
(e) the status of the relevant service, or 
any related account, service or 
device; 
(f) any information about metrics of the 
relevant service or a related 
account, service or device. 
enforcement and national security 
investigations. For example, it allows 
agencies to better allocate resources in 
support of warrants where more intrusive 
surveillance is justified. For instance, if a 
suspect regularly downloads large volumes 
of information, agencies may need to 
assign additional system resources when 
provisioning a warrant.  
2. The source of a 
communication 
Any identifiers of a related account, service 
or device from which the communication 
has been sent by means of the relevant 
service. 
The source of a communication includes 
the phone from which a call was made, the 
account from which an email was sent or 
the IP address allocated to a person 
connected to the internet. 
3. The destination 
of a communication 
Any identifiers of the account, 
telecommunications device or relevant 
service to which the communication: 
(a) has been sent; or 
(b) has been forwarded, routed or 
transferred, or attempted to be 
forwarded, routed or transferred. 
The destination of a communication is the 
recipient. For example, destination includes 
the phone number that received a call or 
SMS. This will include destinations for 
online services, such as the user name, 
number and/or IP address of the recipient 
of a Voice over IP (VoIP) call.  
The Bill explicitly excludes anything that is 
web-browsing history or could amount to 
web-browsing history, such as a URL or IP 
address to which a person has browsed. 
4. The date, time 
and duration of a 
communication, or 
of its connection to 
a relevant service 
The date and time (including the time zone) 
of the following relating to the 
communication (with sufficient accuracy to 
identify the communication): 
(a) the start of the communication; 
(b) the end of the communication; 
(c) the connection to the relevant 
service; 
(d) the disconnection from the relevant 
service. 
For phone calls this is simply the time a call 
started and ended.  
For internet sessions this is when a device 
or account connects to a data network and 
ends when it disconnected – this may last 
from a few hours to several days. 
5. The type of 
communication or 
relevant service 
used in connection 
with a 
communication 
The following: 
(a) the type of communication; 
Examples: Voice, SMS, email, chat, 
forum, social media. 
(b) the type of the relevant service; 
Examples: ADSL, Wi-Fi, VoIP, 
cable, GPRS, VoLTE, LTE. 
(c) the features of the relevant service 
that were, or would have been, 
used by or enabled for the 
communication.  
Examples: call waiting, call 
forwarding, bandwidth allowances. 
The type of communication means the form 
of the communication (for example voice 
call vs. internet usage).  
The type of the relevant service provides 
more technical detail about the service. For 
example, for a mobile voice service, 
whether it is a GPRS or VoLTE service. 
Note: This item will only apply to the service 
provider operating the relevant service: see 
paragraph 187A(4)(c) of the Act. 
Matters to which 
information must 
relate 
Draft data set Explanation and examples 
6. The location of 
equipment, or a 
line, used in 
connection with a 
communication 
The following in relation to the equipment or 
line used to send or receive the 
communication: 
(a) the location of the equipment or line 
at the start of the communication; 
(b) the location of the equipment or line 
at the end of the communication.
  
Location records will be limited to the 
location of a device at the start and end of a 
communication, such as a phone call or 
SMS message.  
Paragraph 187A(7) of the Bill provides that 
two or more communications that together 
constitute a single communications session 
are taken to be a single communication. In 
relation to internet access sessions, this 
means that service providers will only be 
required to keep location records at the 
start and end of a session, which can last 
from a few hours to a several days.  
Paragraph 187A(4)(e) of the Bill provides 
that locations records are limited to 
information that is used by a service 
provider in relation to the relevant service. 
This would include information such as 
which cell tower, Wi-Fi hotspot or base 
station a device was connected to at the 
start and end of communication.  
As a result of the above, the location 
records to be kept by service providers will 
not allow continuous monitoring or tracking 
of devices. Precise or real-time location 
information, such as a GPS location is also 
not part of data retention. 
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Appendix B – Recommendations from PJCIS 
report of May 2013 
Source: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Report of 
the Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation, 
Canberra, May 2013. 
 
List of recommendations - 2013 report  
2 Telecommunications Interception
Recommendation 1 
The Committee recommends the inclusion of an objectives clause within 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, which: 
 expresses the dual objectives of the legislation –
⇒ to protect the privacy of communications;
⇒ to enable interception and access to communications in order to
investigate serious crime and threats to national security; and 
 accords with the privacy principles contained in the Privacy Act
1988. 
Recommendation 2 
The Committee recommends the Attorney-General’s Department 
undertake an examination of the proportionality tests within the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act). Factors to 
be considered in the proportionality tests include the: 
 privacy impacts of proposed investigative activity;
 public interest served by the proposed investigative activity,
including the gravity of the conduct being investigated; and 
 availability and effectiveness of less privacy intrusive investigative
techniques. 
The Committee further recommends that the examination of the 
proportionality tests also consider the appropriateness of applying a 
consistent proportionality test across the interception, stored 
communications and access to telecommunications data powers in the 
TIA Act. 
xxiv  
 
 
Recommendation 3 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
examine the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 with a 
view to revising the reporting requirements to ensure that the 
information provided assists in the evaluation of whether the privacy 
intrusion was proportionate to the public outcome sought. 
Recommendation 4 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
undertake a review of the oversight arrangements to consider the 
appropriate organisation or agency to ensure effective accountability 
under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. 
Further, the review should consider the scope of the role to be 
undertaken by the relevant oversight mechanism. 
The Committee also recommends the Attorney-General’s Department 
consult with State and Territory ministers prior to progressing any 
proposed reforms to ensure jurisdictional considerations are addressed. 
Recommendation 5 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
review the threshold for access to telecommunications data.  This review 
should focus on reducing the number of agencies able to access 
telecommunications data by using gravity of conduct which may be 
investigated utilising telecommunications data as the threshold on which 
access is allowed. 
Recommendation 6 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
examine the standardisation of thresholds for accessing the content of 
communications.  The standardisation should consider the: 
 privacy impact of the threshold; 
 proportionality of the investigative need and the privacy intrusion; 
 gravity of the conduct to be investigated by these investigative 
means; 
 scope of the offences included and excluded by a particular 
threshold; and 
 impact on law enforcement agencies’ investigative capabilities, 
including those accessing stored communications when investigating 
pecuniary penalty offences. 
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Recommendation 7 
The Committee recommends that interception be conducted on the basis 
of specific attributes of communications. 
The Committee further recommends that the Government model 
‘attribute based interception’ on the existing named person interception 
warrants, which includes: 
 the ability for the issuing authority to set parameters around the 
variation of attributes for interception; 
 the ability for interception agencies to vary the attributes for 
interception; and 
 reporting on the attributes added for interception by an authorised 
officer within an interception agency. 
In addition to Parliamentary oversight, the Committee recommends that 
attribute based interception be subject to the following safeguards and 
accountability measures: 
 attribute based interception is only authorised when an issuing 
authority or approved officer is satisfied the facts and grounds indicate 
that interception is proportionate to the offence or national security 
threat being investigated; 
 oversight of attribute based interception by the ombudsmen and 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; and 
 reporting by the law enforcement and security agencies to their 
respective Ministers on the effectiveness of attribute based 
interception. 
Recommendation 8 
The Committee recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department 
review the information sharing provisions of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 to ensure: 
 protection of the security and privacy of intercepted information; 
and 
 sharing of information where necessary to facilitate investigation 
of serious crime or threats to national security. 
Recommendation 9 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 be amended to remove legislative duplication. 
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Recommendation 10 
The Committee recommends that the telecommunications interception 
warrant provisions in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 
1979 be revised to develop a single interception warrant regime. 
The Committee recommends the single warrant regime include the 
following features: 
 a single threshold for law enforcement agencies to access 
communications based on serious criminal offences; 
 removal of the concept of stored communications to provide 
uniform protection to the content of communications; and 
 maintenance of the existing ability to apply for telephone 
applications for warrants, emergency warrants and ability to enter 
premises. 
The Committee further recommends that the single warrant regime be 
subject to the following safeguards and accountability measures: 
 interception is only authorised when an issuing authority is 
satisfied the facts and grounds indicate that interception is 
proportionate to the offence or national security threat being 
investigated; 
 rigorous oversight of interception by the ombudsmen and 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; 
 reporting by the law enforcement and security agencies to their 
respective Ministers on the effectiveness of interception; and 
 Parliamentary oversight of the use of interception. 
Recommendation 11 
The Committee recommends that the Government review the application 
of the interception-related industry assistance obligations contained in 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and 
Telecommunications Act 1997. 
Recommendation 12 
The Committee recommends the Government consider expanding the 
regulatory enforcement options available to the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority to include a range of enforcement 
mechanisms in order to provide tools proportionate to the conduct being 
regulated. 
Recommendation 13 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 be amended to include provisions which clearly express 
 xxvii 
 
 
the scope of the obligations which require telecommunications providers 
to provide assistance to law enforcement and national security agencies 
regarding telecommunications interception and access to 
telecommunications data. 
Recommendation 14 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access Act) 1979 and the Telecommunications Act 1997 be amended to make 
it clear beyond doubt that the existing obligations of the 
telecommunications interception regime apply to all providers (including 
ancillary service providers) of telecommunications services accessed 
within Australia. As with the existing cost sharing arrangements, this 
should be done on a no-profit and no-loss basis for ancillary service 
providers. 
Recommendation 15 
The Committee recommends that the Government should develop the 
implementation model on the basis of a uniformity of obligations while 
acknowledging that the creation of exemptions on the basis of 
practicability and affordability may be justifiable in particular cases. 
However, in all such cases the burden should lie on the industry 
participants to demonstrate why they should receive these exemptions. 
Recommendation 16 
The Committee recommends that, should the Government decide to 
develop an offence for failure to assist in decrypting communications, the 
offence be developed in consultation with the telecommunications 
industry, the Department of Broadband Communications and the Digital 
Economy, and the Australian Communications and Media Authority.  It 
is important that any such offence be expressed with sufficient specificity 
so that telecommunications providers are left with a clear understanding 
of their obligations. 
Recommendation 17 
The Committee recommends that, if the Government decides to develop 
timelines for telecommunications industry assistance for law enforcement 
and national security agencies, the timelines should be developed in 
consultation with the investigative agencies, the telecommunications 
industry, the Department of Broadband Communications and the Digital 
Economy, and the Australian Communications and Media Authority. 
The Committee further recommends that, if the Government decides to 
develop mandatory timelines, the cost to the telecommunications 
industry must be considered. 
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Recommendation 18 
The Committee recommends that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) be comprehensively revised with the objective 
of designing an interception regime which is underpinned by the 
following: 
 clear protection for the privacy of communications; 
 provisions which are technology neutral; 
 maintenance of investigative capabilities, supported by provisions 
for appropriate use of intercepted information for lawful purposes; 
 clearly articulated and enforceable industry obligations; and 
 robust oversight and accountability which supports administrative 
efficiency. 
The Committee further recommends that the revision of the TIA Act be 
undertaken in consultation with interested stakeholders, including 
privacy advocates and practitioners, oversight bodies, 
telecommunications providers, law enforcement and security agencies. 
The Committee also recommends that a revised TIA Act should be 
released as an exposure draft for public consultation. In addition, the 
Government should expressly seek the views of key agencies, including 
the: 
 Independent National Security Legislation Monitor; 
 Australian Information Commissioner; 
 ombudsmen and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security. 
In addition, the Committee recommends the Government ensure that the 
draft legislation be subject to Parliamentary committee scrutiny. 
3 Telecommunications security 
Recommendation 19 
The Committee recommends that the Government amend the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 to create a telecommunications security 
framework that will provide: 
 a telecommunications industry-wide obligation to protect 
infrastructure and the information held on it or passing across it from 
unauthorised interference; 
 a requirement for industry to provide the Government with 
information to assist in the assessment of national security risks to 
telecommunications infrastructure; and 
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 powers of direction and a penalty regime to encourage 
compliance. 
The Committee further recommends that the Government, through a 
Regulation Impact Statement, address: 
 the interaction of the proposed regime with existing legal 
obligations imposed upon corporations; 
 the compatibility of the proposed regime with existing corporate 
governance where a provider’s activities might be driven by decisions 
made outside of Australia; 
 consideration of an indemnity to civil action for service providers 
who have acted in good faith under the requirements of the proposed 
framework; and 
 impacts on competition in the market-place, including: 
⇒ the potential for proposed requirements to create a barrier to 
entry for lower cost providers; 
⇒ the possible elimination of existing lower cost providers from 
the market, resulting in decreased market competition on pricing; 
and 
⇒ any other relevant effects. 
4 Australian Intelligence Community Legislation Reform 
Recommendation 20 
The Committee recommends that the definition of computer in the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 be amended by 
adding to the existing definition the words “and includes multiple 
computers operating in a network”. 
The Committee further recommends that the warrant provisions of the 
ASIO Act be amended by stipulating that a warrant authorising access to 
a computer may extend to all computers at a nominated location and all 
computers directly associated with a nominated person in relation to a 
security matter of interest. 
Recommendation 21 
The Committee recommends that the Government give further 
consideration to amending the warrant provisions in the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 to enable the disruption of a 
target computer for the purposes of executing a computer access warrant 
but only to the extent of a demonstrated necessity. The Committee 
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further recommends that the Government pay particular regard to the 
concerns raised by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. 
Recommendation 22 
The Committee recommends that the Government  amend the warrant 
provisions of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 to 
allow ASIO to access third party computers and communications in 
transit to access a target computer under a computer access warrant, 
subject to appropriate safeguards and accountability mechanisms, and 
consistent with existing provisions under the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979. 
Recommendation 23 
The Committee recommends the Government amend the warrant 
provisions of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 to 
promote consistency by allowing the Attorney-General to vary all types 
of ASIO Act warrants. 
Recommendation 24 
Subject to the recommendation on renewal of warrants, the Committee 
recommends that the maximum duration of Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 search warrants not be increased. 
Recommendation 25 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to allow the Attorney-General to 
renew warrants. 
Recommendation 26 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to modernise the Act’s provisions 
regarding secondment arrangements. 
Recommendation 27 
The Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be 
amended to clarify the authority of the Defence Imagery and Geospatial 
Organisation to undertake its geospatial and imagery functions. 
Recommendation 28 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to create an authorised intelligence 
operations scheme, subject to similar safeguards and accountability 
arrangements as apply to the Australian Federal Police controlled 
operations regime under the Crimes Act 1914. 
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Recommendation 29 
The Committee recommends that should the Government proceed with 
amending the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 to 
establish a named person warrant, further consideration be given to the 
factors that would enable ASIO to request a single warrant specifying 
multiple powers against a single target. The thresholds, duration, 
accountability mechanisms and oversight arrangements for such 
warrants should not be lower than other existing ASIO warrants. 
Recommendation 30 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to modernise the warrant provisions to 
align the surveillance device provisions with the Surveillance Devices Act 
2004, in particular by optical devices. 
Recommendation 31 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 not be amended to enable person searches to be 
undertaken independently of a premises search. 
Recommendation 32 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to establish classes of persons able to 
execute warrants. 
Recommendation 33 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to formalise ASIO’s capacity to co-
operate with private sector entities. 
Recommendation 34 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended so that ASIO may refer breaches of 
section 92 to law enforcement for investigation. 
Recommendation 35 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to clarify that the incidental power in 
the search and computer access warrant provisions includes entry to a 
third party’s premises for the purposes of executing those warrants. 
However, the Committee is of the view that whatever amendments are 
made to facilitate this power should acknowledge the exceptional nature 
and very limited circumstances in which the power should be exercised. 
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Recommendation 36 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to clarify that reasonable force can be 
used at any time for the purposes of executing the warrant, not just on 
entry, and may only be used against property and not persons. 
Recommendation 37 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Act 1979 be amended to introduce an evidentiary certificate 
regime to protect the identity of officers and sources. The Committee also 
recommends that similar protections be extended to ASIO in order to 
protect from disclosure in open court its sensitive operational 
capabilities, analogous to the provisions of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 and the protections contained in the 
counter terrorism provisions in the Commonwealth Criminal code. 
The Committee further recommends that the Attorney-General give 
consideration to making uniform across Commonwealth legislation 
provisions for the protection of certain sensitive operational capabilities 
from disclosure in open court. 
Recommendation 38 
The Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be 
amended to add a new ministerial authorisation ground where the 
Minister is satisfied that a person is, or is likely to be, involved in 
intelligence or counter‐intelligence activities in circumstances where such 
an investigation would not currently be within the operational authority 
of the agency concerned. 
Recommendation 39 
The Committee recommends that where ASIO and an Intelligence Services 
Act 2001 agency are engaged in a cooperative intelligence operation a 
common standard based on the standards prescribed in the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 should apply for the 
authorisation of intrusive activities involving the collection of intelligence 
on an Australian person. 
Recommendation 40 
The Committee recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be 
amended to enable ASIS to provide training in self‐defence and the use of 
weapons to a person cooperating with ASIS. 
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Recommendation 41 
The Committee recommends that the draft amendments to the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 and the Intelligence Services Act 
2001, necessary to give effect to the Committee’s recommendations, 
should be released as an exposure draft for public consultation. The 
Government should expressly seek the views of key stakeholders, 
including the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. 
In addition, the Committee recommends the Government ensure that the 
draft legislation be subject to Parliamentary committee scrutiny. 
5 Data Retention 
Recommendation 42 
There is a diversity of views within the Committee as to whether there 
should be a mandatory data retention regime. This is ultimately a 
decision for Government. If the Government is persuaded that a 
mandatory data retention regime should proceed, the Committee 
recommends that the Government publish an exposure draft of any 
legislation and refer it to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security for examination. Any draft legislation should 
include the following features: 
 any mandatory data retention regime should apply only to meta-
data and exclude content; 
 the controls on access to communications data remain the same as 
under the current regime; 
 internet browsing data should be explicitly excluded; 
 where information includes content that cannot be separated from 
data, the information should be treated as content and therefore a 
warrant would be required for lawful access; 
 the data should be stored securely by making encryption 
mandatory; 
 save for existing provisions enabling agencies to retain data for a 
longer period of time, data retained under a new regime should be for 
no more than two years; 
 the costs incurred by providers should be reimbursed by the 
Government; 
 a robust, mandatory data breach notification scheme; 
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 an independent audit function be established within an 
appropriate agency to ensure that communications content is not 
stored by telecommunications service providers; and 
 oversight of agencies’ access to telecommunications data by the 
ombudsmen and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. 
Recommendation 43 
The Committee recommends that, if the Government is persuaded that a 
mandatory data retention regime should proceed: 
 there should be a mechanism for oversight of the scheme by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security; 
 there should be an annual report on the operation of this scheme 
presented to Parliament; and 
 the effectiveness of the regime be reviewed by the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security three years after its 
commencement. 
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Retention Implementation Working Group, December 2014. 
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Summary of IWG Recommendations  
 
The IWG, following its discussions and support provided by industry experts, 
recommends that the Government consider a number of amendments to the proposed 
data set to support further clarity and assist implementation of the data retention 
scheme. The IWG recommendations relate to potential changes to both the data set 
itself, as well as changes to the explanatory material accompanying the data set. The 
matters that Government may wish to consider are summarised in the Table 1 below, 
and are overlayed on the proposed data set and highlighted at Attachment A for ease 
of consideration. 
Table 1: Summary of IWG recommendations 
Recommendation  Details 
IWG’s proposed amendments to the data set 
1 
Amend text to provide additional clarity on the distinction between actual 
usage or consumption and contractual terms regarding allowances or 
caps.  
2 
Amend text to replace the reference to “bandwidth” with “data volume 
usage” to improve clarity and distinguish from data allowances. 
3 
Remove the proposed requirement for service providers to retain metric 
information relating to plans and contracts (data set element 1(f)). 
4 
Change the phrase “any identifiers” in items 2 and 3 of the data set to 
“identifiers”.  
IWG’s proposed amendments to policy and process 
5 
Any proposed change to the regulations should only come into effect 
after Parliament has had an opportunity to review the proposal and the 
disallowance period has expired. 
IWG’s proposed amendments to the data set’s explanatory material 
6 
Include additional explanatory material providing specific examples of the 
application of data set elements in relation to identifiers across a 
selection of current service types to support clarity for industry while 
retaining technological neutrality 
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7 
Include additional service-level examples illustrating how data retention 
applies, with particular reference to the application to access layer 
services (including where particular data points do not apply).  
8 
Include additional explanation, consistent with paragraph 187A(4)(b) of 
the Bill,  highlighting the application of data retention obligations to 
wholesale and retail providers, including that a wholesale provider is not 
required to retain “downstream” information in relation to a service 
provided by a retail provider.  
9 
Include additional explanation stating, for the avoidance of doubt, that the 
data retention obligations do not require providers of free services that do 
not generate any billing information, to create or retain such data. 
10 
Include additional explanation, consistent with subsection 187A(7) of the 
Bill, illustrating the application of the concept of a “communication 
session”, including more examples and noting that a communication 
session can last for an extended period (e.g. months in the case of some 
internet access sessions). 
11 
Include additional text, consistent with paragraph 187A(4)(b) of the Bill, 
clarifying that data set item 3, the destination of a communication, is not 
required in relation to internet access services.  
12 
Include an explanation of the difference between data usage and data 
allowance, including that these data points may be retained in a way that 
is consistent with a provider's existing records management, (e.g. aligned 
with that provider's billing cycle).  
13 Replace any reference to a “person” with “subscriber”.  
14 
Include, in relation to data set item 5 (type of communication) additional 
examples highlighting the meaning of “type” of communication in 
particular contexts. 
15 
Include additional explanatory material illustrating the operation of 
location information requirements in relation to non-mobile services.    
16 
Insert additional text to clarify that the data retention obligations do not 
preclude service providers from retaining items in the data set for longer 
than the required two year period for their own business purposes. 
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